THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002775031
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: December 1, 1968

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
.T.nesErLC.el
Intelligence Report
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
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AR 70-14
cret
Copy No
SR IR 68-14
December 1968
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Summary
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Contents
I. The Mediterranean Squadron
in Perspective
II. Evolution of the Squadron
A. Surface Combatant Ships
B. Submarines
C. Air Support
D. Auxiliary Ships and
Logistic Support
III. Mission and Capabilities of
the Squadron
IV. Future Structure and Capabilities
Page
1
3
4
4
7
9
11
12
15
Chart: Strength of Mediterranean
Squadron, 1964-1968 4
Map: Anchorages and Airfields
Used by the Mediterranean
Squadron, 1964-1968 10
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1968
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
Summary
From a few surface ships and submarines in 1964,
the Soviet Mediterranean squadron has grown to become
the largest naval force which the Soviets have regu-
larly deployed outside their own fleet operating
areas.
On the average, the squadron now consists of four
to six major combatant ships, more than half of which
are missile equipped, and eight or nine minor comba-
tants, including two or three amphibious ships. Six
to nine diesel-powered torpedo attack submarines nor-
mally operate with the squadron now, as does a nuclear-
powered torpedo attack or cruise missile submarine.
Ten or twelve auxiliary ships provide logistic and
intelligence support. The size and capabilities of
the force have been increased to the point that it
has become a credible threat to the US Sixth Fleet.
The squadron serves Soviet political as well as
military interests in the Mediterranean basin. The
effectiveness of the squadron as an instrument of
policy has grown as its combat capabilities have in-
creased. The image of the USSR as defender of Arab
Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research
and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelli-
gence, National Estimates, and Scientific Intelligence.
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interests is being conveyed more convincingly now
than when the squadron was first established, and
the increased capabilities of the squadron--partic-
ularly the anticarrier capabilities--are intended
to serve as a reminder to the US and others that
Soviet interests must be reckoned with in any mili-
tary moves in the Middle East.
The Soviets also probably consider the squadron's
anticarrier capabilities, now well advanced, to be
part of their strategic defenses against a nuclear
strike on their homeland. In a general war, however,
the chief threat to the USSR from the Mediterranean
would be from Polaris submarines. The squadron's
capabilities against Polaris remain poor, but the
Soviets are taking steps to improve them.
The squadron probably will not be enlarged much
beyond its present size. Its capabilities will con-
tinue to be improved, however, by the regular deploy-
ment of newer and more effective ships and submarines,
such as Kresta-class guided missile cruisers and
Moskva-class helicopter carriers. The logistics bur-
den of the squadron may be reduced by the expanded
use of Mediterranean ports and by increasing the pro-
portion of nuclear-powered units in the squadron's
submarine force.
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I. The Mediterranean Squadron in Perspective
The situation of mutual strategic deterrence be-
tween the US and the USSR which began to emerge in
the early 1960's led Soviet leaders to assign a
greatly expanded role to the navy. In addition to
enlarging its strategic attack mission, they decided
to provide the navy with an improved capability to
counter Western naval forces and an increased flex-
ibility to respond to situations beyond the periphery
of the USSR which could be turned to Soviet advantage.
In the words of Admiral Gorshkov, its commander-
in-chief, the Soviet Navy was to be capable of "carrying
out missions assigned to it, not only in a nuclear
war, but in a war which does not make use of nuclear
weapons, as well as supporting state interests at
sea in peacetime." The navy, in short, was to depart
from its traditional defensive role and become an
instrument for projecting Soviet power and influence
abroad.
In pursuit of this new policy, several new ship-
building programs were initiated, and Soviet submarines
and surface ships began to operate farther at sea in
increasing numbers and with much greater frequency.
The most direct reflection of the new policy was the
deployment of several Soviet ships and submarines to
the Mediterranean in the summer of 1964.
The Soviets had first attempted to establish a
"permanent" naval force in the Mediterranean in
1958. That force, composed at its peak of 12 diesel-
powered torpedo attack submarines, was based at
Vlone Bay in Albania. Its primary purpose was to
move the first line of the Soviets Black Sea naval
defenses forward from the Bosporus to the eastern
Mediterranean. This initial effort ended in 1961,
when Albania shifted its allegiance from the USSR
to Communist China.
Although Soviet submarines operated in the Med-
iterranean from time to time each year thereafter,
no Soviet surface combatant ships did so until the
establishment of the mixed force of ships and sub-
marines in 1964. This second Soviet venture into
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USSR. Strength of Mediterranean Squadron, June '64 -October '68
20SURFACECOMBATANTS (includIng mine warfare and
Equipped wftWsurface-to-air and cruise missiles
M
15 Armed with guns
10
Amphibious ships)
1,SUBMARINES
Nuclear-powered
10 Mt Diesel-powered
5
Nate, The figures plotted set-lent peak totals for each month, with these ex; :Trion,
t I ) Ships in th ',Reda-swans:tun for Fine days ot less are not included.
I 2) A ship anci its relief are counted us only one unit.
the Mediterranean became the Soviets' only year-round
deployment of a mixed naval force beyond home: waters.
Like the first venture, it was intended to extend the
Soviets' defense perimeter- Its major function, how-
ever, was and continues to be the support of Soviet
political interests in the Mediterranean area.
As the force grew in size and capability, its
importance was reflected in its designation as an
independent command operationally subordinate to naval
headquarters, Moscow, rather than to the nearest fleet
headquarters. It soon grew to be the largest force
of ships the Soviets had ever deployed outside their
own waters for purposes other than a major exercise.
II. Evolution of the Squadron
A. Surface Combatant Ships
In 1964-65, the first two years of its exis-
tence, no more than four surface combatant ships were
deployed with the Mediterranean squadron at any one
time. The largest number was deployed in the summer,
the smallest in winter. The winter of 1965-66 was
the first in which at least one surface combatant
ship was present each month.
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Until the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, slow
growth with distinct seasonal variations characterized
the squadron's development (see chart on opposite page).
Surface ship deployments increased by about ten per
year. Each ship usually operated with the squadron less
than two months. Most of the ships came from the
Black Sea Fleet. About one-third of the surface com-
batants were equipped with guided missiles.
Although the annual growth pattern prior to
the June War indicated that the squadron would reach
a new high in the summer of 1967, the war almost cer-
tainly caused the Soviets to deploy more ships than
they had originally planned. Had previous patterns
prevailed, about a dozen surface combatants probably
would have operated with the squadron that summer.
Ten were already there by mid-May. One of these was
missile equipped.
As international tension rose just prior to
the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviets sent four
additional combatant ships to join the force, three
of them equipped with guided missiles. The aug-
mented squadron then divided into three groups to
monitor the activity of the two US and one British
attack carriers then operating in the Mediterranean.
In late June, the gun-armed cruiser Slava was re-
Kynda-class guided-missile cruisers like the one
shown here in the Bosporus have served as command
ships of the Mediterranean squadron. Ships of
this class have a multiple role in the squadron,
being equipped with antiaircraft and 250-nm-range
antiship missiles as well as antisubmarine weapons.
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placed by a Sverdlov-class guided missile cruiser
and two other ships, bringing the total strength to
more than quadruple the original size of the surface
combatant force.
In addition, the Soviets sent amphibious
ships to the Mediterranean for the first time in the
summer of 1967. Although the first of these deploy-
ments probably was not directly related to the Mid-
dle East crisis, the Soviets probably hoped that the
assignment of two more amphibious ships there would
convey the impression of willingness to send troops
ashore should the need arise.
Since July 1967 the Soviet Mediterranean squadron has
included landing craft of the Poinocny (top photo) and
Alligator classes like those shown here transiting. the
Bosporus. This is the first time such ships have been
deployed outside Soviet coastal waters Cor extensive
periods.
'l'OP
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The number of ships in the Mediterranean de-
clined in the winter of 1967-68, but the monthly
average remained higher than in any previous year,
summer or winter. In April 1968 the Soviets de-
ployed almost as many ships to the Mediterranean
as they had the previous June, apparently to carry
out their first major exercise there. In September
the new helicopter carrier Moskva was deployed to the
Mediterranean for the first time and in October the
number of ships in the squadron rose to a new high.
B. Submarines
The growth in Soviet submarine strength in
the Mediterranean generally paralleled that of the
surface forces. (See chart on page 4.) Until the
Arab-Israeli war no more than six submarines oper-
ated there at any one time. The normal pattern was
two or three submarines in winter and three or four
in summer. All but three of the submarines which
operated there before the June War were diesel attack
boats. One nuclear-powered attack submarine deployed
to the Mediterranean in August 1965, and one or two
diesel-powered cruise missile submarines operated
there in the fall of 1966.
In obvious reaction to rising tension in
the Middle East in May 1967, two nuclear-powered
submarines--one a torpedo attack type and the other
a cruise missile unit--were either diverted from mis-
sions in the North Atlantic or deployed especially
for assignment to the Mediterranean. The deploy-
ment of the cruise missile unit to the Mediterranean
raised the number of launchers in the squadron from
three to eleven and significantly increased the
Soviets' anticarrier capability.
At least one nuclear-powered submarine, either
a torpedo attack type or cruise missile equipped, now
operates with the squadron on a regular basis. Since
the nuclear submarines usually attempt to complete
their patrols without being detected, their role with-
in the squadron is apparently more of a military than
a political one.
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SOVIET SUBMARINES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
N-class nuclear attack submarine in the eastern Mediterranean,
August 1967.
F-class diesel attack submarine coming alongside Soviet oiler
for fuel and other supplies in the Gulf of Hammamet off Tunisia,
January 1967.
E-II-class nuclear submarine in
the Gulf of Sine
yan coast, August
submarines are equipped with
250-nm-range cruise missiles.
off the Lib-
1968. These
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The number of submarines deployed to the Med-
iterranean in 1967 was more than twice that of 1966.
Most of the 25 F-class torpedo attack submarines in
the Soviet Northern Fleet had to be used to maintain
the high level of deployments, and Baltic Fleet sub-
marines were assigned to operate with the squadron
for the first time. In addition, patrols by nuclear-
Dowered cruise missile submarines in the Atlantic were
curtailed.
The high level of submarine activity continued
into 1968 but was sustained with fewer submarines.
The level was maintained, in part, by extending the
duration of patrols, which in turn was facilitated
by more frequent calls in Mediterranean ports. The
longest patrol to date was that conducted by three
F-class diesel attack submarines which remained in
the Mediterranean from mid-March to mid-September
1968 and spent about 25 percent of their time in port.
C. Air Support
In April 1968 six Soviet TU-16 Badger medium
bombers were flown to Egypt from the Soviet Union to
provide the squadron with an aerial reconnaissance
capability. Four months later the TU-16's were
Soviet TU-16 Badgers with Egyptian markings and based at
Egyptian airfields are used to reconnoiter US Sixth Fleet
formations in the Mediterranean. Here a US Navy Phantom
fighter escorts one of the Soviet-piloted Badgers.
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FRANCE
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
RUMANIA
PORTUGAL
BULGARIA
USSR
SPAIN
Corsica
GIBRALTAR
?
.+? Alboran Island
'Mars el
Kebir
MOROCCO
Balearic
Islands
M;nfrdonia
ALBANIA
7_AZ
Algiers
ALGERIA
Sardinia
La Galite Terrible
Island cts) Bankt Sicily
[Tunis
TUNISIA
Gulf of
Hammamet 4: Hurd Bank
sJ? (Malta)
GREECE tGai.tie
Bank
Kithira Island t
Crete
TURKEY
RIA
As Sallum
Tripoli
Alexandria.
*Benghazi
Gulf of Sirte rAIRO/ e
w-Esr tairo*
91947 12-68 CIA
LIBYA
Anchorages and Airfields Used by the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
Major anchorage
Minor anchorage Airfield
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UNITE? ARAE
REPUBLIC
NAUTICAL MILES
Port
Said
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joined by three BE-12 Mail antisubmarine patrol planes.
Since their arrival in Egypt, the TU-16's and BE-12's
have been flying reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrol
missions in support of the squadron.
D. Auxiliary Ships and Logistic Support
The Mediterranean squadron has placed unprec-
edented demands on the Soviet naval logistics force.
The Soviets have a number of ships which were designed
to support submarines on extended patrol, but auxili-
aries for support of surface ships are in short supply.
There are no naval refrigerator ships, ammunition
ships, or dry stores ships, and naval oilers are small,
slow, and few in number. Some of the Soviets' older
warships apparently are not self-sufficient in fresh
water and boiler feed water and must be resupplied by
water carriers.
Prior to the June 1967 buildup, the logistic
requirements of the squadron were not too burdensome.
Ships were normally deployed with the squadron for
less than two months and spent about half this time
at anchorages. Most of the ships carried enough
ammunition, spare parts, dry stores, and other pro-
visions for their entire deployment. Auxiliary ships
from the Black Sea Fleet provided fuel oil and water.
Longer deployments, and the increased number
of ships after June 1967, forced the adoption of var-
ious logistic improvisations. Naval oilers from the
Baltic and Northern Fleets and merchant tankers began
to resupply the squadron regularly. In addition, the
Soviets began to make greater use of Mediterranean
ports. The USSR has been granted the use of an oil
storage facility in Port Said, has assigned a repair
ship to Alexandria on a continuing basis, and has
assumed managerial control of a ship construction and
repair facility at Alexandria. These arrangements have
not, however, provided a logistics capability ade-
quate to support the squadron in the event of extended
hostilities.
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III. Mission and Capabilities of the Squadron
Although the Mediterranean Squadron is the most
powerful force of ships which the Soviets have ever
deployed beyond their own home waters for purposes
other than a major exercise, the squadron probably
is more important to the Soviets from a political
than from a military point of view. The squadron
has helped bolster the image of the USSR as defender
of Arab interests and lends weight to Soviet diplo-
matic and propaganda attacks on Western interests
in the Middle East and North Africa.
The effectiveness of the squadron as an instru-
ment of policy has risen as its combat capabilities
have improved. In this connection, the increased
anticarrier capabilities of the squadron are partic-
ularly relevant. The aircraft carriers of the US
Sixth Fleet have in the past provided the defen-
sive shield for US military moves in the Middle East,
and the Soviets almost certainly have come to re-
gard US attack carriers as more of an instrument
of local or limited warfare than as a strategic
threat. They probably believe that the presence
of a credible anticarrier force in the Mediterranean
would cause the US to pause before intervening mili-
tarily in future crises in the area, and might, in
turn, enable the Soviets to intervene in some fashion
themselves should the need arise.
Prior to the June War the anticarrier capability
of the squadron was low. There were few cruise mis-
sile launchers in the force, and the squadron as a
whole was too small to pose a convincing threat to
the US Sixth Fleet. Although intelligence collection
ships were available, air reconnaissance was lacking.
Many of the ships in the squadron were older vessels
suitable for operating under cover of land-based
fighter aircraft but ill equipped for long-range,
long-duration operations.
Since the June War, however, the anticarrier cap-
ability of the squadron has increased substantially.
Most of the time at least two cruise missile ships
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and a nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine--totaling
about 12 cruise missile launchers--operate with the
squadron. Reconnaissance aircraft are available, and
the squadron's air defense capabilities have been im-
proved by the deployment of more SAM-equipped ships.
The new types of ships now being assigned to the
squadron are better equipped for long-range operations,
and the size and readiness of the force have been in-
creased to the point that it has become a credible
threat to the Sixth Fleet.
In addition, frequent and extended calls in Arab
ports--most notably in Egypt--have heightened the
diplomatic value of the squadron, and the assignment
of a few amphibious ships to the squadron conveys the
impression to others that the Soviets might be willing
to commit a token force of some 400 to 600 troops on
the side of client states in the event of renewed
hostilities.
In the event of general nuclear war, the chief
threat to the Soviets from the Mediterranean would
be from Polaris submarines. Aircraft carriers of
the Sixth Fleet still have a strategic potential,
however, and one of the Soviets' first tasks in the
Mediterranean in the event of general war would be
to attempt to reduce US naval forces there to a level
more comparable to their own by eliminating the Sixth
Fleet carriers.
Although the anticarrier potential of the squad-
ron is now considerably greater than before the June
War, Soviet capabilities against the more serious
Polaris threat remain poor. Those capabilities are
being improved, however. Prior to the six-week deploy-
ment of the helicopter carrier Moskva to the Mediter-
ranean last fall, the antisubmarine capabilities of
the squadron were limited to defense against submarines
which might approach ships of the force. Now that the
Moskva is available for deployment to the Mediterranean
and antisubmarine patrol planes are stationed in Egypt,
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TS SECRET
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON UNITS WITH ANTISUBMARINE MISSION
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is a principal
mission of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron
assigned to the units shown here as well as
to other destroyer-type ships and submarines.
MOSKVA-CLASS HELICOPTER CARRIER
PETYA -CLASS ASW ESCORT
The squadron usually includes two
or three ASW escorts like the
Petya-class ship above, equipped
with ASW rockets and torpedoes.
BE-12 MAIL ASW AIRCRAFT
SAM-EQUIPPED KASHIN-CLASS ASW SHIP
The Moskva has practiced ASW
techniques with its helicop-
ters, operating in conjunc-
tion with Kashin-class ships
and UAR-based Mail aircraft.
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the Soviets have a limited capability to seek out
submarines in the Mediterranean rather than wait
for their approach. That capability probably will
be enhanced in the near future by the deployment of
new antisubmarine submarines to those waters.
By developing a more advanced antisubmarine ca-
pability there, the Soviets probably hope to make
the Mediterranean a much less favorable environment
for Polaris submarine operations and may eventually
try to achieve through military means what their
diplomatic offensives have so far failed to accom-
plish--an end to Polaris submarine patrols in the
Mediterranean.
IV. Future Structure and Capabilities
The size and structure of the Mediterranean Squad-
ron probably will change in response to new develop-
ments in the Mediterranean area, but assuming no major
crisis there, the Soviets are not likely to increase
the size of the squadron much above recent levels.
Logistic limitations will militate against further
significant increases in size. Rather than deploy
more ships, the Soviets probably will try to upgrade
the capabilities of the squadron by assigning newer
and more effective ships on a regular basis.
The second of the Soviets' two helicopter car-
riers probably will be operational next year, and
the Soviets most likely will deploy these ships to
to the Mediterranean on a rotating basis to improve
their antisubmarine capabilities there. At least
one of the two new classes of nuclear-powered attack
submarines now under construction in the USSR almost
certainly is intended for antisubmarine work, and
deployment of the first antisubmarine units to the
Mediterranean could take place in the next year or
so. In addition, more ASW patrol planes may be de-
ployed to Egypt and perhaps even to Algeria.
Air defense capabilities probably will be in-
creased by the deployment of a greater proportion of
SAM-equipped ships, including newly converted Kot-
lin- and Krupnyy-class destroyers. Units of the new
Kresta-class guided missile ship probably will be de-
ployed there as well.
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Deployment of the Kresta class, which is equipped
with both SAM's and cruise missiles, would also en-
hance the squadron's anticarrier capabilities. Cruise
missile submarines probably will be the mainstay of
the squadron's anticarrier forces, however, and probably
will be assigned to the Mediterranean on a continuing
basis.
Since nuclear-powered submarines require less
support than diesel-powered boats, the logistic burden
of the squadron may be reduced by the deployment of
a larger proportion of nuclear submarines. In addi-
tion, new types of surface support ships may be built,
though they probably would not be available until after
1970.
The Soviets probably do not want to become over-
committed by formally establishing military bases
of their own in the Mediterranean, but they may try
to duplicate the arrangements which they now have
in Egypt for support of the squadron- Even so, they
probably will continue to rely principally on auxili-
ary ships to support the squadron. At the same time,
however, they almost certainly will try to expand
their current pattern of port calls and may in the
future seek to make use of port facilities at such
places as Mers el Kebir. An expanded program of calls
could provide additional political as well as logistic
dividends.
Although the Soviets will continue to use the
squadron to gain as much political leverage as they
can in the Mediterranean area, they almost certainly
will seek to avoid becoming directly involved in
military conflicts there. The Soviets have not in-
creased the number of amphibious ships in the squad-
ron above the level reached just after the June War,
and during the conflict itself no Soviet warship was
placed in a position that would run the risk of
involvement with Israeli forces.
Nevertheless, in the covert deployment of a
nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine to the Med-
iterranean at the time of the June War and the fre-
quent deployment of such units since then, the Soviets
have indicated that they intend to be prepared for a
variety of purely military contingencies in the area.
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