IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMBODIA OF THE MOVE AGAINST SIHANOUK

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002909551
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-01229
• Publication Date: March 19, 1970

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMBODIA OF THE MOVE AGAINST SIHANOUK
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19 March 1970
No., 0484/70
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 WARNING
This doc?ume- kuntains information affecting the national
defense of the Un d States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or ru cla ' of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized pers is prohibited by law.
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aXCLUDLt, r110 A1 AUTOMATIC
DON N(IIIAINNO ANII
DAC LA ANTI ICAT ION
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of ?.ntelligence
19 March 1970
Implications for Cambodia of the Move Against Sihanouk
Events have moved in Cambodia with uncommon
rapidity. The seven-month old effort on the part of
Prime Minister Lon Nol and his deputy Sirik Matak
slowly to curtail then chief of state Sihanouk's
power has suddenly and with little warning blossomed
into the first full-blown political crisis in Cam-
bodia in over a decade. For the first time in
Sihanouk's 17 years as leader of an independent
Cambodia, important elements of the major domestic
sources of power within the country, the army, the
royal family, the bureaucracy, and possibly even the
people, are aligned against him. For the first time,
those elements in Phnom Penh who have long chafed
under his rule, either because of his authoritarian
style of running the country or because of a funda-
mental disagreement with his economic and foreign
policies, have united and found leadership, notably
in the forceful and energetic person of Sirik Matak.
The struggle for power in Phnom Penh, which
at this moment is clearly running in favor of the
anti-Sihanouk forces, involves truly fundamental
issues: who will make Cambodian policy and what that
policy should be. The two are obviously closely
related, and there can be no question that a major
struggle has been fought over the efficacy of
Sihanouk's policies. The struggle is not simply
between these who support Sihanouk's brand of
neutralism, his accommodation with the Communists,
or his fuzzy-minded economic policies and those who
would align Cambodia with the US and South Vietnam or
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
 who advocate other economic policies... To a large
extent, differences over policies have been merely
the catalyst in the power struggle now under way in
Phnom Penh, but whether the new leadership, should
it prevail in.its contest with the Prince, will be
able to devise. a new formula for meeting Cambodia's
problems is by no means certain.
This memorandum outlines the events of the week
or so preceding Sihanouk's ouster and briefly reviews
the major develoments.in Cambodian national life and
foreign relations of .the past few years that are
relevant to the current situation. The probable reac-
tions of the North and South Vietnamese, as well as the
Soviets and the Chinese Communists, are considered.
Finally, the paper offers some comments on possible
courses of action Sihanouk may take.
 The Current Situation'
1. The formal move to depose Sihanou'~ was
made in Phnom Penh on the afternoon of 18 March.
At the request of the government, both houses of
the Cambodian legislature met in special closed
session and voted to withdraw its confidence in
Sihanouk as chief of state and, in "conformity with
the national constitution," appointed National
Assembly President Cheng Heng as acting chief of
state pending elections to fill the post permanently.
The mechanics through which Lon Nol and Sirik Matak
have moved against Sihanouk--a recourse to aca-
demic constitutional procedures--is clearly de-
signed to clothe the new arrangement in constitu-
tional legitimacy and make Sihanouk's position that
much more untenable. The Prince's only recourse
now, assuming the National Assembly sticks to its
guns, is to appeal to the Cambodian people in an
ad hoc extraconstitutional manner or run once again
for his old job, on the outside chance that he is
allowed to do so. Never a master of constitutional
niceties, Sihancuk now finds that the bogus "con-
stitutional" system he devised has become a telling
instrument in the hands of his opponents. The Cam-
bodian communique' also stated that the vote against
Sihanouk in the legislature was unanimous, a good
sign of the bandwagon psychology now at play in
Phnom Penh.
2. As a security precaution, the government
has closed the Phnom Penh airport and suspended
external communication facilities. No other unusual
security precautions have been noted, but the army
has been on alert for the past week. The Phnom
Penh police chief has been replaced, apparently as
another step in the government's effort to consoli-
date its control. The situation on the South
Vietnamese border, where Vietnamese Communist and
Cambodian troops have been squared off against
each other since the attacks on the Communist
embassies on 11 March, was at last report quiet.
 3. The government thus far has said nothing
publicly about Sihanouk's future position--whether
he will be allowed to return to Phnom Penh or even
whether he has been officially notified of t'he
legislature's action. There is no evidence that
sheds any light on its thinking. The chance's
are pretty good that the leaders in Phnom T'enh have
not yet thought through this problem. Sihanouk's
mother, Queen Kossamak, who has issued several
highly unusual messages to the nation. in recent days,
apparently to protect the position of the throne
in the new scheme of things, has been notably silent.
She presumably will weigh in against any proposal
that would involve Sihanouk's permanent exile.
Sihanouk himself has not yet made any comment on
events in Phnom Penh. According to press accounts,
Soviet Premi.ar Kosygin told Sihanouk .about his
ouster as the Prince boarded a plane taking him to
Peking. Sihanouk's original schedule called for
him to return to Phnom Penh on 24 March.
5. The government's decision to move decisively
against Sihanouk at this time represents a radical
shift from the slow nibbling away at .his power
that government leaders had been pursuing for the
past six months. With Sihanouk out of the country,
and believing they could count on the support of
the National Assembly and many, if not all, army
 commanders, Matak and Lon Nol evidently decided that
they could afford to buck the Prince on the single most
important issue facing the country. They were apparently
prepared for a showdown if that was what the Prince
wanted. Lon Nol apparently believed that Sihanouk
had decided, while he was in Pails, to overthrow the
government and replace it with one that was respon-
sive to his direction. The leaders of the anti-
Sihanouk forces apparently felt they had to move
before Sihanouk had the opportunity to reverse the
trend of events.
Backgrouad
6. The genesis of the current struggle for
power can, of course, be traced back many years.
One crucial turning point occurred in late 1963 and
early 1964 when Sihanouk, convinced that a relatively
early Communist victory in South Vietnam was in the
cards, began to make adjustments in Cambodia's
foreign policy.. This involved abruptly terminating
US military and economic assistance. Sihanouk made
the decision on his own, with little or no consulta-
tion with interested parties in the army and the
government. He placated the army by acquiring
military assistance from Communist China and the
Soviet Union, but many army officers--particularly
those who had trained in the US--still yearned for
a return to the days when the US played.a paramount
role. The politics of these officers, and Lon
Nol was counted among them, were also out of tune
with Sihanouk's blatantly pro-Communist neutralism.
Other members of the Phnom Penh elite, including
members of the bureaucracy and the royal family,
were even more upset over the course of Sihanouk's
policy. With a strong economic stake in a continuing
US presence in the country, and by ideology and
heritage strongly anti-Communist, these elements
that they were op-
posed to Sihanouk.
-5-
 best of what they considered to be a bad deal. in
order to gird the nation for what he knew would be
a perilous period and to help compensate for the
loss of US economic assistance, Sihanouk also insti-
tuted a number of ill-conceived economic "reforms"
that involved banking and the rice trade. These
did little to ingratiate him with the Phnom Penh
elite and when the economy ran into bad trouble in
the coming years, Sihanouk got much of the blame.
8. The fissure between Sihanouk and his' base
of power in the army and among the Phnom Penh elite
was a consequence, then, of two interrelated factors:
a difference of opinion about what was in Cambodia's
best interests, and considerable resentment about the
authoritarian and highly personalized way Sihanouk
ran things. That Sihanouk managed for at least
five years to keep growing disgruntlement from be-
coming a threat to his- own position, while at the same
time doing pretty much what he pleased, is testimony
to his skill, hard work, magnetic personality, and
the unique place he has occupied in Cambodian affairs.
It is hard to say how long Sihanouk might have kept
the show going if events had not began to run too
strongly against him. One of the most important
factors is the sheer physical strain that the effort
required. This not only meant that Sihanouk was forced
to'take a vacation in France when he faced a major
challenge to his authority--a clear tactical mistake
that may prove to be Sihanouk's worst--but that he was
also forced to turn to energetic opposition elements
to help run the government.
9. When Sihanouk turned to Sirik Matak and
Lon Nol to form a new government last summer, he
was fully aware that they would try to run their
government with a minimum of interference. Matak
was not an unknown quantity; his opposition to
Sihanouk's past policies was well known, his inde-
pendence of thought and action had been demonstrated
over the years. Sihanouk wanted Lon Nol and Matak
to take up some of the burdens of running the
government, but the process of passing some author-
ity to others proved to be exceedingly painful.
It was not made any better by the relish with
 which Matak pressed forward and began carefully but
unremittingly to curtail Sihanouk's powers. The
fight was not essentially about issues; Sihanouk
had approved the government's economic refo.ms and
many of the tough policies against the Vietnamese
Communists he had himself been putting into effect
for at least two years.
The Vietnamese Communist Issue
10. Nevertheless, the question of the growing
Vietnamese Communist presence on Cambodian soil
became an important aspect of the struggle in Phnom
Penh. For one thing, it threw into question the
viability of Sihanouk's foreign policy. Although
it was true that the Prince had kept the war for
the most part out of Cambodia--no mean achievement,
but bound to be given short shrift by elements out
to get Sihanouk's scalp--the country faced just
as grave a threat from the about 40,000 Vietnamese
who were ensconcing themselves in Cambodia for the
duration of the war. The Communists had pledged to
remove their forces once the war was over, but who
could tell when that would be? Through all of his
skillful maneuvering--military pressures on the border,
holding up rice and arms shipments, talks with the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, signed documents
pledging Communist respect for Cambodia's borders--the
fact remained that the Vietnamese were still in
Cambodia and had no intention of moving. For
Sihanouk, this unhappy state of affairs was a sad
consequence of Cambodia's weakness and its desire
not to become a party to the US and South Vietnamese
war effort. As long as he believed that the Viet-
namese Communists would prevail--and his message
to the Queen on 17 March indicates that his assess-
ment has not changed--he felt Cambodia had little
choice but to make the best of an inherently bad
situation.
11. It seems reasonably clear from their
public statements and private remarks that neither
Matak nor Lon Nol has been contemplating any radical
departure from Sihanouk's policy, nor have they
shown that they have any detailed plan of how they
 can get the Communists off Cambodian territory.
This may be because the Vietnamese Communist issue
has been, at least up to now, only a means toward
achieving certain domestic ends, i..e., the ouster
of Sihanouk,
12. Although both Matak and Lon Nol appreciate
the difficult position Cambodia finds itself in, they
are more inclined to take a tougher line with the
Communists. There is considerable pressure in the
army for more forceful measures against the Communists,
probably even if that would involve direct cooperation
with the US and South Vietnamese forces. Neither Siri.k
Matak nor Lon Nol is ideologically committed to
neutrality and both men are capable of calling on
the US for assistance if they think it necessary to
protect Cambodia or their own positions. How far they
are willing to push the Communists depends on a number
of factors which neither they nor we can predict.
In bringing the students into the str?ets of Phnom
Penh on the pretext of the Vietnamese Communist
issue, the new leaders have created a major domestic
issue; now they are in the uncomfortable position
of having to demonstrate some progress in meeting
it. Having ousted Sihanouk on this issue--at least
nominally--Matak and Lon Nol have to prove they
can do better. If the Communists dig in their heels,
if the talks that have been under way in Phnom Penh
for the past few days break down, then the new leader-
ship faces the difficult choice of either pursuing
the matter militarily and risking a sharp and
politically embarrassing setback, or doing, in
essence, nothing. The statement by the acting chief
of state on 18 March that Cambodia will continue to
apply the "same policy" indicates that the new
regime will seek a breathing spell befoLc: embarking
on any new adventures tic policy. This also appears
to be the message that, was being conveyed to the US
charge when he was told explicitly on 18 March that
there would be no change in Cambodia's "policy of
neutrality."
 North Vietnamese Reactions
13. The dilemma confronting the Vietnamese Commu-
nists is obvious. Life is inevitably going to be
less easy for them.in Cambodia than it was when
Sihanouk was on.hand.to keep the anti-.Vietnamese
genie in the bottle, and they must consider there
is a strong possibility that the new government
in Phnom Penh will continue to make things more
difficult. They almost certainly think that the
supplies of arms they have been getting through
Sihanoukville are in jeopardy, not to mention-the
rice they have been buying over and under the counter
from the Cambodians. They may consider a serious
confrontation with the Cambodian military somewhat
less likely, but they certainly anticipate more
frequent skirmishes with Cambodian troops. Finally,
they must take into .account the possibility that Phnom
Penh will encourage or wink at cross-border incursions
by the South Vietnamese or the US.
14. The Communists do not have many assets to
deploy against this depressing array of possibili-
ties. They will probably check with Sihanouk to
see if he intends to attempt a return to -Phnom Penh.
If he does not they could use their unquestioned
superiority over the Cambodian military to try to
force further changes in Phnom Penh, but this is a
dangerous card to play--one which could in fact add
a long-term military effort in Cambodia .to those al-
ready under way in Laos and South Vietnam. They
could--and probably will--step up their aid to
indigenous Cambodian insurgents in hopes of di-
verting some of the Cambodian Army's attention from
the Communists' own activities.
15. We therefore suspect that the Communists
will mute their public criticism of Sihanouk's
successors, at least in the immediate future, and
that in private they will be quite reasonable.
They probably are hoping the Cambodians will pre-
serve much of the form and a good deal of the sub-
stance of Sihanouk's neutralist policies., and that
by appealing to the acquisitive instincts of many
Cambodian leaders they can keep the essentials of
 their stake in the country: reasonably secure safe
areas along the South Vietnamese border, a reasonably
constant flow of arms and rice, and a minimum of
Cambodian connivance in harassment from South Vietnam.
If such a deal cannot be made and the Cambodians try
to evict them, the North Vietnamese will be faced
with the serious problem of how to quarter and support
their main force units in the III and IV cord. areas.
South Vietnamese optimism
16. The South Vietnamese view of these develop-
ments is presumably exactly the reverse of the
Communist view. Saigon undoubtedly welcomes the
change in government leadership and the new pres-
sures being applied against Communist use of Cam-
bodian territory because these developments mean
new problems, possibly critical ones, for South
Vietnam's Communist enemy.
17. President Thieu presumably will be glad to do
whatever he can discreetly do to assist the new regime
as it tries to consolidate its position and deal with
the Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia.. He probably
will not rush to embrace the new regime too openly,
however, since this could embarrass 'it politically as
it tries to persuade Hanoi to remove its troops.
18. The South Vietnamese probably expect at the
least that local clashes between Cambodian forces
and Vietnamese Communist units in Cambodia will
increase in frequency and become a greater problem
for the Communists. They probably also expect that
the Cambodians, with Sihanouk gone, will be less
obliging in providing discreet help in.facilitating
the movement of food, ammunition, and.other supplies
to the Communist enemy fighting in South Vietnam.
19. Assuming the present authorities in Phnom
Penh can make their ouster of Sihanouk .stick and that
they arr, willing to .follow through with.their strong
opposition to Communist use of Cambodian ..territory,
Saigon officials can at least hope for some kind of
coordinated efforts by Cambodian, South Vietnamese,
and US forces to destroy the Communist .sanctuary
system in Cambodia. This could involve Cambodian
 permission for cross-border operations in force by
South Vietnamese and/or US ground units.
20. The South Vietnamese probably calculate
broadly that any such new pressures from-Cambodia
on Communist forces will be more effective the farther
south these units.are deployed. Enemy..forces opera-
ting out of the triborder area opposite II Corps
might be hindered somewhat, the enemy..divisions in
northern III Corps would be more seriously embar-
rassed by the loss .of supplies and by military
pressure from Cambodia, and the five.-.plus enemy
regiments now operating along the periphery of IV
Corps would be the-most seriously exposed of all
to Cambodian harassment or pressure.
The Soviet Reaction
21. The Soviets had been playing all the recent
developments in Laos and Cambodia in low key, hoping
that both crises could be papered over without their
having to become too deeply involved, . The way the
Soviets initially handled the Cambodian leader's
visit suggests that they did not see much purpose
in being responsive to his requests to -intercede
with the North Vietnamese.
22. Further talks with Sihanouk, -however, ap-
parently caused Moscow to have second thoughts. It
appears from ,the admittedly sketchy accounts of the
additional sessions that Sihanouk had with the top
leadership that Moscow was al -
ments to be more forthcoming.
23. Moscow too was probably surprised and dis-
mayed by the news from Phnom Penh. The.Soviets have
supported Sihanouk over the years because they re-
cognized that he was one of the few Cambodian leaders
 willing to accommodate the North Vietnamese. Like
Hanoi, the Soviets would probably prefer to see him
restored to power,, The Soviets realize, however,
that much depends on the internal situation in Cam-
bodia--a situation where their influence is prac-
tically nil.
24. Before Sihanouk left Moscow, the Soviet
leaders probably assured him of their support if he
does decide to'challenge the National Assembly action.
In practical terms what this means is promises of
increased economic aid and certain kinds of poli-
tical support. To this latter end, the Soviets may
intervene with Hanoi in Sihanouk's behalf. They
will probably ask the Vietnamese to give Sihanouk
assurances of Cambodian "neutrality and territorial
integrity." Although Hanoi is unlikely to reduce its
troop presence substantially in Cambodia (and the
Soviets are unlikely to ask the North Vietnamese to
do so), Moscow might urge Hanoi to make some token
troop withdrawals.
25. Should Sihanouk fail to return to power, Mos-
cow will undoubtedly follow Hanoi's lead in its
relations with Cambodia. In any event,.Moscow may
hope that the same political forces which compelled
Sihanouk to seek Soviet support will eventually
prompt his successors to do the same.
Consternation in Peking
26. Sihanouk now joins Nkrumah in a select com-
pany of foreign chiefs of state overthrown while
on their way to Peking. The Chinese are withholding
public comment on the ouster of Sihanouk, probably
until they can get a reading from him as to his in-
tentions. The Chinese are undoubtedly seriously
concerned over the change of command in-Phnom Penh
and they will probably encourage Sihanouk to return
to Cambodia in order to try to reassert his control
over events in that country.
27. Although relations between ..the Chinese and
Sihanouk have not been as warm in recent years as
they once were, Peking would still prefer to deal
with the Prince rather than with anti-Communist
 leaders such as Lon Nol or Sirik Matak. Peking's
most immediate concern is over possible further
moves'by the new Cambodian leaders against the Viet-
namese Communists. Peking's own supply line to the
Vietnamese Communists through Si.ftanoukville must
now look particularly vulnerable to the Chinese.
28. Peking seems to have been concerned that
Hanoi might negotiate an end to the war ever since the
Paris talks opened in May 1968 and, therefore, the
Chinese are deeply concerned over any development
,which might further weaken Hanoi's willingness to
keep the war going. Peking will be worried that
consolidation of an actively anti-Communist regime
in Phnom Penh would help to erode Hanoi's deter-
mination to continue fighting.
29. If Sihanouk is unable to reassert his
authority in Cambodia, Peking can be expected to make
a major effort with the new Phnom Penh leaders to work
out a continuation of its supply program to the Viet-
namese Communists and to arrange a solution to the
problem of the presence of North Vietnamese troops
on Cambodian territory. Should those efforts fail,
Peking would probably publicly criticize the new
Phnom Penh regime as a creature of the .US and urge
the Cambodian Communists to step up their activity
against the government.
The Next Round
30. Where Cambodia and the Sirik Matak - Lon Nol
government go from here obviously will depend heavily
on what Sihanouk does. Press reports from Moscow
claim that Sihanouk asserted that he was prepared
to set up a government-in-exile, but if true this
was clearly an emotional reaction on the part of
the Prince. Never the most even-tempered of men,
Sihanouk is going through a major crisis and he is
likely to change his mind numerous times before he
actually decides on a course of action.
31. There is little question that his visceral
reaction is likely to be to return to Phnom Penh
and settle. the hash of the upstarts. If he takes
this tack, however, it is not likely that Sirik
-13-
 Matak and Lon Nol will allow '_7.im to return. They
have staked their futures on the move against
Sihanouk and they are not likely to .run unneces-
sary risks. A repentant Sihanouk returning to
accept an honorific position and to lend his
prestige to the nationalist struggle might be
acceptable, but it seems doubtful that Sihanouk
has the temperament for playing such a role. If
Sihanouk manages to return to Cambodia, it would
be a mistake to count him out, despite the fact
that the deck is strongly stacked against him. He
still commands considerable support among the
people, and it is possible that there are elements
in the armed forces that might rally to his banner,
Sihanouk also knows where the skeletons are hidden,
and revelations about some of the people who are
now sanctimoniously portraying themselves as staunch
Cambodian nationalists--Prime Minister Lon Nol, for
example, has made enormous amounts of money trading
with the Communists--could have a.telling effect.
32. The move against Sihanouk has opened a Pan-
dora's box. No one on the Cambodian scene at present
can command the authority or legitimacy that Sihanouk
enjoyed. By the force of his personality and wits,
Sihanouk managed to keep the contending royal and
personal factions in line. These same groups are
now united in their opposition to Sihanouk and their
desire to do something about the Vietnamese Communist
threat, but how long they will stay together if things
begin to get rough is another matter. The charges of
corruption that they have leveled against Sihanouk's
entourage are also, to varying degrees, applicable to
many of them. They have no magic; formula for meeting
Cambodia's problems, nor do they have great exper-
ience in running the country. It may be that out of
the adversity they are almost certain to go through,
Sirik Matak, Lon Nol, or some other as yet unknown
leader will get Cambodia out of the mess it has been
in. But it is likely to be a dicey game, and
Sihanouk may calculate that his best bet is to wait
to pick up the fallen pieces.
or.~~nrm
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