NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 27 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065504
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 27, 1982

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
21-Jun-2010
Top secret
tl $
 Poland: Efforts to Combat Unrest. . . . . . . . . . . 1
4
Syria-Lebanon: Renewed Bilateral Contacts . . . . . . . . 5
France-USSR-Algeria: Natural Gas Deals . . . . . . . . . 8
I USSR-China:
Possible Border Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
. 10
9 Italy-USSR: Reply to Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
. 12
7,1 China: Deng Out of Public View . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
/Z Sudan: New Vice President To Be Named . . . . . . . . . . 13
/_5-Venezuela-Cuba: Oil Swap Continued . . . . . . . . . . . 14
/ Czechoslovakia: Price Increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Finland: New President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Special Analyses
r~ Poland: Reviewing Martial Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
USSR: After SusZov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
27 January 1982
 Martial Law Restrictions
The government is sending mixed signals regarding
an easing of martial law restrictions. Since late last
week it has allowed International Red Cross representa-
tives to visit and talk privately with some internees
and has permitted the reopening of foreign libraries and
cultural centers sponsored by Western governments. A US
to diplomat traveling in southern Poland, however, recently
was stopped four times by police and,once was held at
gunpoint while his car was searched.
Comment: The regime is trying to give the impres-
sion, particularly for the benefit of some West Europeans,
that it is easing restrictions significantly. Neverthe-
less, the diplomat's experience indicates continuing
insecurity by the government and suggests that it may
/I be tightening controls in some areas.
Reactions to Jaruzelski's Speech
TASS yesterday quoted Jaruzelski's address to the
parliament at length, including his carefully hedged
suggestion that martial law might be lifted at the end
of February. The Soviets paid particular attention to
the Premier's criticism of Western "interference" and
sanctions and took note of his veiled threat that Poland
would withdraw from the CSCE review session in Madrid if
it encounters criticism there.
--continued
Top qG-g9t
2
27 January 1982
 Comment: The TASS commentary indicates that the
Soviets approve the tone of Jaruzelski's remarks. It
nonetheless may be significant that TASS the same day
carried excerpts from an interview with Politburo member
2 Olszowski, voicing hardline sentiments. The interview
could be intended as a signal to Jaruzelski that if he
fails to pursue satisfactory policies, there are others
waiting in the wings who would be more willing to do
so.
Meat Exports
The government reportedly has resumed exports of
meat products from at least one plant as a result of
increased pork production and procurement.
Comment: Warsaw suspended meat exports last month
in an effort to increase domestic supplies. The resump-
tion of the exports--if it becomes widely known--will
cause considerable resentment among Polish consumers who
face reduced meat rations in January and February and a
22-percent reduction in meat supplies this year.
27 January 1982
 Lebanese Foreign Minister Butrus's visit to Damascus Zast
weekend and the earlier cancellation of a scheduled meeting of the
Arab Conciliation Committee on Lebanon suggest that Syria is aban-
doning the joint Arab effort to promote a reconciliation in Lebanon
and is returning to bilateral negotiations to protect its interests.
Butrus's trip followed a visit to Beirut earlier
last week by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. The re-
newed contacts between Syrian and Lebanese officials
3 come at a time when Syria's talks with the Christian
Phalange Party, its main rival in Lebanon, reportedly
also have been expanded.
3
Lebanese authorities maintain that the renewed
emphasis on contacts with the Syrians is intended to
supplement rather than replace the efforts of the Con-
ciliation Committee. Damascus, however, has already
indicated that it will not allow the Committee to be a
conduit for progress on reconciliation until after the
Lebanese presidential election this summer.
The Syrians have long viewed the Committee as a
stalking horse for a Saudi-Phalange-US plan to reduce
their influence in Lebanon before the election. Since
last September, they have used their Lebanese Muslim
allies to stall the Committee's efforts.
Comment: Syria's interest in expanded talks with
both the Lebanese Government and the Phalange suggests
that Damascus, like the Phalange, is trying to preserve
maximum maneuvering room during the election campaign.
Earlier this week, Phalange party chief Pierre Jumayyil
/ offered to turn responsibility for security in Phalange-
controlled East Beirut over to the government. Although
2 little is likely to come of this offer, the Phalange
will use it as a gesture of good faith toward Lebanese
Muslims.
5 E
27 January 1982
 France reached agreement with the USSR on the price of gas
from the Siberian pipeline in part with an eye to negotiations with
Algiers on an aid and liquefied natural gas pricing package.
French and Algerian officials resumed talks last
Comment: Paris appears to have decided to conclude
the gas agreement partly because it was convinced that
the Soviets had made their best offer and because it was
?/persuaded of the need to sec
factor in the Algerian deal.
Mitterrand believes France's own economic performance
is tied to Third World economic progress and sees a
special role for France as a privileged interlocutor of
the Third World. The Third World is the area in which
French export performance has shown the most improvement
lately, and Algeria is the largest consumer of French
products among less developed countries.
27 January 1982
 The Soviets apparently are probing the oscow's . -;.rope an proposal that border negotiations be resumed.
A Western press service reported on Monday that
Chinese officials have held "secret talks" in Beijing
over the past 10 days with Sergei Tikhvinskiy--a deputy
chairman of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society--about
a resumption of the border talks, which were last held
in the Chinese capital in June 1978. Although there
is no solid evidence that such preliminary discussions
have begun, a Chinese official has confirmed Tikhvinskiy's
presence in Beijing on an "unofficial visit."
that Tikhvinskiy probably would meet with
Foreign Ministry officials but insisted that the Chinese
would not discuss political issues with him. Other
Chinese officials have held off on setting a date for
,'\ the talks and have predicted in conversations with in-
terested third parties that if new talks are held, they
moral A be nn more
rorlnr, ti ve i-han the
revious ones
p
p
Comment: Tikhvinskiy, formerly deputy chief of
the Soviet team at the border talks, almost certainly has
been seeking clarification on what the Chinese meant in
their diplomatic note on 26 December, when they agreed
"in principle" to a resumption of the talks but insisted
on "serious preparations" before beginning them.
The Soviets have been spreading rumors in Beijing
that bilateral relations are improving. At the same
time, Soviet media have avoided commenting on relations,
while continuing to criticize Chinese behavior in Asia
and Beijing's failure to respond more forcefully to the
US stand on the Taiwan issue.
Both sides have good reason to hint that some sort
of preliminary talks have been held in Beijing. Moscow
may have hoped to put pressure on the US on the eve of
the meetings between Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Secretary of State Haig. Beijing may be signaling its
unhappiness over US arms sales to Taiwan.
27 January 1982
 ITALY-USSR: Reply to Moscow
The firm, but measured rejoinder yesterday by Italian Communist
leaders to Moscow's denunciation over the weekend of the Italian
Party confirms that relations between the two parties have reached
a new Zow.
The Italian Party insists that Moscow's attack
represents a return to tactics of the Stalinist era. The
party also reasserts its longstanding argument that each
Communist party has a right to develop and pursue its
own brand of "socialism" and suggests that Moscow could
profit from the Italian Party's attempts to reconcile
"socialism" and democracy.
Comment: Although it may be some time before it
becomes clear whether current polemics will lead to a
formal break, the size of the Italian Party and the
stature of its leaders mean that the dispute could be-
come a watershed in relations between Moscow and the
more independent West European Communist parties.
The new low in party-to-party relations could have
similarly important implications for domestic politics.
Party Chief Berlinguer probably saw the Soviet attack
as an opportunity to enhance his party's democratic
credentials with the broader Italian electorate at a
time of growing concern that still another government
crisis may arise in the spring.
Most Italian commentators have acknowledged that
the Communist Party position in the dispute with Moscow
represents an important turning point in its political
development, but they caution that the party has to
evolve further to become an acceptable governing partner.
It is clear that the party's dispute with Moscow will
provide new ammunition to those Italian politicians who
believe it is in their interest to "take another look
at the Communist question." These developments could
convince Socialist Party leader Craxi, whose ambitions
to become Prime Minister are tempting him to precipitate
a government crisis, to forge ahead out of fear of being
eclipsed by a more acceptable Communist party.
27 January 19V2
 CHINA: Deng Out of Public View
Deng Xiaoping has thus far not made a publicly
announced appearance during the lunar new year holiday.
China's media have accounted for all other top leaders
in the first two days appeared
of the holiday. Dena in public 1 January
Comment: In the past year, Deng has altered the
pattern of his appearances with the leadership. He has
always appeared in public on important occasions, however,
presumably to forestall speculation about his political
or physical health. Although Deng was attended by a
nurse at the National People's Congress in December, he
27 January '
 Y3
Third Vice President and Minister of State Security
Tayyib will soon be appointed First Vice President, one
of the posts from which Abdel Majid Khalil was dismissed
on Monday. Nimeiri has assumed Khalil's role as Army
Chief and Defense Minister. A number of other officers
believed to be supporters of Khalil also are being
purged.
if they will challenge his action.
Comment: Tayyib has little support in the Army,
and his appointment as the regime's number-two figure
probably will not be well received by most senior
officers. Nimeiri's dismissal of Khalil caught the
President's critics by surprise, and it is still unclear
27 January 198-2
 VENEZUELA-CUBA: Oil Swap Continued
Venezuela has agreed to continue supplying Cuba
with 4 million barrels of oil this year under a quadri-
lateral swap arrangement with the USSR. Moscow will pay
$4.85 per barrel above the OPEC market price for the oil
and in return will supply an equal amount of oil to
Venezuela's West European customers. The arrangement
originated in 1975 under the administration of former
President Perez and has been maintained on an ad hoc
basis since 1980. It coincides with separate discussions
between representatives of Mexico's state oil company
and Soviet officials on a longstanding proposal for an
oil swap that also would involve Cuba.
V
Comment: The amount of oil involved is negligible
in terms of Venezuela's total exports and represents only
about 5 percent of Cuba's oil demand. Venezuelan state
oil company officials have periodically criticized the
swap as offering little commercial benefit to Caracas,
but political leaders emphasize that the contract gives
Venezuela some leverage with the Castro regime and helps
to improve strained bilateral relations.
14
27 January 1
 Retail price hikes, apparently scheduled for
implementation on Monday, include some steep increases
on a wide variety of consumer goods. The increases will
average about 50 percent. Concurrent increases in wages,
pensions, and family allowances will partially offset
the impact of the price hikes.
Comment: These are the first significant price
hikes on consumer goods since July 1979 and will at a
/ minimum contribute to the continued stagnation of living
v standards. The regime, however, evidently realizes that
it cannot afford to cater to consumer interests in the
face of mounting economic pressures. It probably will
be able to contain any popular discontent over the in-
creases.
A majority of 167 of the 301 first-round electoral
college ballots went to Prime Minister Koivisto yesterday,
making him the country's first Social Democratic President.
ot both the popular election and the electoral college
decision may make it easier for him to resist possible
future attempts by the Soviets to push Finland away from
its self-declared policy of neutrality.
The unambiguous result
15
27 January 1982
 POLAND: Reviewing Martial Law
Six weeks after the imposition of martial law, Premier
JaruzeZski faces numerous problems that threaten his current firm
3 hold on power. The situation in the country is inherently unstable
as intraparty strife continues, Solidarity activists try to organize
resistance, the economy slides, and the popular mood sours
Archbishop Glemp recently has expressed apprehen-
sion that current trends will lead to popular unrest and
violence. A close adviser to Jaruzelski has publicly
admitted that the economy is deteriorating, blaming West-
ern sanctions, and fears spontaneous protests against
v planned price hikes. The Soviets made their gloomiest
public assessment yet on the Polish situation in a recent
article in Pravda.
Trouble Spots
Jaruzelski's failure on Monday to chart a comprehen-
sive program that goes beyond the current emphasis on
"control" suggests that moderates and hardliners are
/ still jockeying for primacy in the leadership. Partly
as a consequence, local party organizations are in dis-
array. Although Jaruzelski's control over the martial
law mechanism provides him an important political lever,
a continued impasse in the leadership will undermine his
authority.
Solidarity activists still at large are disseminating
underground leaflets and trying to create a clandestine
structure. Organizational work, however, continues to be
seriously hampered by the internment or arrest of more
t..
-.
A
-.
4-i
c
4-L.-- G nnn ..
4-r4
t4-.1 l
t"
c
m
s
s
n
r
w res
-
on
The Church is increasing its pressure on the govern-
ment to lift martial law, but at the same time fears that
Solidarity's intransigence will contribute to violent
popular unrest. Poland's bishops last week issued a
pastoral letter
3
warning of civi
16
27 January 1
 The economy is the key variable, and production con-
tinues to decline because of lingering passive resistance
among workers, bad weather, and raw material shortages
aggravated by Western sanctions. Delay in formulating
policy may only deepen the economic slide.
The regime's policy of using threats and blandish-
ments to induce private farmers to step up deliveries
has had mixed results. Reduced meat rations this month
are only being met with stopgap Soviet shipments. The
2 government intends to proceed with massive price hikes
J in early February but has increased the partially off-
setting wage hikes in the hope of heading off manifesta-
tions of worker resentment.
Looking Ahead
Concerns about control probably will prompt the
government to keep basic martial law restrictions in
effect beyond spring, despite Jaruzelski's ambiguous
promise in his speech on Monday to ease restrictions by
the end of February. Although many of the participating
Polish military units have resumed normal training, the
civilian police remain primarily responsible for main-
taining order.
The popular mood has soured now that the initial
shock of martial law has worn off. This increases the
1 likelihood of strikes or other forms of unrest in the
near future. The regime, however, will use whatever
force is necessary to suppress resistance.
This may be a viable strategy for the short term,
but it carries the risk of touching off larger scale
3 unrest that will be more difficult to control. It also
delays further the political accommodation that must be
reached if the economy is to recover.
17
27 January 1
 policy shifts.
The death of Mikhail SusZov, the senior member in terms of
tenure on the Soviet Politburo and the Party Secretariat, will en-
hance President Brezhnev's authority but will not produce sudden
influence until his death.
Suslov ranked second in protocol in the Party
Secretariat--behind Brezhnev--and third on the Polit-
buro--behind Brezhnev and Premier Tikhonov. He served
as the guardian of ideological purity and of leadership
collectivity, working to prevent the establishment of
personal dictatorships under both Khrushchev and Brezh-
nev. Suslov's personal power waned as that of Brezhnev
increased. Many younger party leaders may have considered
his ideas outmoded, but he commanded respect and wielded
has hurt the political position of Andrey Kirilenko,
long thought to be a potential successor to Brezhnev.
Since former Premier Kosygin's death in 1980, Suslov
was the only independent voice on the Politburo other
than Brezhnev, who now will have a freer hand in person-
nel appointments. The political prospects of Konstantin
Chernenko, a longtime Brezhnev crony who was promoted
7/ rapidly to top party posts in the late 1970s, probably
have brightened. The official announcement of the arrange-
ments for Suslov's funeral suggests that his departure
Suslov's death removes a strong force for stability
during the succession that will occur when Brezhnev
dies or retires. He would not have aspired to the top
post himself, but he would have been a power broker, act-
ing to limit the influence of the new party chief while
promoting the leadership's common interest in maintaining
unity during an uncertain time.
27 January 198-2
 Impact on Policy
Suslov's doctrinaire perspective and extraordinary
concern for the maintenance of domestic security led him
to oppose economic reform and "populist" programs at
home. He apparently argued against greater investment
in the consumer sector, which Brezhnev and Chernenko
have promoted, and wider use of wage incentives to spur
productivity. Suslov's departure itself will not mean
any quick change, but it removes an obstacle to the
possible adoption over time of more flexible domestic
policies.
It is doubtful that Suslov's death will have a
noticeable effect on Moscow's policy toward the West, of
which Brezhnev has long been the chief architect. His
absence may be felt, however, in areas where Suslov took
a particular interest, notably Soviet relations with
Communist parties abroad.
One of the most outspoken critics of liberalization
/ in Poland, Suslov argued for a firmer hand in dealings
with Solidarity. The recent Soviet decision to confront
i
i
i
s bless
the Italian Party probably was made w
th h
ng,
and his departure could bring greater Soviet moderation
in disputes with West European Communist parties.
Suslov was suspicious of "national liberation"
movements that seemed ideologically impure or too inde-
pendent of Moscow's control, and therefore he sometimes
appeared less enthusiastic than others in supporting
the Palestinians. He was more willing, however, to con-
front "imperialism" in the Third World and seemed to be
in the forefront of those uraina Soviet intervention in
Angola in the mid-1970s.
Possible Political Shifts
The funeral will provide an opportunity to observe
the new lineup of Soviet leaders for clues of possible
shifts in political standing. Brezhnev has been absent
from public view for more than a month, presumably be-
cause he is on vacation. Protocol requires his presence
at the funeral, however, and his failure to attend would
suggest that he is seriously ill.
19
27 January 19 2
 Ton Ct'
F