NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS TOWARD SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0003206312
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-01733
• Publication Date: May 22, 1975

g 001, (b)(1)
Se (b)(3)
01563
SPECIAL
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
23-Feb-201 0
North Korean Military Capabilities and
Intentions Toward South Korea
SNIE 14.2-1-75
SC 01621-75
22 May 1975
Copy N2 18
 ng No
Sensitive Intelligence Souand Methods Involved
TIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
orized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanction
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and
Development Administration
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the
Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND
INTENTIONS TOWARD SOUTH KOREA
SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate covers the period through the end of 1975.
KEY JUDGMENTS
The modernization and expansion of North Korea's armed forces in
recent years have bolstered its defenses and given Pyongyang an im-
proved and more flexibile offensive capability. The North is develop-
ing this capability in order to achieve unification through military
action should propitious circumstances arise. This intent has been par-
ticularly evident in the construction of tunnels in the DMZ, the de-
velopment of an amphibious capability, and, more recently, in the for-
ward positioning of armor concentrations.
The factors that have restrained Pyongyang from launching major
hostilities continue to do so. These are the US-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty, the presence of US troops, the lack of an across the board su-
periority over ROK forces, especially if they are supported by US tac-
tical air and naval elements, and the need for support from either Mos-
cow or Peking in a sustained, large-scale conflict.
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 Recent events in Indochina have probably strengthened Kim II-
song's determination to press for removal of US forces. They may also
have caused him to question the US commitment to South Korea,
thereby increasing the attractiveness of limited acts of force to probe
American resolve. But, at least until after the General Assembly vote on
the Korean issue, political considerations seem likely to be more im-
portant to him than any military move that he believes would portray
North Korea as responsible for disturbing the peace of the peninsula.'
With heightened tension on the peninsula, there is an increased pros-
pect that small incidents, deliberate or otherwise, might escalate into
conflict between naval vessels or even aircraft. This is especially likely
in the waters around the Western Islands.
1 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of
Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
partment of the Air Force believe that these political considerations will not preclude limited but
deliberate acts of force designed to probe US and ROK resolve and that such acts are likely
within the period of this Estimate.
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 DISCUSSION
1. The major program adopted in 1970 to
strengthen and modernize North Korea's armed
forces has bolstered Pyongyang's defenses and given
it an improved and more flexible offensive capa-
bility.2 The North is developing this capability in
order to achieve unification through military ag-
gression should propitious circumstances arise. This
intent has been particularly evident in the con-
struction of tunnels in the DMZ, the development
of an amphibious capability, and, more recently,
in the forward positioning of armor concentrations.
2. Pyongyang has also succeeded in reducing its
dependence on outside support. How long North
Korea would be able to carry on major offensive
operations without external logistic support would
depend on the nature of the ROK/US response;
against ROK forces alone it could be as long as 90
1ays.
3. The North Korean program has been analogous
in some respects to modernizing efforts during the
same period in the South. North Korea has. em-
phasized naval construction, but the ground and
air forces have also received new equipment. South
Korea's military program is primarily designed to
strengthen ground and air defense capabilities. Im-
provements have tended to offset each other, and
neither side has overall military superiority.
North Korean Military Capabilities
4. Deployments observed since 1973, but in-
creasingly evident in 1974 and 1975, have
cantly enhanced North Korea's offensive capability.
An armored division has been formed in a strate-
gically located position about 40 nm above the
DMZ. Additional hardened artillery positions as
well as multiple rocket launcher sites have been
constructed in forward areas along the DMZ. ,Two
new jet capable airfields nearing operational status
will permit air patrols of longer duration near the
DMZ and the UN controlled offshore islands.
5. During the past few years, North Korea has
emphasized national stockpiling programs, particu-
larly of POL, the construction of undergound
shelters for air and naval craft, and the develop-
ment of a diversified industrial base that can sat-
isfy the full range of needs for ground armament
and munitions. Present output includes naval ves-
sels, tracked amphibious carriers, trucks, artillery,
infantry weapons, multiple rocket launchers, and
ammunition of all calibers. North Korea is also be-
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lieved to be producing limited numbers of medium
tanks.3 However, it continues to rely on the PRC
and the USSR for sophisticated weapon systems
as well as electronic and fire control equipment.
It is completely dependent on Moscow and Peking
for aircraft and on Moscow for air-to-air missiles.
6. The North Korean capability for offensive
naval action is based on its 8 submarines, 18 guided
missile patrol boats, 2 destroyer escorts, and a
sizable torpedo boat force. Since 1971, new con-
struction. has been focused on the development of
an amphibious landing and fire support capability.
Three classes of indigenous-built boats, all capable
of supporting amphibious assault operations, have
been introduced into the naval inventory. These
are the Chaho-class fast fire support boats, the
Chongjin-class motor gunboats, and the Nampo-
class fast personnel landing craft. The navy has
participated in large-scale joint service exercises
involving amphibious landings and is continuing
to refine its amphibious capability.
7. The number of vessels in the fleet, which
now includes 370 combatants, has grown about 25
percent annually since 1972. The most ambitious
domestic production program to date-the con-
struction of R-class submarines-could have begun
107,
as early a
s
As this construction progresse
c ass
submarines will be based on both coasts and North
Korean anti-shipping capabilities will be improved.
Other new classes
since early 1974 include a small guided missile boat
patterned after the Soviet Komar, a small submarine
chaser, and a fire support motor gunboat which
will provide an expanded capability for shore
bombardment in support of an amphibious landing.
8. The North Korean navy continues to display
a high state of both materiel and operational readi-
3 The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that while
North Korea has the technological capability to produce most
if not all medium tank components, reports of actual pro-
duction have not yet been confirmed. The Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army shares
this view.
ness. Since 1973, patrols of the southeast coast have
routinely reached some 40 to 50 nm offshore and
have extended at times to 100 nm. Since late 1973,
the North Koreans have extended their patrols
below the Northern Limit Line and around the west
coast islands that are under the jurisdiction of the
UN Command (UNC). Coordination in training
operations between naval units and aircraft has also
been stressed. Such joint training contributes to ef-
fective coastal defense and also enhances offensive
capabilities against the South.
9. The North Korean army has an estimated per-
sonnel strength of 408,000;4 within 72 hours an
additional 172,000 men could be mobilized for
action from paramilitary training units. Since about
1970 the army has given particular attention to
upgrading its armor forces and its mechanized in-
fantry capabilities. Increased inventories of armor
have led to the formation of additional tank regi-
ments and tanks have been introduced into infantry
division armor battalions to replace or augment
less effective assault guns. Some of the new armor
may be located in the new division located north
of the DMZ.
10. Although North Korea has been unsuccessful
in attempts to build a guerrilla network in the South,
it has been strengthening its unconventional war-
fare forces in the past two years. These currently
number about 40,000, many of them trained for
airborne and amphibious assaults. The bulk of these
forces are organized into 11 light infantry brigades.
Although trained for deep penetration, these forces
could also be employed to support conventional
operations. The completion of a number of sec-
ondary airfields in the southern part of North
Korea will enhance Pyongyang's capacity for air-
borne unconventional operations in the South.
11. Since 1971 air force tactical capabilities have
been enhanced by the acquisition of MIG-21/Fish-
bed J, SU-7/Fitter and MIG-19/Farmer aircraft.
It has also acquired additional AN-2/Colt light
trans
ports and, most recently, 16 IL-28s from China
 KOR EA FM Y
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in December 1974. Air Force combat units now
have 86 IL-28 jet light bombers and about 450 jet
fighters, of which about 120 are all-weather ca-
pable. The location of important South Korean
targets only a few minutes flying time from North
Korea enhances Pyongyang's ability to launch a
surprise attack.
12. Since 1973 overall air force flight activity
has increased. Ground attack training has been
emphasized and ground controlled intercept ca-
pability improved. Patrols off both coasts have
been extended and in 1975 aircraft operated beyond
the Northern Limit Line for the first time.
13. The two tunnels discovered under the DMZ
in November 1974 and March 1975 are reportedly
part of a large-scale construction -program that
began as early as 1971.
e tunnel system was probably in-
tended to be used to place troops behind the ROK's
forward defenses during the initial phase of hos-
tilities in order to neutralize key defensive posi-
tions along the critical avenues of approach to the
South. The system could also have been used to
facilitate commando and guerrilla movements into
the South and to provide yet another avenue for
infiltrating subversive agents and aiding dissident
elements in the South. The insertion of a large force
through such tunnels in support of a frontal attack
across the DMZ could give the North significant
offensive advantage. The advantage, however, has
obviously diminished with the tunnel discoveries.
Prospects
14. Pyongyang's capacity to carry out a variety Part wr
periority over ROK forces, especially if they are
supported by US tactical air and naval elements,
and the need for support from either Moscow or
Peking in a sustained large-scale conflict. The
Chinese treatment of Kim 11-song's visit indicates
that Peking has not abandoned its preference for
continued stability on the peninsula.
15. Recent events in Indochina have probably
strengthened Kim's determination to press for re-
moval of US forces from Korea. He is probably
counting on victories at the Non-Aligned Confer-
ence in Lima this summer and at the UN this fall
to increase the international pressure on the US
to end its presence. His principal mission in Peking
last month may have been to induce the Chinese
to give more unequivocal support to his position
on the troop issue. Hanoi's victory may also have
caused Kim to question the US commitment to
South Korean defense, increasing the attractiveness
of limited acts of force intended to probe US de-
termination, and to point up for the American
audience the dangers of this continuing commit-
ment. But, at least until after the General Assembly
vote, political considerations seem likely to be more
important to Kim than any military move that runs
the risk of portraying North Korea as responsible
for disturbing the peace on the peninsula.6
16. Even without deliberate provocations, with
heightened tension on the peninsula small inci-
dents may produce sharper exchanges than either
side has been willing to permit in the past three
or four years. Seoul is already deeply concerned
lest it fail to respond vigorously to any North
Korean probe. And the North Koreans for their
than previously in
of military options has been enhanced by the mod- es m e imits of ROK (and US) forebearance
ernization and expansion of the North Korean
armed forces. In our judgment, however, the factors
that have restrained Pyongyang from launching
major hostilities continue to do so. These are the
US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the presence of
US troops, the lack of an across-the-board su-
5 Through the two tunnels thus far discovered, the North
Koreans could have put one or two regiments in an hour
or so.
6 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department
of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force believes that these political con-
siderations will not preclude limited but deliberate acts of
force designed to probe US and ROK resolve and that such
acts are likely within the period of this Estimate. These
North Korean probes could take the form of hit-and-run
attacks in the DMZ, deliberate seizure or sinking of ROK
fishing or small naval craft, or even the attempted seizure of
one of the less heavily defended Western Islands.
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17. The prospect for incidents is particularly
great in the waters surrounding the five UNC-con-
trolled Western Islands. Not only does North Korea
claim the waters around these islands, but also
the fishing fleets of both Koreas operate there.
Incidents involving fishing boats have been fre-
quent in the past. There is now greater danger
that these could produce clashes between naval
vessels and even aircraft.
18. If the General Assembly votes for termina-
tion of the UN Command, Pyongyang could well
claim the islands. From the North Korean point
of view, this would be a low risk way of challeng-
ing the ROK, testing the limits of the US commit-
ment, and possibly placing new strains on ROK-US
relations. Beyond this, with success in the General
Assembly behind it, one factor that now inhibits
North Korea from aggressive probing action against
the South will have been removed.
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2, 22 June 1953.
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