NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 8 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065441
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 8, 1982

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 Poland: Criticism and Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
France-Nicaragua: Arms Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
(a 4
Iraq-Turkey: Explosion on Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Japan - South Korea: Aid Talks To Resume . . . . . . . . . . 5
. . 6
/o Jamaica-US: Visit by Seaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Special Analysis
(i Poland: Looking Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8 January 1982
 I POLAND: Criticism and Advice
Archbishop GZemp sharply criticized martial law authorities
on Wednesday, and Solidarity leaders have denied that union officials
are holding talks with the government. Several Hungarian officials
are re ortedZ in Warsaw to oer advice, but this ma not be of
heZ .
Meetings between ig -ran zng Soviet and Polish
civilian officials are taking place for the first time since the
imposition of martial law.
In his sharpest public critique of regime policies
since the imposition of martial law, Archbishop Glemp on
Wednesday called for the release of detainees. He also
criticized the demand by factory managers that workers
either resign from Solidarity or be fired, stating this
is unethical and violates Polish law. Glemp did stress,
however, that Poles should not meet violence with violence.
The Archbishop's sermon probably reflects his grow-
ing concern and frustration at the failure of the govern-
ment to either undertake a serious dialogue with the
The Solidarity leaders who are still free have cir-
culated a statement in underground channels denying they
have authorized any of their members to talk with the
government; officials in Warsaw maintain that such talks
are under way. The statement said the regime was trying
to confuse the issue in order to get out of the deadlock
it had created for itself.
High-level Hungarian officials, including Deputy
Prime Minister Aczel, are reportedly in Warsaw suggest-
ing ways to rebuild the Communist Party--and possibly
the economy. The visit closely follows the trip to
8 January 1982
 Hungary last week by KGB Chief Andropov. Andropov may
have discussed with the Hungarian leadership the possi-
bility of using its experience in establishing party
rule--based on public support--after the suppression of
the revolt in 1956 as a model to fill the political
vacuum in Poland once martial law is ended.
The situation in Hungary in 1956, however, does not
parallel that in Poland today. Poland is much larger in
size and population than Hungary and has a more diverse
social structure. Hungarian leader Kadar did not have
to contend with a powerful Church, a strong trade union
movement, or a large foreign debt. Even so, it took
Kadar more than a decade before he felt enough political
security to introduce economic reforms, and Poland's mili-
tary rulers probably will not be as flexible in implement-
ing reforms as Kadar.
--continued
To" seere*--
ii 8 January 1982
 Soviet Commentary
Izvestiya on Wednesday leveled a personal attack on
President Reagan, accusing him of taking "direct control
of the business of directing all subversive work against
socialist countries." The article, which focuses on
Radio Free Europe's activities, charges that the radio
station's broadcasts are aimed at increasing tension and
l promoting US interests. It accuses the station of prompt-
ing Poles to violate martial law.
Moscow has also broadened its attacks on West Euro-
pean governments critical of the USSR's role in the Polish
crisis. According to Western news services, Izvestiya
today accused Italian Prime Minister Spadolini of trying
to play up to Washington and to those in Italy who want
to make political capital out of anti-Communism and
anti-Sovietism. Pravda registered additional criticism
of the French for "antisocialist hysteria."
iii
 FRANCE-NICARAGUA: Arms Agreement
The Mitterrand government believes its decision to sell mili-
tary equipment to Nicaragua ultimately will lessen the Sandinistas'
dependence on the USSR and Cuba, but Managua's policies probably
will not be significantly moderated by increased ties with Paris.
delivery dates are unknown.
According to press reports, the agreement announced
yesterday includes two patrol boats, two utility heli-
copters, trucks, and training for Nicaraguan sailors and
airmen. The contract also is said to include a strict
clause prohibiting transfer of the French equipment to a
third party. Financing arrangements and projected
Soviet and Cuban influence.
Paris' decision probably reflects, in part, growing
concern in Socialist circles about a perceived increase
in US pressures on the Sandinista regime. Many Socialists
believe Washington is pushing the Sandinistas closer to
Moscow and Havana. President Mitterrand has long held
that in Central America, as in other areas of the Third
World, closer relations between France and "progressive"
governments can halt, and eventually reverse, growing
term deterioration of relations.
Although Mitterrand almost certainly expects a sharp
US denunciation of the arms deal, he probably has con-
cluded that broad areas of agreement between Paris and
Washington--for example, on East-West, Middle East, and
some African issues--will prevent any serious and long-
tional solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution.
hail the French agreement as proof of continued interna-
The Sandinistas recently have been concerned about
waning West European support for their regime. They will
8 January 1982
 January 1982
 3
January 1 2
 8 January 1982
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 per day.
~1) IRAQ-TURKEY: Explosion on Pipeline
The pipeline that carries Iraqi crude oil to Turkey's
Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan is being repaired follow-
ing damage by an explosion on Wednesday. It was handling
up to 650,000 barrels per day--about 50 percent of Iraq's
total oil exports. The incident follows damage last
weekend to the Tripoli spur of the other major pipeline
system carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. Exports
through Baniyas, Syria, continue at up to 500,000 barrels
Reconstruction of the Lebanon branch of the Iraqi
pipeline, reopened only last month, is expected to be
finished this Saturday. Since the closure of its Persian
Gulf oil terminals as a result of the war, all of Iraq's
oil exports transit these pipelines. Continued inter-
diction, however, would seriously reduce Iraq's oil
exports--which were running at about 1 million to
1.2 million barrels per day before the recent damage.
~_~/JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Aid Talks To Resume
Korea's five-year plan.
A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official is to
visit Seoul next week to reopen negotiations on economic
assistance. Both sides are anxious to resolve what has
become a serious bilateral problem, but a quick solution
is unlikely. The Koreans are still demanding a five-year,
/ lump-sum commitment of $6 billion. Tokyo is willing to
'V increase assistance, including doubling aid to $180
million in the current fiscal year, but it wants annual
aid commitments to be tied to specific projects in
8 January 1982
 t) JAMAICA-US: Visit by Seaga
ILI/
Prime Minister Seaga is planning an unofficial visit
to the US next week and is to meet with officials of
international financial institutions. IMF support, coupled
with austerity measures required by the IMF and with some
capital repatriation, ended seven years of declining
economic growth last year, but prospects for 1982 are
uncertain at best. The current Alcoa strike, which shut
down one-fifth of Jamaica's alumina production capacity,
has further damaged Jamaica's already bleak export outlook.
Jamaica will remain heavily dependent on IMF support
to meet foreign financial obligations and increase imports,
but adhering to the IMF-imposed program will be painful
this year. Many inefficient businesses will be forced
into bankruptcy, consumer prices will rise, and subsidies
to the poor will be reduced.
Lup T
6
8 January 1982
 1r` POLAND: Looking Ahead
The government of Premier Jaruzelski in the weeks and months
ahead will reduce the restrictions of the martial Law regime, but
it will continue to emphasize rebuilding the Communist Party, solid-
ifying control, and imposing austerity measures. It will at some
point produce a "reform" program, but only a shadow of what seemed
possible before martial Law. This combination of policies may re-
store economic activity, but it will not reform the political and
economic system, and Poland probably is headed toward another crisis
over the Longer term.
If Solidarity had been able to stop all work in
Poland by staging an effective general strike after the
imposition of martial law, or if large-scale violence
had resulted, Jaruzelski's forceful solution to Poland's
economic and political problems would have failed, and
his Warsaw Pact allies probably would have finished the
job for him. Having undertaken such a high-risk gamble
are essential to any reconstruction of the economy.
diate future will be to purge the party by creating a
smaller, more disciplined organization; to screen offi-
cials in the government, media, and industry to assure
their reliability; and to implement some austerity
measures--such as a more realistic price structure--that
The principal objectives of the regime in the imme-
vinced that the need for them has disappeared.
that has worked so far, Jaruzelski will not be swayed
from pursuing his repressive policies until he is con-
Need To Ease Restrictions
Jaruzelski also has a need to relax martial law.
Civilian communications need to be restored if commerce
is to revive. The Army cannot be kept dispersed through-
out the country in winter without damaging its morale
7
8 January 1982
 Top S cret
The government probably will want to release de-
tainees to remove a point of contention with the West
and the Catholic Church. These relaxations will be
portrayed as signs of a return to normalcy and as con-
ciliatory gestures to the public.
The Premier recognized that reforms were necessary
long before he concluded that martial law was essential
to ease pressures from Moscow and to restore domestic
order. He probably will eventually keep his promise to
preserve "the positive gains" of the past 16 months with
a program of "reforms," but these will be designed to
avoid eroding regime control over decisionmaking.
Jaruzelski probably will create new institutions
for consulting the public and for giving workers more of
a voice in running factories, in determining benefits,
and in decisions on local social and economic issues.
He will also make changes in the economic management
system. None of these changes will result in the kind
of decentralization or self-management demanded by Soli-
darity in negotiations with the government in November.
Passive Resistance Likely
This program of mixing repression with limited re-
forms, along with Soviet economic assistance, because
of its inherent contradictions and inadequacies, is cer-
tain to heighten tensions in the longer term, if not the
short. It will not convince the public that the martial
law authorities deserve its active cooperation or that
the program will lead to vigorous economic growth.
As a consequence, passive worker resistance will
persist and, when travel and communications restrictions
are relaxed, Solidarity will be able to rebuild more of
its infrastructure. Worker militants and dissident in-
tellectuals probably will revive such activities as an
underground press and "flying" universities. Forced to
balance most trade with the West and unable to offer
credible incentives to workers and farmers, the govern-
ment will find the economy still suffering from supply
1
8
8 January 1982
 dislocations, an increasingly antiquated technology,
and low worker productivity. A debt moratorium may be
declared, or default may result.
again, and Poland will have another crisis.
The potential will remain for local strikes to flare
up from time to time and for some violence. Even if
popular resistance diminishes and some Solidarity offi-
cials collaborate with the regime, however, Jaruzelski's
program is likely to come to be seen as a failure by
the public, the party and government, and the Soviets.
When this occurs, as it has following both previous
Polish efforts at reform beginning in 1956 and in 1970,
the domestic and foreign pressures for change will build
8 January 1982