UNTITLED)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002018076
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-01320
• Publication Date: December 23, 1950

G 8 (b)(3)
1. Estimate of Chinese Communist intentions in Korea--
According to the US Naval Attache in Taipei, the Chinese
Nationalist Ministry of Defense estimates that the Chinese
Communists have already crossed the 38th Parallel in
the middle sector and intend to penetrate all of South
Korea with the object of driving US troops from the country.
The Ministry believes that the Communists intend to sur-
round Seoul while simultaneously rushing troops over the
most direct route to Pusan; the timing of these moves will
depend principally on supply problems, but the Communists
will exploit any advantages to be gained through UN dis-
cussions or actions.
British views on. Southeast Asia--US Consul General Langdon
in. Singapore reports that. at a recent conference of British
diplomatic representatives in Southeast Asia it was generally
agreed that., (a) conditions in Burma are continuing to improve;
(b) opposition in Thailand to the Phibun regime is rising and
there is anxiety over commitments to the West; (c) the situa-
tion in. Indochina is "very gloomy"; and (d) Indonesia is "un-
settled but not hopelesswith much hinging on the outcome
of the negotiations for the disposition of New Guinea, The
conferees were of the opinion that the entire Southeast Asian
antisCommuniist structure is being shored by Tonkin and
that. thi.s vital area must be held to prevent further south-
ward advances by Communist forces. They estimated that
Ho Chi Minh would launch an attack within two months and
that whatever was to be done to stop it would have to be done
in the next few weeks,
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 3, Dutch-Indonesian disagreement on New Guinea--US Am-
bassador Cochran in Djakarta shares the concern of his
British colleague over the trouble that may result if the
Netherlands fails to reach a compromise agreement that
will permit de jure transfer of sovereignty over Nether-
lands New Guinea to Indonesia by the end of 1950. The
British Ambassador fears that failure to reach such an
agreement would cause the fall of the Natsir Government
and that no comparable moderate regime could hold power
in view of the disturbed conditions that would ensue. He
pointed out that although conditions in. Indonesia appear
relatively calm, incidents might occur which would set off
a chain of violence that could "split East and West over
Indonesia and contribute to over-all tension."
(Comment: The conference at The Hague over the
disposition of Netherlands New Guinea appears deadlocked
following Dutch rejection bf the Indonesian proposal for
de jure transfer of the disputed area to Indonesia by the
end of 1950.)
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
4. INDIA. Government to request US food assistance--US Am-
bassador Henderson in New Delhi has been informed by the
Indian Finance Minister that the Cabinet has made the decision
to discuss with US authorities the possibility of obtaining
additional food grains for India during 1951. He also indicated
his government's interest in the possibility of India's being
included in a broader economic aid program, possibly in
connection with the proposed Colombo Plan. According to
Henderson, the Finance Minister believes that this decision
represents a formal turning point in India's economic re-
lations with the US inasmuch as it means that India, after
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careful Cabinet consideration, has come to the conclusion
that US economic assistance is vital to the stability of
India. Henderson voices his opinion that this decision is
of "the utmost significance" because it reveals the crumb-
ling of such opposition as existed previously to closer
economic relations between India and the US. He is con-
vinced that even with "possible war in the background"
it would be in the national interests to extend considerable
economic aid to India beginning in the near future.
5. IRAN- "Powerful forces" working for Razmara's fall--
US Embassy Tehran, in transmitting an analysis of the
present situation in Iran, expresses the view that Prime
Minister Razmara's fall is not imminent but there are
signs that powerful forces are working for that end. The
Embassy considers that Razmara, who is ambitious, might
not yield gracefully if a real showdown occurs and that "it
is not entirely impossible" he might, in the absence of any
other immediate, tangible support, even look to the USSR
indirectly to help him retain power. The Embassy points
out that from the Soviet viewpoint he is certainly the most
cooperative Prime Minister in recent years.
EUROPE
6. GERMANY- Attitude toward Schuman Plan--The US High
Commission in Bonn expresses the opinion that the majority
of German political leaders view the Schuman Plan with
reserve. The Commission reports that although the coalition
parties still favor the Plan, they are now demanding that cer-
'tain conditions (principally the elimination of the Ruhr authority
and the lifting of restrictions on industry) be met before they
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will vote for its ratification. The Commission adds that
although this reluctance to go ahead with the Schuman Plan
is partially due to fear of Socialist opposition, the coalition
parties' reticence should be regarded in the light of German
demands for equality rather than as an isolated development.
Analysis of Grotewohl letter--The US High Commission
in Berlin reports that in a recent interview with a Dutch
correspondent East German Foreign Minister Dertinger said
the Grotewohl proposal to Adenauer for East-West German
talks was not designed to lead to an all-German election, but
rather to permit the recognition of both German governments
as "realities," and enable both sides to accommodate dif -
ferences in economic and political institutions.. Dertinger
added that if the Grotewohl proposal for East-West talks was
rejected, a plebiscite would be conducted in West Germany.
Dertinger reportedly stated that the USSR would consider its
security threatened by a -material increase in Western forces
in Germany, although a West German centralized police force
would not be considered such a threat. The High Commission
believes this interview is a further Soviet attempt to undercut
Western European support for West German participation in
European defense and to develop opposition to increased Western
allied troops in Germany.
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