DEAR MR. DULLES:

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: DNI
• Keywords: ICBM
• Keywords: SPUTNIK
• Collection: Intelligence Warning of the 1957 Launch of Sputnik
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0003030512
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: September 22, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2017-00012
• Publication Date: October 23, 1957

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Washington, D. C.
23 October 1957
' Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr.
This letter will confirm our conversation of 22 October
during which we stated to you that we believed the United States
is in a period of national emergency.
We spent the day preceding our conversation with you in
reviewing and discussing evidence regarding the Soviet guided
missile program, particularly those aspects dealing with offensive
ballistic missiles. The data proves beyond question that the
Russians have an orderly and progressive program which is being
prosecuted in an agressive and intelligent nemner. The program
does not appear to us to be of a "crash" nature but rather one
that has been thoroughly thought out and followed for years. One
of the most distrubing features revealed is the high level of Soviet
competence in achieving their planned goals. Just two points will
illustrate this conclusion:
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
In this context, it should be
noted that both the first firing EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
and the orbiting of their satellite were accomplished
as scheduled and with practically no delays.
b. Ph p eeeeracies achieved in their fie4,,.
indicate an extremely high p 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
ficiency in guidance components such that no imagination
is required to extrapolate these results to usable accu-
racies in an ICBM.
This material contains informtion affecting the
national defc-n!7e cc tes wi?hin the
meaning of the Tifk, 13, USC, Secs.
793 and 794, i1_. or revelation of
which in any rcia:mer to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
_1012--SEeRtur-
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Yge Allen W. Dulles
23 October 1957
As meetieeed above. the Progression in their ballistic
missile program h__ EO 13526
and earth satellite, illustrates thoroughly te-
a) 13526
soundest technical concept and execution. This program is eeeeweee
supported by highly reliable rocket motors EO 13526 3.3(b)(1
This latter motor, reportedly ready fT64-1-34-46+373.4.-(b.)(1
Lu 1.3b2b .3..,3(0)(1
probably is an essential eleme
in 1952, is
ICBM. Inasmuch -as precise glade:ace and dependable
the chief factors in an ICE% we -bust conclude that the USSR can
have some (a dozen) operational missiles by the end of 1958. We
must also conclude that significant vantitites ofethese missiles
(with atomic warheads) are not large vantitites and could be pro-
duced fairly rapidly.
Our high concern has resulted from our knowledge of the
US program _
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
)>25Yrs
)>25Yrs
)>2bYrS
)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
our comparison of the US and USSR programs. Although we reaieze
Intelligence has no responsibility for making comparisons of this
nature, omission would remove basis for concern. US experience in
ballistic missiles does not match that of the USSR and in our
opinion is lagging by two to three years. We submit that there
is no spot remedy that will eliminate this critical difference
In capabilities within any short time. period. Rather, only by
the most determined and concentrated US effort, extending over
a period of several years, will me raise our experience level
again to a par with the USSR.
Not immediately akin abut very closely connected, it is
our belief that guided miasile intelligence must be more closely
interwoven both within itself and with the US research and develop-
ment program such that intelligence may be able to arrive at firmer
conclusions on a greatly accelerated time base. Inasmuch as national
policy decisions aretet3g made in Washington, intelligence, to be
timely, also needs be accomplished in Washington. For this reason,
we submit that the technical competence of CIA, should be expanded
without delay and that direct connections between CIA and US missile
contractors be effected. .
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Mr Allen W. Dulles 23 October 1957
We note that the guided missile intelligence community
has initiated some technical studies which might lead to a refine-
ment in the military characteristics of an ICBM.. While refinement
of estimates is required, such should not obscure nor delay the
basic fact of the near existence of a Soviet operational ICBM.
Your consultant panel believes, as stated before, that
the country is in a period of grave national emergency and that
it will only be by the most intelligent and coordinated efforts
of all concerned over a period of same years before such an
emergency can be eliminated. In parallel, we cannot emphasize too
much that increased efforts by the intelligence community, both
overt and covert, are mandatory to counter this threat.
/s/
Robert R. MoMb.th
/8/
Lawrence A. Hyland
/s/
George B. Kistiakowsky
/s/
Francis H. Clauser
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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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