NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 4 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005065425
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00446
• Publication Date: January 4, 1982

(b)(1)
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APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
21 -Jun-201 0
CO N/n R mw, i y
January 1982
 f Poland: Martial Law Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Egypt: Moubarek Names Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . 1
3 Ghana: Coup Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Cuba: Economic Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-Namibia: Reaction to Western Initiative . . . . . . 4
Italy-USSR: Views on Siberian Pipeline . . . . . . . . . 5
South Korea: Cabinet Shakeup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
East Germany: Impact of Oil Shortages . . . . . . . . . . 6
Lebanon: Pipeline Explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10 Bolivia: TorreZio in Trouble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
It ........ 8
Special Analysis
1 yWest Germany - Poland: Attitudes Toward Sanctions . . . . 9
4 January 1982
 C POLAND: Martial Law Tactics
The government is attempting to use the carrot-and-stick ap-
proach to head off problems and encourage productivity as most
workers return to their jobs this week.
Pravda, meanwhile, has published another commentary
appears o argue for a measured Soviet response to US economic
Warsaw on Friday announced extra benefits for workers
in hazardous or demanding jobs. The measures--which in-
clude early retirement and disability pay--will apply to
2 million industrial workers in sectors that have been
Solidarity strongholds. In addition, workers now will
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Polish radio, reminding would-be strikers of the
penalties they risk, announced the stiffest sentences
yet handed out to Solidarity activists. Five organizers
of the strike at the Katowice steelworks received prison
terms of up to seven years--almost double that of other
sentences--because of the r a damage" to the national
economy.
police and military forces in Warsaw.
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actories are idled by raw
material shortages. long a source of labor unhappiness.
At the same time, the government may be deploying
more security forces to intimidate returning workers.
The US Embassy yesterday noted an increased presence of
the author-
feel little sympathy for their immediate superiors.
ities may see to weed out militants in the Baltic coast
shipyards by issuing new access cards. The government
/ also is putting pressure on low-level supervisors in
factories to maintain production levels by threatening
to fire them if work quotas are not met. This tactic
may yield mixed results because some workers probably
4 January 1982
 The purge in the party and government seems to be
gathering momentum. Members of party committees at all
levels are being expelled, with 535 in one province alone
4' being dropped. Special "verification" committees made
4 up of party and Army representatives continue to inter-
rogate officials outside the party apparatus. The lib-
eral former editor of the Krakow party newspaper recently
failed such a test, and at least five provincial gover-
nors have been dismissed.
Contrary to frequent press reports of harsh condi-
tions for detainees, some at least have received good
treatment. A respected intellectual in Krakow has told
a US official that the conditions under which he was con-
fined ranged from "adequate" to "excellent." In a rest
home belonging to the Ministry of Interior, prisoners
were even permitted to listen to Voice of America broad-
casts on radios provided by guards.
Conditions for detainees probably vary, however,
and intellectuals may be treated differently than union
activists. A recent Solidarity bulletin claims that
12,000 persons have been detained, significantly more
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Government Moves Toward Normality
A senior deputy in the parliament has hinted to a
US Consulate officer that the entire body may meet soon
to consider legislation, despite the continuance of mar-
tial law. The government probably hopes that the public
would be more willing to accept controversial laws--
especially on the contentious issues of economic reform
1 and trade unions--passed by parliament rather than ones
seelce
ii
4 January 1982
 Deputy Premier Rakowski reportedly told
last week that Warsaw has the $350 million
debt for 1981. -The--report,-if true,vmeansythe?money-
probably came from Moscow, because Poland has virtually
no hard currency reserves and apparently has not received
any new loans from Western banks.
West European Reactions
Austrian Chancellor Kreisky yesterday reiterated
his opposition to US economic sanctions against the
USSR. In an interview on French television, Kreisky
reportedly said it was naive to try to prevent the con-
struction of the planned gas pipeline from Siberia to
Western Europe. The Chancellor, who earlier character-
ized the sanctions as precipitous and premature, is
opposed to any action that threatens detente and economic
cooperation with the East.
The EC Foreign Ministers meeting today in Brussels
will consider the Community's response to US sanctions.
Soviet Views
A commentary in Pravda criticizes the present course
of US foreign policy but asserts that this policy repre-
sents only one of two "strains" within the American es-
tablishment. Pravda attributes this "irrational" strain
iii
January 1982
 to the extreme right wing of the Republican Party and
claims that once its "dangerous nature" becomes apparent
a "realist" strain will reassert itself.
The article is the second in three days that appears
to argue for a measured Soviet response to US sanctions.
These commentaries may represent one side in an ongoing
9 debate rather than a justification to Soviet critics
that a decision already has been made.
Activity by Soviet and East
7 European forces has been at typically low levels during
iv
4 January 1982
 EGYPT: Moubarek Names Prime Minister
President Moubarek's decision to form a new cabinet and appoint
a prime minister reflects his growing self-confidence and success
in consolidating his hold on bower.
First Deputy Prime Minister Fuad Muhi al-Din, who
was given the post of prime minister that Moubarek had
r been holding himself, is a longtime Moubarek intimate
and has had responsibility for day-to-day administration
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3
The new Prime Minister has retained many of the
members of the old cabinet, including Defense Minister
Abu Ghazala and Foreign Minister Ali. Deputy Prime
/ Minister for Economic Affairs Abdel Meguid, who was not
close to Moubarek and was recently implicated in a major
corruption scandal, has been replaced. He also may be
used as a political scapegoat for Egypt's mounting eco-
nomic problems. Several other economic and planning
ministers also have been replaced.
Most Egyptians apparently approve of Moubarek's
performance in office since the assassination of
President Sadat. Moubarek's National Democratic Party
won two parliamentary byelections last week in districts
/ previously held by the leftist opposition. Despite their
defeats, opposition leaders have praised the regime for
conducting fairer elections than Sadat had.
Egyptians are especially pleased with Moubarek's
anticorruption drive and his decision to release about
100 political prisoners arrested by Sadat during the
crackdown on dissent last September. On Saturday,
Moubarek also eased restrictions on journalists and uni-
versity professors ordered by Sadat.
4 January 1982
 J GHANA: Coup Developments
Coup leader Rawlings is slowly gaining control despite some
7 sporadic fighting.
In a radiobroadcast on Saturday Rawlings appealed
for public support and indicated his intention to pursue
,,,-,a nonaligned foreign policy. He has been unable, however,
Lf to arouse much public enthusiasm for the coup.
Rawlings appears to be taking a moderate line. He
and his fellow coup plotters apparently are trying to
avoid the divisiveness, indiscipline, and harsh measures
3 that characterized the coup he led in 1979.
The composition of the Provisional National Defense
Council still is unannounced although Rawlings is trying
to attract prominent civilians. The whereabouts of
President Limann and many of his cabinet members remain
Poor economic conditions because of government mis-
management, soaring inflation, and depressed world prices
for Ghana's exports helped precipitate the coup. Rawlings
is unlikely, however, to be any more successful at finding
solutions to these problems than was Limann.
Rawlings's first appeal on Friday for voluntary
price reductions has been rebuffed by Accra's politically
powerful market women. He will have to move quickly to
impose order on a chaotic political and economic situa-
tion or face the threat of another coup.
There has been little international reaction so far
to the coup. Nigeria, which cut off oil deliveries
following the coup in 1979, seems to be taking a wait-
and-see approach. If the Nigerians do cut off oil
supplies to show disapproval for the new regime, this
could force Rawlings to turn to Libya for oil and politi-
cal support.
The coup may have irrevocably shattered what was
left of Ghana's already floundering institutions, and
restoring order may be difficult. Unless he can do so
l quickly, Rawlings may look to Cuba or other radical coun-
4 January 1982
 The Cuban economy will grow more slowly in 1982 because the
price of sugar is down in international markets and Havana has
ZittZe prospect of increasing export volume.
Cuba's top planning official in a speech last week
claimed that 1981 was the best year for economic perform-
ance since the revolution. Much of the improvement,
however, represented a recovery from the dismal record
during 1979 and 1980.
The official also noted that conditions would be
worse in 1982, predicting economic growth at a modest
2.5 percent. He stated that increasing import prices
and interest rates, coupled with depressed sugar prices
and the recent intensification of US economic actions
against Cuba, have led to a hard currency shortage that
is unlikely to improve in the near future.
Havana probably will not be able to maintain cur-
rent import levels of either consumer or industrial goods
without increasing its foreign debt substantially. In
the past, the Castro regime has been reluctant to accept
this, and it has preferred to reduce imports.
4 January 1982
 Moscow recently has taken several steps that apparently are
1 aimed at undermining the Western initiative on Namibia.
mark
that US policy on the Namibian
The USSR's immediate concern about the Western
initiative is that it will strengthen the moderates in
the leadership at the expense of pro-Soviet SWAPO
elements. Over the longer run, moreover, a Western-
brokered settlement would strengthen the standing of
the US and other Western states with the African states.
In addition, the Soviets are concerned that a Namibia
settlement could be linked to a reduction of the Soviet
and Cuban presence in Angola.
Despite efforts to undercut the Western initiative,
Soviet leverage seems limited. While Soviet ties with
SWAPO are close, the group has consistently acted in
unison with black African states, and Moscow has had
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January 1982
 ITALY-USSR: Views on Siberian Pipeline
Speculation that Italy may withdraw from the Siberian natural
gas pipeline project appears premature.
Rome's decision to reexamine its plans to purchase
additional Soviet gas follows several weeks of domestic
political maneuvering. The Socialist Party has been
urging that parliament debate the pipeline issue, alleg-
ing that the project is uneconomical for Italy.
The Socialists are using the issue to embarrass
the Communist Party and at the same time enhance their
"Atlantic" credentials. The imposition of martial law
in Poland has prompted the small Liberal and Social
Democratic Parties to support the call for review, making
it all but impossible for the Christian Democrats to
resist.
Italian leaders agree that the country will need
additional energy supplies during the last half of the
decade and that there are few alternatives to Soviet
gas. The Italians have been counting on the Siberian
pipeline to supply 8 to 10 billion cubic meters per
year of the anticipated shortage of 15 billion cubic
meters per year in natural gas by 1990.
The Minister of State Participations says that the
contract to supply 19 compressor stations using government-
subsidized credit remains valid. Rome almost certainly
will proceed with the deal, although it may refuse to
subsidize as generously additional contracts for pipeline
equipment and may buy a smaller amount of gas than
originally planned.
5
4 January 1982
 Cq) SOUTH KOREA: Cabinet Shakeup
President Chun has reorganized his cabinet apparently
in an effort to revitalize the economy. The shakeup,
which affects five cabinet posts, includes the appoint-
ment of a new prime minister and deputy prime minister
and appears keyed to ministries related to economic
affairs. The move reflects Chun's continued concern
over South Korea's sluggish economic performance and
gives him a new team to push ahead with the fifth develop-
ment plan that began last Friday.
-O EAST GERMANY: Impact of Oil Shortages
Germany's large hard currency debt, chronic trade deficits,
and reduced access to Western credit markets make it
unlikely that East Berlin will be able to turn to Western
sources of oil. As a result, industrial production prob-
ably will fall to levels lower than were planned for
this year.
4 January 1982
 *ANKARA
r o ripoli
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Sov
Unio
Turkey
Syria
*DAMASCUS
Golan
J Heights
(Wes
Ban
AMMAN
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Israel
i Jordan
0 100
Kilometers
$ Oilfield
Oil pipeline
W16- Oil terminal
Boundary representation is ~Neut/E/
not necessarily authoritative. Zone
TEHRAN
Iran
 LEBANON: Pipeline Explosion
An explosion of unknown origin on Saturday has
disabled a recently activated pipeline carrying crude
oil from Iraq to Tripoli. The reopening of the pipeline
had followed an agreement in November between Iraq and
Lebanon calling for a minimum average flow of 115,000
barrels per day through this spur--with a capacity of
500,000 barrels per day--of the Iraqi-Mediterranean
pipeline system. Despite the temporary closure, Iraq
still will be able to export as much as 1 million barrels
v per day of crude oil through alternate pipeline routes.
The explosion followed an attack on Friday on a tanker
loading crude oil at Tripoli.
President Torrelio has to carry out economic austerity
measures by 15 January to satisfy IMF requirements for
financial assistance, despite anticipated popular oppo-
sition to the program. Torrelio lacks a strong military
or civilian power base; he was installed in September
by key Army commanders seeking an interim solution to the
prolonged leadership crisis. Military hardliners view
Torrelio's recent decision to renew labor freedoms as
a capitulation to "leftist-inspired" civilian elements.
Widespread resistance to the President's planned reforms
could lead to a takeover by a military strongman.
4 January 1982
 Bonn's cautious attitude toward the situation in Poland re-
flects the public consensus in West Germany. Barring an overt
Soviet intervention or bloody repression by the Warsaw regime, this
outlook is unlikely to change.
There has been little public debate over the West
German Government's position toward Poland and the USSR.
Both coalition parties, the trade union movement, the
business and banking communities, and even the opposition
parties generally support the government's approach.
The West German public has consistently sympathized
with Solidarity. Long before martial law was declared,
however, it believed that the situation was sliding
toward economic and political anarchy.
V S The West Germans considered Soviet intervention a
strong possibility as long as Solidarity continued to
make political gains. They also feared that the West in
general and West Germany in particular would face increas-
ing difficulty bailing Poland out economically.
Reaction to a Soviet Intervention
Although the West Germans would react strongly to
a Soviet military move into Poland, they will be reluc-
tant for now to make any drastic moves. They do not want
to jeopardize their economic interests--including the
massive Polish debt to West German banks, only 40 percent
of which is guaranteed by the government. Bonn also does
not want to complicate its policy of reconciliation with
East Germany.
9 h4 January 19V2
 Under current circumstances, Bonn believes that a
distinction must be made between Warsaw and Moscow on
the question of economic sanctions. Although the West
Germans think that sanctions will have little impact on
the Soviet or Polish regimes, they have made clear to
the Poles that future aid is contingent on Warsaw's ad-
herence to the promises made by Premier Jaruzelski on
take place.
The West Germans are unwilling for now to consider
sanctions against the USSR. They do not believe that
Soviet involvement has been overly blatant. Moreover,
they fear that imposition of sanctions would remove an
inhibition on Soviet intervention and deprive the Allies
of their main retaliatory option if an invasion should
Schmidt's Strong Views
Chancellor Schmidt recognizes that his government
has been singled out for its "weak" reaction, and he is
likely to express his resentment forcefully. The West
Germans consider themselves firm supporters of the West's
principal objectives of salvaging some element of the
Polish reform movement and avoiding a Soviet invasion.
4 January 1982