REPORT ON THE SUNRISE - CROSSWORD OPERATION FEB 24-MAY 2,1945 SUBMITTED BY MAJ. GENERAL WILLIAM J DONOVAN BY ALLEN W DULLES AND GERO VON GAEVERNITZ

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00033995
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01506
• Publication Date: April 1, 1945

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R E P 0 R'T
on the
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SUNRISE - CROSSWORD
/Operatiaa
Feb. 25-May 2, 1945
Submitted to MAJ. General Wm. J. Donovan
Allen W. Dulles
bY Gero von Gaevernitz
BERN, May 22, 1945
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44, ;
The First German Surrender
The End of the Italian Campaign
Report by: Allen W. Dulles, and
Gero von Gaevernitz.
Tern, May 22, 1945.
I. The Background
.In the messages which passed back and forth between
Bern, AFHQ at Caserta, Washington and London, the project
which was eventually to bring about the end of the Italian
Campaign and the surrender of almost a million men of the
German Army was given the code designation: "Crossword".
To ensure quick and limited distribution, the messages
were introduced by the special word "Sunrise". These labels
proved to be prophetic. For weeks the negotiations were �
like a crossword guzzle. Could we be sure that the Germans
with whom we were dealing were sincere in their offers to
bring about the unconditional surrender of their forces in
North Italy? Or were they merely playing for time and try�
ing to divide the Western Powers from their Russian Ally?
When at last this crossword puzzle was solved on May
1945, it meant "sunrise" for Allied troops and Italian
patriots in Italy. Its solution brought the rapid and
relatively bloodless occupation of large areas of North
Italy without that reckless and wanton destruction of life
and property which generally characterized the German
abandonment of any occupied territory. It opened the
southern flank of the German redoubt in the Alps and
facilitated the quick occupation of Trieste, a port vital
for the supply lines of our troops moving into Austria.
Finally, it set the pattern for other German surrenders
which followed in quick succession.
For the background of the story it is necessary to
go back several months prior to the beginning of the
conversations which led to the Italian surrender.
When in the early autumn of 1944, France was liberated
and the American, British and French Armies under General
Eisenhower paused for breath and supplies on a line running
from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier, it became obvious
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even to the majority of German military men that the war
was lost for them. It was equally obvious, however, that
Hitler, Goebbels, Bormann and the Nazi fanatics proposed
to fight to the last man, and that nothing in the nature
of airunconditional surrender was likely to occur. The
A
name of Himmler is deliberately left out of this list,
because Himmler, during the last months preceding Germany's
collapse, quite openly flirted with the wholly unacceptable
idea of sounding out the Western Allies with the idea of
trying to negotiate a surrender to.them, with the reserva-
tion for himself, however, of some personal immunity. As
this was largely a selfish personal move, he watched with
a particularly vigilant eye and ruthlessly suppressed any
e;fort on the part of others to "queer his pitch" by
effecting local surrenders.
As the chances for any general unconditional surrender
seemed slight, it was decided that it would be desirable
to explore the possibility of bringing about the surrender
of particular Army Groups by persuading high Generals of
the Wehrmacht that the continuance of the struggle would
only lead to the total destruction of Germany. It was
obvious that the mad men in power in Berlin, in a type of
suicidal frenzy, were determined to destroy as much as
possible, if they themselves were to be destroyed, and
that the Wehrmacht, and the S.S.1g4 now becomi4the tool
of fanatical Nazi party leaders. The problem wg�s how this
point of view could be presented to the German Generals, and
what German Generals would be most likely to respond to such
arguments. The Russians, through the use of the Paulus-
Seydlitz Committee, had already done effective work on
their front in undermining German military resistance and
had found a vehicle, through this Committee, for appealing
to the war-weary German officers and soldiers in the East.
Nothing comparable had been done by the Western Allies,
whose formula of unconditional surrender had been twisted
and turned by Goebbels to stiffen the morale of the Wehr-
macht.
Late in 1944, we had discussed these possibilities
with high ranking Allied officers on the West front, and
as a restat G.G. had interviewed a considerable number
of German Generals, held as prisoners of war in France
and England. Here he found a group of Generals who
recognized the futility of continuing the struggle, and
who, in principle, were ready to see what they could do
to establish contact with leaders of the Wehrmacht on
the western front to help stop the futile German
resistances.
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The course of events, particularly the Rundstedt
offensive in December, 1944, followed by a constant shift-
ing of command among the Generals on the West front, operated
to prevent the carrying forward of this project in this
theatre. Also, it proved almost impossible to find any
effective channel of communication to any of the leading
German Generals on the West front, or to get any clear
evidence that any of them would have the courage to act.
They were all surrounded by agents of Himmlerts Gestapo.
They were terrified and subdued by the brutal massacre
of the Generals following the July 20th affair, and were
disposed to hide behind their oath of allegiance to the
Fuehrer. German or rather Prussian military abhorrence
of "Eidbruch" (breaking the oath) played a sinister rOle
&tiring these days. It was an easy excuse for the timid
to do nothing, but it also deterred many a German military
man from taking the action which in his innermost conscience
he felt was both right and necessary.
To return to the thread of our story: The hopeless-
ness of effectihg a military surrender on any part of the
West front, led us to turn our attention to-the Italian
front which presented many advantages for the type.of
action which we had in mind. The very geographical situa-.
tion of the German Army in Italy, which still represented
an intact force of over twenty divisions, gave it a form
of independence and a possibility of separate action.
Its communications with Germany, due to our bombing of
the Brenner and other passages, were becoming more and
more precarious. It was now too late to think of with-
drawing any substantial part of the Army to reinforce the
cracking fronts in both the East and West. The most this
Army could hope to accomplish was a partial withdrawal
into the German redoubt and Venezia Giulia, where it
might have defended the southern approaches of the Nazi's
last fortress.
The personalities in command in Italy, both from the
military and the S.S. side also offered possibilities. We
had had reports, dating from early January, of meetings
attended by Kesselring, S.S. General Wolff, the German
Ambassador to Italy, Rahn, and others, in which these
men had frankly discussed the growing hopelessness of the
situation. We further had a report that Kesselring in
February had arranged a meeting between a private envoy
and his former Chief of Staff, General Westfal, who had
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become Rundstedt's Chief of Staff in the West, and General
Blaskowitz, at which the German military situation had
been the subject of realistic discussion. Himmler's
representative in Italy, S.S. Gruppenfuehrer Harster, had
already sounded out Allied circles through Italian
industrialist friends in Switzerland, but had been re-
buffed, because these attempts bore the stamp "made by
Hitler". However, the evidence indicated that in North
Italy the OKW and the S.S. saw more or less eye to eye,
and, therefore, there seemed to be some possibility of
obtaining the essential mutual action. If the OKW and
the S.S. should work at cross purposes, they would defeat
each other; any surrender plot would be discovered and a
fdw more Generals would lose their lives, be "promoted
to other commands", or consigned to fortresses.
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II. The First ftFeelers".
This was the situation, when late in February, an
important Italian industrialist, Baron Luigi Parrilli, met
with G.G. in Lucerne, introduced by a trusted Swiss friend.
Parrilli stated that certain important German officials in
North Italy, including S.S. General Wolff, desired to
establish contact with the Allies, with a view to terminat-
ing German resistance in North Italy. Wolff was reported
to be ready to arrange the turning over of North Italy to
the Allies, under conditions which would avoid unnecessary
bloodshed, and protect against wanton destruction the art
treasures, the industrial establishments, and the power
plahts of that rich area. We were satisfied as to the
good faith of our Swiss friend, who under no conditions
would have knowingly allowed himself to be used by the
Germans. We investigated the standing of Baron Parrilli
and while we had little information on his recent past under
the Fascists, we learned that before the war he had been for
years the representative in North Italy of a well-known
American corporation. A radio inquiry in Washington con-
firmed that he had been for 15 years the European representa-
tive of that corporation, that his American employers had
considered him a man of ability. The radio added the re-
assuring comment, based on information from the American
companY, "you can count on him if he gives his word". How-
ever, he admittedly came to us with the full knowledge of
certain Germans and the S.S. and we were on our guard.
Parrilli returned to Italy from the Lucerne meeting
and on March 2, the news reached us that one of General
Wolff's chief assistants, Standartenfuehrer Dollmann, and
Wolff's aide, Max Zimmer, together with Parrilli, were com-
ing to Lugano to ascertain whether contact could be established.
We decided cautiously to take a chance on finding out what
these men wanted. Dollmann's record was well known to us.
He had played a considerable Ale in Rome and claimed,
possibly with some basis, that-he had had a part in saving
Rome from destruction, when it was evacuated by the Germans.
He had helped to rescue certain Italian personalities,
possibly sometimes for a price, but in any event his record
showed that he was one of the more realistic and less
fanatical of the S.S.
One of A.W.D.'s associates was going to Lugano on other
business; he was briefly brought up to date and given the
background of the matter. His instructions were to listen
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to what Dollmann had to say, to make no comments, and report.
As he left for Lugano, A.W.D. handed him on a sheet of paper
two names; one was the name of Ferruccib Parri, an outstand-
ing leader of the Italian resistance movement, who after
months of clandestine activity in Milan with the C.L.N.A.I.
(Committe of National Liberation for North Italy) had
finally been tracked down by the Germans and was in the
dungeon of Verona. The other name was that of Major
Usmiani, who had developed an' important intelligence net-
work into North Italy, had been caught and imprisoned in
:the famous Italian jail San. Vittori at Milan. A.W.D. told
his associate to advise Dollmann that if they were really
serious in their intentions, they should as evidence �
immediately and unconditionally release these two men to
hint in Switzerland.
The meeting took place quietly at Lugano on March 3.
On this occasion there was also present Professor Max
Husmann, a prominent Swiss citizen, and director of a
school for boys near ZUrich. Husmann was a friend of
Baron Parrilli and had had close relations with many lead-
ing Italian personalities. He played a prominent role
throughout the conversations which followed and acted as
one of our Swiss intermediaries. He told the Germans some
plain truths about their situation and what they should do.
Professor Husmann was both eloquent and to the point. He
disabused the Germans of the idea that they could either
bargain over the terms of unconditional surrender, or base
any hopes on a breach between the Anglo-Saxons and the
Russians.
The meeting with A.W.D.'s representative was brief.
Dollmann indicated that he wished merely to ascertain. .
whether a sure channel of communications was established.
Subject to confirmation, he would return on March 8, after
consultation at General Wolff's headquarters at Fasano,
and he would then bring credentials and definite proposals.
He said he would do what he could to release the two Italian
patriots we had asked for. To Professor Husmann, Dollmann
indicated that Kesselring, then Commander in Chief in North
Italy, Wolff, Ambassador Rahn and Harster, were all included
in the group for which he was speaking, and that the proposals
which would be brought to the next meeting related to the
surrender of the German forces in North Italy.
These developments were fully reported to Washington,
London and to AFHQ at Caserta, wi.412 the added remark that,
unless instructed to the contrary, we would listen to what
the emissaries had to say on March, 8. In this message,
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we referred to a comment which we had previously received
from AFHQ to the general effect that if Kesselring wished
to treat for surrender, he could find ways of dispatching
an emissary through the lines. We pointed out that if the
Kesselring group wished to work out a surrender they would
have to act with the greatest secrecy, lest their movements
be betrayed by fanatical Nazis in Kesselring's entourage,
that the normal procedure of despatching an aeroplane or
of sending a messenger through the lines in Italy might
prove difficult, but that it was relatively easy for high
German officials to come to Switzerland without arousing
suspicion, as they had been doing this over a considerable
period.
From London, we received for our guidance the follow-
ing general description of Dollmann. He had been sent to
Italy as early as 1933 by Himmler, had become official
adviser to von Mackensen, the German Ambassador, was
liaison officer between General Wolff, Kesselring and
Graziani. Military circles sought his advice on political
matters and Kesselring often turned to him. He had influen-
tial contacts in Italy and was reported to be realistic
enough to realize that Germany had lost the war; a vivid
personality, temperamental and egotistical.
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III. General Wolff Appears on the Scene.
On March 8, A.W.D. radioed Washington and AFHQ that
General Wolff, together with Dollman and others had
arrived in Switzerland claiming that he was prepared
to talk definitely, and that we proposed to see what
they had to say. On the evening of March 8, in ZUrich,
A.W.D. and G.G. received Wolff at A.W.D.'s apartment in
that city. We declined to meet with Wolff's other
companions, stating that if Wolff had anything to say
he could come alone to us and tell us his story. Before
the meeting took place, Wolff sent his identification
papers,
. (1) a full page picture of him in the "Sildfront
Illustrierte", an illustrated magazine of October 1944,
with his high sounding titles, viz. "Hochster SS- und
PolizeifUhrer in Italien, SS-Obergruppenfiihrer und General
der Waffen-SS, Bevollmachtigter General der Deutschen
Wehrmacht in Italien" ('Supreme SS and Police Chief in
Italy, Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS and General of the
Waffen-SS, plenipotentiary General of the WOrmacht in
Italy"), and
(2) a memorandum, giving not only his titles, but
a list of 9 references. The first of these references
was none other than Rudolph Hess, the second was the Pope!.
The other references included two high Catholic prelates,
Count Calvi di Bergolo, and the widow of the former Duke
of Aosta. The paper also included certain data about
Wolff's activities in Italy, including his claim to have
rescued precious art objects from the Uffizi Gallery in
Florence, as well as the priceless coin collection of the
Ring of Italy, and also referred, to his help in protecting
Rome from destruction.
.�
From our own files we knew that Wolff had been in Italy
for some two years as chief man of the Waffen-SS and that
prior thereto he had been liaison officer at the Fuehrer
HQ, also for the Waffen-SS. These references, plus a.
certain amount of background data from other sources,
influenced us less than did the fact that Wolff released
to us, even before we consented to see him, Parri and
Usmiani, whom A.W.D. met a few hours afterwards in a Zurich
clinic. At least he was a man of power, and at that stage
we were more interested in his power than in his morals,
We did not expect to find in this SS General a Sunday School
teacher.
The meeting with Parri and Usmiani was dramatic; both
were close personal friends of A.W.D. from long months of
work with the Italian forces of liberation. They had been
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marched out from their respective dungeons under S.S. guard,.
believing that they were either going to the shooting squad,
or, what was almost worse, deportation into Germany. To
their utter bewilderment, they were delivered at the Swiss
frontier without a word of explanation and taken to Zurich
by our Swiss friends. They could hardly believe it when s
A.W.D. told them that they were unconditionally free to
continue their work for the liberation of Italy.
The first meeting between A.W.D., G.G. and Wolff lasted
about an hour. Wolff gave the impression of a man of energy.
He wasted no words and did not attempt to bargain for himself.
He said he had committed no crimes and was willing to stand
on his record. He did not dispute either the hopelessness
of. the German military position, nor the fact that the German
armies must surrender unconditionally. He said he was
completely won over to the need for immediate action, that
he believed he could win over Kesselring to his plan and he
would proceed immediately to try to do this. The next day,
March 9, in a longer talk which Wolff and Dollmann had with
G.G., Wolff stated that in his ppinion the time had come
when some German with power to act should lead Germany out
of the war to end useless material and human destruction,
that he was willing to act and felt he could persuade
Kesselring to join, that between them they controlled the
entire situation in North Italy, and that, as far as the
S.S. forces were concerned, he, Wolff, likewise had
authority in the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, including both
the northern and southern approaches to the Brenner pass,
that if he and Kesselring took joint action, Himmler
would be powerless to take effective countermeasures,
and that their joint action would have vital repercussions
on the German armies elsewhere, as many German Generals
were only waiting for someone to take the lead. Wolff
then outlined the procedure which he contemplated:
(a) He would see Kesselring over the weekend in order .
to obtain from him a definite commitment to joint action.
He said he had had the closest personal relations with
Kesselring for several years. He indicated that Kesselringls
problem. was how to reconcile his action with his oath of
allegiance to the Fuehrer. Kesselring throughout his long
military 'career had always kept his oath and felt that he
was now, too old to change his habits. Wolff believed,
however, that he could be won over to the senselessness
of the struggle and to the realization that his duty to
the German people was above that based on his oath to the
Fuehrer.
(b) Be would draft with Kesselring an appeal to be
signed by them, Rahn and others, setting forth the useless-
ness of the struggle, their responsibility toward the German
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people to terminate it, and calling upon the military
commanders and others generally to disassociate themselves
from the Hitler Himmler control. The statement would also
announce that hostilities in North Italy would be terminated
by the Germans.
(c) Radio and leaflet action would be prepared to get
the message over to the German people, the army and its
commanders.
(d) Provided Kesselring could be won over, Wolff
believed that he, Kesselring, would come clandestinely
into Switzerland within a week to meet our military men to
coordinate the technical military surrender measures with the
abpve appeal. Apparently, no one on Kesselring's immediate
staff was particularly suited to do this for him. His Chief
of Staff Panzer-General Roettiger, who later proved to be
one of the stoutest supporters of Wolff, was not yet
acquainted with the project.
As evidence 'of his ability, to act, in addition to the
steps he had already taken in releasing Parr4. and Usmiani -
and here it should be noted that in delivering Parri,
Wolff had given up to us his most important Italian hostage -
he stated he was prepared to take the following steps
immediately:
(a) Discontinue active warfare against the partisans
merely keeping up necessary pretense pending the execution
of the plan.
(b) Release to Switzerland several hundred Jews
interned at Bozen.
(c) Assume full responsibility for the safety and
treatment of 350 British and American prisoners at Mantua,
of whom 150 were in a hospital and 200 in a camp on the
southern outskirts of the city. He claimed these were
all of the American or British prisoners then held in
northern Italy, as all others had been. currently trans-
ferred to Germany.
. (d) Release to Switzerland, if he could be found,
Sogno Franci, the well known patriot working with the
C.L.N.A.I.
(e) Facilitate as far as possible the return to
North Italy of Italian officers, held in Germany, who
might be useful in the post-hostilities period.
Wolff claimed, and we pressed him hard on the point,
that he was acting entirely independently of Himmler, who
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had no information regarding Wolff's activities in Switzer-
land. This was a crucial point. Was Wolff telling us the
truth?
Wolff made it clear in his talks with us that his
ability to carry out his program depended largely on
securing the cooperation of Kesselring. A combined
coordinated action by both Wehrmacht and S.S. would be
necessary to effect a complete surrender in .North Italy.
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IV. The Allied High Command
in Italy shows an Interest.
These developments were immediately flashed to
AFHQ at Caserta, to Washington and to London, with the
recommendation that if we received word that K.essel�
ring or any other high military authority in North
Italy was prepared to come to Switzerland to act on
military matters, it would be desirable for AFHQ to
be ready to send appropriate military men to meet
with them. We emphasized that we had engaged in no
negotiations, had merely listened to Wolff's story,
and had advised him that we were only interested in
unconditional surrender. We still considered the
whole matter as subject to test. We had no evidence
EA yet how much weight could be placed on Wolff's
assurances.
AFHQ decided to act immediately without awaiting
definite news as to Kesselring's position, and on
March 9, we were advised that two senior staff offi�
cers from AFHQ were preparing to proceed to Switzer�
land, together with certain selected OSS personnel.
Meanwhile, however, things were not going smoothly
on the German side, and we encountered the first of
a series of misfortunes which dogged our footsteps
until the final surrender on May 2. On March 12,
Baron Parrilli, who at considerable personal risk
acted throughout as emissary between Wolff's head�
quarters at Fasano and the Swiss frontier, arrived
in Switzerland, and we had a midnight meeting with
him in Lucerne. He reported that when General Wolff.
reached Fasano, early on March 10, on his return trip
from Switzerland, he telephoned Kesselring and found
to his dismay that Kesselring had been summoned by
Hitler and had gone to the Fuehrer HQ. While he
might be back, there was a chance � and we in Switzer�
land felt it was more a probability than a chance �
that he would never come back. Wolff reported it
might, therefore, be necessary to postpone the plans
for the next meeting, though he was prepared to re�
turn to Switzerland at any time upon our call.
On receipt of this report, we sent Parrilli back to
Wolff at Fasano with these questions:
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(a) What did he propose to do if Kbsselring
did not return?
(b) What would he do if he likewise were or-
dered to report to the Fuehrer?
(c) If he refused to report, what was his
plan, and what forces did he dispose
of to carry it out?
(d) What areas could he temporarily control
for possible contact with our forces,
even if the principal army commanders
did not cooperate?
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It should be added that Parrilli also reported
to us that Wolff had received peremptory instruction
from Kaltenbrunner to break off any contacts he, Wolff,
had in Switzerland, as Kaltenbrunner had his own plans
and that what Wolff was doing might spell catastrophe
for these plans. This was sufficient clew to lead us
to feel that Kaltenbrunner, and if so Himmler, now knew
a good deal more than we could have wished about what
Wolff was doing, and that they were both undoubtedly
starting to d+hat they could to block Wolff's program.
The leak, apparently, occured because Harster, Himmler's
top Sicherheitsdienst man in Italy, who had been to
some extent in Wolff's councils, had taken fright and
had advised Kaltenbrunner and Himmler of Wolff's activil
ties.
This disturbing information about Kesselring's
parture and Kaltenbrunner's intervention reached Caserta
before the departure from-Caserta of the high Allied
staff officers, but their plans had been so far laid
that it seemed wise to the High Command not to change
them. We were, therefore, advised that the American
Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, deputy Chief of Staff
to Marshal Alexander, and the British Major General
Terence Airey, G-2 of APHQ, would arrive at Lyon on
March 13. With them were Colonel Glavin, Lieutenant
Colonel Weil, Captain Crockett, and others of the OSS
staff in Italy. Meanwhile, the Russians were fully ad-
vised of the developments to date and consideration
was given to the feasibility of adding a Russian offi-
cer to those who were coming to Switzerland.
While Generals Lemnitzer and Airey were on their
way from Lyon to the Swiss frontier at Annemasse, Baron
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Parrilli returned from a conference with Wolff. He
reported that Wolff had made his decision to proceed
and that his decision was not affected by the change
in the situation due to Kesselring's departure.
Wolff also gave the following answers to the specific
questions which had been sent him:
(a) If asked by the Fuehrer to return to Ger�
many during Kesselring's absence, he would
refuse, stating that it was impossible to
leave the situation in North Italy without
a chief. If summoned to do so after Kessel�
ring's return, he would delay and if neces�
sary allege illness.
(b) If Kesselring did not return, Wolff was
ready to prepare a plan of his own and come
to a meeting if we desired. If a substitute
for Kesselring was appointed, Wolff had two
possible choices: either he could try to win
over the substitute, or he could act alone.
Wolff had apparently not decided which of
these alternatives it would be best to follow
as this depended on the personality .of the
successor.
As to what he could do, if required to act
alone, Wolff indicated that he would draw up
a plan of the forces which he felt he could
dispose of and what he would need. This
would include the possibility of facilitating
a coastal landing or the seizure of airfields.
Wolff further stated that he was prepared to accept
at his HQ any radio man we might wish to send and would
arrange safe conduct for him. Wolff then expressed
through Baron Parrilli his apprehension over the activi�
ties of Kaltenbrunner, Himmler's second in command, who
was endeavoring also to make contact with us through
an agent named Hoettel. Wolff thought that both Him�
ler and Kaltenbrunner were trying to throw up a smoke
screen by starting a fake peace offensive of their own.
He also was apprehensive that Kaltenbrunner might be
'planning g visit to North Italy in the effort to tie
Wolff down there and prevent his leaving. In this con�
nection, he begged us to be particularly careful with
our ciphers, because he knew that at one time in 1943
certain messages sent from Bern had been read and gave
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some details of his knowledge on this point. (The
fact that certain ciphers used by certain services
in Bern, not OSS, had been read in 1943, had been
disclosed to us at the time by certain Germans who
were reporting to us, and the ciphers had been dis�
carded.)
Wolff also sent us word that he had narrowly
escaped being shot up by our fighter bombers on his
return trip from Switzerland, a week before. His
chauffeur and one officer had been shot and he sent
us a memento a burned piece of cloth from his coat.
He suggested that the work might be helped, if our
bombers could go a little more lightly on the Milan�
Fasano road.
After this conference with Parrilli, A.W.D. went
to Annemasse, the French border town opposite Geneva,
and there met with Generals Lemnitzer and Airey and
the OSS officers accompanying them, and described
the unfortunate turn events had taken due to Kassel�
ring's removal from North Italy. The Sunrise plan
had been largely built upon team play between Kassel�
ring and Wolff. Our information indicated,, they
trusted each other and could work together. It was
now necessary to build anew, which might take time.
A. W. D. reported on the latest message from Wolff
which he had received from Baron Parrilli earlier in
the day. The two Generals felt that having come so
far, they did not wish to turn back and would proceed
to Bern if the trip could be arranged. They sug�
gested, therefore, that Parrilli return to Fasano and
advise Wolff that it was desirable for him to come
to Switzerland for another conversation with A. W.D.
in the light of the new situation. No mention was .
to be made of the arrival of officers from Caserta.
For two high ranking Allied officers to enter
Switzerland, without their presence becoming known to
the enemy, was no easy task. It seemed unwise to
trump up some inocuous mission such as prisoner of
war wo* or army purchases, as such subterfuges would
hardly stand up under fire. It was, therefore, de�
cided to arrange their entry under assumed names, as
the guests of A.W.D. and for consultation with him.
In this capacity, they would come in openly and legally,
but once in Switzerland they would be required to re�
strict their contacts to the selected circle of a
handful of people who were in the know. The question
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of some identification papers was a problem, but
finally we hit upon the solution of taking the
identification tags, which fortunately omit date
of birth, of two of the radio operators at the
Annemasse base, two Army sergeants, named respec�
tively Nicholson and McNeely; the American General
became Nicholson, and the Englishman, McNeely. We
then discussed the problem of arranging for a
Russian to join the American and British Generals,
in case the negotiations should take a favorable
turn. This presented certain additional difficul�
ties, due to the fact that Russia had no diplomatic
relations with Switzerland, and the introduction
of a high Russian officer was, therefore, not easy.
A program was worked out to effect this, in case it
should be desired by the Russian Government, and
appropriate information on this subject was sent to
Caserta.
A.W.D. then returned to Bern and arranged through
a Swiss friend, who controlled the question of entry
into Switzerland, for his two friends, Nicholson and
McNeely, to come to Bern on March 15 for a few days
consultation. He installed them in his apartment
and assumed responsibility for them while in Switzer�
land -- an easy tak, as two more accomplished and
reasonable gentlemen could hardly have been found in
the Armies of the United States and Great Britain.
They accepted without question each and every pre�
caution which was thrown about them during their
three weeks stay in Switzerland, to prevent any ink�
ling of their presence there coming to the attention
of the enemy. In fact, hardly a dozen persons knew
they were in Switzerland until weeks later and most
of them did not know their true identity. Before
General Airey purchased the dachshund "Fritzel", which
the British press has made famous, the security angles
of this abnormal "operation" were carefully considered
and it was decided that no one would suspect that an
eminent British General on an important secret mission
would go shopping for a dachshund and that this was in
fact an excellent security measure. Thereafter,
Fritzel accompanied us wherever we, or rather General
Airey, Went.
Upon his arrival in Bern, General Lemnitzer
cabled again with regard to the adding of a Russian
officer to the group stating: "I have now had an
opportunity to observe the security measures required
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in getting getting Airey and me to Bern. Our position is
considerably underground since we are in civilian
clothes and are using assumed names. The intro-
duction of a Russian officer must obviously be even
more underground. He should arrive at Lyon or Di-
jon, in civilian clothes, where OSS will meet him
and bring him to the frontier and arrange for his
crossing. If it is decided to add a Russian officer
to our group, the earliest information would be
helpful in completing our plans for getting him to
Bern."
�
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V. The Second Meeting with
General Wolff.
Upon returning to Bern from Annemasse on the
evening of March 14, A.W.D. sent Parrilli back to
Pasano to tell Wolff that if he was prepared to
return to Switzerland and had a concrete plan, he
would be received and that we would be in a posi�
tion to consult quickly on any technical points.
We suggested that he should be accompanied by
such military advisers, as security permitted,
and as he might consider advisable. No mention
was made to him, however, of the arrival of any
officers from APHQ. We further sent word to
Wolff that we would defer the question of sending
a radio operator to his HQ until we had out next
&conversation with him. To be on the safe side,
however, a suitable radio operator had been brought
up from Caserta and was waiting at the Swiss fron�
tier in case we should need him.
On March 17, we received information through
our established lines of comtunication that Wolff
would come to Switzerland on March 19, fot a meet�
ing, and most careful plans were laid to hold this
meeting in complete secrecy. The place had to be
in the vicinity of the Swiss�Italian frontier,
South of the Gotthard Pass, as the pass was still
covered with snow and could only be travelled by
train through the tunnel. Wolff was too well known
to too many people who might be travelling that
route to risk another train trip. It was only great
good luck that he had escaped recognition during his
previous trip to Zurich. It was decided to hold the
meeting in Ascona, as G.G. had two houses there at
his disposal which were separated by about a mile,
a charming villa on the lake, and a more extensive
estate on the hill, both admirably located for se�
curity purposes. Ascona is a quiet town with just
enough holiday guests at this season to permit the
influx of a dozen or more people to remain unobserved,
granted they did not publicly foregather. The train
journey for Generals Lemnitzer, Airey, Colonel Glavin
and the other OSS personnel was carefully arranged.
By a separate train the communications personnel
reached Ascona to set up a clandestine radio which
was to link Ascona directly with Caserta. Automobiles,
under carefully selected escort, were to pick up the
Germans near Ohiasso and bring them directly to Ascona.
Fortunately, the plans carried through without a mis�
hap, and Wolff arrived accompanied by his aides, Major
Wenner and Zimmer, at the point of rendezvous on the
morning of March 19.
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In making these arrangements, as well as for sub�
stantive advice and guiding throughout the entire
period of the conversations, we were deeply indebted
to Major Max Waibel of the Swiss General Staff.
Without his help we could never have effectively
maintained the contact between Switzerland and
Wolff's HQ. We could not have sent our radio oper�
ator to Milan or Bolzano, we could not have main�
tained that secrecy which*was essential to success,
but in addition to all this we had at each stage
of this kaleidoscopic adventure the benefit of his
sound advice, based on intimate knowledge of the
technique and tactics of the Germans. In all his
actions, Major Waibel conducted himself solely as
a good Swiss, working in the interests of his own
country to prevent the destruction of North Italy
'and the flooding over onto Swiss soil of the rem�
nants of a beaten but still combatant German Army.
Swiss interest in the orderly surrender of the
German Army in North Italy and the peaceful turn�
ing over of the caunt/y to Allied occupation was
only second to that of the Allies themselves.
The conversations with General Wolff started
with a two hour conference in the morning during
which he was alone with A.W.D. and G.G. The follow�
ing is taken from notes of this conversation which
were made at the time:
Wolff remarked that he, like so many other
Germans, had been for some time impressed with the
classical argument of the propagandists and of Head�
quarters that a change for the better might still be
brought about in the German situation; that there
were new secret weapons at the disposal of the High
Command and that the Dusenjaeger were far superior
to any other aeroplane and would soon change the
military situation. His trips to Switzerland had
sufficed to clear his mind of this fog, and that he was
now convinced as to what he must do for his homeland
and that he was prepared to stand or fall by the enter�
prise in which he was engaged.
In effect he had three possible alternatives and
which alternatives should be chosen depended upon how
long he had in which to act. If there was practically
no time available, he would halle to do what he could
alone and this might not be very effective with his own
unaided forces. If he had three or four days to pre�
pare, he would go directly to Vietinghoff, who had
replaced Kesselring in command of the German Armies
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in Italy, and see whether he could enlist his aid.
If he had from five days to a week, he would strongly
recommend the desirability of his going immediately
to Kesslring HQ on the West Front for the reasons
which he would explain.
In reply to A.W.D.'s request that Wolff briefly
review the developments since the meeting ten days
ago, Wolff stated that K.esselring had taken over
Rundstedt's command. Wolff had hoped, on hearing this
,_news, that Kesselring would return to Italy to make
his adieus to Mussolini and to pack his effects, but
the situation on the west front was so serious that
he had not been allowed to do this and had apparently
gone directly from his conference at the Fuehrer HQ
to hii'xiew command. Vietinghoff was expected in North
Ilaly on�.that very day, March 19, to take over Kessel-
ring's fCriner command. In reply to A.W.D.'s inquiry
about Vietinghoff's movements) Wolff stated that Vie-
tinghoff had gone on leave when Kesselring had returned
to North Italy in the middle of January after recovering
from the serious injury he had receive'd some months be-
fore. Sometime towards the end of January, Vietinghoff
had taken over the command in North Italy as Oberbefhls-
hab er Sudwest
In reply to A.W.D.'s inquiry, Wolff said that he
had had no direct contact with Kesselring since his de-
parture from North Italy some ten days ago and that he
did not wish to communicate with him by telephone. He
could only assume, knowing his general attitude, that
he had taken over his new duties as a soldier under the
Fuehrer's orders, but probably with a heavy heart.
A.W.D. inquired regarding a report in the Swiss.
press to the effect that Wolff had had a recent impor-
tant conference with Mussolini. Wolff replied that
this was not quite exact. When he returned from his
last visit here he found an invitation from Mussolini
asking him to join an inspection of some black shirt
brigades, that he had to accept this invitation.and he
was with Mussolini on a brief inspection trip which was
interrupted by a serious air raid. Three of the cars
in the procession *ere shot up, his chauffeur was shot
in the arm, and alieutenant of his was killed. Hence,
he had no long conversation with Mussolini on this occa-
sion and had not seen him since.
In reply to A.W.D.'s inquiry about Mussolini, Wolff
said that he, was pulled this way and that lv the women
around him, i.e. the l'ettaci sisters, who really control-
led his movements and decisions. Wolff thought that if
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he were left to himself he would put himself at the head
of a black shirt brigade and let himself be killed in
action, but that under the influence of the women, he
might try to take refuge in Switzerland or do something
of that nature. Wolff did not consider him as of any
substantive importance in connection with his, Wolff's,
problem.
Returning to an analysis of the three alternatives
before him and the changed situation since the previous
conference of March 8A, due to Kesselringis departure,
Wolff outlined the forces which he had at his own due
disposal. He stated that they were of a very hetrogeneous
nature and did not have any great supply of heavy arms.
They had a few rather ancient tanks and light weapons.
Wolff remarked that he had two functions and would out-
lirie the forces he had under each separately. He was
both Hochster SS- und Polizeifiihrer and Bevollmilchtiger
General der Deutschen Wehrmacht in Italy. He had taken
over his first-named functions in September, 19431 hav-
ing previously been in the Fuehrer HQ as liaison officer
for the Waffen-SS. As HOchster SS- und Polizeifiihrer
he had the following forces at his disposal, the figures
being approximate: 15,000 Germans, 20,000 Russians
(Cossacks, Don 'Cubans and Turcomans), 10,000 Serbs,
10,000 Slovenes, 5,000 Czechs and an Indian Legion, and
100,000 Italians, militia, black shirts and the X MAS.
As Bevollmaechtigter General der Deutschen Wehrmacht
in Italy, which function he had taken over only at the
end of July, he had directly under his command 10,000
Germans and he also had under his tactical command for
use in case of attack an additional 55,000 Germans,
mostly supply troops, etc. for the region north of the
Po. Except for the Germans this heterogeneous comman4 was
not particularly dependable and was widely scattered, the
Serbs and Slovenes being mostly in the extreme eastern
section around the Goetz area. Any action which he took
based solely on his own forces and if he had no Wehrmacht
support, would probably find him caught between the OXW
to the south and to the north.
As regards the prospect of accomplishing something
directly with Vietinghoff, Wolff stated that his rela-
tions with Vietinghoff had been close and friendly and
he felt he had been oirconsiderable help to Vietinghoff
during the protracted period when Kesselring was absent
daring his injury. However, Vietinghoff was a non-
political soldier and he would not be an easy man to
gain over to a political action unless he had the support
of others in the Wehrmacht. Further, Wolff had never
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discussed the proposed type of action with Vietinghoff
who might therefore be unprepared for it since obviously,
while K.esselring was in command, he, Wolff, had discussed
the matter solely with the latter.
Here again Wolff remarked that it was all a question
of the time at his disposal. The German command had in�
dications which led them to believe that there would be
a big Allied offensive in Italy by the end of this month.
If he had a minimum of five or possibly seven days
he would strongly favor an immediate visit to Kesselring.
He would have to take this trip by auto as the arrange�
ments for an aeroplane trip would render the security
difficult and there were other problems involved in going
by air. As he controlled the Police forces on the Brenner
and beyond he could, subject to the interruptions which
Brenner traffic had, proceed by car to Germany and take
up the whole matter with Kbsselring. With Kesselring the
ground work had already been id in previous conversations
which Wolff had had with him. Wolff had a perfectly
legitimate reason to visit Kesselring since there were
many unfinished matters relating to the Italian situation
which he should go over with him.
A.W.D. stated to Wolff that he had available for
consultation competent military advisers and he would
like to discuss with them the various matters that
Wolff had brought up. G.G. and A.W.D. stated, however,
that their first impression was that Wolff should probably
follow his own judgment regarding a visit to Kesselring.
They could not, of course, state, � as they did not know, �
how much time was available for action; all they did know
was that the time was exceedingly short.
A. W. D. remarked that his military friends had never
understood why the Germans had continued to maintain a
large force in North Italy, given the present German
military situation. Wolff then repeated and expanded what
he had previously said, viz, that the orders had been all
prepared and approved by Hitler for an evacuation of a
large part of North Italy in September 1944. Under this
plan nine divisions would have been available for other
sectors. 'Both he and the military people in North Italy
felt that the line could be held for some time to come
and had opposed the move in September. The food supplies
available in North Italy were considerable, Italian in�
dustry had some value, a great deal was then being taken
out of North Italy and advanced air bases in the Italian
plain would be a serious danger to Germany. These in
effect were the arguments they used at that time and
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Hitler swung over and subsequently lad been opposed to
evacuation for the same reasons that impelled him to
hold on in Norway and other such areas. Hitler was
afraid of what they call a "Raeumungspsychose" (with�
drawal complex), fearing that this would become epidemic
after the complete defeat in France and lead to a general
breakdown.
A.W.D. asked Wolff how he explained the telegram
he had received from Kaltenbrunner, advising Wolff to
have no contacts in Switzerland as "this would have a
catastrophic effect." Wolff answered that he thought
that Kaltenbrunner believed that he himself was developing
ing a line and did not want this disturbed. Kaltenbrunner
had tried to get him to come to Innsbruck for a meeting
but Wolff said that he had refused on the ground that he
could not absent himself during Kesselring's absence.
In reply to an inquiry as to what Wolff thought about the
ideaof a German reduit in the Alps, Wolff remarked that
this was madness, that it would only bring untold and
unnecessary suffering on the German people and that every�
thing must be done to prevent it.
Wolff stated, in reply to an inquiry, that he was
quite ready to take in a radio man or two men if we pre�
ferred. It was desirable that they speak German and that
while he would be responsible for their safety, they would
have to accept rather strict regulations about circula�
ting. He suggested that it would be of no use to have the
men there during his absence in Germany, but suggested
that they be ready to come in within three or four days.
A.W.D. pointed out to Wolff that to realize any pro�
gram of surrender there were complicated and technical
military matters to be settled. It was easy to start .a
war but difficult to stop one. It would, therefore, be
necessary in connection with giving effect to the surren�
der to have conferences between technical military men and
these could best take place at the HQ of the Allied forces.
Wolff replied he recognized this and that he would be pre�
pared as soon as the plan materialized to send competent
persons to Allied HQ. In reply to A.W.D.'s inquiry
whether this should be through the lines or via Switzer�
land, he said that secrecy could be better preserved if
we could then arrange for them to be met at the Swiss�
Italian frontier and if we could then take them from
there to southern Italy.
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The conversation then turned again on the relations
between Kesselring and Vietinghoff and whether Vietinghoff
would possibly act on his own. Wolff emphasized that
Kesselring's prestige was far greater than that of Vie-
tinghoff, that if Kesselring went alon4any plan, Vieting-
hoff would be easy to gain, that Kesselring knew the
situation in Italy and what could be done, and his support
would, in Wolff's opinion, be vital in securing the collabo-
ration of Vietinghoff.
G.G. asked Wolff what other commanders on the western
front would be likely to cooperate with Kesselring and
specifically inquired about Blaskowitz. Wolff replied
that Blaskowitz was the type of man who would not take
risks and would probably not be inclined to act unless
he were 90 percent sure of success. As to others there,
he mentioned SS General Hauser, who had fought in Normandy
and who he believed had taken over command of the northern
group of Armies on the West front. He would possibly be
a man with whom Kesselring could work. This ended the
morning conversation with Wolff.
During the lunch hour, A.W.D. and G.G. reported fully
to Generals Lemnitzer and Airey, and the Generals decided,
after full consideration that they would themselves meet
Wolff briefly in the afternoon, that they would not give
their names or identity, but that they would appear as the
military advisers of A.W.D.
qicutozni..
A.W.D. opened thexmeeting by explaining to Wolff
that he had reported on the results of the morning meet-
ing and that his military advisers now thought that it
was an appropriate time to meet to discuss certain matters
with Wolff. General liemnitzer then conducted the balance
of the meeting.
He explained that the report he had received of the
morning meeting had furnished a good picture of the our-
rent problems facing Wolff as the result of the changed
situation which had arisen. It was his view that the
defeat of Germany was inevitable, and that it was impera-'
tive that this should be realized by all concerned as
quickly as possible. He regretted that there must be
some delay due to the changes in command which had occurred.
He had hoped for quicker action but he understood the
difficulty in securing quicker action due to circumstances
described by Wolff.
General Lemnitzer stressed the importance of the
time factor in this matter. He felt that Wolff as a
soldier also understood that time, as in any operation,
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was a vital factor. General Lemnitzer stated that he
realized that Wolff would now need more time to put his
own plans into operation. He stated that Wolff alone was
in a position to assess the German situation existing in
Northern Italy and that it was up to him, in collaboration
with the appropriate military Commanders, to produce
specific plans and proposals to achieve the desired end.
General Lemnitzer also pointed out the need and urgency
for extremely careful consideration of the military
problems involved. He suggested that it was necessary
for authorized and qualified military persons to be pro�
duced by Wolff to meet with Allied military representa�
tives for the purpose of working out the detailed plan.
The quicker that action was taken, the better. It was
decided to leave to Wolff the responsibility for arrang�
ing to secure appropriate military representatives and
bripg them out via Switzerland.
Wolff then pointed out that there would be two
representatives, both in civilian clthes, and that he
proposed to deliver them to Chiasso, a town on the
Swiss�Italian border. General Lemnitzer then emphasized
that there should be no worry on. Wolff's part about se�
curity and secrecy of the two representatives, as they
would be wholly protected.
A.W.E. then asked Wolff to explain his reasons for
wanting to see Kesselring before visitng Vietinghoff.
Wolff explained that first he was confident of more
success by following that plan. He had been very close
to Kesselring for a long time and in certain ways had
already made approaches to Kesselring on this problem.
Thus, he pointed out that he would not be presenting a
new or startling problem to Kesselring, but one with which
he was already familiar. On the other hand, he had never
talked about this problem to Vietinghoff and, therefore,
it would be difficult to broach the subject to him with
any expectation of success until he could guarantee
Kesselring's and Westfal's complete support. General
Lemnitzer then asked specifically for Wolff's view as
to what he thought Kesstl4ng would do when-approached
by Wolff. Wolff replied that this would depend entirely
on whether his mission to Kesselring was successful or
not. He, himself, expected to go directly from Kessel�
ring's headquarters to meet Vietinghoff, or would be
prepared to come directly to the border, depending on
what Kesselring recommended. Gene2a1 Lemnizter then asked
approximately how long it would take for all this to take
place. Wolff replied that he was no prophet, but with
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�26�
good luck and freedom from Allied aircraft attack, he
believed five days would be the minimum. He explained
that he could not fly for certain technical reasons (lack
of fuel and attack by Allied aircraft). Thus he must go
by car and this might be quite slow as the roads are
frequently under air attack. However, he fully realized
the urgency and would do his utmost to accomplish the
task as quickly as possible. He believed he would take
a maximum of seven days, and would do his best to do it
in less.
General Lemnitzer then asked how Wolff proposed to
get Vietinghoff into this picture. He pointed out that
this was the important factor. Wolff replied that he
was going to see Kesselring, and then he would visit
Vietinghoff. As far as Vietinghoff was concerned he had
been very close to him during the time Vietinghoff was in
command for three months in Northern Italy during Kessel�
ring's absence due to wounds. Once Kesselring had been
won over, he did not anticipate difficulty with Vieting�
hoff, in view of the close relationship existing between
Wolff and Vietinghoff. General Lemnitzer then asked Wolff
whether he had any questions to ask. Wolff had none.
G.G. then raised the question as towhat would be the solu�
tion in the event that Kesselring sent out military
representatives with Wolff in addition to those produced
by Vietinghoff. General Lemnitzer stated that such a
situation, if it did arise, would be referred to senior
Allied military headquarters for decision. He again
strongly emphasized the importance of time and, to that
end, recommended that the close working arrangements nom
existing between Wolff and A.W.D. be maintained.
Wolff then asked where the Gelman military representa�
tives were wanted. General Lemnitzer said they should.be
prepared to come to an Allied headquarters, as detailed
military discussions could best be held there. He re�
peated that the officers authorized to act for the Army
Group Commander must come to a military headquarters.
His view was that they would be delivered to the OSS
representative in Switzerland who would arrange for their
transportation to Allied headquarters. Wolff indicated
that he now understood the complete framewak of the
problem and fully realized that it was up to him to fill
in this framework as quickly as he possibly could.
After the Generals withdrew, A.W.D. and G.G. had a
further brief talk with Wolff and then with_Husmann and
Parrilli. It was agreed that if any question ever arose
with regard to the meetings with Wolff, he would state
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�27�
that the purpose of his trip had been in connection
with prisoner exchange matters. To build up his story,
he asked us whether we could not give them some German
officer in exchange for Parri: and Usmiani, whom he had
already delivered. As he left, he assured us that he
would comezgain as soon as possible and he hoped also
with plenipotentiaries from Kesselring's new headquarters.
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VI. Kesselring and Himmler
Make Their Influence Felt.
The Allied members of the party then returned from
Ascona and reassembled in Bern, and there were several
days of delay before the next item of information was
received. On March 26, Zimmer established contact with
Wolff by telephone from Milan via Fasano. Wolff stated
that he was at Ebsselring's headquarters on the West Front
and that he could not return for several days. He hoped
that the delay would not result in breaking the contact.
which had been established but the technical difficulties
of his trip had been greater than he anticipated, and
that Kesselring had been so much on the move and so busy
(in view of the break through on the western front,
this statement seems more than plausible) that he had
had. a hard time in getting much of his time, that he
hoped to return with a complete progrAm, and that this
might require two or three days longer.
Wolff asked Zimmer to find out from A.W.D. whether
this delay would be fatal and if "the gentlemen would go
away in anger." (verargert abreisen...) Wolff urged
Zimmer to get the whole story over to'..A.W.D0 and to ';:ry
to keep the door open. This message was received by
General Airey and A.W.D., who had made another trip to
Ascona. Further days went by with no news of Wolff,
until, finally, on March 30, a report was received that
he had returned to Fasano and arrangements were accord�
ingly made for a further meeting to be held at Ascona
as soon as Wolff could get to the Swiss frontier.
On March 31, Zimmer again crossed the frontier and
gave us the following report:
Wolff had arrived at Fasano Friday morning and im�
mediately summoned Parrilli and Zimmer to Fasano where
they spent Friday afternoon together. Zimmer was then
sent here by Wolff, Parrilli remaining in Fasano.
Wolff endeavored to contact Vietinghoff before he
went .to see Kesselring, but was unable to reach him.
The trip to Kesselring had been most difficult
and when he reached Kesselring's headquarters, hell had
already broken loose. The first conversation took
place only 15 km from our advancing forces. Wolff pre�
sented his plan for the Italian surrender and Kesselring
advised him to go through with it. He, Kesselring, re�
gretted that he was not also in Italy.
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In a second conversation with Kesselring, the latter
again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and said
that he should so advise Vietinghoff, but added that on
his front he could not "go along" (uitmachen). Kesselring
found himself largely surrounded-by strangers whom he did
not trust. Zimmerigned the impression from Wolff that
Kesselring was half a prisoner.
Immediately on his return Wolff had tried to reach
Vietinghoff but he was on an inspection trip at the front
and was returning to his HQ only on the night of the 31st.
Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend
Sunday with him. Wolff sent this message through Zimmer
for A.W.D.: "I am ready to come to a final conversation
in order to arrange matters. I hope to come with Rahn,
Dollmann and either Vietinghoff or a staff officer."
!Zahn had been called back to Germany lout avoided the
trip by alleging serious strike conditionsngorth Italy which
he had to handle. Harster did return to Germany but ap�
parently on account of a row with Gauleiter Hofer of the
Tyrol. Neither summons was believed to be connected with
Sunrise.
While in Germany, and this was one of the reasons for
his delay in returning, Wolff was summoned by Himmler who
asked him to explain his action in giving up prisoners.
Wolff replied that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted
to give the Fuehrer a German General and close friend of
Hitler's as a birthday present. Himmler also accused him
of having been in Switzerland and asked the reasons.
Wolff answered that he had a contact in Milan who promised
to bring him in touch with the Allies and that he was act�
ing pursuant to the Fuehrer's recent secret order to seek
any possible contact with the Allies. Wolff had heard that
many efforts had failed and wanted to see what he could do.
Himmler ordered Wolff to wait around for a couple of days
as he wanted toihink the matter over. Himmler told him
that he should not leave Italy, and particularly that he
should not go to Switzerland. Fortunately, however,
Himmler was suddenly called urgently to Hungary and referred
Wolff to Kaltenbrunner. Wolff did not see Kaltenbrunner but
left for Italy.
In his Conversation with Kesselring, the latter said to
Wolff, "Our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell the
truth to the Fuehrer, who is surrounded by a small group of
advisers, who still believe in a last specific secret weapon
which they call the 'Ver4iflungs' weapon." Kesselring be�
lieved that although this weapon could prolong the war it
could not decide it, it might cause a terrible blood bath
on both sides. Kesselring said if the Fuehrer gave him the
order to use the weapon he would surrender his command.
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VII. General Wolff Fails to Put in
an Appearance but Sends a Message
On April 2, the day fixed for the meeting with Wolff,
Parrilli alone appeared and gave us at Ascona the following
message:
He had spent from Friday, March 30, to Monday at 0500
hours at Wolff's HQ at Fasano in constant contact with him.
Meanwhile, Wolff was endeavoring to establish contact
with Vietinghoff, whom he had arranged to see Sunday April 1,
and Monday morning April 2, at his HQ, some 150 km from Fasano.
On Sunday, April 1, Himmler who had now returned to his
HQ in Germany, called Wolff on the telephone at 1130 and said
peremptorily that he expected him to stay in Italy and that
he, Rimmler, would telephone him periodically. Then he added
somewhat sarcastically that he understood that Wolff had sent
his family to a point near the Brenner, but that he, Rimmler,
had taken better care of them and thought they were safer
elsewhere, so they were going back immediately to St. Wolfgang,
near Salzburg.
Wolff said to Parrilli that if he had only his family
to think of, he would not alter his program, .but that if
Himmler also arrested him now, which he would do, if Wolff
made a false move, then the whole project would fall to the
ground, that as a corpse he could be helpful neither to the
German people nor to the Allies. Wolff believed that Himmler
had given special instructions that he, Wolff, should be watchg,d.
Therefore, he must be very careful and could not move at the
moment. Major Wenner, Wolff's aide, gave Parrilli the im-
pression that Wolff was in danger of assassination.
Wolff had talked with Ambassador Rahn and Rahn was in
agreement with his prbgram.
Sunday evening, April 1, at 2000 hours, Wolff left
Fasano to visit Vietinghoff at this HQ and arrived back at
0430 hours. Wolff reported that he had seen Vietinghoff and
his chief of staff, Roettiger, and affirmed that both of them
were in agreement with him. Vietinghoff was reported to have
remarked that it was nonsense to go on with the fighting.
Wolff, in conversation with Parrilli, said that
Kesselring had told Wolff when he saw him that it might
last 10 to 15 days longer in Germany, but that Germany was
Lacing a:catastrophe. Wolff had passed on to Vietinghoff
this report and his impressions of his visit to Kesselring.
Wolff asked Parrilli to pass on the message to A.W.D.
that if they could be given a little more time, say ten days,
he could hand over North Italy on a silver platter.
Parrilli reported that from April 2, a new degree of
alarm (Alarmstufe) for North Italy had been prescribed from
,f�-�
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Germany, and that everyone was held in readiness.
Parrilli understood that instructions for the rapid
carrying out of destruction in North Italy had been given
from Germany and that Wolff no longer had control in the
ports of Genoa or Trieste. Wolff and Vietinghoff had dis-
cussed this question and Parrilli had gained the impression
that both of them were opposed and would do what they could
to prevent destruction. According to Wolff, Vietinghoff
had received instructions in case of a general Allied attack,
to withdraw to the Alps fighting (kdmpfend abzusetzen),
destroying as they went.
With regard to the new V weapon, Wolff had been able
to get no information about it and he understood that even
Nesselring did not know what it was, that it was in the hands
of specialists for employment. Wolff confirmed that Kessel-
ing would oppose the use of this new weapon.
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VIII. General Wolff's Message is Answered
After getting the various sidelights of the situation,
Parrilli was given two messages for Wolff which he was to
memorize as we refused to send along anything in writing.
The first was a general message and the second a personal
message from A.W.D. These two messages are quoted below:
First message: "We have received your messages and
are glad to learn that you have achieved your object in
winning over Vietinghoff and Roettiger to your plan.
Therefore, we trust that the necessary machinery can
now be set in motion.
"If military surrender can be effected, it must be
done very quickly in view of the collapse of organized
German resistance in the west and the threat to their
tines of communication in the north. This should be
effected by sending military parliamentarians through the
lines at a point and at a time and date which may be com-
municated via Parrilli and A.W.D. to the south. Parlia-
mentarians, crossing the lines, should use the password
Narnberg. If it is preferred to send parliamentarians
south via Switzerland, this can also be arranged, but it
has the disadvantage of taking longer. If there is not
time to send word via Switzerland that Parliamentarians
are coming, then the usual parliamentarians can be sent
on any grounds that they consider suitable for this purpose,
using the above password upon reaching the Allied lines. If
Wolff desires to come personally with Vietinghoff, or a high
staff officer of Vietinghoff, every effort will be made to
have him met by the two gentlemen he saw in Ascono,among
others".
Second message: "Wolff should also be reminded of what
A.W.D. and G.G. previously emphasized to him, viz, that
pending surrender it is vital to prevent the carrying out
of any Hitler Himmler instructions regarding destruction
in North Italy. Wolff and Vietinghoff must see to this.
"Wolff should also be reminded of his previous promise
to limit action against the partisans.
"The destruction of North Italy will merely add another
burden of responsibility on the German people, who, in one
form or another, will have to make good such destruction.
"Wolff had also assured A.W.D. that he would do all
in his power to protect Allied and partisan prisoners and
hostages in his hands. A.W.D. emphasized that Wolff and
Vietinghoff now had a final opportunity to act. Now it
is only action which counts. The alternative may be:
1) the assumption of co-responsibility for chaos
and destruction in North Italy, and
2) the eventual cutting off of a remnant of German
forces by the advancing Allies, bringing only further
futile sacrifice of German lives."
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This ended the first phase of Sunrise, which we
feared was heading for the rocks. Wolff appeared to
have fallen under the control of Himmler and it seemed
dubious whether he would have the power to save the
project, if he lacked the power to disobey Plmmler's
orders against absenting himself from his headquarters.
We returned to Bern rather discouraged.
In view of these developments Generals Ismnitzer
and Airey deemed it best to return to Caserta. They left
instructions with A.W.D. and G.G. to follow-up the matter
closely and to keep them advised of all developments, and
they expressed their readiness to return in the event that
their presence was needed.
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IX. April 9-10. More Messages
Vietinghoff Shows Signs of
Joining.
The next important entry in the diary of events was
on April 9. Baron Parrilli had taken our messages to
Fasano and delivered them to Wolff on April 3. Wolff
had in turn had a further meeting with Vietinghoff on the
night of April 5, and again on the afternoon of April 7.
The events of these days were described to us by Parrilli
as follows:
Between 1000 hours and 1300 hours, April 6, Wolff
had held a meeting with his commanders and informed them
that he would hold each personally responsible in his own
territory for preventing destruction in North Italy.
Mussolini had been alarmed by a press item, reading
as follows:
"German troops at Milan received on Wednesday the
-order not to leave their caserns. According to
Neo-Fascist and Nazi circles, this measure is
connected with negotiations which have commenced
to determine the fate of the German Army Italy.
Two members of the Resistance have been liberated
and taken to the frontier. Allegedly, they car-
ried definite propositions. One of these person-
alities is Ferruccio Parri, head of military
section of the C.L.N.A.I. Parri had been arrested
in Milan and imprisoned by the SS at Verona."
He summoned Ambassador Rahn and asked for explana-
tions. This forced Wolff to redouble his precautions
against premature disclosures.
On April 7, between 1400 and 1700 hours, Vieting-
hoff and Roettiger conferred with Wolff at Fasano.
Following this conference, Parrilli had a three-quarter
hour conference with Vietinghoff and Roettiger. (Dur-
ing this conference Vietinghoff was called to the tele-
phone and ordered five thousand additional troops to be
sent to the Oomacchio area, as the Allied offensive was
already undar way.) Following this conference, Parrilli
conferred until 0200 hours on April 8 with Wolff and
Dollmann, and then proceeded immediately to the frontier
with Wolff's adjutant to protect him against search as he
brought two memoranda summarizing the results of Wolff's
conferences with Vietinghoff and Roettiger and answering
the two oral messages which Parrilli had taken.
. .
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The first memorandum read, in translation:
"1 agree with your judgment of the military situa-
tion. I also consider that it would :be an ir-
responsible act to countenan-ce further bloodshed
and senseless destruction. This cannot derisively
influence the clearly apparent and early outcome
of the war.
"I am, therefore, prepared - however, only after
grave conflicts of conscience and out of a feeling
of deep responsibility towards the entire people -
to draw the consequences which the situation re-
quires, on the understanding that in any official
negotiations the following points be guaranteed:
"1) Withdrawal (Abzug) with military honor after
G the Cessation of hostilities.
"2) Maintenance of a modest contingent of the Army
Group as future instrument of order inside
Germany."
Parrilli explained that this message while dictated
by Wolff, expressed Vietinghoff's views. "Abzug", he said,
meant only eventual return to their homes when the prisoners
would be released. Point 21 he said, represented a wish.
(Here we felt that the over-enthusiastic intermediary was
attempting to explain away clearly untenable propositions.)
The second memorandum related largely to * preventing
destruction, limiting action against the partisans, pro-
tecting prisoners, etc. With regard to preventing destruc-
tion in North Italy, General Wolff confirmed his previous
understanding that he would do everything within his power
to prevent destruction, but that in the area where the German
Marine was in control, he could not give guarantees. This
was under the competence of Admiral Doenitz and Doenitz had
already issued his orders. Wolff, Vietinghoff and Rahn
had all intervened with the Fascist Marine authorities to
prevent marine-destruction, but did not wish to be held as
* After the conclusion of the capitulation, General Wolff
summarized, at the end of the report quoted in Chapter
XXII, what he felt he had been able to do to prevent des-
truction and limit warfare against the partisans. Here he
states:
"Finally, I wish to emphasize that upon my return from my
visit to Switzerland, in the early Part of March, I issued
orders to all SS, Police and Wehrmacht units, whose comman-
ders I called in to various conferences, and whom I placed
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guaranteeing success. With regard to limiting activities
against the partisans, the memorandum stated that an order
had been given to all German military authorities in North
Italy to remain on the defensive, except in cases of parti-
san attacks or serious sabotage acts by them. In this
connection, Wolff mentioned certain acts of sabotage by the
partisans and also repeated raids of the partisan bands under
Moscatelli, northwest of Novara, and attacks by Tito on the
Adriatic coast. Finally, in the second memorandum, General
Wolff confirmed that he recognized that this was their last
chance and that quick action was required.
After handing us the two memoranda and giving these oral
explanations, Parrilli added that Vietinghoff had taken the
position that the successful accomplishment of the surrender
might be prejudiced if it was necessary to send parliamen-
tarians back and forth through the lines several times and
tpat the matter should be settled if possible with one trip.
Therefore, Vietinghoff, Roettiger and Wolff joined in an
urgent request that they be given the draft of capitulation
which they were expected to sign.
Wolff had also stated to Parrilli that Vietinghoff
while recognizing the uselessness of the struggle, and
while he was willing to work with us to prevent destruction
and to spare lives, and would not follow senseless Hitler
Himmler orders, nevertheless he did not want to be a traitor.
Vietinghoff, he said, was ready to sign an unconditional sur-
render if it could be put in a form which was consonant with
his honor as a soldier and such that those surrendering
under strictest mandate, to avoid any destructions and to
prevent them if necessary by the use of force. I, myself,
for a year and a half always opposed destructions which
did not have a military character. Since March, I gained
over Army Commanders friendly to me such As Vietinghoff
and Roettiger and the Marine Commander Vice Admiral Loewitsch
so that the docks and port installations of Genoa and Trieste
were in general not destroyed, insofar as I now know. Major-
General von Leyers, in charge of the armament and production.
ministry and who was under my command, I made personally re-
sponsible to see to it that industrial destruction should be
avoided during the evacuation of Italy. In the conduct of war
against the partisans, I have endeavored to spare lives.
I succeeded in many cases in making local armistice agreements
with the partisans and three times I succeeded in terminating
general strikes in Turin, Milan and Genoa by negotiations
without bloodshed, despite contrary instructions from above.
Further, I obtained from the Duce, in October 1944, an am-
nesty for 80,000 partisans who were cut off in the high
snow mountains, and I protected them from counter-measures
by the Neo-Fascists.n
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would feel that they had behaved in a more honorable way
than the soldiers on other fronts who had uselessly sacri-
ficed life and property. Wolff said that it was a question
of words and of appearances. Wolff then made to Parrilli
the following rather curious suggestions to meet the point
of honor, suggestions which presumably originated with
Vietinghoff:
(a) The surrendering Germans would like to stand at
attention when the Allies arrive to accept their
surrender.
(b) The prisoners would like to do some useful work
such as repairing roads and railways in Italy.
The soldiers would like to keep their belts and
bayonets when eventually allowed to return home
as evidence that they surrendered from conviction
and not as a beaten rabble.
Wolff further stated to his messenger, Parrilli, that
events were moving fast and that the Italian theater was
rapidly becoming independent; that it was only a matter of
days before they would be cut off and on their own, an4
therefore, Vietinghoff, was beginning to feel that he must act
on his own initiative.
Parrilli concluded the resume of Wolff's attitude by
stating that Wolff felt he could hold to his promise to
deliver North Italy on a silver platter by April 16, and
that it was up to us to give the orders, that it was a matter
of timing and doing something to meet the point of military
honor.
Parrilli indicated to us that he was impressed by Vie-
tinghoff but he was obviously a soldier of the old school
who would fight on in a recognized hopeless situation rather
than act contrary to what he conceived to be military honor.
Parrilli's statement and the substance of the above
memoranda promptly reached Caserta. The Wolff-Vietinghoff
request that we furnish them with an outline of the surrender
terms looked tricky. Quite naturally AFHQ, as well as we in
Bern, felt that this was an effort to draw us into something
looking like Aegotiations. We had steadily refused to give
Wolff or Vietinghoff anything whatever in writing. We were
not negotiating, we were merely opening them a way to surren-
der, if they desired to do so. We were, therefore, instructed
to advise Wolff that the draft copy of the capitulation would
only be handed to the German parliamentarians on their arrival
at the appropriate Allied headquarters, in accordance with
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the usages of war, that we fully agreed as to the advis�
ability of speed, and that there shouldbe only one such
visit by parliamentarians, and that, therefore, any offi�
cers who were sent should come with absolute authority to
act. Parrilli left immediately for Fasano with this message
which was given him on April 10.
�
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X.
Establishment of Vital
Communication Links
The Allied offensive in Italy which was to drive the
Germans to the Alps was gaining momentum. We controlled the
air in North Italy and travel by our messenger from the Swiss
frontier to Fasano was becoming doubly perilous. The time
it took to get messages back and forth was increasing with
each trip. Meanwhile, the time for great decisions was nar-
rowing and something had to be done to improve our line of
communication from Bern to Wolff's headquarters. For security
reasons it was difficult to put a radio operator at Fasano,
the small town on the lake of Garda, where Wolff had his head-
quarters. We decided, however, to put an operator at Milan,
in the house of Wolff's aid, Zimmer. Across the border in
Alsace, with one of our units, we found a yonng Czech operator
who spoke good German and who could easily pass as a German.
He had been trained by us at Bari and had a signal plan and
ftstals for working directly with Bari and hence with Caserta.
It was a ticklish undertaking as we did not wish to give a
hostage to the Germans and did not wish to send in anyone who,
if captured by some SS units unfriendly to Wolff, would pos-
sibly give away the Sunrise story under torture. We decided
to take a chance on our Czech and he proved to be one of the
really star performers of the entire enterprise. We passed
him through Switzerland with his radio transmitter ciphers
and signal plan and gave him cryptic instructions. He was
told nothing whatever about Sunrise. He was instructed to
go to Milan with the person to whom he was delivered and to
encode and radio any message he received from this person.
He was, of course, trained in the usual precautionary secret
signals to give in the event he was taken over by anyone else
and forced to send fake messages. We ourselves in conjunction
with Caserta naturally assumed responsibility for determining
the credence to be put on any messages which he might receive
from Zimmer, Wolff's aide, to wham we consigned him. Little
Wally; as we dubbed Walter, proceeded to Chlasso and from
there to Milan with Zimmer, installed himself in Milan and
within 48 hours we had word from Caserta that his radib was
functioning and had been picked up by them. Some of little
Wally's messages were classic and some of them which he sent
from Bolzano, as reported in a later chapter of our story,
made history. One of his messages from Milan gave us the
location of General Vietinghoff's headquarters with an ob-
vious invitation to bomb it. This was promptly done, much
to General Vietinghoff's discomfort as he nearly lost his
life and did lose several of his officers. Why we were
given this location through the SS is somewhat of a puzzle,
but we rather assumed that at that stage of the proceedings,
Wolff thought it would do no harm to make things a little
warmer for the slow-moving Vietinghoff. A few days later
Wally radioed that Mussolini was in. Milan and was lodging
a few blocks away. Again Wally suggested a few bombs but
asked that care be taken so that one should not fall on
his own head, not many blocks away from the given objective.
Our Air Force decided not to waste bombs on Mussolini at
this stage because of the danger to the civilian population,
and by now Mussolini was no longer "big game".
* See following page.
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Footnote
Wally's real name is Vacalr Hradecky. He was born
on April 4, 1919 in Prague where he went to school and
high school and then entered the University of Prague
to study medicine. In December 1938 he joined the
Czech Army being dismissed in March 1939 after the
German occupation. The Germans arrested him in November
1939 and imprisoned him at Dachay. He escaped in April
1940 with some English and Czech parachute saboteurs
with whom he operated in Holland, Belgium and Germany
getting information on fortifications and munitions
dumps until once more arrested by the Germans in 1942.
Escaping again in the summer of 1943 he crossed into
Switzerland where he was interned until October 1944
at which time a third escape got him into Prance. He
was taken over by OSS in November 1944 and was sent
to Bari for training from December 1944 till February
1945. His mission in April 1945 to Milan was his first
as an OSS radio operator.
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Xi. April 13-16. New Adherents, Agents
Provocateurs, Himmler again Interferes
Our next news came on. April 13. Wolff was still
hopeful and was in direct telephone communication with
Kasselring, who by that time had been driven by our
Armies to a point between Nuremberg and the Czech fron-
tier. However, the most encouraging feature of this
message was that Luftwaffe General von Pohl, who had
about 50,000 air men and air ground forces under his
command, had joined Wolff's group in working for an un-
conditional surrender.
Now to make matters all the more complicated, two
apparent agents provocateurs appeared on the scene. A
Dr. Georg Gyssling arrived in Bern, stated that he was
German Consul at Merano and had been sent to A.W.D. with
an important message from Wolff. To add to the plausi-
4bility of his story, he gave several names of persons who
were on the inner circle of Sunrise negotiations and seemed
to know more about the matter than was good for UB or for
him. Gyssling talked with an associate of A.W.D. who
fortunately had not been working on Sunrise and who quite
truthfully told him that he knew nothing whatever about
the matter, that A.W.D. was in Paris. On his return,
A.W.D. advised Gyssling through his associate that he
was uninterested in his story, that he was expecting no
message from Wolff or anyone like him, that he would not
see him, and that as far as he, A.W.D., was concerned
Gyssling might return from where he had come. This matter
was never wholly solved, but we seriously suspect that
Gyssling was sent by Hofer, the Gauleiter of the Tyrol,
who had been in on some of the earlier Sunrise conversa-
tions at Wolff's headquarters. In the later phatiJes of
Sunrise Hofer played a disturbing and traitorous part,
and we believe that he sent Gyssling on a fishing expe-
dition to try to gain some ammunition which would permit
him to checkmate Wolff's plans.
The second appearance of an agent provocateur was in
quite a different quarter and took place almost simultane-
ously. A man who claimed, falsely no doubt, to be a British
officer turned up in the Genoa area and asked that a message
be sent to Vietinghoff, stating that he had been advised
that Vietinghoff was in touch with A.W.D. and that he, the
officer, wanted to get in touch with Vietinghoff, in order
to carry on the conversations. Vietinghoff naturally
jumped to the conclusion that his name was being spread
about as being engaged in a traitorous affiar. Wolff,
when he next met him, found him a frightened and doubly
cautious man. Vietinghoff refused to see the alleged
agent and even prepared a letter to General Jodi of
Hitler's headquarters discussing Wolff's contacts with
the Allies and stating that he, Vietinghoff, did not
propose to have anything to do with them until be had
received Jodl's clearance. According to the reports we
received, Wolff, Roettiger and Rahn finally persuaded
Vietinghoff not to send the letter.
On April 16 Zimmer appeared on the Swiss scene
again. He had just came from Wolff and brought a long-
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hand letter addressed by Wolff to A.W.D., dated April 15.
In this letter Wolff expressed his condolences on the
death of President Roosevelt, stated he could not foresee
what the consequences of this might be for the matters
which we had in hand, but that A.W.D. could count on him
to carry through his program. The letter added that the
victorious Allies, through the honorable proposals already
made by Wolff, could shorten the war and end the destruc-
tion of life and culture, that he, Wolff, would do every-
thing in his own power to realize this aim, and in spite
of certain difficulties which made results slower than he
had originally hoped, he was convinced of the final success
of the mutual effort.
Zimmer also reported that on April 13, Himmler had
telephoned Wolff from Berlin and told him to leave immediate-
ly for the German capitol by the fastest possible means.
We were told that Wolff, instead of complying, sent a letter
by a speciell courier in which, according to Zimmer, he
advised Himmler that he, Wolff, had told him at their last
�
meeting that it was useless to continue the .slaughter in
view of the complete Allied success in the invasion of
Germany, that Himmler's idea that the West Wall would hold
was wrong, and that Wolff had been clearly right in his
view of events, that it was useless for Wolff to go to see
Himmler but that he, Himmler, should come to Wolff and make
use of the existing Allied contacts to surrender all of
Germany to the Allies, and that if Himmler did not see fit
to do this, Wolff would consider himself as entirely
disassociated from any Himmler control.
On April 14, both morning and afternoon, Himmler,
according to Zimmer, twice telephoned to Wolff to inquire
why he had not arrived. The only answer he received was
that Wolff was absent.
Wolff also reported via Zimmer that he was determined
to effect the surrender of North Italy, with or without
the consent of Vietinghoff, that on April 12 and 13 he had
seen the chief Army commanders and felt sure that they
were with him, regardless of Vietinghoff. Zimmer also
gave the following message as being a direct quotation of
Wolff's words:
"I beg A.W.D. to do everything possible that the
Allies do not make useless sacrifices with their
intensified offensive because I take full
responsibility and guarantee that during the
coming week all will be surrendered."
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At the time we were in a quandry as to whether this
was merely an attempt, - but obviously a futile one -
to slow down the victorious progress of our North Italian
offensive, or whether it expressed a determination based
on power of accomplishment. In any event, whatever may have
been the motives, within a week Wolff's and Vietinghoff's
plenipotentiaries were in Switzerland ready to sign the
surrender. But this no one knew on April 16.
In this same message, Wolff also sent an interesting
item of news which he had from Hofer, who had seen Hitler
and Himmler on April 12. Hitler and Himmler, he stated,
were planning to stay in Berlin and, instead of discussing
plans for the German redoubt, were crazily, as Wolff
tAought, talking of new German offensives.
Zimmer also gave us an important item of news on the
military command in North Italy which subsequently had a
bearing on the surrender terms. According to Wolff, the
German High Command, presumably the Fuehrer HQ, a few days
before, namely about April 10th, had issued an order which
removed all territory east of the Isonzo river, from the
area of command of Vietinghoff and placed it under the
command of General Lohr who commanded the heterogeneous
German-Croatian-Cossack etc, .Army Group in Croatia.
Following this order, General von Pohl, who was working
with Wolff, had placed all his Luftwaffe personnel west
of the Isonzo and had taken steps to block the Brenner
with flak to prevent any entry from the North and East.
According to the news Wolff sent us, the chief danger to
his surrender plan might be the entrance of General Lohr
on Vietinghoff's flank in the Isonzo area. Wolff also
reported that his second in command, Rauff, was now fully
cooperating with him.
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XII. General Wolff visits
.Himmler and Hitler.
broken. Wolff again
land, this time with
Berlin and sees
Contacts are
comes to Switzer-
Vietinghoff's envoy.
On April 17, news came through which we feared might
spell the end of Sunrise. Parrilli followed Zimmer to
Switzerland and brought us the disturbing report that
Wolff, despite his bold letter to Himmler, had finally
consented to talk with Himmler on the telephone and
Himmler had persuaded him to go to Berlin for a con-
ference. Before leaving, Wolff sent A.W.D. a message
tliat he was going on this trip as he thought there
might be a chance of accomplishing something for the
entire German people, that he would return to Italy
immediately. This message we took with some scepticism;
not many people had returned from the Hitler-Himmler
headquarters and those who did return generally came
with their wings clipped. Wou1d Wolff be the exception?
On April 21, we received two messages from quite
different quarters. The first from Washington, con-
firmed a few hours later from AFHQ, instructed us in
the most categoric terms and from the highest authority
that all Sunrise contacts should be broken. This message
was understandable in the light of the delay, Wolff's
apparent failurd or inability to line up the German
military leaders in North Italy, his obedience to the
Himmler-Hitler order to go to Berlin. We took immediate
steps to comply with this order, but there was no way
of breaking the contact without getting in touch with
Wolff or his intermediaries and advising them of the.
decision taken. And, then, only a few hours after the
receipt of Washington's order, we ilpgived a message
from Fasano that Wolff had returnedBerlin, that
,final conclusions were being reached and that Parrilli
was on his way to Switzerland to advise us of the results.
On April 234 Parrilli arrived at the frontier with
news that Wolff, his- aide Major Wenner and one of Vieting-
hoff's iMportant staff officers were arriving at the
frontier and were proceeding immediately to Lucerne and
that Vietinghoff's envoy was equipped with full powers,
for the surrender. Our position at this juncture was not
an easy one. We felt certain that the orders to break
contact would not have been issued if it had been known
that at that very moment Wolff was on his way to Switzer-
land, apparently ready to go to Caserta with Vietinghoff's
envoy, to carry out the unconditional surrender of nearly
a million Germans. But military orders do not admit of
,
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speculation and no orders could have been more precise
and clear than those we had received.
We immediately laid the new facts before Washington
and AFHQ, stated that we would transmit such intelligence
information as the German envoys might communicate via our
Swiss and Italian intermediaries, that we would refuse to
receive them and would advise them that we were instructed
to break off the contact. We then asked for further in-
structions for our guidance. We could hardly expect an
answer without considerable delay because the decision
to break off the contact had been reached in the highest
quarters, confirmed by the combined Chiefs of Staff, and
could not easily be reversed.
On April 241 through our Swiss friends and Parrilli,
we were informed that Wolff and his adjutant Major Wenner
and Lt. Colonel Viktor von Schweinitz were in Lucerne
ready, to proceed to southern Italy to conclude matters.
Wolff, of course, required no full powers, as he could
sign himself for all S.S. and Police troops in North Italy. .
Von Schweinitz bore full powers, dated April 22, on
official stationery of. "Der Oberbefehlshaber Suedwest und
Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe C". The full powers
stated that, von Schweinitz was empowered to conduct and
to conclude binding engagements "within the framework of
the instructions which I have given him" signed Vietinghoff.
A prompt reply came from AFHQ stating that in view of
the new developments they were requesting a reconsideration
of the entire matter by the combined Chiefs of Staff, at
least to permit us to ascertain the seriousness of the
intentions of the German envoys and the scope of their
powers. Meanwhile, we were authorized to parry for time
and to endeavor to see to it that Wolff, von Schweinitz
and Wenner remained available until the final decision
could be obtained from the Combined Chiefs.
For 48 hours Wolff and his associates waited in
Lucerne. During this period, through our Swiss inter-
mediaries, we advised them that while they were on their
way to Switzerland, we had received word to break off
contact with them, that those instructions still stood
and that therefore we would not see them. Indirectly,
through our Swiss intermediaries, we permitted word to
reach them that the fact of their arrival had been
communicated to the appropriate quarters and that if they
wished to wait we would let them know whether this fact
altered the decisions reached. Meanwhile, through
Parrilli and our Swiss friends, we obtained the follow-
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ing report of Wolff's visit to Berlin and we pieced. out
the events of the days following his return from Berlin
on April 19, at noon. Here is what Wolff had to say
about Berlin a few days before its capture by the
Russians and Hitler's disappearance or death:
Wolff on the first day of his visit to Berlin,
April 18, saw first Himmler alone, thereafter,
Himmler and Kaltenbrunner, both meetings last�
ing many hours. Kaltenbrunner appeared well.
informed on Wolff's two visits to Switzerland,
for which Kaltenbrunner attacked Wolff furiously.
As to Hitler's and his own personal future,
Himmler spoke of three possibilities:
a) Fight it out in Berlin,
b) Retreat to northern redoubt,
c) Retreat by plane to Berchtesgaden.
As to the last possibility, Himmler added that
Hitler now did not like to fly, but might do so
in emergency.
On the second day of his visit, Wolff saw Hitler
in an air raid shelter about two hours motor ride
from the centre of Berlin. Hitler seemed in low
spirits but not hopeless and stated substantially
"we must fight to gain time. In two more months
the break between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians
will come about and then I shall join the party
which approaches me first. It makes no difference
which." Wolff tried to put in a word about the
senselessness of further destruction in Italy to
Which Hitler did not react.
Through our Swiss friends we also learned that Wolff upon
his return from Berlin had had long conferences with
Vietinghoff and Gauleiter Hofer, and, according to his
story, had finally induced Vietinghoff to send an envoy
to sign the surrender.
By this time, the success of General Clark's offensive
in North Italy left no doubts as to the fate of the German
Army. The only question at issue was whether there could
be some sort of an orderly surrender which would help
spare Italy from destruction and save thousands of lives and
prevent a strong remnant of the German Armies from making
their way into the German reduit or fighting it out in the
isolated valleys leading to Switzerland or to the Austrian
Alps. If no order for surrender came, these forces could
still have been a very costly nuisance, and there is no
telling what might happen to the treasures of art and to
the industrial and hydroelectric installations in the
area still held by the Germans.
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XIII. General Wolff, a prisoner of the
Italian Partisans. The Rescue.
While the German envoys were still waiting at Lucerne,
the offensive in North Italy was bringing more and more
dramatic results. The Germans suffered a crushing defeat
south of the Po, and the Po was being crossed. The Germans
were in retreat toward the mountain and Venezia Giulia.
Finally, on April 26, Wolff felt he could wait no longer,
as his return route to his HQ at Fasano was already
threatened. He also feared some sort of a coup by
Mussolini and the Neo-Fascists as Mussolini had been
maneuvering around in Milan for several days. Accordingly,
Wblff gave written full powers to his aide, Major Wenner,
as to all SS, Police and other troops under his command,
and instructed him and Lieutenant Colonel von Schweinitz
to remain a couple of days longer, to proceed to Caserta
if authorization was given, otherwise to return to the
German headquarters.
Shortly before Wolff left Lucerne, he received a
telephone call from his man on the Swiss-Italian frontier
that a message had just been received for him from
Himmler, dated April 23. In translation the message read:
"It is more than ever essential that the Italian
front hold and remain intact. No negotiations
of any kind should be undertaken. (Es kommt
jetzt mehr denn je darauf an, dass die Italienische
Front halt und intakt bleibt. Es dUrfen nicht die
geringsten Verhandlungen gepflogen werden.)"
According to Major Waibelts report to us, Wolff on receiv-
ing the message shrugged his shouldergAnd said that what
Himmler had to say no longer made any difference. At last
the serpent apparently had lost his fangs:
Arriving at the Swiss-Italian frontier, Wolff crossed
over into Italy just as the storm broke. The Italian
partisans, who had been waiting for the moment of libera-
tion, came down from the mountains, occupied Como and the
neighboring area, and without knowing who or what they had
caught, surrounded the villa of Locatelli, of Bel Paese
cheese fame, in which General Wolff had taken refuge.
G.G., through his Swiss friends, learned these facts late
on the evening of April 26, and proceeded to the Italian
frontier. It was obvious that if Wolff was caught by the
partisans, he would be shot out of hand. If he were shot,
any possibility of continuing the surrender negotiations
would disappear. It was a tricky matter to act, but G.G.
decided that Wolff should be rescued if possible. In
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taking this decision G.G. felt that it was more important
for us to have Wolff inside of the German fortress support�
ing our plan for surrender rather, than to have him as a
prisoner or as a corpse in the hands of the partisans.
r,
At Chiasso G.G. ran into Donald Jones (A.W.D.'s
representative in Lugano) who had just returned from
Como, where he had been negotiating with the partisans,
most of whom knew him well as for almost two years he
had been giving them precious aid. G.G. in a few words
told Jones his problem and requested him to proceed to
the villa where Wolff was surrounded, but from which,
strange to say, he could still reach the Swiss frontier
by telephone. A telephone message was sent through to
the General that a car was coming to get him and to see
to it that his German guard did not fire on it. Here
is Jones' report of what then transpired:
"The situation in the Como area was critical
but I felt that I could manage to get through by
my personal knowledge of the partisans of the
region to whom I was known as tScottito I crossed
the frontier and met two German officers who had been
sent by General Wolff through the partisan lines.
I put the two German officers in the first car with
white flags, and I followed immediately behind in
my car with the headlamps of my car focused on the
white flags. In a third car, we put some armed
partisans. As we left Chiasso, the partisans opened
fire on us. I got out of the car and stood in the
headlights, as I felt sure that if the partisans
saw me, someone would recognize me and stop the
firing. And so it worked out. An old friend of
mine, leading the firing squad, rushed out of the
darkness, greeted me warmly 1I1 amico Scott!' and
immediately put an end to the firing. From there
we went on to Como and secured from my friend the
Prefect the necessary papers to pass the partisan
lines. With more or less interference by partisans,
we finally reached the Villa Locatelli near Cernobbio,
where Wolff and his German guards were installed.
The General was in full uniform and I told him to
put on civilian clothes. While he was doing this I
was offered some real Scotch and LuclgStrike
cigarettes which they claimed to have brought back
from North Africa. I put the General in my .car,
after having arranged that his officers would remain
unarmed in the villa but under an agreement that
they would not be molested by the partisans until
the American Army arrived.
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"We then started back for the frontier and
after a series of negotiations with partisan bands,
most of whom knew me; and by assuming responsibility
for the convoy, we avoided having any control made
and we safely passed over into Switzerland and delivered
General Wolff to G.G."
As Wolff believed, and probably rightly so, that his
life had just been saved, G.G. felt that an extraordinary
opportunity offered itself to impress on Wolff the
necessity for prompt and determined action on his part
upon his return to Bolzano which was his new H.Q. and also
that of Vietinghoff. In a dimly lit room, in a small hotel
in Lugano, G.G. conferred with Wolff through the early
hoirs of the morning and received from him the following
assurances:
(1) Should Himmler suddenly arrive in his area to
take over supreme command, Wolff was determined to arrest
him.
(2) Should any of the military commanders at the
headquarters of the German Army Group attempt to block
the surrender, Wolff was prepared to take forcible
measures against them.
(3) Wolff reiterated his promise that he would bring
all his influence to bear - which was obviously considerable
to prevent destruction in his area and to protect the lives
of political prisoners. His anxiety to see the promises
to this effect which he had given to A.W.D. and G.G. carried
out, seemed one of the reasons why he wished to return to
Bolzano as quickly as possible.
' (4) Wolff confirmed that a few hours before, from his
surrounded villa in Cernobbio, he had, by telephone,
instructed Rauff, S.S. Commander in Milan, to avoid fight-
ing and bloodshed under all circumstances, and if necessary
to surrender even to the partisans. In G.G.'s presence
he confirmed these instructions in writing, and they
were passed on to Parrilli to be sent to Rauff in Milan
as quickly as possible.
By this time, as above stated, the German headquarters
for North Italy forces had been moved to Bolzano and Wolff
started to retrace his steps through Switzerland to the
Swiss-Austrian frontier at Feldkirch, from where he hoped
to reach his new headquarters via the Vorarlberg. Before
Wolff left Switzerland the ban had been lifted by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff and we received instructions to
send Wolff, von Schweinitz and Wenner, or the latter two
if Wolff wqs not available, to Caserta to receive and sign
the surrender terms. This information we were able to
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communicate to Wolff before he reached the Swiss-Austrian
frontier. He decided, and we concurred in his decision,
that it was preferable for him to return to Bolzano. His
presence there would be essential to keep the situation
in hand and to give backing to the envoys, who would now
go to Caserta. Travel was then getting so precarious
that no one knew whether the envoys sent to Caserta would
ever get back to the German lines. It thus seemed essential
to have someone working at both ends of the line. Wolff,
therefore, continued on his journey and reached Meran, not
far from Bolzano, in the early hours of the morning on
April 28.
. .
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XIV. The German Plenipotentiaries go
to Caserta. A new communica-
tions problem.
Meanwhile, AFHQ had sent a plane to Annecy, and we
passed von Schweinitz and Wenner through Switzerland to
the Swiss-French frontier and they, together with G.G.,
left Annecy for Caserta on the morning of April 281 in
foul weather, as spring had given way to a last fling of
winter and snow was falling.
Now we had another crucial problem to face, viz, that
of communications. As soon as we had been instructed to
break off contact with Wolff and company, we took steps
to extract little Wally from his hot spot with the S.S. in
Milan. We sent him a cryptic message to come to the Swiss-
Italian frontier at Chiasso for consultation, and Zimmer
was despatched to get him out. We did not tell Zimmer why,
as we were always afraid they would hold Wally as a
hostage. Fortunately, everything went through on schedule
and when we received the authorization to resume contact
and to endeavor to carry through the original program,
Wally was safe in Switzerland with his radio transmitter,
ready for more work and danger.
We then established on the Swiss-Austrian frontier the
same courier system which we had previously had on the
Swiss-Italian frontier. Zimmer took up his post at Buchs
in Switzerland, from where he could easily move over to
Feldkirch in Austria. We turned Wally over to Zimmer with.
instructions to move him as rapidly as possible to Bolzano,
to set up his radio there. He arrived safely at his dangerous
destination at about the time of Wolff's return. We -did not
know, however, how his machine would function from this
rather badly enclosed mountain retreat.
It can not be overstressed that, for the successful
carrying through of our plans, quick, sure and secret
communication was absolutely vital. Without Wally and
his radio, the Italian surrender would never have gone
through as it did. AFHQ fully appreciated this and while
we were doing everything we could, they kept hammering at
us. On April 28, they radioed us "urgent you get radio
facilities established Wolff's HQ earliest", and on April
29, General Lemnitzer radioed "I expect that communication
with Wolff-Vietinghoff HQ will soon be of supreme importance.
Walter should contact Caserta earliest. Is there alternative
means of communicating with Wolff if Walter fails to reach
Bolzano."
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The next 24 hours was an anxious time, but on the
evening of April 29, we received a welcome signal from
Caserta that Walter had come through on the air, and from
then on he was one of the busiest and most important cogs
in the negotiations.
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XV. The capitulation is signed, with a
reservation. The envoys start the
perilous home trip.
Upon the arrival of von Schweinitz and Wenner at
Caserta, developments there proceeded rapidly, but this
part of the story is for AFHQ to write. Suffice it to
say that three meetings took place, presided over by
General Morgan; Chief of Staff of Field Marshal
Alexander. The meetings were attended by most of the
high-ranking officers of General Alexander's Staff, and
in addition. two Russian observers were present.
The first meeting took place on April 28, at 18.00
at which the terms of surrender were presented and
turned over to the German emissElries.
The second meeting took place later on in the even-
ing of the same day. At this meeting the German emissaries
asked for certain explanations of some of the terms of the
surrender instrument, and raised certain objections as to
the practicability of carrying through some of the provi-
sions. At the first and second meetings the German
emissaries tried their best, but in vain, to obtain an
assurance that the German armies in Italy would remain
interned on Italian soil after they had surrendered, and
would not be transferred to Great Britain or the United
States*
After the second meeting broke up, G.G. spent most
of the night with the German emissaries going carefully over
the surrender instrument. In the early morning a cable
message was composed to be transmitted to Wolff and �
Vietinghoff by the two German emissaries. This was sub-
mitted to General Lemnitzer for transmission about four
a.m.
The situation now was such that Major Wenner, represent-
ing Wolff and under instructions from Wolff, was willing to
sign the surrender document, while Schweinitz was still
holding out for some assurance as to the internment of
German troops, and insisted that the powers conferred on.
him by Vietinghoff did not permit him to return with
empty hands in this respect.
On the morning of April 29, after lengthy discussions
with G.G. and a final talk with Generals Lemnitzer and
Airey, Schweinitz finally agreed to sign the document,
stating however that in doing so he was exceeding his powers.
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The rest of the morning was spent with the Chief
Signal Officer of AFHQ trying to make the necessary
arrangements for direct wireless communication between
German HQ at Bolzano, and AFHQ.
The final meeting at which the instrument of sur-
render was signed took place shortly after 14 hours on
April 29. The German emissaries were obviously disturbed
by the floodlights, the clicking and grinding of cameras,
which they had not expected. The instrument of surrender
was signed by Lt. General Morgan for the Allies, and on
the German side by Oberst Lt. von Schweinitz, signing for
Vietinghoff, and Major Wenner signing for Wolff.
' The time was getting short, as the party had to leave
Caserta early in the afternoon to reach Annemasse before
nightfall. After a stay at Caserta of less than 24 hours
the plane took off at 15 hours with the emissaries and G.G.
on board. The weather was bad and flyinunditions doubt-
ful. However a perfect landing was made larAnnemasse at
19.15, and the party reached the Swiss border prior to the
wireless message which had been sent to Bern: announcing
their return. Consequently no arrangements had been made
for the border crossing. On arriving at the frontier,
G.G. left the emissaries on French soil, crossed into
Switzerland and telephoned for help from his Swiss friends,
but found that they were out of the office busily working
on other matters connected with the surrender. Faced with
this dilemma he explained to the frontier guards that as
the record would show the two persons accompanying him had
left Switzerland the day before for a short trip into
France and were now returning. He did not of course men-
tion that during this "short" trip they had signed the
surrender of the German Armies in Italy. The guards looked
through the records and asked for the names. Since, for
security reasons, the emissaries had used false identities,
G.G. was completely ignorant of the names given. He
suggested to the guards that they should cross into France
and speak directly to the two persons. With the introduc-
tion of this personal touch the ice was finally broken and
the surrender documents and their custodians leaped over
one more hurdle - not by any means the last.
. The party was now facing an all night drive through
Switzerland from border to border; this after thirty-six
momentous and almost sleepless hours.
Meanwhile, as Walter had not given any signs of life
from Bolzano by the morning of April 29, when the signature
�
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took place, an urgent message was radioed to us in
Bern, which we were instructed to transmit immediately
to Vietinghoff and Wolff in Bolzano. This message con-
tained the basic terms of the unconditional surrender
as submitted to the German emissaries at Caserta to-
gether with a comment by the emissaries to Wolff and
Vietinghoff explaining some of the details.
Speed was vital in the delivery of the message.
Tracy Barnes, of the Bern Legation Staff, recently
decorated for an operational jump and daring action.
in Brittany following D-day, who had been associated
with A.W.D. and G.G. in many phases of the Sunrise
operation was called in. After consulting one of our
'Swiss friends he decided to try the quickest method
possible, namely, a plane trip to Bolzano with a para-
chute jump. A password "Nuremberg" had already been
agreed upon with Wolff some time before in case a WT
operator should be parachuted. The prospect of a
plane from Switzerland over German-held territory plus
a parachutist snatching surrender terms from his bosom
seems quite in character with the dramatic development
of the enterprise. A pilot was found who was willing
to make the flight but due to approaching darkness he could
not lay on the operation till early the following morning.
The flight never materialized because on arrival at
Buchs a message was received stating that the envoys and
G.G. had arrived safely in Annemasse from Caserta, had
crossed the Swiss frontier and were on their way with
the signed surrender terms.
Just before midnight, on April 29, they arrived in
Bern and stopped at A.W.D.'s house. Refreshments were
ready for the exhausted, envoys, and A.W.D. gave them in
a few words the developments in the military picture of
the last twenty-four hours and a final vigorous "pep
talk" to stress the importance of finishing out their
mission. They were worn out and discouraged. They still
had before them an all nights ride to the Swiss-Austrian
frontier and then ten hours by auto through dangerous
country. Their arrival in Bolzano was absolutely
essential if the surrender terms were to be carried
out according to the program arranged. They left with
the promise that they would do everything in their power
to carry through.
When, early on the morning of April 30, they
arrived at the Swiss-Austrian frontier, they were met
with the word that the Swiss authorities had absolutely
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closed the frontier and that neither they nor anyone
else could pass. The Swiss friends, who had been so
far assisting us, could do nothing to change this
order which had come from the highest authority and
permitted no exceptions. Now every hour of delay
threatened to be disastrous in view of the close time
schedule between their possible arrival in Bolzano and
the date fixed for the end of hostilities.
A.W.D. then went to one of the highest officials
of the Swiss Foreign Office, a man of prompt decisions
who was not afraid of responsibility. He told the
Swiss-official briefly how much depended upon the
passage of these two men. Switzerland itself was
.vitally interested in the peaceful surrender of the
beaten German forces in North Italy. It was also
vitally interested in seeing that North Italy was not
destroyed by a fighting retreating German Army, a part
of which might try to seek refuge on Swiss soil. The
Swiss official understood in a minute what was at stake,
promised that the men would pass and sent immediate
orders to the frontier to this effect.
The trip through the Vorarlberg was a dangerous
one. This area was rapidly becoming a military no-
man's-land and, to make matters worse, was partially
blocked by the late snows. It was successfully
negotiated, however, despite the ramshackle German
auto which was all they had at their disposal since
for security reasons they felt they could not accept
our offer of a good American car. Von Schweinitz and
Wenner reached Bolzano late on the evening of April 30.
Fearing that they would not get through over the Vorarl-
berg, we had kept back one copy of the signed instrument
of surrender and made arrangements to send this copy to
Bolzano by a messenger of our own,' using a more southerly
and less dangerous pass from Switzerland into Austria at
Martinsbruck. We even sent to Caserta a message for
Walter asking Wolff to come to Martinsbruck to pick up
the papers. Fortunately, Caserta did not have to send
this message, as the news of the safe arrival of the
envthys. crossed our radio to them.
. . - .
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XVI. Would Vietinghoff ratify his envoy's
signature? May 1, a day of tension.
May 1, was an anxious day. No word had COMB through on
April 30, from Bolzano to confirm the acceptance of the sur-
render terms, and the ratification of the signatures of the
Vietinghoff-Wolff envoys. Marshal Alexander, late on May 1,
sent through Walter a strong message to Vietinghoff, asking
for a categorical reply as to whether or not the Germans
would cease firing at the appointed time and accept the
surrender. For hours this remained unanswered, and the
reasons for this is a story told in our next chapter.
Finally, shortly before the expiration of the time limit,
the radio stations at Caserta began to pick up signals
being sent by German commanders to their troops, indicating
that hostilities would cease at the appointed time. This
was taken as sufficient evidence of the acceptance of the
surrender terms; the formal announcement of the surrender
was made by Field Marshal Alexander and shortly thereafter
a belated confirmatory message passed through Walter's hands.
The reason for the silence at Bolzano was told us in a
written report prepared a few days later by General Wolff,
and handed to G.G. who meanwhile had proceeded to Bolzano,
which by that time was occupied by American troops of the
Fifth Army. This report is an essential part of our story
and a translation follows, eliminating only one or two
items which are not pertinent to this phase of our story.
General Wolff himself must assume responsibility for the
statements in this memorandum. Some day Kesselring and
others may give their own account of what took place.
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XVII. General Wolff's Story of Events
at Bolzano - April 27, - May 2, 1945.
After I had been freed from the partisans who had
encircled me at Cernobbio near Como, for which I am in-
debted to G.G. and Jones, I was secretly taken through
Switzerland and on April 27, 1945, at approximately 16.00
hours, I reached Feldkirch in the Vorarlberg.
On April 28, 1945, at 1.00 a.m., I picked up Ambassador
Rahn at Meran and we rode on to a joint conference at the
official quarters of Gauleiter Hofer at Bolzano. This con-
ference lasted from 2.00 a.m., on April 28, 1945, until
about 7.30 a.m. The following men participated:
Colonel-General von Vietinghoff,
General Roettiger,
Lieutenant-Colonel Moll, IA of the Army Group,
Ambassador Rahn,
General Wolff,
Gauleiter Hofer,
his military adjutant, Major von Reichel,
his political staff-leader, Stengl.
-
At the outset of the conversation, I reported on the
events of my trip and the situation which I faced due to
the fact that upon my arrival in Switzerland, together
with Lieutenant-Colonel von Schweinitz and Major Wenner,
we.were surprised by the news that the men representing
the Allied High Command were forbidden to continue the
seven weeks old negotiations regarding the surrender terms;
that finally, however, the permission of the Allied High
Command was given for von Schweinitz and Wenner to proceed
to the HQ of Marshal Alexander and they had set out upon
their journey on April 28, 1945. I made it clear to those
present, that, due to the great loss of time and the out-
standing success of the offensive in the Italian theatre,
it was, for the moment, not possible to think of attaining
the conditions originally viewed; that particularly it was
impossible to realize the political desires of Gauleiter
Hofer, who desired that southern Tyrol and northern Tyrol
should not be occupied by the Allied troops and that his
direction there should continue. Gauleiter Hofer, with
whom I had discussed this possibility even before my trip,
and who had expressly requested my views, was deeply dis-
appointed. He insisted that all military organizations in
this territory be subject to his political leadership and
orders. This was violently opposed by all present. Further,
there was a decided diversity of opinion between Gauleiter
Hofer on the one side, and General Roettiger (Chief of the
General Staff of the Army Group Southwest) and Lieutenant-
Colonel Moll (Staff Officer of the Army Group Southwest)
on the other, regarding the military situation and the
really obtainable armistice terms, which were not good
enough for Gauleiter Hofer. After a 5-i hour conversation
without results, those present parted, to await the return
of the tWo representatives, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schweinitz
and Major Wenner, who had been given full powers.
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During the night of April 28-29, at the suggestion of
the leader of the National Liberation Committee for the
region. Alto-Adige/Hochetsch, a long discussion took place
between him and SS- and Polizeifuehrer for the operational
zone nAlpenvoralp" - SS-Brigadefuehrer Brunner - with the
object of permitting the participation of partisan groups
in the administration and establishment of peace and order
within the operational zone. On April 29, 1945, at approxi-
mately 2030 hours, I took the position that I would, in
principle, be agreeable to any reasonable and bearable
arrangement, which had as its object the saving of blood-
shed, and further that I would be prepared on one of the
following days to receive an accredited representative of
the American General, Clark, for such conferences. General
von Vietinghoff, for the Army Group, then agreed with the
demands of Dr. De Angelis, without asking the permission of
the competent Gauleiter Hofer. Hofer felt hurt and believed
tlaat the Army Group was deliberately undermining him in his
official functions. Though he had been the one to induce all
the responsible men of the Italian theatre of war to pledge
themselves jointly to carry through their mutual plans, by
force if necessary, now he did not even attempt to clear up
the independent action of the Army Group by telephoning
either Vietinghoff or me, but made by telephone a direct
complaint to Field Marshal Kesselring, and by exposing to
him all our agreements and secrets, gave both the Army Group
and myself a dangerous stab in the back. As a result of this
clear act of treachery, Hofer induced Frield Marshal Kesselring,
who, on April 28, 1945, had been appointed by the OKW as
Oberbefehlshaber of all the Army Groups fighting in the South,
and who thus was the superior of the Army Group Southwest,
to relieve of their posts the main pillars of my plan, General
von Vietinghoff, as well as his Chief of Staff Roettiger. On
the morning of April 30, he, Kesselring, appointed the former
Oberbefehlshaber of the Army Group G, Infantry General Schultz
as OB. Southwest and Major General Wentzel as Chief of the
Staff OB. Southwest. These two Generals reached the HQ at
Bolzano about noon on April 30, at the same time as Vietinghoff,
coming from a conference held at Hofer's estate near Innsbruck,
at which the removal of Vietinghoff had taken place. Due to
Vietinghoff's and Roettiger's removal, the situation changed
completely. Kesselring's measure was taken without previous
agreement with me. The day before my departure to Switzerland
on. April 23, 1945, I had sent his and my old confidants, SS-
Standartenfuehrer Dollmann and Staff Doctor Niesen, to inform
him of the situation. At the time, Kesselring was not head of
the Army Group, and, therefore, was not officially concerned
with the matter. He expressed his thanks to Dollmann aid
Niesen, and seemed pleased to receive the information which
gave the broad outlines of our project, without burdening the
Marshs1 unnecessarily with details. Upon their return,
Dollmann and Niesen said that they were both convinced that
the Marshal fully understood everything, but that he could
only take an active part himself after the impending death
(bevorstehenden Tod) of the Fuehrer which would release him
of his oath of allegiance. Both men were of the opinion that
the Field Marshal, since he himself lacked current information
regarding the actual development in the southern area, would
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accep the Marshal, on the basis of Hofer's presentation of
the situation, took the position that the despatch of von Schweinits
and Wenner with powers to reach a final decision was too far -
readhing, and apart from the immediate recall of Vietinghoff and
Roettiger, he ordered an official investigation of the whole
proceeding by a General. My own case he referred to the Chief
of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SS -Obergruppenfuehrer Kalten -
brunner, who was then in North Tyrol. This last measure, based
on all our previous experiences, involved a very serious threat
for me, particularly as Kaltenbrunner had in my area his special
Gestapo representatives (Gestapo -Sonderrollkommando) Skorzeny and
Begus. On the afternoon of April 30, 1945, Vietinghoff went to
the "retreat area" (Ausweichstelle) of the Army Group, called
"Blaupunktfl, without, as had originally been generally agreed,
opposing his removal. Roettiger was to break in his successor,
Major-General Wentzel, for a day, and then was also to withdraw
to the "Fuehrer" reserve of the Army Group at �Blaupunkt".
On April 29, radio operator Walter turned up with his
apparatus, and at 12.00 hours his apparatus was ready to send and
to receive. A long radio Nr. 2, containing a resumh of the sur-
render conditions, together with an explanation of our delegates,
was not received the first time, and various repetitions could
not possibly be decoded. In these critical hours, I received the
news that von Schweinitz and Wenner were on their way back. Their
attempt to telephone me from Feldkirch on the afternoon of April
30, failed. In the night April 30/May 1, at about 00.30 hours,
they both arrived pretty well exhausted, but bringing with them
the drafts of the armistice agreement which they had signed.
There then followed, beginning on. May 1, about 06.30 hours, con-
versations with Roettiger, Moll, von Schweinitz, Wenner and Doll -
mann, regarding the measures to be taken in order to bring about
the end of hostilities on May 2, at 12.00 hours Greenwich
time, as provided in the signed agreements, despite the
withdrawal of Vietinghoff. OB. General Schultz, as well as
his Chief of Staff Wentzel, were not prepared, without the
specific approval of Kesselring to give the order to lay down
arms. As the approval of Kesselring had not been received
and was not to be expected, the only thing we could do was to
prevent Schultz and his Chief of Staff Wentzel from hindering
the giving of the surrender orders, or as the case might be to
prevent their giving contrary orders. Roettiger, in agreement
with me, saw no other way out except to take into custody
Schultz and Wentzel from May 1, at 7.00 o'clock in the
morning until 16.00 hours in the afternoon. To prevent
other officers of Schultz' Staff from telephoning to Kessel -
ring or to the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the news of
the arrest of Schultz, the head of the intelligence service,
Major-General Kempf, under orders from. Roettiger and Wolff,
cut off the telephone communications between Bolzano and the
Reich throughout May 1. As a result of these measures,
Roettiger had the defacto leadership of the Army Group and
was working in close collaboration with Wolff. However, the
Commanders of the 10th and 14th Armies, Generals Herr and
Lemmelsen were not willing to accept the authority seized
by General Roettiger. They refused to collaborate to effect
the surrender as long as their superiors, Schultz and Wentzel,
were illegally robbed of their freedom. We, therefore, bad
no other course except to endeavor to win the voluntary
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collaboration of Schultz and Wentzel, as without the
cooperation of the Army group leaders nothing could be
done. Air General von Pohl declared that he was still
ready to work for the armistice, provided that Lemmelsen
went along. He said that he was ready to work on Lemmelsen
and did his best in this regard. After a two hour conversa-
tion, which I had with Schultz and Wentzel I succeeded, on
May 1, at 16.00 hours, in reaching an understanding on the
basis of which both of these men were prepared, despite
their arrest, to resume their functions. There followed a
general meeting of commanders at 18.00 hours in the head-
quarters of the Army Group in Bolzano. Those present at
the meeting were:
�
OB. of the 10th Army, General Herr,
OB. of the 14th Army: General von Leumelsen,
Air General von Pohl,
Admiral Loewitsch,
General Wolff,
General Roettiger,
General Wentzel,
under the chairmanship of General Schultz. The commanders
of the 10th and 14th Armies, in describing the situation
stated that their respective armies, were to all intents
and purposes defeated, were without heavy arms and almost
without munitions, and that continuation of the battle from
the standpoint of the responsibility of the High Command
did not make any sense. General von Pohl and I both agreed
with this view from the political standpoint. Thereafter
Schultz and Wentzel agreed that they would faithfully present
this viewpoint to Field MarshaLK.esselring. They refused,
however, without the specific and personal agreement of
Kesselring, to undertake any action, or in particular to
give the order to stop fighting. On May 1, at about 21.30
hours, there arrived a radio from Marslinl Alexander, in
which he demanded a decision as to whether the agreed-upon
surrender date would be honored. Without such a decision
he would not be in a position to instruct his troops in
adequate time to aase fire. On the basis of a telephone
conversation which had meanwhile taken place, with General
Westfal, Chief of Staff of Field Marshal Kesselring, Marshal
Alexander was advised that a final decision would be reached
within the next hour. After receipt of this radio, Schultz
and I telephoned immediately to General Westfal to force an
immediate decision. Kesselring could not be reached on the
telephone, as he was on the road. As Westfal, Kesselring
and Schultz refused to assume the responsibility for the
surrender, I demanded of Westfal that one of us four, viz.
Herr, Lemmelsen, Pohl or Wolff, as we were ready to carry
through the surrender and assume all the consequences of
it, should immediately be given the command of the Army
Group South West. Westfal replied, he would lay our
demands before Kesselring and give us an answer by 22.00
hours. At 22.00 hours, we still had no decision from
Kesselring or Westfal, but Generals Herr, Lemmelsen, Pohl
and II in view of our responsibility to our troops and to
our people, gave the necessary order to lay down arms at
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the time agreed upon, without awaiting the approval of
Kesselring. Our purpose in this was to avoid further un-
necessary bloodshed and destruction and to create a political
basis for a later Anglo-American-German understanding. Also
we. felt a responsibility to respect the signatures which had
been given in the name of von. Vietinghoff and in. my name.
On May 1, at 23.00 o'clock, the death of the Puehrer
was announced. By this, both officers and soldiers were
released from their oath and from their conflict of con-
science. Nevertheless, Schultz still refused his approval
to the orders which had already been given by Roettiger, Herr,
Lemmelsen, Pohl and. If for the surrender. He was awaiting the
order of Kesselring. Pohl, Lemmelsen, Herr and I returned at
23.30 hours to my headquarters for further conversations.
Shortly thereafter on May 2, at 01.15 hours, Kesselring gave
tEne order to arrest Vietinghoff, Roettiger, Kempf, von Schweini
and Captain. Altenpohl. Shortly before an order had gone out
from the OB. of Luftflotte VI, Colonel General Dessloch, for
the arrest of von Pohl. This went to von Pohl's Staff Officer,
Major Neubert. The order was not carried out. Whether there
was also an order of arrest for Herr, Lemmelsen and me, is
still not known, but it seems likely. In this way, in any
event, my friends and I were warned in time. As we were
leaving the HQ of the Army Group, we had already run into
Armed officers of the Army Group who had taken rather a
hostile attitude. However, we succeeded in getting back to
our quarters using secret back-door passages. In view of the
threatening danger, I caused seven tanks to be drawn up in
front of my HQ and I called in about 350 men from my special
units to prepare for an eventual attack. Under the impression
of the threatening development and in particular to meet the
possibility of contrary orders being given by Xesselring by
radio to the Army Corps and Divisions, Generals Herr, Lemmelsen
and Pohl returned as rapidly as possible to their posts of
command in order to ensure the carrying out of the orders they
had given.
About 2.00 o'clock at night I had a call from Field
Marshal Kesselring, who had learned about the initiative we
had taken and attacked me in the most severe fashion. In a
telephone conversation which lasted off and on for almost
two hours, and which due to the bad communication was carried
on from time to time by my adjutant Major Wenner with General
Westfal, I once again besought Kesselring, as a reasonable
man and in view of his responsibility as Supreme Commander
of thousands of soldiers, to approve and to support our
individual decisions which had already been taken. At 04.30
hours, on May 2, 1945, after even General Schultz had pleaded
with Kesselring for the acceptance of my proposal, at last
the approval of Kesselring was finally received for the
surrender.
With the exception of the first and fourth parachute
divisions the orders to cease fire were punctuallLi. obeyed.
After repeated order from General von Vietinghoff, these
troops also stopped fighting. Whenever, within the ranks of
the troops there were temporary incidents of lack of discipline,
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the commander of the parachute corps, General Heidrich,
through personal appeal to the divisions aid through
drastic measures which included the degrading of a Colonel,
discipline was again restored.
(End of Wolff Statement)
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XVIII* General von Vietinghoff's Story..
While G.G. was in Bolzano, he also obtained from
General Vietinghoff a memorandum which purported to be
the notes excerpted from his diary covering the part he
had played in connection with the capitulation. A trans-
lation of these notes is appended. The General, in his
notes, passes over lightly certain dissensions among his
military colleagues as well as certain possibly embarrassing
incidents to them such as the temporary arrest of his tem-
porary successor. On the whole, however, General Vietinghoff's
story bears out the broad outlines of what General Wolff has
given in the preceding chapter.
Diary Notes on my Part in the
Capitulation Negotiations.
19 March:
I assumed command as C-in-C, Southwest and
Army Group C.
1 April:
General Wolff informed me and my C of S that he
had been able to establish contact with responsible American
personalities in Switzerland and through them ild.th the HQ of
Field Marshal Alexander.
The object of his negotiations was, first, to
prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting in Northern Italy
which would result in the destruction of as yet undamaged
industrial installations and of the harbors, with consequent
unemployment and disorder; second, in view of the impending
collapse in Gennany, to arrange an honorable armistice for
Army Group C with Field Marshal Alexander.
I entirely approved of Wolffts intentions and
recognized their value, since I tpo was convinced that
German resistance inside the Reich would inevitably collapse
within a calculable space of time.
Official and military considerations, however,
made it impossible for me to participate in his negotiations
at this time, since I could not expose my comrades who were
still fighting stubbornly North of the Alps to attack from
the rear, and since, moreover, my own troops would fail to
understand such a proceeding and would, in part refuse to
follow my orders. As for demolitions in North Italy, I had
already prepared orders forbidding all destructions not im-
mediately required by military necessity. I had no authority
to issue orders concerning the harbors, since they were under
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the exclusive control of Grand Admiral Doenitz, but I
undertook to find means to prevent their destruction -- a
decision which was later approved by the Grand Admiral in a
personal telephone conversation.
7 April:
With my consent, an Italian industrialist, who
had been serving General Wolff as an intermediary, cane to
tea at Wolff's so as to make my acquaintance and witness the
understanding between General Wolff and myself.
11 and 13 April:
I was informed by General Wolff that the
other side was pressing for a speedier conduct of negotiations
and insisted upon military participation.
� I was obliged to refuse once more, for the following .
reasons:
�
1) The question of guilt: We, like all other clear-
thinking officers, perceived that the war was irretrievably
lost for Germany and that an immediate cessation of hosti-
lities would prevent much senseless loss of life. The mass
of the people, however, and the majority of our soldiers were
still under the influence of the Fuehrer's proclamation
declaring that the Battle of Berlin would tarn the course
of the war in Germany's favor. If we should lay damn our
arms at this moment, it would be easy for government
propaganda to clear the Reich's leadership of responsibility
for the collapse and persuade the German people tha-Only our
treachery had prevented an ultimate German victory. A new
"stab in the back" legend!
In such an event, the Army Group itself would have got
out of hand. It was therefore impossible for me to enter into
negotiations until the collapse of the Reich had become obvious
to the people themselves so that no one could accuse is of
having fallen on the rear of our fighting front.
2) The particular situation of the Army Group: For
several weeks past I had been asking both the OKW and the
Fuehrer personally to grant MR freedom of movement in case
of a major Anglo-American attack, since only thus would it
be possible to withdraw the Army Group to positions in. the
Alps without excessive losses.
My request had so far been refused in the sharpest
manner, with threats of a court-mArtial, etc., and I had
been ordered to hold fast to our present positions.
I had, however, resolved that as soon as communications
with the North, which were already precarious, should become
impossible, I would assume full freedom of movement on my
own responsibility so as to prevent a complete collapse.
22 April:
General Wolff returned from a visit to the Puehrer
during which he informed the latter of his dealings with our
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opponents. Nothing was done to prevent the continuation
of these negotiations.
Gauleiter Hoffer, likewise returning from the Fuehrer,
now joined in insisting that negotiations should be pushed
forward rapidly so as at least to save his province from
senseless destruction and a struggle between the German
majority and the Italian minority supported by Partisan
bands.
Ambassador Rahn, as plenipotentiary of the German
Reich, adhered unreservedly to our undertaking.
I now consented to dispatch a military emissary, It.
Colonel on the General Staff, von Schweinitz, and empowered
him 'to make binding commitments for me within the limits
of my instructions.'
Essential points of these instructions:
1) No dishonorable conditions.
2) A settlement to be arrived at only as follows:
a) When fighting north of the Alps should have
progressed so far-that there could be no
accusation of a 'stab in the back'.
b) When there should no longer be any German
government capable of conducting negotiations.
3) Political stipulations, advanced by Gauletier
Hofer, though we made it plain to him that it
might not be possible to insist upon them un-
conditionally.
I saw to it, furthermore, that Field Marshal Xesselring
was informed of our negotiations since be was our neighbor on
the field of battle and we were soon to come under his command.
This was effected in the first instance by emissaries
and then on 27 April, in a conversation between. Field. Marshal
Xesselring, Ambassador Rahn and myself at the headquarters
of Gauleiter Hofer.
Xesselring declared himself in accord with our
proceedings, but insisted that he could consider a settle-
ment only after the death of the Fuehrer.
28 April:
An urgent appeal from Field Marshal Xesselring
compelled me to refuse my consent to a demand from the other
side, transmitted to MB by General Wolff on the evening of
28 April, that we should renounce allegiance to the Reich
and send out W-T signals that very night ordering the Army
Group to lay down its arms.
In any case, it seemed to me that I should await the
outcome of negotiations still in progress with Field Marshal
Alexander.
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Night of 28-29 April:
During the following night I gave
my consent to the conclusion of an agreement with the leade
of the Italian liberation movement so as to prevent a racie
clash in the Bolzano area pending the arrival of Allied tro
28 April:
Army Group C and C-in-C Southrut were placed
under command of Field Marshal KesselringArefused to sancti(
either the conclusion of an .agreement With the Italian patrj
or the mission of Lt. Colonel on the General Staff, von
Schweinitz, and relieved me of my command.
I turned over my command to General of Infantry, Schult
but remained near headquarters and in effect continued to be
responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs through my
'Chief of Staff, General of Armored Troops, Roettiger, who
had conducted the preliminary negotiations most ably and who
was to remain in charge for another day or two.
2 May:
upon the return of our emissaries, after protracted
discussions with the C-in-C of the Armies Field Marshal
Kesselring, and with his consent, the order was given to
lay down arms. On 2 May, I resumed my command, by order
of Field Marshal Kesselring.
(End of Vietinghoff Statement)
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XIX. Conclusion
In his statement to the Commons, May 2, Prime Minis
Churchill summed up the results of the surrender:
"The total forces of the enemy, the fighting troops
of the enemy, include the remnants of 22 German
divisions and six Italian Fascist divisions, but
with the combat and echelon troops upon the lines
of communication throughout this country they
have held so long, the total numbers who have
surrendered to the Allies are estimated to amcunt
to nearly 1,000,000.
"Thus not only has a vast area of territory vital
in its character fallen into the hands of the
Supreme Commander, Sir Harold Alexander, but the
actual surrender which has taken place so far,
comprising the numbers it does, constitutes, I
believe, a record for the whole of this war and
cannot but be helpful to the further events for
which we are looking." .
The Prime Minister then pointed out that this surren(
was made to forces under Marshall Alexander, which had bef
seriously depleted to strengthen other fronts, and added,
"Thus this army was an army stripped of its strength
and facing an enemy force which, for all purposes of
war, must have been considered far stronger because
it had the duty of defending mountain rarges and
afterwards plains flooded with autumn and winter
rain, and which, certainly in the number of
divisions, exceeded those who were left to attack
him."
In reply to an inquiry addressed to the Prime Ministe
"May we know whether the German Generals surrendered on th
own, responsibility?", Mr. Churchill replied:
"The discussions have been of a highly private nature
for some time. At times they have appeared more hope.
ful than at others, but for the last two days I have
known what was coming, yet one was not certain that i-
might not be snatched away at the last minute. There.
fare, great secrecy was necessary."
As the Prime Minister pointed out, the maintenance of
complete secrecy was essential to the success of this unde:
taking. On our side this was successfully maintained. FM
over two months the work had gone on continuously with ups
and downs, with peaks of optimism and depression, with drat
excitement and even its touches of comedy and pathos. In
addition to complete secrecy, sure and rapid communication!
were equally essential. If we lost contact, the game was
lost. If our messengers failed to reach Fasano and the
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Swiss frontier, or if our radio in Milan or Bolzano fai1
to function, if the surrender terms did not get to Bolze
in record time, the game might be up. It also required
boldness to dare to even make a start, and temerity to
push forward in the face of discouraging and doubtful
omens. After all, we were dealing with a high SS Genera:
Was he merely a tool of Himmleres, or was he really work:
for a surrender?
We met many doubting Thomas, during the sixty-five
days that the work went on. Sometimes we even doubted
ourselves, but the stakes were big, the risks were worth
the gamble. No concessions were ever made in our demand
for unconditional surrender. No promises were given as
a price for that surrender.
We do not undertake to pass on the record of General
Wolff prior to MArch 1945, - we do not know what it may
contain - but that from that time on, whatever his prior
merits or demerits or motives, he vigorously worked to
bring about the surrender and, certainly on the German
side, was the primary influence in effecting it.
Surrender for a large part of the German forces in
Italy was, of course, inevitable after General Clark's
smashing victories and the forcing of the lines of the
Apennines and the Po. The only question was the extent
of the surrender, its timing, and its cost both in. Allied
lives and in damage to the industrial and cultural life of
North Italy. The quick and general surrender on May 2, -
the greatest German surrender theretofore secured - may
have spared thousands of Allied lives. The solemn under-
takings given 1.1s prior to the surrender, and the orders
issued to the German Army, SS and police forces pursuant
to those undertakings to avoid all measures of destruction,
were among the principal causes for the delivery of North
Italy relatively free of vandalism during those days of
German defeat and withdrawal.
Marshal Alexander and his particular deputies in this
matter, Generals Lerritzer and Airey, saw the possibilities
of Sunrise-Crossword from the very outset. While properly
realistic and even properly skeptical at times, they
courageously seized the initiative and never failed to
give UB complete support in any practical steps to carry
the task forward. Among the messages received during these
hectic days, the most gratifying of all was that from
General Lemnitzer, sent from Caserta, May 2, immediately
after the surrender went into effect. It read as follows:
"Heartiest congratulations results Crossword. Has
been complete and tremendous success. You and your
associates may well be proud of splendid part you
have all played in epoch-making events which
occurred today. My admiration for your loyalty
and devotion to duty during these recent difficult
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�70.
weeks equalled only by pride which is mine for
having privilege and pleasure of participation
with you in this operation which spells end of
Nazi domination in Europe."
I
THE END.
pproved for Release: 2023/07/17 C00033995