NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 12 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065453
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 12, 1982

Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
12 January -1982
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
21 -Jun-201 0
ro niln R2-009Jx
(b)(3)
 I Poland: West Condemned for interference . . . . . . . . . . i
Syria-USSR: Khaddam's Impending Visit . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Brazil: Political Liberalization in Jeopardy . . . . . . . 3
j USSR-Ghana: Soviet Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Mexico-Canada: Trudeau's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Romania : Payments Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Special Analyses
Egypt-Israel: Prospects for Autonomy Talks . . . . . . . . 6
/ I r a n : A More Confident Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12 January 1982
 POLAND: West Condemned for Interference
TASS yesterday criticized the US and NATO for allegedly inter-
fering in Poland's internal affairs. Official Polish statistics
indicate that the government has more individuals under detention
than it did at the beginning of the year.
TASS reported yesterday that Polish Foreign Minister
Czyrek and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed
"a number of questions of Soviet-Polish relations and
topical international problems." The brief description
of the talks emphasized the discussion of disarmament
and highlighted President Brezhnev's proposals on INF
made during his visit to Bonn in November.
The ministers condemned "attempts by the US as well
as by some other NATO countries to interfere in the
internal affairs of Poland." TASS also charged yesterday
that NATO's statement on the situation in Poland consti-
tutes "impermissible pressure" on a sovereign state and
/ contradicts the UN Charter and the Helsinki accords.
Comment: The emphasis on disarmament--usually the
most publicized theme of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers'
talks--probably was intended to impart a "business as
usual" flavor to the Czyrek-Gromyko talks and to high-
light a subject that the Soviets believe to be of greater
concern to the West European public than martial law
Statistics on Detentions
A government spokesman over the weekend claimed
that since the imposition of martial law, 5,927 individ-
uals have been detained, of whom 918 have been released.
In addition, 1,433 have been arrested, of whom 276 have
been sentenced and 17 acquitted.
Comment: The regime distinguishes between the two
categories by claiming that the detainees have not been
charged with a crime. They have been taken off the streets
to prevent them from leading or becoming involved in
resistance to martial law.
i
12 January 1982
 The statistics indicate that the regime has more
individuals in custody now than it did 12 days ago.
Government officials have been noticeably reticent about
when these people will be released, but it is clear that
the regime fears many would quickly become involved in
political activity on Solidarity's behalf.
This perception suggests that many of the detained
will not be released for several months at the least.
/,/This issue will continue to generate tensions between
the Church, the Vatican, and Western governments on the
one hand, and the Polish regime on the other.
12 January 19 2
 SYRIA-USSR: Khaddam's Impending Visit
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam will attempt to elicit stronger
Soviet support for Syria in confronting Israel's annexation of the
Golan Heights when he visits Moscow soon.
The USSR and Syria announced over the weekend that
Khaddam would travel to the USSR "around the middle of
the month" for consultations under the bilateral Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1980.
relations have'been
strained by Soviet toot dragging in invoking those provi-
sions of the treaty calling for consultations in the
event of a threat to the peace or security of one of the
parties.
Comment: Moscow will want to appear forthcoming--
especially in light of Secretary of State Haig's visit
to the Middle East--but Khaddam is unlikely to obtain
more than rhetorical support. Mistrust of the Syrians
probably rules out any advance commitments to a specific
course of action. As a result, strains in bilateral re-
lations appear certain to increase in the coming weeks.
2
12 January 19B-2
 BRAZIL: Political Liberalization in Jeopardy
Government efforts to ensure victory in the national elections
next November have aroused growing opposition and are threatening
the liberalization process.
President Figueiredo's sweeping electoral "reform"
package became law yesterday without a formal vote by
Congress. Emergency rules had to be invoked, however,
under which eyeputive proposals become law automatically.
The President had expected government majorities
in both houses to produce a favorable outcome, but the
opposition was united against the proposals. Even some
members of his own party objected, and it became clear
the government could not risk bringing the measure to
, a vote.
Comment: Figueiredo has lost significant prestige.
His manipulation of the electoral process may not be
enough to offset the strong showing the opposition is
likely to make, and more ch in electoral procedures
are almost certain.
Any move to postpone the elections--which the oppo-
sition now fears--probably would not come until after
these additional measures were attempted. A postponement
would lead to a reimposition of authoritarian controls,
a step that Figueiredo and most military officers are
reluctant to take.
3
 USSR-GHANA: Soviet Reactions
Soviet media are becoming increasingly positive about
the military coup in Ghana, portraying it as a victory
for democracy and economic revival. Pravda blamed Ghana's
economic and social problems on previous pro-Western
governments, which it alleged were installed by the CIA.
Earlier in the week, TASS noted aian leftists
were supporting the coup.
Comment: The commentary reflects both the USSR's
/ belief that coup leader Rawlings will consolidate power
/ and Moscow's effort to improve relations with the new
regime. The Soviets probably also are encouraged by
Accra's decision over the weekend to resume diplomatic
ties with Libya. Nevertheless, Moscow will be wary about
dealing with Rawlings, who expelled several Soviets two
years ago following his first coup.
Talks between President Lopez Portillo and Prime
Minister Trudeau in Mexico City this week will focus on
political developments in Central America and on bilat-
eral trade, which has nearly quadrupled since 1979 to
over $1 billion. The Canadians also are interested in
supplying reactors for Mexico's ambitious nuclear devel-
opment program. Although Mexico is considering reactors
from the US and several other countries, the Canadians
are optimistic that they are in a favorable position
because their reactors do not require enriched uranium.
Comment: Lopez Portillo and Trudeau have built
on their similar political views to establish a warm
personal relationship, highlighted by their joint chair-
manship of the Cancun summit last October. The Mexican
leader is stepping down next December, however, and
Trudeau will take advantage of his visit to meet with
Lopez Portillo's desianated successor, Miguel de la
4
12 January 1982
 TopSe^r^t
ROMANIA: Payments Problems
The Romanians are meeting today and tomorrow with
representatives of at least 10 major Western banks to
discuss payments problems. Bucharest's arrearages to
banks and Western exporters total more than 81 hillinn
Comment: The banks consider Romania a poor risk.
They probably will reject the bid for new money as a
last-ditch attempt to avoid a formal rescheduling.
5
12 January 1982
 lq
EGYPT-ISRAEL: Prospects for Autonomy Talks
More than two years of Palestinian autonomy talks have failed
to narrow significantly the differences between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
Neither side appears willing to make the concessions necessary to
In recent talks with high-level US and French visi-
tors, the Egyptians were pessimistic about the prospects
for a breakthrough. Foreign Minister Ali indicated,
moreover, that Egypt does not want the talks accelerated
or given a high profile as the deadline approaches for
Israel's withdrawal in April from Sinai.
Egypt's cautious approach is designed to avoid any
development that might delay the withdrawal or complicate
President Mubarak's eventual efforts to forge a rapproche-
ment with Saudi Arabia and the other Arabs after April.
Although the Egyptians probably would accept the appoint-
ment of a special US ambassador for the talks, they are
unwilling to make any concessions that will jeopardize
their efforts to end Egypt's isolation in the Arab world.
After April
i
gypt probably will search for a pretext to back out of
the current autonomy negotiations and seek an alternative
format. The Egyptians recognize that the Camp David
process is anathema to the rest of the Arab world and is
unlikely to gain significant Palestinian endorsement no
matter what aarppments are reached by the US, Israel, and
Egypt.
Once the Sinai is returned,
12 January 1982
 Egypt realizes, however, that a precipitate with-
drawal from the autonomy talks after April could lead to
Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. Mubarak
probably calculates that sooner or later Israel will give
Egypt justification for pulling out--perhaps by carrying
out airstrikes in Lebanon or moving the prime minister's
office to East Jerusalem. He would then blame Israeli
intransigence and expect the US to keep Israel from an-
Israeli Perceptions
Israeli leaders have emphasized that their appre-
hensions about Egypt's commitment to the peace process
and possible return to the Arab fold after April rule out
major concessions on autonomy. Foreign Minister Shamir
late last month told a political meeting that "we need
a few years to clearly ascertain the fate of peace with
v Egypt." He indicated that Israel would take no "further
risks" beyond the Camp David accords, which Prime Minister
Begin's government regards as providin on for narrowly
7
4
2
Shamir and other Likud leaders have made the same
point in recent meetings with visiting US officials.
They have pointed out that Washington should consider
Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights last month a
signal that Tel Aviv will not agree to further territo-
rial or other major concessions on security-related
issues after the final Sinai pullout.
By taking this line, the Israelis aim to head off
US pressures for greater flexibility on key autonomy
issues to pave the way for an Israeli-Egyptian agreement
before April. Shamir has publicly predicted that Secre-
tary of State Haig will open such a campaign during his
Begin's Position
Begin would welcome an autonomy agreement, hoping
that it would help head off Egypt's return to the Arab
fold after April. He also would regard an agreement as
/ a major step toward setting in train the five-year tran-
sitional period called for in the Camp David accords.
12 January 1982
 Begin has said that during this time he intends to assert
Israel's claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and
Gaza.
The Prime Minister nonetheless wants to put US-
Israeli relations back on a more cordial basis, in part
to gain Washington's agreement to restore the Memorandum
of Understanding on strategic cooperation. To this end,
he may try to seem more flexible by making new proposals
on the procedures to be used for election of a self-rule
regime, on its size, and on its administrative functions.
Begin may present such ideas to Mubarak during his planned
i
i
i
v
s
t
n February with the aim of putting the onus
Cairo if the deadlock on autonomy persists.
The Israeli leader and his coalition colleagues are
acutely interested in possible US intentions to appoint
a new special mediator--an action Tel Aviv would regard
as signaling an increase in US involvement. The Israelis
also will be watching closely the US vote in the Security
8
12 January 1982
 ID IRAN: A More Confident Regime
The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini has at least temporarily
thwarted the domestic opponents who chaZZenged it Zast summer, and
it has gained the initiative in its war with Iraq. The new confi-
dence these successes have inspired is reflected in recent Iranian
aggressiveness toward its Arab neighbors. It aZso den
Tehran to improve its relations with Moscow.
Repression has been effective. Since June, the re-
gime has executed at least 2,000 suspected opponents and
jailed thousands more. Assassinations of regime officials
are far less frequent and street battles--daily occur-
rences last summer--have all but stopped.
The Islamic socialist Mujahedin, the principal op-
position group, appears in disarray. Its leader. Massnurl
Rajavi, is still in Paris
One faction of the Mujahedin may have joined with
the pro-Moscow Communist Tudeh Party. The group has
been forced to stay in hiding before, however, only to
Other opponents of the regime remain cowed. The
military is preoccupied with the war, and the Kurds and
other ethnic minorities either are quiescent or are on
Despite increased factionalism in the ruling cleri-
cal party, Khomeini probably will continue to prevent
serious rifts. The government now feels secure enough
to push such potentially divisive policies as land re-
form, which the more conservative clerics oppose.
Economic Outlook
If the political situation remains stable, economic
prospects will improve somewhat. The Iranians recently
have begun to price their oil more competitively, which
9
12 January 1982
 USSR is a "lesser Satan."
probably will lead to expanded exports and hard currency
earnings. The economy, however, will not expand signi-
ficantly over the next year, and production will remain
For now, Tehran is swapping oil for industrial
products and ar muc-h is trade is with East Euro-
pean countries.
well below prerevolutionary levels.
Because of foreign exchange constraints and distri-
bution bottlenecks, food and fuel shortages recur. The
fuel supply for winter heating seems better than last
year, and the government's distribution of food and other
consumer supplies probably will satisfy the limited ex-
nectatiois of the poorer people--the regime's power base.
Relations With the Soviets
Relations between I
d th
ran an
e USSR remain strained,
but Western reluctance to supply arms or to enter into
long-term economic agreements with Iran will increase
the pressure on Tehran to expand trade with Communist
countries and their clients. Iranians believe that the
greatest threat to them comes from the US and that the
y~
Iranian leaders, moreover, appear confident that
they can control relations with Moscow. This is a du-
bious assumption, particularly if Iran becomes reliant
on the Communist states for trade and military equipment.
Moscow has long sought improved ties and continues
to give strong support to the Khomeini regime. The USSR,
for example, continues to supply arms.
12 January 1982
 The War and the Persian Gulf
Tehran's growing confidence that it will win the war
is making it more assertive in its dealings with Baghdad's
Arab allies. Iran has warned Arab leaders in the Persian
Gulf region that aid to Iraa is futile and shortsiahted_
Iran remains uninterested in negotiating a settle-
ment of the war, believing that its military advances
eventually will cause the collapse of the regime in
Baghdad. Iraq's apparent readiness to make major conces-
sions has strengthened Tehran's conviction that Iraq is
weakening.
Further Iranian victories will be unsettling to Arab
leaders in the Persian Gulf region. Iraq will become
less effective as a counterbalance to Iran, leaving the
other states more vulnerable to pressures and subversion
from Tehran.
11
12 January 1982