NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 5 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065429
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 5, 1982

Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
5 January 1982
APPROVED
FOR RELEASE^
DATE:
21 -Jun-201 0
top MCI et
CO N/D 82-003JX
January
Copy 249
 Poland: Worker Reaction Subdued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
France-US: Defense Minister's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Zimbabwe : Racial Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
LL Ghana: Rawlings in Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Sudan: Student Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4
Greece: New Military Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
South Africa - Angola: Cross-Border Operations . . . . . . 5
Special Analysis
El Salvador: Moving Toward Elections . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5 January 1982
 Overall industrial activity apparently was sluggish yesterday,
although several enterprises in Warsaw appeared busier than at any
2 time since the imposition of martial Zaw. Poland has yet to repay
a major share of the interest owed Western banks despite reports
that it has the funds to do so. Moscow, meanwhile, has welcomed
the EC Foreign Ministers' position on US sanctions but has rejected
their criticism of the Polish regime.
Official media reports on the workday implicitly
acknowledged that many enterprises were not functioning
at normal levels, claiming that production in Katowice
was "on the whole" normal and that "practically all"
shipyards in the Gdansk area resumed work.
activity seemed especially slow at the
large steel mill in Warsaw. The government probably is
willing to endure lower levels of activity for a time if
it can continue to avoid new strikes.
The regime still is attempting to convey the impres-
sion that it is seeking to ease martial law restrictions
as quickly as possible. It announced yesterday that
telephone and telex communications will be restored to-
day in 10 rural provinces. The action leaves most of
the country without communications, however, including
all major industrial centers.
There still is no confirmation of press reports
that Poland has the $350 million to cover the interest
that was due Western banks on 14 December. Although
several banks appear to have received some payments
beginning in the last week of December, as of yesterday
the Poles aooarently had not paid the bulk of the amount
due.
If in fact Poland does have the funds, the USSR is
the likely source. The Soviets themselves are exper-
iencing a serious hard currency squeeze, but the political
and economic advantages of preventing a Polish default
might justify the $350 million expenditure. A Soviet
move to save Poland from default might encourage West
Europeans to maintain a business-as-usual approach toward
--continued
 Poland and the USSR. Moreover, it may prevent further
damage to the ability of the USSR and the other CEMA
countries to obtain credit from the West.
Archbishop Glemp, meanwhile, will meet today with
directors of Warsaw's universities in what appears to
be an effort to help maintain calm on the university
campuses. Some faculty members have expressed concern
to US officials that younger university students will
organize underground resistance that risks clashes with
7 the police. The government evidently still plans to
delay for an indefinite period the return of younger
students to the universities.
EC Meeting
Differences among the EC Foreign Ministers kept them
from going beyond announcing disapproval of Polish devel-
opments and of Soviet and East European efforts to under-
mine reform in Poland. In the communique released after
their meeting in Brussels, the ministers called on Warsaw
to end martial law and resume discussions with the Church
and Solidarity and proposed that the CSCE Conference in
Madrid reconvene as soon as possible to discuss the
Polish situation at the ministerial level.
January 19
 The ministers noted but did not voice support for
US sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union. Belgian
officials claim French Foreign Minister Cheysson was the
chief obstacle to adoption of a position more supportive
/ of the US, while West German Foreign Minister Genscher
was willing to accept a stronger communique. Genscher
may have felt that others would veto a stronger statement,
and saw this as an opportunity to improve West Germany's
image in Washington.
Before the meeting in Brussels, Jaruzelski tried to
gain an understanding for martial law during a two-hour
session with EC Ambassadors to Warsaw. According to a
/ Western official, Jaruzelski also tried to drive a wedge
~between the US and its allies and implied that Warsaw is
considering the expulsion of Solidarity militants to the
Soviet Response
Initial Soviet reaction to the ministers' meeting
was mixed. A radiobroadcast in Moscow noted that the
ministers did not go beyond "general promises" not to
undermine US sanctions against the USSR and Poland and
called for continued humanitarian aid to the Poles.
/I The commentary criticized the EC communique, however,
for its interference in Polish internal affairs.
Izvestiya yesterday carried the strongest Soviet
attack yet on France's posture toward Poland, accusing
French leaders of attempting to "dictate" to Poland "as
if it were a French province." TASS today also cited a
Polish television program alleging "close cooperation"
between the leaders of the Independent Students Union
and "counterrevolutionaries" at the Polish emigre publi-
cation, KuZtura, which is based in Paris.
5 January 1982
 9 n
FRANCE-US: Defense Minister's Visit
Defense Minister Hernu's discussions this week in Washington
with US officials will center on Poland. technology transfer, and
bilateral arms cooperation.
Hernu almost certainly will reaffirm his government's
position condemning martial law in Poland and its reluc-
tance nonetheless to invoke sanctions against Poland
or the USSR. Concerning technology transfer, he probably
is prepared to compare lists of restricted countries and
critical equipment items, and will seek clearance for
French military use of US computers. He is not likely to
agree to curtail French technological contributions to
the Siberian gas pipeline project.
Arms cooperation discussions probably will include
the US suspension of the purchase of Roland surface-to-
air missiles, the delay in purchase of the jointly pro-
duced CFM-56 aircraft engine, and the US Navy's selection
of a British trainer aircraft rather than the French-German
Alpha Jet. Hernu will maintain these decisions jeopardize
French consideration of US equipment purchases.
Hernu will reflect France's emphasis on its own stra-
tegic nuclear forces programs. The bulk of the defense
budget this year will again go to strategic nuclear force
modernization, with funding for more nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines and their missiles. Paris
also will work to complete the deployment of the S-3
silo-based IRBM as well as the development of a mobile
intermediate-range surface-to-surface missile
medium-range air-to-surface cruise missile.
The French Government has not yet reaffirmed its
predecessor's commitment to replace the Pluton short-
range surface-to-surface nuclear missile or to construct
two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, but it probably
will do so in the near future. Although testing and de-
velopment of an enhanced radiation warhead continues, no
decision has been made as to its final deployment.
The emphasis on strategic programs indicates that
Paris continues to view the USSR and its allies as France's
primary external threat. France views the Soviets' de-
ployments of the SS-20 IRBM and the Backfire bomber as
responsible for a dangerous imbalance of forces in Central
Europe, and supports NATO's INF modernization but refuses
to include French systems in INF talks.
-ter !jeer
1
 30 ZIMBABWE: Racial Tensions
Harsher government policies and worsening economic prospects
1 have aggravated racial tensions.
The bombing last month of the ruling party's head-
quarters in Salisbury was the latest in a series of
incidents, including the recent arrest of a white member
of parliament for antigovernment activities, that have
strengthened black opposition to Prime Minister Mugabe's
conciliatory policies toward whites. Although the in-
vestigation of the bombing is continuing most blacks
blame dissident whites and South Africa.
The economic situation will pose an even greater
challenge to Mugabe's moderate policies. Although
Zimbabwe enjoyed high levels of economic growth during
the last two years, the postindependence boom has begun
to fade. The economy now suffers from double-digit in-
flation and continued high levels of white emigration--
particularly among skilled professionals--and a recent
survey of Zimbabwean businessmen revealed that they are
increasingly pessimistic about the future.
South Africa's termination of a preferential trade
agreement with Zimbabwe this March will hurt manufactur-
ing industries. Western companies, unsure of the govern-
ment's intentions, have not increased to any great extent
their investments in Zimbabwe.
Economic sluggishness will significantly hinder the
government's ability to improve black living standards,
and some of Mugabe's political opponents have already
sought to capitalize on black grievances. The government
has attempted to silence these critics by imposing new
restrictions on
olitical activit
Mu
however
abe
p
,
y.
g
,
also may eventually have to accelerate land redistribu-
tion and other socioeconomic reforms to meet black ex-
pectations--a step that would further alienate whites.
5 January 1982
 (GHANA: Rawlings in Control
Coup leader Rawlings is continuing to consolidate
his control over the political situation. Resistance by
forces loyal to former President Limann has collapsed,
and he has been arrested. Demonstrations supporting the
3 coup by trade unionists and civilian radical fringe groups
with prior ties to Rawlings took place over the weekend
in Accra, but the general populace remains passive. Al-
though Libya has recognized the new regime, there is
still no evidence of Libyan involvement in the coup.
Rawlings's handling of the military and its officers
could determine the success of the new government. Many
I officers blame Rawlings for the serious split that
occurred between officers and enlisted men after his coup
in 1979, and they have not forgotten the abusive treatment
y they suffered or the executions of senior officers under
the first Rawlings government. Rawlings's decision to
free and restore to rank former military personnel jailed
by the preceding regime--many of them misfits and
criminals--is not popular.
SUDAN: Student Protests
Students in the Khartoum area have staged violent
protests against the 63-percent increase in the price
of sugar announced on 31 December. Security forces used
tear gas to disperse 500 rock-throwing demonstrators in
a suburb of the capital on Sunday. Students reportedly
/ burned several gas stations yesterday and may have caused
a major fire in a poor section of Khartoum. The govern-
ment has announced that schools will be closed "until
further notice." Additional demonstrations, however, are
likely as the government attempts to deal with the eco-
nomic crisis by enforcing other austerity measures and
as supplies of fuel and essential commodities dwindle.
3
5 January 1982
 J GREECE: New Military Leadership
The new leaders of the armed forces whose appoint-
ments were announced yesterday are well-disposed toward
the US and NATO. As part of the annual promotion and
retirement cycle, Prime Minister Papandreou took the un-
precedented step of appointing a Navy admiral as chief
of staff. Rotating the top post among the services is
required by law, but previous governments have chosen
//I officers from the Army because it is the largest service.
The move reflects Papandreou's distrust of the Army and
the greater support he enjoys within the Navy and Air
Force. Army officers will be disturbed by the choice
of a Navy man, but Papandreou probably hopes to assuage
them with his choice of a highly respected. anti-Soviet
officer as commander of the Army.
1V JCl.1C
4
January 1982
 SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Cross-Border Operations
Since last September South African forces have main-
tained a continuous presence in southern Angola in order
1/to preserve gains achieved by previous incursions. Pre-
toria is determined to prevent guerrilla forces of the
South-West Africa People's organization from reestablish-
ing forward positions in southern Angola. It also is
attempting to deny Angolan forces access to bases in the
border area from which the Angolans had supported SWAPO.
5
 q EL SALVADOR:
Moving Toward Elections
The junta is working hard to give greater legitimacy to the
f national elections planned for 28 March. Resistance from rightist
opposition parties to some of these moves reflects the continuing
inability of the different parts of the political spectrum to coop-
junta.
Encouraged by the recent OAS vote overwhelmingly
endorsing its plan, the junta is attempting to give the
1 elections greater credibility abroad. San Salvador has
invited almost all countries with which it has diplomatic
relations to witness the process. A notable exception is
Mexico because it recently has been unfriendly to the
Increasing disillusionment over Sandinista repres-
sion in Nicaragua, combined with the recent successful
elections in Honduras, could encourage additional for-
eign sympathy for an electoral solution in El Salvador.
The insurgents fear that a successful election will hurt
Domestically, the junta wants to broaden support
I for the plan and to reduce local criticism of its imple-
/ mentation. The junta has, for example, restored legal
status to a leftist--but noninsur ent-- olitical party
banned for the past decade.
Council along nonpartisan lines.
electoral law to permit open registration. It hopes
that this will encourage a large popular vote and help
protect participants from extremist retribution. The
law also reorganized the three-man Central Elections
1~
5 January 1982
 Rightist Intransigence
The new law is meeting strong resistance from the
five rightist opposition parties, which had planned to
use voter registration lists to control individual pre-
cincts. Moreover, they believe that a large turnout
will help the cogoverning Christian Democrats. The
v rightists also are angry that the junta has refused to
create a Central Elections Council made up of one member
from each political party.
The rightist parties, some of which apparently have
significant voter appeal, have criticized the junta and
in a recent letter to the OAS scored the government and
the Christian Democrats for "impeding" the electoral
process. Although rightist criticism of the law prob-
ably will continue, these parties are unlikely to carr
through on their threat to bo
cott the ballotin
y
g
The junta, meanwhile, has indicated that it has no
intention of yielding ground and has begun its own cam-
tinues to come from the insurgents.
Acknowledging the insurgent threats, the junta has
extended the state of siege into February. Although
San Salvador has emphasized that the restrictions do not
I apply to the registered political parties, a continuing
state of siege hinders efforts to portray domestic secu-
/,jrity conditions as conducive to free and fair elections.
7
5 January 1982
 Twin Se
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