DOC IS MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WILLIAM DONOVAN CONCERNING RECENT PLOT TO ASSASSINATE HITLER AND OVERTHROW THE NAZI REGIME.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00031587
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01257
• Publication Date: April 1, 1944

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22 July 1944
VFMORANDITV POR TRE RPFSInPNT
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The military coup dtetat attempted on/July 1944 by strong
elements of the German gigh command appears to have been the out-
growth of political preparations of at least six monthst duration.
For your information, T have prepared a factual presentation sum-
marizing the data on this subject which has been cabled to us from
our representative in Pern.
Sinee it is possible to infer from the statements of gitler and
Goering' that the rebellion was not put down at once, T have also in-
cluded certain possible lines of action suggested for consideration
by our Bern representative in the event that the opposition may be
able to maintain a stand in any region of Germany.
1. Composition and Aims:
Tow emissaries of the conspiring group first approached the .OSS
representative in Bern in January 1944. The group was then described
as composed of various intellectuals from certain military and govern-
ment circles gathered into a loose organization. The membership was
said to be somewhat divided as to a course of action, some holding
that Hitler and his cohorts should be made to shoulder all responsi-
bility to the bitter end; while others favored an overthrow of gitler
and the organization of a new government before the fighting stops,
which might negotiate peace. The conspiring elements were united in
their preference for a western rather than an eastern orientation of
German policy. In general, they were characterized by their emis-
saries as well-educated and influential but not rightist individuals;
such characterization may have been designed for Anglo-American
consumption. The group as a whole apparently maintained its foreign
contacts through the Csnaris organization.
The following were said by the emissaries in rebtmary and April
1944 to be among the members of the group:
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General tudwig Peck, one of the two leaders of the group, former
chief of the German General Staff, who retired flat his own request!'
in 1938. General neck, General Fritsch, and General Fromm (mentioned
later as a member of this group) dominated the Reichswehr Ministry
until 1938.
Carl Friederich Goerdler, co-leader of the group, a former Mayor
of Leipsiz, and one-time Nazi representative to business circles in
the united States.
Rrigadier-General Hans Oster, former right-hand man to Canaris,
who was 'arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 and later released but kept
under surveillance eind was officially discharged by Keitel in early
1944.
Colonel-General 'Franz Ritter von Felder, a strong figure in
Catholic circles, anti-Soviet, reported ousted in 1942, although
thought under consideration by the Nazis for an important new post
In Late June 1944.
General Thomas (probably General Georg Thomas, Chief of War
Economy and Armaments in the Mil.
Hans Leuschner, socialist leader and former Minister of the
Interior in Hesse, a former anti-Nazi who may have made some sort of
peace with the Nazis.
In early April the group's emissaries again approached the OSS
representative, bearing a declaration said to represent the views of
General Beck and ITerr Goerdler. This message stated that, with
Germany's position coming to a head and the end of the war in Europe
definitely in sight, the group was willing and ready to take steps to
oust the Nazis and eliminate Hitler (see report to White Wouse Map
Room, dated 12 April 1944). The group claimed to be the only one with
personal access to Hitler and other Nazi chiefs, with enough arms to
accomplish its purpose, and with enough power in the army to make a
coup feasilbe. Such action, however, would be contingent upon assur-
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ances from Britian and the United States that, once the Nazis had
been overthrown, negotiations would then be carried out solely with
the Western Powers and under no circumstances with the USSR. The
essential conservatism of the group's planners was stressed, but also
its willingness to cooperate with any available elements of the Left
except for the Communists. The group expressed its anxiety to keep
Central Europe from coming under Soviet domination. if capitulation
were to be made primarily to the Soviet Union, the negotiations would
have to be carried on by another group. Such mehrmacht commanders in
the West' as von Rundstedt and FRlkenhausen, the declaration maintained,
would be ready to assist Allied landings once the razis were removed
from power.
To these overtures the OS P representative
said little beyond
pressing his strong conviction that the United States would never
without previous consulataion with the ITSSII. He reported at that
that he had doubts as to the group's chances of success, since he
ex-
act
time
said
that both Beck and Goerdler had been publicly mentioned as potential
leaders of a coup, and since it could be taken for granted that the
Gestapo was aware of this group. The representative thought that
Gestapo had not stepped in either because it planned to wait until the
group's plans had been more n any perfected, or because the Gestapo
too wished to have flan anchor in the west".
In early May the two emissaries forwarded to the (SS representa-
tive a further communication from the group. Its membership was daid
by this time to include important new members: Generals von Pundstedt,
Falkenhausen, Heusinger, 7e1tz1er, and Olbricht (see report to white
House Map Room, dated 16 May 1944). These Generals were all reported
ready to assist Anglo-American units to enter Germany provided the
Western Allies would agree to allow them to continue the war on the
eastern front.
A new plan of action was outlined in the may communicatift.
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The plan called for the landing of three Allied parachute divisions
in the Perlin area with the help of local Army commanders; major
amphibious landings at or near Bremen and Hamburg; the isolation of
Hitler and high Nazi officials in Obersalzberg by trustworthy German
units posted in the Vunich region; and Allied landings on the French
coast, though these in their early stages were thought difficult to
plan as Rommel could not be counted upon for cooperation. Tn the
communication the group reaffirmed its belief thatGermany had Bost the
war, that the last hope of preventing the spread of Communism in
Germanywould be an Anglo-American occupation of the greatest possible
_portion of the Reich, and that the only means of accomplishing this
would be to help the A nglo-American forces to enter Germany before
military collapse in the East.
The two emissaries at this time expressed the -opinion that the
group's proviso with regard to the exclusion of the TISSR was un-
realistic; they regarded the plan for speedy American and British
occupation of Germany as the core of the proposal. One of the emis-
saries admitted a lack of confidence in the political courage of the
German generals, on the bails of past experience, and remarked. that
the Allies might do well to ignore their propositions if an early
' victory and speedy occupation of Germany appeared certain. The OSS
representative reported his own doubt S as to indli whether the group
would possess the necessary determination to act effectively at the
appropriate time.
Tn early July a courier arrived in Pern bearing a communication
_
displaying new.confidence in the strength of the group (see report
to White House Yap Room, dated 18 July 1944. This message reported
that the movement had gained new vigor from the Soviet victores in
the Fast, from the Allied landings in the West, and from certain
developments in Germany. Colonel-General Fritz_Tromm, Chief of the
Home Command, who controlled the regular army within Germany, was
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said to have joined the group. Further strength was said to have
been required by the alleged transfer of ORW headquarters from Past
Prussia to a locality near Berlin and the resultant proximity to
Berlin of General abricht, Chief of the General Army Office, Colonel
General Kurt 7eitzler, Cliief of Sfaff, and other generals supposed
to be in the opposition. Cooperation was also claimed from a group
of anti-Fitler elements headed by 7olff Graf Helldorf, Perlin chief
of police and an old time Nazi, The message said that the group's
plan of action called for an ordered retreat from the west and the
dispatch of all crack divisions to defend the eastern front. fforts
would be made to convince the generals to wage a final struggle
against Nazism.
12
0n/July the OSS representative reported that a dramatic event
might take place up north, if the information brought by the group's
courier could be trusted, and warned that any news would be suppressed
by violence, if necessary. This was the last word received berore
the news of the attempted coup.
2. Nazi Countermeasures.
By the first week in July it became amply clear that the National
Socialist Government was aware of impending revolt in high milltary
circles. Tn his funeral oration_ for General rietl (2 July) Fitler
extolled those who devoted themselves to the German cause with
fanaticism as opposed to the lukewarm supporters of the war effort.
On 17 July when the break through in the Fast began and the 'western
beachhead loomed as a firmly established threat, Goebbels wrote an
editorial in Pas Reich pointing out that the home front was the
critical area in the German war effort and that an power should be
given to "the fanatics". This article constituted a marked departure
from the earlier propaganda line, which emphasized the participation
of all Germans in the conduct of the war.
These official statements were harbingers of the rartyls intention
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to seize all power in the state, including that over the military
;establishment. On 19 July news leaked out to Stockholm that weinrich
Himmler would shortly be named to a post of first importance in the
'German High Command. Himmler's powers, it was said, would include
complete control over all military appointments both in the field and
in the Home Command. As this report was received, telephone commu-
nications between Stockholm and Perlin were cut (1655, 19 July). The
report therefore antedates the coup of 20 July.
3. The Coup d'Pltat
- To the Army leadership the acquisition of such powers by Himmler
clearly would be regarded as the end of their political power, domestic
and international, which rested on their control of the armed forces.
It may be assumed that the High Command felt its international bar-
gaining strength to lie in its armies in the field. This was weakened
,by enemy action and also by the removal of General von Pundstedt and
the presence of Pommel on the western front. The High Command's
domestic strength, on the other hand, resided in General Fromm's home
forces. As the armies in the field approached defeat the importance
of the home army would increase. Only through control of the home
army could Germany's military leadership gi�i eliminate the Nazis
-without exposing itself to social revolution.
It is therefore believed that the proposed appointment of Fimmler
jsubsenquently announced in Hitler's speech after the coup) precipi-
tated the military conspirators into premature action. The actual
attempt upon Hitler's life, hastily organized as it was, had to be
made before the appointment of_Himmler could take place.
We hai-e- just recdived from the OSS representative in Bern the
following dispatch, dated 21 July, containing his estimate of the
situation:
,
"The coup d'etat appears to have been the result of the
planning and organization outlined in my earlier communicYations.
It had been intended that certain men in the inner circles of the'
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conspiracy, such as General Heusinger, would be at the meeting
when the bomb went off because the only chance for planting the
bomb was in conjunction with a conference attended by many of
the chief military leaders. One of the members of the group was
Stauffenberg who served as liaison wit between the older officers
on active duty at General Headquarters and the younger group,
formerly headed by Helmut von )1coltke. Stauffenberg, in addition,
acted as councillor to Goerdler.
"The outcome of the revolt at present rests with the Reserve
Army wHeimatheert and their willingness to follow Himmler as
their chief or whether they will stick to their old commanders
some of whom appear to beinvolved in the plot. Naturally, the
blood purge will be unmerftful.
"One of the disheartening facts seems to be that the parti-
cipants in the revolt do not have adequate radio facilities at
thqir command. However, it has come to our attention that a
report from Reuterts states that a message dispatched by the
rebels from Frankfurt-Am-Vain this morning was interrupted.
"However, a thorough perusal of the Goering-Hitler statements
would lead to the inference that the rebellion was not put down �
at once."
=4. Suggested Lines of Action.
In the event that the opposition does find it possible to maintain
a stand in any region of Germany, it has been suggested by our repre-
sentative in Bern that the Allied Government might wish to consider
the following possible lines of action:
"(1) Some word from the President to counter Goebbelts
line about the Allies? plan for complete annihilation of ,the
German people. This would encourage the anti-Nazi groups.
"(2) Air raids on the Nazi stronghold in the region of
perchtesgaden. Although the immediate military effectiveness
of such action would be unimportant, it is possible that the
psychological reaction would be great. Naturally, any break in
the communication channels between the region of Perchtesgaden
(fr and the rest of the country would be especially valuable.
"(3) Providing the rebellion gains any momentum, some
announcemtnt to the effect that any German town which sides
with the opposition would not be attacked whereas Gestapo
centers and Nazi strongholds would be bombed unsparingly.
"(4) Large-scale dissemination of pamphlets from the air."
William J. Donovan
Director
P.S. Since writing the foregoing T have received a further dispatch
from Bern which reads as follows:
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"Up to 100 P.M. today (22 ,Tuly 1944 the razi Legation
had not had any news from the Foreign Office, not even the
customary "sprach regelung." This is the Yazi term for
instructions on how to lie. There are positive signs that
if a revolt did get under way, several Tazi officers at this
end would abandon the sinking ship."
w.J.P.
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29 July 1944
'MEVORANPUM FOR THF, PRESTIVITT
The recent plot to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the razi
.regime (about which I have sent you several reports) recalle an
'earlier approach which was made to one of our representatives in
Istanbul. (You will remember that an approach was also made in
Sweden, concerning which T wrote you on 20 T.narch 1944.)
The approach in Istanbul was made at a time when it was clear
that our relations with theRussians would not permit negotiation with
such a contact, especially since the plan advanced involved an attempt
to permit Anglo-Saxon occupation to the exclusion of Russia. How-
ever, the incident is of historical interest at this moment as it
now appears that the approach which was made by a well known lawyer,
then attached to the German High Command as an expert on international
questions, was in all Probability a manifestation of the movement.
described in the memorandum to you dated 23 July 1944. A despatch
from our representative in Pern dated 21 July and quoted in our
memorandum to you states that this man, to whoM we have given the
code designation Hermann, acted as the head of the younger group of
officers at General Headquarters who participated in the conspiracy.
The proposal in essence set forth the willingness of this group
(then known as the Hermann Group) to accept military defeat and
occupation by the Allies in order to prevent a Russian invasion of
Germany. As essential condition to the foregoing was the stablish-
ment of a line against the Russians based on Lemburg-Tilsit. The
group expressed' its readiness to undertake military cooperation with
the Allies on the largest possible scale with a view toward ousting
Hitler and paving the way as speedily as possible for thefinglo-
American occupation of Germany. On the most important point of how
this cooperation could be effected the plan was silent.
proved 'tor Releke_
Date _OCT 19.91 _
di 0
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T directed our representative in Tstanbul to enter into no
negothtions with Fermann but to keep open the channel of contact.
The American Military Attache was apprised of this contact and -a' the
outlines of the proposal.
Although subsequent to the delivery of the
group's proposal to our representative in Istanbul further overtures
were made and a meeting was requested, this meeting could not take
place due to the arrest of vermanni who, so far as we know, has
remained in custody.
-1ATill1am J. Donovan
Pirector
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