NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 23 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065492
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 23, 1982

Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
23 January 1982
APPROVED
FOR RELEASE^
DATE:
21-Jun-2010
January 1982
Copy ~ 4 ~ .,
 0
' Poland: Leadership Differences 1
Venezuela-Nicaragua: Strained Relations 6
Arab states: Foreign Ministers' Meeting 9
9
10
~ G Mexico-USSR-Cuba: Possible Oil Swap to
11
11
India: Impact of Nationwide Strike 12
~ y Ghana: Political Developments 12
6 USSR-US: Pentecostals' Hunger Strike 13
23 January 1982
 ' POLAND: Leadership Differences
The ruling Military Council may be more unified than the
Politburo. There are reports of increasing popular irritation in
several areas. London and Bonn meant to exempt bineZine-related
contracts from US sanctions policy.
Comment: The Military Council probably is more
unified than the party leadership, a factor that helps
it maintain control.
Although greater unity within the Council would
seem to give it an advantage in establishing long-term
policies, Poland's military leaders have been trained to
defer to the party and may still do so despite their
unhappiness with mistakes made by the party since August
1980. If the Politburo is deadlocked on setting policies,
the Council may feel compelled to take the lead. This
would g' considerable leeway in setting
policy.
Signs of Restiveness
The US Consul in Poznan notes that there are signs
that people are beginning to express their feelings of
anger. In Krakow, the US Consul reports that one priest
23 January 1982
 believes the overall situation in the steel town of
Nowa Huta--as in neighboring Silesia--is building up
to an "explosion."
Comment: These reports
'i e wi pu is an priva e
concerns 'Fiurc ea ers ave voiced about the possibility
j of violence. Such dissatisfaction also may sharpen dis-
(~ putes between those in the regime who favor easing some
martial law restrictions as a way of lessening tensions
and those who argue that strict controls are the only
way of maintaining order.
Wieslaw Gornicki, a close adviser to Jaruzelski,
recently told Hungarian radio that he fears spontaneous
protests to the price increases planned for February.
He blamed Western sanctions for the deterioration in
/^ the economy over the past two weeks. Another Polish
/1 official stated on Thursday that Western sanctions are
prompting Poland to reduce its economic dependence on
the West and to expand trade with Communist and develop-
ing countries.
Comment: Gornicki's statement is the first public
admission of the regime's concern about public reaction
~j to price hikes. His remarks probably are part of an ef-
fort to encourage increased aid from CEMA countries.
Government attempts to blame sanctions for current
n problems seems to exaggerate their impact. Current
'/ shortages probably stem more from import cutbacks in
late 1981 and the virtual halt of commerce during the
early stages of martial law. Sanctions will have a
greater impact in coming months.
Discrediting Walesa
An anonymous pamphlet mailed from Paris to an offi-
cial of the International Labor Organization in Geneva
alleges that Solidarity leader Walesa is a "longtime
23 January 1982
 police spy" who deliberately sabotaged the anti-Communist
workers' movement in Poland. The US Embassy in Brussels
attributes the pamphlet to Soviet disinformation efforts
in Western Europe.
Comment: The pamphlet could represent an effort
by Soviet or Polish authorities to sow confusion among
Solidarity's supporters in the West and, as word filters
?~~ back, in Poland as well. The document probably will not
~" have much impact, but the effort could indicate that
Soviet and Polish authorities are losing hope that
Walesa can be persuaded to ass f with the
martial law regime's policies.
The UK has again asked the US to rescind its ban
on existing contracts relating to the Siberian natural
gas pipeline, stressing that the closing of an important
~ plant could cause the loss of many jobs and 180 million
pounds. West Germany, also citing economic difficulties,
has asked the US to allow a West German firm to purchase
contracted General Electric components for the project.
Comment: The Thatcher government is beginning to
have some success with its economic policy and fears
that pipeline sanctions will complicate its task. As a
result, the British may no longer be content to let the
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3
23 January 1982
 VENEZUELA-NICARAGUA: Strained Relations
Nicaraguan Government does not portend a break in reZat2ons.
Comment: The Herrera government's rapid moves
against the Nicaraguan diplomats and the rhetorical ex-
changes marking Sandinista charges of Venezuelan compli-
city in antigovernment plots is reminiscent of the manner
in which Caracas reacted in 1980 to Cuba's treatment of
Venezuelan personnel in Havana. Those steps led to the
reduction of representation in both countries. Current
political and economic considerations outweigh any short-
term satisfaction Venezuela might gain from breaking
relations.
Venezuela's backing of the Sandinista regime pro-
vides a useful counter to domestic criticism of its sup-
port for El Salvador. Moreover, the Herrera government
lacks broad support at home and will not risk a politi-
cal battle with the opposition party, which supports the
Sandinistas.
Caracas provides substantial economic aid to Managua
and recently pledged an additional $15 million for 1982.
The Venezuelans continue to believe that such aid demon-
strates the nonpolitical nature of their extensive for-
eign aid program. They also believe such aid gives them
economic leverage in Nicaragua and assists those th~
view as moderate members of the Sandinista regime.
e recent hardening of Venezuela's attitude toward the
6 ~
23 January 1982
 1 ARAB STATES: Foreign Ministers' Meeting
Arab League Foreign Ministers will meet in special
session in Tunis tomorrow to discuss further action
against Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. The
meeting, originally called by Syria for late December,
was postponed to await the outcome of the UN Security
Council debate that concluded on Wednesday.
Comment: The Syrians are unlikely to obtain Arab
3 agreement for any concrete actions against Israel. The
meeting, however, will serve Syria's interests by keep-
ing Arab attention focused on the Golan Heights issue
and afford another opportunity for urging increased Arab
political and financial backing of Syria. Damascus also
will push for an Arab summit and for Arab support for a
special session of the UN General Assembly to debate the
annexation issue.
9
23 January 19
 (~ MEXICO-USSR-CUBA: Possible Oil Swap
Representatives of PEMEX, Mexico's state-owned oil
company, and Soviet officials are meeting in Mexico City
apparently to discuss a longstanding proposal for Mexico
to supply Cuba with oil in return for Soviet petroleum
deliveries to Mexico's European clients.
/ Comment: The new Mexican Ambassador to the USSR,
former PEMEX director Jorge Diaz Serrano, may have
provided the impetus for renewed interest. Transporta-
tion savings in an oil swap would offer both Mexico and
the USSR limited financial benefits. In addition, the
Mexican Government might use such an agreement to offset
expected domestic criticism of a ro osed increase in
sales of natural gas to the US.
10
23 January 1982
 23 January 1982
 INDIA: Impact of Nationwide Strike
ment s antistrike powers was largely ineffective.
The one-day national strike that opposition and
labor leaders organized on Tuesday to protest the govern-
ion emp oyees
Comment: Although the opposition claims it gained
valuable experience in its first effort to coordinate
multiparty trade union agitation, the strike is a sig-
nificant setback for those who are searching for some
means to undermine Prime Minister Gandhi's political
power. Moreover, the government's image probably has
been strengthened by its handling of the situation
through preemptive temporary arrests and the minimum
use of force. Gandhi clearly wants to eschew repres-
sive measures that could build nt~blic support for the
only one-third of the 19 mil-
in the modern sector work force took Dart
and that there was minimal economic disruption.
GHANA: Political Developments
The new regime is still having difficulty in orga-
nizing a government. A 16-member civilian cabinet, sub-
ordinate to the seven-man Provisional National Defense
Council, was announced on Thursday--three weeks after
the coup. The regime is stressing political action at
the local level by organizing People's Defense Com-
what the committees will do.
Comment: Like the Council members, most members of
the cabinet are obscure individuals, except for the For-
eign Minister, a moderate whose appointment may be in-
tended to reassure Western governments. The proposed
People's Defense Committees that are being organized to
fight corruption may be the harbinger of efforts to
structure a "new" Ghana. The lack of organization and
direction in the new regime, however, makes it uncertain
anuary 1 2
 USSR-US: Pentecostals' Hunger Strike
The two Soviet Pentecostals who have been on a
hunger strike in the US Embassy in Moscow have said that
as of today they will refuse a l l l ; rr,,; .~a
Comment: The Soviets are unlikely to change their
position that the Pentecostals will have to leave the
Embassy before consideration will be given to their re-
quest to emigrate. The five other members of the reli-
gious group probably would remain in the Embassy even if
one or hnth of the strikers were removed to a hospital.
23 January 1982