NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 9 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065445
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 9, 1982

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
9 January 1982
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
21-Jun-2010
Copy ~ n p
 Poland: Purge of Party Liberals i
3
S Ghana: Uncertainty and Instability. 4
South Africa - Namibia: Tougher Negotiating Position. 5
Haiti: Failed Invasion Plot 6
Special Analysis
~b western Europe - Poland: Political and Security Concerns. 7
9 January 1982
 POLAND: Purge of Party Liberals
violating the Helsinki Final Act.
A purge of party liberals will make it difficult for Premier
JaruzeZski to carry out his pledge to continue reforms. Reports
from Krakow indicate that the regime has given intellectuals better
treatment than workers in the detention camps. TASS again has
accused the US of interfering in Poland's internal affairs and
A leading liberal in the Communist Party, Tadeusz
Fiszbach, has resigned as party chief in Gdansk Province.
Fiszbach had been a strong supporter of reforms and had
sought--with relative success-- t a working
relationship with Solidarity.
for another two to three weeks. A plenum of the Central
Committee is being prepared, but no date has been set.
Although some officials assert there will be no
purge, the party media continue to emphasize that the
party must remove quickly those people with "alien"
ideological and political convictions. Jaruzelski's
political and economic program will not be made public
convenes.
Comment: The purge in the party is probably hitting
hardest the liberals who advocated that the party give
up its highly centralized and authoritarian style of
rule, although the evidence is inconclusive. This group
includes intellectuals, members of the academic community,
and workers in the largest and most strategic industries
who were the strongest supporters of Solidarity. More
resignations are expected before the Central Committee
population.
A conservative victory in the party will present it
with serious and long-term problems. By insisting on
ideological purity and loyalty, the party will lose some
of its most skilled people, thus making it difficult--
if not impossible--for the party to initiate programs to
meet Poland's problems. Despite his alleged desire to
implement reforms, a conservative victory would diminish
Jaruzelski's ability to do so. A conservative party will
find it almost impossible to win any credibility with the
9 January 1982
 small groups of detainees who were formerly Solidarity
leaders are on hunger strikes in several prisons and
that there was a "rebellion" by detainees being held
near Rzeszow. Relatives of these detainees have been
denied visiting rights and letters and acka es have
not been distributed. a "model
I prison" had been set up to deceive the Red Cross and
/ other groups reporting on prison conditions. Archbishop
Glemp, in his sermon on Wednesday evening
criticized
,
ry/ conditions in some of the detention centers.
Comment: Most earlier reports that said that con-
ditions in detention camps were not bad had come from
intellectuals. The more gentle handling of intellectuals
n may reflect, in part, a realization that the military
'/ government will be judged in the West more by its treat-
Soviet Commentary
TASS yesterday assailed Vice President Bush's re-
marks on Thursday as another attempt by the US to "sell
its anti-Soviet line" to Western Europe. The article
contended that Washington is exploiting divisions within
Europe to pressure the Allies into applying their own
sanctions against Poland and the USSR.
j TASS also attacked the decision by the Voice of
America to increase the number of Polish-language broad-
~ ~ casts as an escalation of US "psychological war." The
commentary described the broadcasts, along with those of
Radio Free Europe, the British Broadcasting Corporation,
Deutsche Welle, and others as a blatant effort to turn
the population against the Warsaw government and the
USSR, "in violation of the letter and spirit of the
Helsinki Accords."
anuary
 Comment: The TASS commentary on Western broadcasts
also was intended as a response to the US demarche made
on Thursday about Soviet jamming of Voice of America
Polish-language broadcasts. Since the start of the
Polish crisis in the fall of 1980, the Soviets have
countered Western accusations that jamming violates
those provisions of the Helsinki Final Act governing
the free flow of information with the contention that
some Western broadcasts contravene the Act's principle
of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
iii
9 January 1982
 9 January 1982
 ,i
~~GHANA: Uncertainty and Instability
The new government's Zack of direction militates against an
early return to stability.
Coup leader Rawlings still has not completely formed
his government. He also has failed to provide clear
guidance on how he intends to improve economic conditions
and restore military discipline. The regime's statements
and actions so far have stressed nonalignment and the
avoidance of excesses that characterized the last Rawlings
regime.
Supplies of goods remain near normal, and government
pressure has resulted in some price reductions. Nothing
has been done, however, to attack the economy's underly-
ing problems.
Comment: Without stronger domestic direction and
some results in the economic sphere, more unrest seems
inevitable. Rawlings presides over an uneasy coalition
of Armv officers and former supporters eager for reforms.
The establishment of people's tribunals outside
existing laws to lead the anticorruption drive could
degenerate into a witch hunt.. In addition, public
criticism of security agencies of the ousted government
are likely to be followed by drastic reforms or purges
that could raise new fears among the military.
9 January 19 2
 f
`'t~C8h811181 Probable location of
 '~~ SOUTH AFRICA - NAMIBIA: Tougher Negotiating Position
South Africa is portraying the skirmish with Cuban
soldiers in southern Angola earlier this week as con-
firmation that Soviet-directed Cuban forces are taking
over the Namibian insurgency from guerrillas of the
South-West Africa People's Organization. Only four
Cubans were involved in the encounter near Cahama, and
they were not accompanying Angolan or SWAPO units. At
least one was a logistic specialist. The government-
controlled radio and principal Afrikaans newspapers
are linking the incident to the Namibian negotiations,
and are stressing that withdrawal of Cuban forces from
Angola will affect domestic acceptance of a settlement.
Comment: Pretoria is trying to exploit the clash
to help build its case for withdrawal of Cubans from
Angola as part of a Namibian settlement. It is misrep-
resenting the time and place of the clash to support its
exaggerated claims of a threat by Cuban troops to Namibia.
Although media accounts claim that one Cuban was captured
in the area of operations against SWAPO, the incident
actually o an 100 kilometers inside Angolan
territory.
5
9 January 1982
 ~~ HAITI: Failed Invasion Plot
The ill-conceived and highly publicized attempt
yesterday by longtime exile leader Bernard Sansaricq to
overthrow the Duvalier regime is one of a number of coup
plots rumored in recent weeks. Sansaricq had planned to
launch an airborne invasion of Haiti from South Caicos
Island. Turks and Caicos officials seized a small amount
of arms and ammunition intended for his group and arrested
two American mercenaries, leaving the 37-man Haitian con-
tingent stranded. Sansaricq, who participated in three
unsuccessful invasion attempts during the 1960s and a
leaflet airdrop over Port au Prince in October, and his
j group face deportation to Miami. Unconfirmed informa-
tion from Haiti, however, indicates that the group has
1 relocated to The Bahamas.
Comment: Exile plotting is continuous, and the
recent international publicity over the exodus of the
"boat people" has intensified the rumormongering. The
disparate exile groups lack organization, unity, and
effective leadership. Security forces will remain on
full alert in Haiti until Duvalier is confident that
the threat posed by Sansaricq has subsided.
9 January 1982
 WESTERN EUROPE - POLAND: Political and Security Concerns
Soviet policy.
Differences among West European members of NATO will continue
to prevent a strong response to the imposition of martial law in
Poland. The West Europeans remain determined to insulate their
economic interests and detente as much as possible from the Polish
crisis. The Allies feel frustrated at their inability to prevent
the repression in Poland or US sanctions against the USSR, which
many fear will neither alleviate the Polish situation nor change
for them by events in Poland.
Disagreements like the one over Poland do not
threaten the unity of NATO members in their determina-
tion to resist the latent threat of direct Soviet aggres-
sion against the West, a threat that has been underscored
weakened NATO as a political force.
On the other hand, the controversies in recent years
over INF modernization and arms control, the Middle East,
Afghanistan, and now Poland have found the Alliance able
to arrive only at lowest common denominator solutions.
The appearance of disunity and irresolution has steadily
region from the US-Soviet competition.
While some West Europeans were concerned about the
risks involved in Polish reforms, many had hoped that
liberalization, a revival of nationalism, and a trend
toward limited independence would help increase European
leverage on the superpowers. Increased ties between
Poland and Western Europe, coupled with increasingly
independent West European security policies, had raised
European hopes of stimulating detente and insulating the
This was as true for most West European Communists
as for the other parties, the governments, and the people.
anuary
 Poland was an object lesson for Communists who wanted to
prove that, in the environment of detente, democracy and
"socialism" could coexist in the same country. Before
martial law, West European Communists pointed to evolu-
tion in Poland as evidence that a revitalized Europe
could include a Communist system distinct from both the
Soviet model and West European social democracy.
These hopes have been dashed. The Allies neverthe-
less are encouraging Warsaw and Moscow to salvage renewal
in Poland, while urging Washington not to allow Poland
to damage the INF talks or other vestiges of detente.
Domestic Political Factors
,/ The peoples of the West European countries have
~~ generally reacted more strongly than their governments
to the imposition of martial law in Poland. Demonstra-
tions have taken place in most large cities. Labor
leaders have provided vocal and material support to
Solidarity and seem intent on increasing their aid.
The media, while skeptical of US sanctions, also
have been solidly anti-Soviet and opposed to martial law.
Public outrage explains in large part why West German
and other European authorities have been persuaded to
adopt stronger rhetoric.
The crisis in Poland has temporarily distracted
West European populations and media from the peace move-
ment and the question of INF modernization and arms
control. This distraction, however, will not kill the
movement or substantially reduce the reluctance of most
West European governments to allow new US missiles to
be based in their territory.
The West Germans, with the largest economic and
political stake in the Polish crisis, have tried to
limit the damage outside Poland. Bonn wants to prevent
a Soviet invasion that would shatter OstpoZitik with Moscow
9 January 1982
 and intra-German relations, the preeminent issue for many
Germans. Chancellor Schmidt has been having increasing
difficulty managing relations with both superpowers.
Short of an invasion, West Germany will continue to
trade with the East and to seek access to Soviet raw
materials.
France's economic and political stake in the crisis,
on the other hand, is not as high as Bonn's, and Paris
has been the Ally most willing to take a strong
rhetorical--but not punitive--stand.
President Mitterrand's political position at home
enables him to take advantage of traditional French ties
to Poland reflected in mass demonstrations against mar-
tial law. He is by inclination more critical of Moscow
than his predecessor.
Mitterrand can further embarrass the French Commu-
nists, whose tortured, pro-Moscow position on Poland
has left them isolated from domestic public opinion and
most West European leftist parties. Poland may have
completed the destruction of the party's efforts to
project its political independence from the USSR.
Italian Prime Minister Spadolini also has taken a
firm stand against Moscow. He must maneuver delicately,
however, between contending partners in his fragile
coalition. Socialist leader Craxi hopes to use a tough
anti-Soviet line to gain votes at the expense of Italy's
Communists and to forestall any rapprochement between
the Communists and Christian Democrats.
The Italian Communist Party, the largest and most
influential in Western Europe, has reacted sharply to
Polish developments, however. Party statements have
been anti-Soviet and against martial law.
Some party members have chafed, either out of loyalty
to Moscow or because they consider Polish workers irre-
sponsible. Party leaders have reacted to the dissension
by preventing denunciations of martial law.
9
9 January 19 2
 Outlook
As long as the situation in Poland remains as it is,
West Europeans will continue to reject Soviet policy and
react cautiously to the US response. If Moscow invades
Poland, however, or if martial law results in renewed
worker resistance or prolonged repression, the Allies
may become more inclined to invoke limited sanctions
against Warsaw.
West Europeans have become apprehensive about US
anti-Soviet sanctions following the invasion of Afghani-
/ stan. Public opinion could turn hostile if the West
I~~ Europeans believe that US actions are becoming provoca-
tive, overly harmful to detente, and aimed at crippling
Fears that the US is encouraging economic collapse
would make it easier for Allied governments to convince
their constituencies of the need for a divergent course.
In addition, Communist parties once more would concen-
trate h it fire against US rather than Soviet policies.
10
anuary 19 2