NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 14 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065461
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 14, 1982

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 Poland: Stance Toward Opposition i
'3 Italy: Exaggerated Energy Needs 2
'~f France: Socialist-Communist Summit 3
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5
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5
4; west Germany: Schmidt's Statement to the Bundestag 6
C~ EC-Japan-Canada-US: Trade Discussions 6
(3 Israel: Political Situation in the West Bank 9
14 January 1982
 POLAND: Stance Toward Opposition
Premier Jaruzelski yesterday chaired a meeting of the Military
Council of National Salvation to begin reestablishing normal rela-
tions with various social groups, but he reportedly believes that
Solidarity cannot be allowed to reemerge. At the same time, a
(~ Solidarity provincial leader has retracted his support for martial
1/ law, and a university professor expects a purge of faculty members
ensuing discussion.
The Military Council session was attended by workers,
party officials, members of Solidarity, and the other
unions. The Council "informed" those present about cur-
rent conditions, but no details were released about the
According to a member of the Polish party Politburo,
Jaruzelski hopes eventually to win credibility through
economic progress but currently lacks the means and must
ensure that opposition to his regime will not reappear
in the meantime. The party official said that a "program
of peace" has been prepared and will be presented to the
parliament by Jaruzelski next Tuesday. He played down
the role of the party statin that the ro ram was
developed by the government.
officials.
Comment: The Council meeting was the government's
first attempt to convey the impression that it is seek-
ing to reestablish normal relations with various groups.
The Council probably dominated the discussion, and the
Solidarity members present apparently were low-level
The remarks by the Politburo member suggest that
Jaruzelski's program will not go far toward meeting
Western demands that detainees be released, that martial
law be ended, and that a dialogue be renewed with the
Church and Solidarity. Instead, the program probably
will underscore the government's need to retain strong
controls and its willingness to back its policies with
1 January 1982
 force. The martial law authorities seem to believe,
unrealistically, they can use coercion to restore the
Polish economy.
Support for Martial Law Retracted
The Solidarity leader in Poznan, Zdzislaw Rozwalak,
has retracted an earlier statement supporting martial
law saying it was made under duress. Rozwalak spoke
to a group of foreign correspondents who were visiting
Poznan's largest factory as part of the first organized
trip for the press outside Warsaw since the imposition
of martial law. The factory workers told the reporters
that they still supported Solidarity leader Walesa and
the union.
Comment: Rozwalak's retraction will reach the popu-
lace by way of Western broadcasts and will make it more
difficult for the government to gain support from other
local Solidarity leaders. The incident also will dis-
credit government efforts to demonstrate that it is
~~ talking with Solidarity "activists and Warsaw may de-
cide to halt such trips.
The willingness of workers to state their support
publicly for Solidarity, despite possible sanctions, is
evidence of the union's strength, and probably is why
martial law authorities have not moved quickly to release
the more than 5,000 union activists being held under
detention.
14 January 1982
 Comment: A purge in the universities would set
back Jaruzelski's efforts to win the support of intel-
lectuals, or at least to neutralize them. He met with
a group of intellectuals before Christmas to demonstrate
his willingness to listen to their advice. A purge
would reinforce doubts that the rP~;me is serious about
I~ ~ Jaruzelski may not have been personally involved in
tah:ing the initiative on arrests and dismissals. Although
the Military Council reportedly sets out basic guide-
lines and makes major decisions, other actions may origi-
iii
1 January 1982
 ITALY: Exaggerated Energy Needs
Rome's apparent overestimation of Italy's energy requirements
by 1990 could Zead to more controversy over participation in the
Siberian natural gas pipeline but probabZu ~iZZ not by itself Zead
Preliminary data released earlier this week on
energy consumption in 1981 suggest that the latest
National Energy Plan overstates 1990 needs for energy
by the equivalent of 7 million tons of oil or some 8.5
billion cubic meters of natural gas. The Italians have
a preliminary agreement with the Soviets to buy 8 to
10 billion cubic meters of gas annually to be supplied
through the pipeline. Partisan political pressure--
largely from the Socialists--following imposition of
martial law in Poland has forced the government to
suspend negotiations with Moscow temporarily.
Comment: The new information on probable energy
needs may strengthen opposition to participating in
/~ the pipeline project. The government, however, can
\ still argue that buying the gas would reduce heavy
dependence on oil, which fills two-thirds of Italy's
energy requirements.
With unemployment at more than 9 percent in October,
labor groups are likely to urge the government not to
abandon the project. Italian companies, moreover, have
been expected to secure pipeline equipment contracts
Pulling out of the venture would weaken Italy's
bargaining position with Algeria. Rome is counting on
12 billion cubic meters of Algerian gas per year, but
discussions on price are currently deadlocked.
14 January 1982
 Socialist and Communist leaders, in their first meeting since
June, recently agreed not to Zet their differences over Poland
split the leftist coalition engineered by President Mitterrand.
At the meeting on 8 January, Communist leader
Marchais held fast to the view that the Polish crisis
was an internal matter. He refused to accept a Social-
ist proposal calling for the release of Solidarity lead-
ers, a return to the public liberties recognized by the
Gdansk agreements, and the dispatch of a French trade
union delegation to Poland to meet with Solidarity
leader Walesa. The final communiQue noted simply the
exchange of differing views.
Comment: Both the government and Socialist Party
leaders probably judge that additional pressure on the
Communist leadership--already torn between loyalty to
Moscow and a desire to stay in tune with public opinion
and pro-Solidarity elements in the party rank and file--
will only make continued Communist participation in the
` government more difficult. For now, Mitterrand's
strategy is to keep a weakened and divided Communist
YParty in the government in order to minimize its ability
to thwart his domestic plans. The Socialists particu-
larly hope to forestall labor strife so that they can
carry out their program for long-term socioeconomic
Looking to the party congress in February and the
municipal elections in 1983, the Communists continue to
see participation in the government as a means to limit
and, if possible, reverse their recent electoral losses
to the Socialists. As members of the government, the
Communists intend to show that they are capable of
governing responsibly. They also want to share in the
early public approbation of the government and hope to
time any break with the Socialists to exploit eventual
disenchantment with the Socialists' domestic economic
performance.
14 January 1982
 5
14 January 1982
 WEST GERMANY: Schmidt's Statement to the Bundestag
Chancellor Schmidt is to present a detailed state-
ment to the Bundestag today covering his talks with
President Reagan and President Mitterrand.
Comment: Schmidt probably will portray the talks
as efforts to develop a coordinated Western response on
Poland. In addition, he is likely to argue that US
sanctions and tough statements by other West European
governments have put useful pressure on the Polish mili-
I tary government and the Soviets. At the same time, how-
/ ever, he will attempt to justify his government's more
v restrained response by adding that concurrent incentives
are needed to enco
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and continue earlier reforms. There is still a domestic
consensus supporting Schmidt's line, and the opposition
has vet to develop a credible alternative.
Informal trade talks among the EC, Japan, Canada,
and the US begin today in Key Biscayne, Florida. The
meeting was delayed until this month by wrangling within
the Japanese Government over whether to attend. There
is no formal agenda, but there is some understanding
that ways of resisting protectionist pressures will be
an important topic.
Comment: Japan almost certainly will try to divert
attention n from the problems caused by its large trade
surpluses with the US and with the EC by enumerating the
actions it has already taken and by introducing long-
range topics. The talks nevertheless may produce an
agreement on what trade problems the four parties will
oncentrate on over the next 6 to 12 months.
14 January 1982
 to avoid such contacts.
Defense Minister Sharon apparently plans to push
ahead with his campaign to undercut PLO influence in the
area and get local leaders to work more closely with the
recently announced Israeli civil administration. Although
Sharon has not been able to enlist any significant Arab
support for the autonomy process, he is pleased by the
willingness of a number of officials to deal with the
civil administration desn;t-P pr,n warn;ncss to local Arabs
prirnariZy passive among Arab residents of the areas.
omy scheme, and they are reluctant to cooperate. Organized opposi-
tion to the Israeli moves has been muted, however, ZargeZy because
Arab political activists have been preoccupied with factional dis-
putes among themselves and have been hindered by tough Israeli
security measures. Support for the PLO remains widespread although
Most Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip see Israeli efforts
to encourage anti-PLO elements as the prelude to an "imposed" auton-
Civil administration head Menachem Milson has stepped
up his contacts with the Israeli-sponsored Village Leagues,
which are composed of rural clan leaders who have been
given expanded powers in order to undercut the popularly
elected Arab mayors. He also has opened talks with other
rural organizations. Milson and Sharon hope to encourage
rural Arabs, whom they believe are more conservative and
less inclined to support the PLO, to play a larger politi-
control individuals they believe are pro-PLO.
At the same time, the Israelis have made it clear
that they are prepared to use harsh security measures to
14 January 1982
 Determined Opposition
Opposition remains widespread in the West Bank and
Gaza both to the Camp David process and to the civil ad-
ministration. Even local leaders who are looking for ways
to involve the Palestinians in the negotiating process
fear that the autonomy talks are at a dead end.
The local leaders maintain progress can be made only
if Israel is prepared to freeze Jewish settlement activity
or guarantee local Arab control over water and land re-
sources. Those few area figures willing to support the
autonomy framework--most are associated with the Village
Leagues--are widely regarded as collaborators and lack a
political following.
of the West Bank trade unions federation.
West Bank and Gaza leaders have been unable to orga-
nize sustained area-wide opposition to the Israeli occu-
pation, although sporadic strikes and demonstrations have
occurred almost daily for the last two months. Political
/~ activists have been hamstrung by a series of tough secu-
rity measures. They also have been hindered by factional
disputes such as the one at an-Najjah University in Nablus
between Islamic fundamentalists and radical elements and
another between conservatives and radicals for control
Virtually all West Bankers and Gazans continue to
look to the PLO for leadership on the major issues af-
fecting the Palestinian question. Even conservative
mayors admit that the PLO is the only legitimate repre-
sentative of the Arabs living in the two areas. Apart
from the outspoken student population, however, few are
willing to work openly for the PLO in the West Bank and
Gaza.
Outlook
Sharon probably will increase his efforts to foster
a moderate Palestinian leadership as the deadline for
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai approaches. The
Israelis would like to have at least some Palestinian
 figures lined up in case an agreement is reached with
the Egyptians on arranging autonomy in the West Bank and
Gaza. If the talks fall apart, these leaders could then
be used as part of an "imposed" autonomy scheme.
Jewish settlers in the area probably will continue
to be given expanded authority. Regional councils have
been set up in the West Bank and Gaza and many settlements
now have their own court systems. Some settlers have
been given the right to detain and search local Arabs
~~ under certain circumstances.
These efforts are likely to meet with continuing
opposition, and the security situation could deteriorate
quickly, leading to more violence. Disarray in Arab
ranks coupled with continuing tough security measures,
however, will enable the Israelis to keep the situation
under control and prevent an or anized olitical oppo-
sition from coalescing.
14 January 1982