COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR THE TET OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT (PUBD IS UNK NOWN) - 1968/01/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00016884
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

A. �roved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00016884
' -Content UNCLASSIFIED.-
per -3S31C
dCle.
COMMUNIST PREPARATION� FOR THE TET
1. The overall concept of 4 massive-attack. -
against South Vietnam's cities and towns was prob-
.
ably formulated by the High Command in Hanoi at.
�
1:�7-Xeast as early as last*summer.--Subseguehtly; _
- .
2.-- From the beginning, extreme precautions
� ,-;;;;51.2:.;
were taken to keep the Tet plans secret in at to
preserve the -all-Important element of surpriSa.-.:_
' -
Need-to-know criteria were probably strict/7 en-
.
- "-
forced in disseminatina bettle:plansPossiblv-only:-,
the
Cammunistsltentral Office for South 'Vietnam
(COSVN) and some elements of the Nilitary:Adminig.tra-
:tive Regions arid major theatre commands weregivau
-a complete overview of the planned offensive.
Ithe specifics only of their own missionsand thcise,
"-; - -
-
of cooperating units. The conntry7Wide:characterS
- � tt14tar;v: e :7:"17�'iiiirrisi,:earerS.-
.--.. of the effort apparently was described only InAhe:r;
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highest echelons probably had clear knowledge that
for the first time virtually every major city and
town in South Vietnam was to be invaded in force-
4. The Communi,sts began a new indoctrination
program among all their party cadres and military
officers in September, based on Resolution 13 of the
Hanoi party central committee. The reSOlution called
for a "general offensive" and "generairprising" which
would prepare the way for a Communist-dominated �
coalition government,*
-
5. A wide variety of battle -geparations for_
, - - -
the Tet offensive .bad to be undertaken, many of
them starting in November. Detailed operations'
. �
planning commenced 4 each command level. Units had
� .
to be strengthenedbyzeplacements and augmented or '
reinforced with newly arrived units. -Some effort
apparently was made to infiltrate guerrillas. into ,
cities and 'towns to strengthenunits there- Special
local recruiting =Anew infiltrators provided some
of the fresh personnel. Others were upgraded from
irregular elements.: larger volumes of supplies had .
to be brought in and stockpiled.
*A copy of the resolution itself has never
been obtained; the reflections of it in captured
documents and other sources have been so general
as to preclude judgments on any specific changes
in strategy that the resolution might have called
for.
;
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� . Communist Intelligence, security, and
. ,
logistical elements probably began to reconnoiter
approach routes toward each target city. and town
in order to assure that large forces would be able
to march long distances in complete secrecy. Re�'
quirements for detailed city maps showing key con�
trol points were levied undei some cover story; kor .
-"example,-tmeupport 'stepped up terror opern.,ii.ons..4::::4L.c..a.
4
and arrangements for, special communications were made. ' '
� �: � �
to coordinate the attack. ,
:but many apparentlyreceived relatively little so if
as to keep Ranol's intentions well disguised.
8. ...By December, each command level was review�
ing the tactical plans of subordinate commands and
menitoring their implementation.. Many coordination
----------------
problems were solved along the way. By this time, all
command levels of the Communist military appar�-
must have had a
clear idea that .a major coordinated '
attack would be launched sometime around the turnes
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9_ By late December, preparations along the
approach routes were almost certainly well ad-
vanced, since troops would begin to march in mid-
January. Security arrangements were completed
to assure that villagers living along the 'approach
routes kept silent. Bivouac areas were selected,'
prepared and staffed. Guides were arranged. Boats
were made available at water crossings. Ammunition
� �
10. Briefings were given to commanding officers
their missions. .
..- .�� -..v, 1
al. When Banoi.debided that preparations were..y
,-satisfactorily advanced, attack planapredumably-were.
. . .
,..
....,;- :-.7.
,.,.=7..:
. .
-given final approval for allarnmand leyelsicthe---z
timing waa-set, and orders were'issued:to.marcb:at-
ti.--,.:_.
the appropriate-t4me-
12. Thus, in. mid- and late January in Com-
munist units began to converge on the -cities and'
towns of South vietnam, some making relattvelk
long forced marches and all employing the tightest
'
possible security-precuations.'.,
13. Meanwhile, more routine operations con-
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. .
further sonth. These operations probably were mounted
partly to help screen the coming urban offensive..
14. As the troops neared their final pre -attacl
_
stations, rear services elements presumably supplied
them with the -previously cached weapons and ammunition.
Final briefings were-given to preparethe.officers -
_ .
, . _
_
- and troops to -fight in a new environment.. - � - tr.:et
. ,
'-Shortly before 30 January, lianoi gave -the'[.
-attack order and the Tet offensrve was launehed.:r.'..-..17,72.
_
7:k
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