(EST PUB DATE) WEST AFRICA: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THe LIBERIAN CRISIS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: LIBERIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001508393
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• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00542
• Publication Date: June 1, 1991

Director of
Central
Intelligence
West Africa: Regional
Implications of the
Liberian Crisis
Special National Intelligence Estimate
This Special National Intelligence Estimate represent,
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advise and assist-epee of the
US Intelligence Community.
909
rNIE6/9J
4EtE,'-466
Ftrfi?. -TR
TMI
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
19-Jan-2009
Sec
SNIE 67-91
June 1991
crr
opy A? RJ 1 1
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 Director of
Central
Intelligence
SNIE 67-91
West Africa: Regional
Implications of the
Liberian Crisis
Information available as of 17 June 1991 was used
in the preparation of this Special National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
 THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 West Africa: Regional
Implications of the
Liberian Crisis
? Unless there is a decisive shift in the military balance that breaks
the current political impasse, a negotiated settlement of the Liberi-
an civil war is unlikely over the next year. F-7
? There is a growing likelihood, however, that the West African states
that have intervened in Liberia will attempt to take a more assertive
stance against the chief factional leader, Charles Taylor. Such an
effort would raise chances of a political settlement, but failure
would jeopardize the fragile regional consensus and heighten the
threat of unrest in neighboring states.)
? As long as Liberia's future remains unsettled,. its neighbors face the
possibility that more fighting and refugees will spill across their
borders from Liberia. The approximately 2 million refugees and
displaced people-over three-quarters of Liberia's population-will
remain a security and resource problem throughout this turbulent
period. F_]
? The role the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) has played in trying to mediate the dispute reflects
some progress toward political cooperation in the region, but the
organization is not yet united enough to become a long-term
stabilizing influence. F__]
? The turmoil in Liberia has given Libyan leader Qadhafi opportuni-
ties he is almost certain to pursue to improve his standing in the re-
gion, particularly since he and many West African leaders perceive
diminished US interest there.)
iii
SN/E 67-91
June 1991
 Figure I
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Members
Benin
Burkina
Cape Verde
Ivory Coast
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Mauritania
1.9
Slain Q~.,
4.7 Population in millions
i Member country providing
i troops to the West African
peacekeeping force
 Key Judgments
In our judgment, Liberia will remain a major concern of many West
African countries for some time regardless of how the current civil war
ends:
? A political settlement probably will not be achieved over the next year:
rebel leader Charles Taylor will continue to frustrate peace initiatives by
stalling in negotiations and reneging on agreements to try to outlast his
opponents and gain control of the government. His removal would
improve chances, for a settlement but would not put an immediate end to
instability. in Liberia:
? The chaotic situation in the countryside and Taylor's undisciplined troops
will continue to confront neighboring countries with the challenge of
preventing cross-border incursions-such as have occurred in Sierra
Leone-and dealing with the financial and logistic burdens of growing
refugee populations.
? Unless Taylor unexpectedly loses out in the contest for power, his ties to
Libya and to West African dissidents will continue to fuel fear that
Liberia has become a base for efforts to destabilize the region.
? Many West African leaders will come under increasing pressure to adopt
a more assertive strategy to resolve the crisis. But this will confront them
with growing difficulties in financing the regional peacekeeping force in
Liberia and maintaining political support for it.
We, nonetheless, see accumulating signs that Nigeria will attempt to lead
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) into
applying more political, economic, and military pressure on Taylor-short
of a countrywide pacification campaign. Full implementation would be
unlikely, but we believe Taylor would be weakened and more willing to
compromise in such a scenario. On the other hand, should Taylor succeed
 in outlasting and wearing down the peacekeepers, the implications for the
region would be adverse, with heightened likelihood of-
? A permanently weakened ECOWAS.
? Discredited Nigerian regional leadership, with possible damage to Presi-
dent Babangida's domestic standing.
? A resurgent Taylor posing a greater threat to Liberia's immediate
neighbors.
? A freer hand for Qadhafi in Liberia and the region, particularly if he per-
ceived dwindling US involvement and concern.
West African leaders recognize the dominant role the United States has
played in international humanitarian and refugee assistance and will
continue to look to Washingtton's good offices in peace negotiations. But
they have lowered their expectations of US contributions to'Liberia's long-
term. reconstruction and Washington's willingness and ability to influence
the Liberian -factions'. Washington's decision not to intervene forcefully in
Liberia has reinforced perceptions of diminishing US interest in the region,
which may complicate US ability to pursue its goals there.
The crisis and the US posture provided Nigeria an opportunity to expand
its leadership role in the region and highlighted its importance to effective
collective action. Nonetheless, Lagos' ability to translate even successful
resolution of the Liberian crisis into enduring regional influence is limited.
Fear of Nigerian hegemony, particularly among Francophone states, will
work against Lagos' leadership aspirations, which may in fact become
tempered by domestic preoccupations as civilian rule late in 1992
approaches.
Similarly, ECOWAS could emerge from the crisis as a strengthened
regional institution, but its prospects for overcoming underlying rivalries
among members and significantly improving their economic or security
status in the foreseeable future are remote. The Liberian experience will
probably not prompt a greater willingness to intervene collectively in
internal conflicts.
Qadhafi, probably in cooperation with Burkina, will stay active behind the
scenes in Liberia, working to improve Taylor's chances for securing power.
The prospect that Liberia will remain weak and unstable for years to come
will afford Libya continuing opportunities to meddle and expand its
influence in the region.
This information is
 she t+et,
Contents
Pie
Key Judgments
v
Discussion
1
The Liberian Crisis
1
Regional Dimensions of the Crisis
1
Border Strife
2,
Refugees
2.
Instability in Neighboring Countries
3
Nervousness About Contagion.
4
ECOWAS at a Turning Point
4
Nigerian Role
4
Libyan Meddling
4
Implications Over the Next Year: Three Liberian Scenarios
9
Scenario 1: Deadlock Continues
9
Scenario 2: ECOMOG Turns Up the Heat
10
Scenario 3: Negotiated Settlement
12
Outlook
12
Implications for the United States
13
Annex: West African Military Balance
15
 Figure 2
Economic Activity in Liberia
Cape ?
Verde, o ?
North'Atlantic
Ocean._...
Monrovia
arbel
Buchanan
Rubber belt
L ? Rubber concession or.
processing facility
5 Iron mine.
;j Timber exploitation
Road
+-+ Railroad
Equptorial
Guinea
Salo Tome
and Principe
----ID.
Equnlor . ..
Viii
 Discussion'
The Liberian Crisis
The Liberian civil war, launched in late December
1989 by a poorly armed and organized dissident group
led by Charles Taylor, quickly became the focus of
West African concern as the conflict intensified and
threatened to spread ethnic-based instability through-
out the region. The growing number of refugees, the
rebels' seizure of West African hostages, and. failure
of the belligerents to negotiate a political settlement
prompted unprecedented intervention by members of
ECOWAS. The region's leaders were also troubled by
reports that Taylor received aid from Tripoli and that
the fighting would encourage further Libyan inroads
in West Africa.F___~
The intervention of a regional peacekeeping force-
the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)-in
August 1990 helped prevent Taylor from forcibly
assuming total control of Liberia and achieved a
cease-fire in December. But, despite intense negotia-
tions, a political solution to the crisis has remained
elusive. Neither ECOMOG nor Taylor appears capa-
ble of breaking the deadlock with their current levels
of political support or military capabilities. Taylor
holds the key to ending the political stalemate, but he
has clearly demonstrated unwillingness to surrender
his claim to the presidency. Despite his obstinance,
however, there is as yet no regional consensus to order
the peacekeeping force to expand its control into
Taylor-held territory outside Monrovia. F__1
Regional Dimensions of the Crisis
Taylor's inability to control his troops and the incur-
sion by some into neighboring Sierra Leone in March
1991 underscored the continuing danger that instabil-
ity will spread in the region. Moreover, rebel control
of the Liberian countryside provides a safehaven for
dissidents from other countries to train and prepare
'This Estimate assesses prospects for settling the Liberian conflict
over the next year as well as implications of this for the wider West
African region and for the United States.)
ECOTfAS at a Glance
The # member Economic Community of TWest
rtlric n totes Was created in 1975 to unite;the
region: into ti single trade ann customs union
.; :
and otter economic;:development Nigeria,
which:funds at least 30 perce..__aft he ECOWAS
budget, was the prime mover behtnd the estab
lishment ctl 01C tyommunito an e,Xtort to
: assert greater leadership to the region and to
reduce French. tttfluence Ivorian President
1Youplrtsttet-Bviglry played a' leading role Tn
persuading the 'retch pea kin Cat*$-`404614,
CQ ? $, however, end rivalrtesAbet ueen t{'est
A rica's Francophone and Anglophone court
tries, particularly marked t4 the postlndepen
de decade tJ'the 19611, , were papered over
Regional reluctance%:: 0 cede power an national
fiscal and monetary deci`slon.r and to,reduce
close ec nomic{ties t4 t urope x prtirortt has
hampered prdgress towarc SCOW S' prlmar .
goal,o! regional econotritc #nte atlon. I dustr.#
17-
alined countrie remar rest . frl d' ,primary
commercial partners, anal iatracommuntty
trade it negltg blew--about 4 pence t rf total..:;
.t trade 1 oreover 11 dIVrent currencies and
extensive smuggling across porous bordersfun-
s;ther coxrplicstte e8'orts to increase legiti- ate ?=
eeotnomic interaction; within the region.: ~~
forces to launch similar insurgencies elsewhere in the
region. ECOWAS members remain divided, however,
over how to settle the civil war and whether to
establish a permanent regional defense mechanism.
 T ;West; lrlQdn X encekr prn9 Fora-;
'1?ctal .Manpowbr7,700 to 8,40,0 ground, air, dh
naval forces. including,,700 in 'ierra,Leone
Ni eh~, 20(1 to 5,700 ground, atr and naval
Jorc s in Iberia Anil Sierra ebne rganized into
"tlv ee lNa tir 'bhtt Ytons, ars' at tnbretl unit; tthd an
"bluaes ltght'th'ks; armoredvhta~l s Q51122 mm i
heavy mortars, recoilless r'-es, alttitank guns, and
shoulder-fired surfs !e-?a!'r m ssiles:? ,aval er
a t ro-
tate b,ut,have. tnclud d,patr'ol combatants, :a mine'
swee er,` and; p landing shrp,; iir For,ce assets
include'e ground attackand twotransport air
croft ::Fled tea transport fret% npters,', large Ian .
forces. are well trai d and disc linedt, repond
well under i re, and .,lt"ave gaud leadership rznd' "'
adequate?logttic support,
Ghana 1 ' 1.00 to" 1 x00 ground, air ? anti naval
forces Organized into qu infantry baitgli'on with
support units'. Equipment includes armored'cars,4
heavy:nwrtbrs, two patrol crt11t, Three ground
r attack and one transport aircraft Gltangign troopsi
are well harried and.; disciplined anda 7lnited
I ati ns Interim Foree in banon'(UNIF'I J'expe-
rience but limited logistic sr pport
Border Strife. Rebel cross-border attacks like the one
into Sierra Leone, which involved about 1,000 troops,
would severely challenge the security forces of Liber-
ia's neighbors. Even before the Sierra Leone inci-
dent-the most serious to date-the bordering states
had augmented their frontier forces to prevent rebels
from looting or establishing bases in sympathetic
communities. But some military commanders of the
ECOMOG member states are concerned that the
open-ended participation of their forces in Liberia is
proving costly and detrimental to defense capabilities
Srerra Lebngs 650 to'7 grou>idforc s, Q~ganized
into
Otte infantry butt }lion with an englrteer super
pb]~Y" ' -
u~iit .Equiptti'i'if lneluales' afew ar>iored
~elilcles,pnd mottgrs. SlerrU Lcpnean troops are
not prepared for combat atd require loglsttg
"Support
Guinea ISOb;grounrl:yor~ees "Granted into ;one
eompostte battalion!iuitlt twp armor platootz& and
one airborne unit ,lrjurptent fnc+luaies armired
vehicles and a multrple Yd ket launcher d ears '
ore averageln lrgintng and hsatplrie, dre the only;;
'rancophone:contingent a-r (have Soviet eqr ip-
meirt a>d doctrkne. ,!utnea has ciboul 2OO troops
onfrontltne in terra Leone.::
The Gambia ;150 gl'bttnd~orces Organized Into
one ilight fantry coo ipany._ fi'he.Gambinns, Ire
inadequately _trained =not prepared for combat,
have nezpertended leadership and require logistic
support M , 01 Mali: Six cers assigned to EGGNOG Head
quarters,StaS" " e
and resources that are already stretched thin. More-
over, as the Sierra Leonean Army response to the
threat demonstrates, most of these regional militaries
are poorly trained, equipped, and led for combating
insurgents, F
Refugees. About 1.2 million of the estimated 2.6
million citizens of Liberia have been displaced
within the country and another 770,000 have fled to
 Bclrkina+rn ctioperatit n wath lbya, qne it
pri'lcsa(, hene/actors, hp, c4 tst~entiy sttp~i?rteg~ ;
diaries ~'aylot s rebg(fael{on llttau /tdt~l his In-
:: surgeney''~'re id tit (aise +~'ontbtiare, who main=
talnscordial rg(atlans with set/ ~rorl.tmed revolu-
r
tionclry gover':nritents like ib1~a.North Korea. anMinister and: svmaa`thettc`or hr~bed-nltr li js
`',' Qt$6 probably vieH'ed Taylor as a "Mather to allowed Stt/e;passag Bterl tnabe arms she metres'
s~>~stern; to L"t~erla Crlinpa$re`at!ov ed thb rebels to operatives to Liberia A W Doe if J'earh; however;'
train extensty ly~I, ~iir tna,,hefore mounting the lacing mounting:nternatlottal pressure] Ilou
incursion, pro ided Burktttabe weapons, channeled phouet=Botgny, ordered the seizure of some w
Libyan, t i(ttary andhnancidfd'. $'islgtice tti Tay klnabe:'atins shipments transitZfl Ivar'ianterritory;
lor, .'ei , 4tdvlsers to.Liberia Ea ,s por..tt rebel ; d, 7 , Worried by the fighting in Sierra Leone, e,t event
miitldry gperations, and stgckpiled material:to ly further tightened border securitr 1louphouet s
repl.en/ h Tnyrow's ctr ?nrt(s' (lthough Conipaore personal involvement'1N th , i ertait.co ict prob
leas ifblrcly tfpported,the !W ;;peace.ed- a,~ly leas redirected by ,u desire to,avoid damage fo
"pfdlnised ro cut o ar trs'stepplies to iimattd to ocat sympathy~or aylrir's^fgllbwe s the.rttre ai
ePntrtltute a 300 >#atlcoptlrlgent to ECQrO, we kickbacks, ,itndthe paraus frontier llQtilzeYel, tote r
doubt that theflow af'grms to the rebels through it del cu, ltlor Ivory Coast to fnterdret.all mil turY
neighboring countries. Added to this refugee popula-
tion are at least 160,000 people who either have been
displaced from their homes in Sierra Leone or have
sought refuge in neighboring Guinea. The financial
and resource burden has overwhelmed local communi-
ties and further strained national governments.
Although international humanitarian efforts are
under way, poor roads and lack of vehicles have
hampered operations in remote areas.F___1
Instability in Neighboring Countries. As the events
in Sierra Leone have shown, Liberia's neighbors can
do little to prevent warfare from spilling over the
border and aggravating ethnic tensions and political
unrest in their own societies. In addition, refugee
communities have provided conduits for smuggling
weapons and other contraband that, in turn, contrib-
ute to local instability. Ethnic rivalries have been
particularly pronounced in Guinea, where many gov-
ernment officials, merchants, and town dwellers are
Ivory Coast*40,000.41.0, Taylor based mare',on the
puit Qf:cro~s,,bgraer ethnic qc,c qpd on Prps{dent ,
Houphouet Boigny s ersongl animosity toward
the .lete President Doe, has been drastu ally t e-
Malinke tribesmen who tend to oppose Taylor's re-
bels, but the Mano majority along the southeastern
border is sympathetic to Taylor and has supported his
troops' cross-border raids and atrocities. F_~
The regional military intervention in Liberia has not
aroused significant domestic discontent in the
ECOWAS countries. As the impasse drags on, howev-
er, opposition groups may charge that governments
are focusing on Liberia at the expense of domestic
priorities or that the involvement will lead Liberian
rebels to target the ECOMOG countries. Moreover,
support for a democratic solution in Liberia risks
adding to frustration with the pace of political re-
forms at home in countries such as Sierra Leone,
Guinea, and Ghana.
 Nervousness About Contagion. Regional leaders are
aware that the Liberian rebels have been supplied by
pro-Libya Burkina, and some fear that their own
vulnerability to externally backed insurgencies will
grow. Dissidents from The Gambia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Guinea already serve as mercenaries and
train in rebel territory with Taylor's support and
probably with Libyan assistance. What is more, F7
a terra
Leonean dissident may have been involved in part of
the March incursion from Liberia. In any event,
Freetown has charged that Taylor is trying to destabi-
lize Sierra Leone, a view shared by others such as
Guinea and The Gambia.l
ECOWAS at a Turning Point. The threat of widening
conflict and differences among ECOWAS members'
on the wisdom of intervening in Liberia havecom-
pelled them to evaluate the organization's perfor-
mance and future role. The Liberian experience has
demonstrated ECOWAS' ability to overcome initial
divisions and cooperate in mediation efforts and mili-
tary intervention. But.the threat of a prolonged
economic and military burden and the risk of reopen-
ing Francophone versus Anglophone rivalries will
dampen enthusiasm for intervening elsewhere. Even
ECOMOG's commitment to providing a safe environ-
ment in Monrovia is in danger of waning over time,
particularly after the failure of the Liberian national
conference in March and April to reach a political
settlement supported by all parties. Other than sym-
bolic participation, we do not anticipate additional
countries joining the peacekeeping force. Moreover,
Guinea and Nigeria are the only ECOWAS members
likely to support Sierra Leone's efforts to drive the
rebels back into Liberia.
Nigerian Role. The Liberian crisis also has prompted
Nigeria to reexamine its role as a regional power and
its aspirations for regional leadership. These issues
have immediate significance because President Ba-
bangida became chairman this month of the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU) and will become
president of ECOWAS in July. In addition, Lagos is
bearing the brunt of ECOWAS financial obligations
to help alleviate the economic burden on other mem-
bers. Lagos has been careful not to overplay its
prominence in the Liberian military operation to
?lie Nigerian M litary.
Overwhelmingly .larger than any Ott Wes 9lrica,
the::Nigertan military numbers about 118,000
personnel 1i is well equipped with:tanks, ar-,
moved cars, artillery, ,let ig~hters,.; surJacerto-
surface missiles and guyed missile shtps..De-
spite its impressive;size, the military has '`
undertakenfew..xerctsespor operations since the:.
end of the Nigerian. civil war in 1:970 and suffers.
from a litany ct1'weaknesses Except for the
brie interlude of civilian rifle during 1979-83
senior members oj;the Ql cer corps have.been
occupied in governing the country and acqu7nng:':
lucrative political positions., Nonetheless, ;the
military has recently preyed in l iberta 'th'at it
can deploy and support an enhanced brigade-
sized unit beyond its borders,~~
The Army in particular is::?likely`t remain a
moor military and political actor.:.even after'
next year's :transition to civilian rule President
liabangida?wall carefully weigh any additional
military initiatives in n Liberia, to minimize
chances fora debacle that would focus Army
disgruntlethent on:him or would cause neigh
bars; to became alarmed at: the demonstration:a
the; other . hand he wants toavoid;a lingering
commitment as an ' occupation",force that.:'
bleeds morale and encourages corruption.
avoid antagonizing Taylor's backers and enflaming
other ECOMOG members' nationalist sensitivities.
The rebels' incursion into Sierra Leone and Free-
town's request for Nigerian assistance, however, inev-
itably highlight the importance of Nigeria's leader-
ship and Army. F___]
Libyan Meddling
The military assistance Libya has provided to Taylor,
first by training him and several of his supporters and
then by sending arms and funds through Burkina, has
 been a low-risk, low-cost attempt to influence the
Liberian conflict and boost Tripoli's regional leverage.
In our view, Qadhafi's support for Taylor demon-
strates his determination to install a sympathetic
regime in Monrovia and to establish a more influen-
tial political role for himself in West Africa. Tripoli
has pressured Ghana to limit its support for the
peacekeeping operation, and Libyan representatives
have met with ECOWAS leaders to discuss the
Liberian situation. A high-level delegation attended
the Lome summit in February and met with rebel
faction leader Prince Johnson. Tripoli subsequently
offered to help resolve the crisis, emphasizing that an
African solution must be found that excludes any
Western influence. Qadhafi is no doubt prepared to
deal with other factions should Taylor falter. F__1
 Figure 3
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) Military Disposition
Lun@~
Freetown
Area of control/operations
Major troop concentration
Minor troop concentration
Airfield capable of handling
medlum?range transport planes
0 75 NMamdero
0 75 Mlles
BuchanAn
 Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS)
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
Independent National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (INPFL)
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)
National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL)
Mount
Coffee
Figure 4
Deployment of Various Factions in
Monrovia and Environs, Mid-1991
(t};wgll`
MONROVIA
0 10 Kilometers
0 10 Miles
 Perhaps encouraged by the course of events in Libe-
ria, Libya also has increased its efforts to make
inroads elsewhere in the region. In addition to sup-
porting other dissident groups operating with the
rebels in Liberia, Tripoli has continued its two-track
strategy in the region by extending its diplomatic,
cultural, and commercial presence while preparing to
use subversion when Qadhafi deems it useful?
 West African leaders are wary of Qadhafi's inten-
tions, and Nigerian concern about Libyan activities in
the region was a factor in Lagos' decision to intervene
through ECOMOG. Nonetheless, some governments
in the region have sought to accommodate Qadhafi.
Mali's new transitional government has accepted Lib-
yan aid, and President Saibou of Niger has continued
his good-neighbor policy, including expanded diplo-
matic and commercial ties to Tripoli.F_~
Implications Over the Next Year: Three Liberian
Scenarios
Scenario 1: Deadlock Continues. Decreasing likeli-
hood over time as pressures grow within Liberia and
the region for a resolution. West African leaders
increasingly realize that a peaceful resolution of the
Liberian conflict will not occur as long as the faction
leaders lack incentives to compromise. No;faction is
strong enough to win outright:
? Taylor considers the territory under his control as
having enough resources to sustain his forces indefi-
nitely. He probably feels confident that his rebels
are sufficiently well armed and supported by Libya
and Burkina to maintain its current position, but,
given ECOMOG's demonstrated ability to repulse
his forces, he is unlikely to launch an offensive
against the peacekeepers to gain power militarily.
? Although Prince Johnson lacks a significant politi-
cal base, he probably believes he has enough lever-
age to remain a key player and will continue to align
himself with any group that best supports his inter-
ests at the moment. Neither Taylor nor Johnson will
agree unconditionally to disarmament.
? Amos Sawyer's reelection in April as interim presi-
dent by a national conference of Liberia's political
factions somewhat strengthened his legitimacy and
that of the interim government. But his fledgling
regime still depends totally on ECOWAS for finan-
cial backing and protection, and diplomatic recogni-
tion of his government remains problematic despite
being officially seated at the June OAU conference.
The conference's failure to forge a political accommo-
dation with Taylor portends continued political stand-
off and instability in Liberia. A prolonged stalemate
would further test ECOWAS patience with the Libe-
rians, especially with Taylor. Although Ghana has
decided to reduce its contingent, we believe the
member states are resolved to maintain the peace-
keeper's presence in Monrovia at least for the remain-
der of this year. The cost of the operation, already a
persistent issue, is unlikely to become critical as long
as Nigeria continues to subsidize most of it. After
bearing considerable cost and putting its reputation
on the line, Babangida is unlikely to risk the embar-
rassment of abandoning the interim government in
Monrovia without alternative arrangements. More-
over, as ECOWAS president, Babangida will not
want to preside over a failure of the peacekeeping
effo'r`t;,~~
As,-long,as the de facto cease-fire holds and negotia-
tions;continue, however futile they may seem, Baban-
'gida probably will not risk a countrywide offensive to
defeat Taylor. Even among ECOMOG's more com-
mitted participants, there is little interest in undertak-
ing widespread military operations in the Liberian
countryside, where the force probably would become
overextended in a costly and protracted counterinsur-
gency campaign against Taylor's rebels. Instead, in
this scenario, we would expect ECOMOG to continue
to provide buffer zones between the factions and
security in Monrovia to protect the interim govern-
ment while it attempts to restore essential services in
the capital. F_
Taylor almost certainly will try to exploit the addi-
tional strain the incursion into Sierra Leone has
placed on ECOMOG and may tacitly, if not actively,
support future attacks. In our view, Taylor will con-
tinue to stall in negotiations and renege on agree-
ments in an effort to outlast his opponents and gain
control over the government. We believe he has no
intention of submitting himself to a free and fair test
of his popularity at the polls out of fear that he would
lose. In addition, he would be unwilling to allow the
disarming of his forces before an election because
they are the source of his power. F__1
There is a growing chance of fresh fighting as one of
the factions, most conspicuously Johnson's, loses pa-
tience with the standoff and provokes armed clashes.
 itf Liberia
Strength: 5,000-to-6;000 may force. composed.2tf'
six :battalions, some 1,000 of them presently
operating'in Sierra .Leone. ~~ ,`
Equipment: Four. armored vehicles, three to six
multiple rocket 'launchers,?afew.ma'chineguns;
possibly a'
few shoulder fired SAMs, fewer than
ten 115-mm howitzers, some assorted mortars,'
~afew recoilless,riNes, grenade :: launchers, gre-
nades and small arms-one 654f oat patrol boat
(armed with 81.-mm mortar, and twin, 7rd mm
machtneguns), two toahree trawlers (one,armed
Capabilities: ;Operates freely,throughout mos;,;
of the Liberian countryside, from which many
people have f ed depends " on Libya; Bur-
kina;,and Ivory, Coast for resupply .?i:com-::.,
mand;and control strongest in Gbarnga Itakata
corridor, weak;
In outlying areas, particularly
Voin Tama and Bolni Hills . , +,constant recruit-
ng required becausecsfnumerous desertions. .
effectively uses'psychologicaloperations
. warns villages: h? advance ikpendtng attack,
then moves into vacated villages.
over the country's exportable natural re
sources'i , negotiating agreements wtt'h foreign
roves{ors to restart minim concessionsand rub'
bet plantations, from which he . receives royal-
ties ?.?NPFL warl'ords' also have exported
through. frontcompany:;'at Buchanan .. rail-
mad between"Yekepa?and'.Buchananfacilitates
transportatton,a!these;products to the-port.
Johnson and remnants of late President Doe's forces
have enough arms to initiate more fighting, drawing
in Taylor. In view of Johnson's past success with
limited manpower and weapons, his forces might hold
their own in combat, especially to avoid defeat by
Taylor. ECOMOG is capable of containing such
skirmishing in the Monrovia area, however. F_
Prolonged deadlock would have profound effects on
Liberia's neighbors, and regional leaders are becom-
ing more acutely aware of the longer run dangers and
costs of impasse. Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory
Coast are already hard pressed to assist refugees, and
we can anticipate increasing requests for international
assistance. As the deadlock extends, refugees will look
to permanent relocation as their only option, and local
backlash against them-to include skirmishes-and
cross-border raids-is a growing danger. Such condi-::
tions would be conducive to increased Libyan med'--
.ding in the region. In addition, if deadlock persists;,
the economic costs of ECOMOG will no doubt,be.,1
come an issue. in Nigerian politics as campaigning
intensifies in 1992. A significant decline in Nigerian
funding would probably mean the collapse of the
peacekeeping effort, almost certainly plunging Liberia
back into uncontrolled factional fighting and ethnic
retribution.
Scenario 2: ECOMOG Turns Up the Heat. Increasing
likelihood as Nigeria draws the conclusion that
Taylor must be pressured. Accumulating evidence
suggests Nigeria is formulating a strategy that, al-
though not intended to pacify Taylor's territory, is
designed to pressure him politically and economically
as well as militarily by:
? Pressing for widespread diplomatic recognition of
Sawyer's interim government. Babangida may also
urge ECOWAS to accept its credentials at the July
summit, when he will assume the presidency.
? Choking off Taylor's access to outside funds and
supplies. Nigerian combatants are already searching
ships calling at Buchanan, and contingency plans
for a full-scale blockade of all National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL) -controlled ports are in
place. The interim government is threatening legal
action against foreign firms doing business with
Taylor.
 ? Pressuring Burkina to honor its promise to cease
military support for the NPFL.
? Aggressively enforcing provisions of the cease-fire
and asserting ECOMOG's authority over Taylor's
strongholds near Monrovia and Roberts Interna-
tional Airfield.
? Conducting selective airstrikes, if necessary, against
rebel enclaves further inland-while avoiding any
prolonged'ground action far outside the Monrovia
Should Nigeria overcome regional misgivings and
gain-enough support among ECOWAS members to
implement: such. a strategy, Taylor would probably
resist militarily. He demonstrated last year that he
can attack the peacekeeping force with effect. Al-
though full implementation of such steps would be
unlikely, the outcome would hinge on Babangida's
ability to sustain the ECOWAS effort versus Taylor's
staying power:
? The key to implementation would be Babangida's
willingness to devote the attention and resources
required to stiffen the determination of his
ECOWAS partners. Although he is under no do-
mestic pressure to act more aggressively, the Nigeri-
an political scene now allows him about 12 months
to attempt this, in our view. As campaigning for a
new government heats up, however, he will have to
concentrate more on internal matters and take
smaller risks regionally. In addition, he no doubt
wants to take advantage of his somewhat greater
diplomatic influence before the expiration of his
one-year terms as head of ECOWAS and the OAU.
? Renewed warfare, however, would jeopardize the
precarious ECOWAS consensus and step up pres-
sure on financially strapped Ghana, Guinea, and
Sierra Leone to withdraw from the peacekeeping
force. For Nigeria to act virtually alone in Liberia
would probably not be politically sustainable for
Babangida, both domestically and regionally. More-
over, Taylor would threaten harm to Ghanaian and
Nigerian hostages we believe he is still holding.
Expenses for,'.:deploying and operating the pure-;
stdntial burden on participating countries -Al
though they originally estimated operational
costs to be $30 million. Nigeria alone has'rspent
roughly $180: million, to date. Costs ;y the':
expedition h'ad not een`included in,the coon=,..
tries'respective defense budgets and must now
be covered at the expense of'domestic programs,.
Governments .are sensitive about these sexpend!
lures: and haze not made.them public pisancial.
Only Nigeria has the.manpower? to support
ECOMOG without degrading capabilities at'
home ,the other part cipants' with much small
er militaries, have contributed w porporttonate,
ly greater, number of mhtary personnel and=`are;"
straining to meet perceived domestic require-
pnents.
? The cohesion of Taylor's group, already suffering
from defections and eroding command and control,
would further weaken under sustained pressure
from a disciplined and well-armed opponent. The
ties that bind Taylor's followers to him would
probably wither should he suffer setbacks that
undermine his aura of success, control of territory,
and ability to provide food, arms, and opportunities
to loot.)
On balance, we believe that Taylor would be weak-
ened and more willing to compromise in such a
scenario, but the risks to ECOWAS and Nigeria
would be high. Should Taylor outlast and wear down
the peacekeepers, ECOWAS would probably be per-
manently weakened and Nigerian regional leadership
discredited, at least for a while. The repercussions
 could extend to Nigerian domestic politics, opening
Babangida to criticism, especially from Army officers
embarrassed by setbacks in Liberia and displeased
with his plans to turn power over to civilians. )
Moreover, a resurgent Taylor would pose a greater
threat to Liberia's immediate neighbors, including
Ivory Coast, through his ability to foment border
unrest. A receding ECOWAS would also give Libya a
freer hand in Liberia and the region. While, on his
own, Taylor's ability to export instability is limited by
logistic realities to the countries bordering Liberia,
the non-Liberian dissidents':and ihercenaries in the
NPFL could reach further afield'Ywith Libyan assis-
tance: In our view, Qadhafi would seize?the opportuni-
ty under these circumstinces fd"make Liberia a base
for extending 'Libya's regioridlIinfiuence particularly
if he perceived dwindling US involvement and con-
cern.
Scenario 3: Negotiated Settlement. Unlikely because
of inadequate pressure to compromise. In our estima-
tion, unless there is a decisive shift in the military
balance to break the current impasse, a negotiated
settlement is unlikely. Should ECOWAS manage to
force necessary concessions from Taylor, as in scenar-
io 2, talks could produce a compromise solution
among the contending factions. Even then, serious
obstacles to stability would remain, and the presence
of an international peacekeeping force would still be
needed:
? Because government services are virtually nonexis-
tent, large-scale financial and humanitarian assis-
tance would be critical.
? Elections in the near future would be very difficult
to run, especially outside the Monrovia area. Elec-
tion logistics and monitoring would be complicated
by the dispersion of Liberia's population caused by
the civil war; most refugees will not return without
credible guarantees of their security and continued
relief assistance.
? New security forces would have to be created from
the rival factions. In doing so, any Liberian regime
would remain dependent on an international force to
help it demobilize or integrate the factional armies
that had fought one another. In addition, some
warlords in Taylor's group might go their own way;
banditry and lawlessness would be widespread; and
disaffected ethnic groups, some well armed, would
remain a serious problem.
? Taylor would strive to dominate the political process
and undermine initiatives that did not directly
enhance his own power and election prospects. F
Taylor's removal by assassination-Johnson is proba-
bly seeking the opportunity-or incapacitation would
improve. chances for an overall accommodation.
Should he leave the scene, NPFL cohesion Would
most likely falter altogether, unravelling~the:small
coterie of leaders now around him. Some NPFL=.
leaders would probably come to terms wtthstbe!tnter
im government, providing the basis