(EST PUB DATE) INFORMAL HISTORY- -US INVOLVEMENT IN THE EAST-WEST EXCHANGES PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: EAST-WEST
• Keywords: EXCHANGES
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001495225
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-01949
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965

Informal History--US Intelligence Involve=ment in the
East-west Exchanges Program
The official East-West exchanges program had its genesis in the Geneva
Summit Conference of mid 1955 when the US and USSR heads of state discussed
the possibility of a future exchanges program. Details of the program were
worked out. late in 1955 during a conference of foreign ministers.
However,.the first agreement itself was not signed until January 1955
and covered a two year period as did each subsequent agreement until 1973.
The current agreement negotiated last year will remain in effect through
1979. Although informally referred to as "the culture.l ~~,xneTMnn.+'; the
document is properly titled "Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scien-
tific,, Technical, Educational-, Cultural and Other. Fields". The word "contacts"
appears for the first tine in the current title.
The period between mid 1955 and January 1958 vas taken un with many
discussions, arguments perhaps, compromises and resolutions within the
Intelligence Community and other areas of the US Government concerning the
proper method to handle such a program.? This period also saw several infor-
mal.ad hoc exchanges take place.. The most famous was possibly the Soviet
Agricultural Delegation which trooped through the Iowa corn fields in 1955.
It was shortly after this delegation visit that the unite House annroached
CIA requesting all available intelligence obtained from the delegation.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2008
 The reporting furnished was the product of Contact Division, CIA. This
probably marks the first intelligence involvement in, the embryonic exchanges
program.
In' addition, several individual US scientists were invited to the USSR
by private invitation. They happened to be Co.itact Division sources. I1r.
A
Ashcraft, then Chief/Contact.Division, saw in! these invitations a unique
potential for the collection of foreign positive intelligence :(rPI) against
the priority target--the USSR. Ire, therefor , forwarded a memorandum re-
questing the blessing of the US government i the form of a policy statement
on such visits in order that no stigma be attached to the travellers upon
their return to the US. This was a real fear of the scientists.durinci
that period of cold war.
In June 1956, President "!Eisenhower approved DISC 5607 autho`rz cT an
East-West Exchanges program The thinking behind it included certain safe
guards--security measures for the protection of the US. In brief, the
I
security measures were thc,se:
Intelligence Community advice to State on exchanges
Collection of FPI from US citizens involved in exchanges
Interna:~ security, (counter-intelligence) carried out by
the FBI
By the time 5607 dame into being there already existed--and indeed was
operating--a mechani^m to maximize the intelligence yields from exchanges.
This mechanism was .he Standing Committee on Exchanges of the intelligence
 Advisory Committee (IAC). The chairman of the Standing Committee was
William Bundy; the executive secretary was Guy Coridea, both with CIA at
that time. The executive secretariat was established within Contact Divi-
sion because it was felt that intelligence utilization and exploitation
of exchanges teas a collection function rather titan a research and intelli-
1 t . I
gence production function., Membership at that, time included Stare, Army,
Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, CIA, AEC and FB4.
The activities of the Standing Committee were:
a. advising State, of intell- Bence potential of exchanges
proposed by SovBloc US individuals and groups
b. suggesting exchange p/.oposals for US initiative. (ror
it. was soon found (that. the lack of exchange topics
anprovcd by the US government weighted the grog., :%
in favor of the Soviets)
c. coordination of intelligence interests and activities--
exploitation, collection
The activities of the Standing Committee were carefully and thought-
fully limited to the FPJ aspects of the-.program; in other words separated
from the internal US security side of the question--counter intelligence--
tho purview of the FBT~ Each side, aware of the actions of the other, es-
t_n1)l. i shed i t-; >>, nne-ls to the Department of State where, within the
-r`IT'` ''u of I'crrot~,' ,n -,f-fairs, was set up the future soviet and Eastern
European Excha-in S
ec- (SL?'S) to direct the exchanges program.
 in order to keep various government agencies fully informed of
developments and to solicit advice, SES held bi-wee):ly meetings until
1966 with members of the Soviet Desk and Cultural Affairs Bureau of
the Department, DOD, Commerce, AEC, USIA, the Nptional Academy of
4
Sciences and CIA. A lengthy status report was published until approx-
imately 1964. or '65 when the volume of visitor's rendered such a tabulation
impossible.
In Spring 1959 the US Intelligence Board took over the functions of
IAC and of the Standing Committee by virtue, 'of DCID 2/6 which remains our
charter. Bundy and Coriden simply changed hats and continued their
activities now as Chairman of the USIB Committee on Exchanges and Executive
Secretary.
in mid 1959 the Department of Commerce expressed its concern over
various aspects of the proc;ram, and its desire to be represented on the__USIB
committee. The Commerce interest involved its role under the Export
Control Act for the control of technical data. DCID 2/6 provided that
members from non-USIB agencies could be invited.by the chairman as appropriate.
Thus, in July 1959, Allen Dulles invited Commerce to beta co-member.
In 1963, another change was in store for the Committee. President
Kennedy, feeling that there were too many USIB committees, asked Mr. McCone
to review the USIB structure. One of the many to be "disestablished", so the
action was termed, was the Exchanges Committee. However, the functions,
activities, respotsibilities, and membership would remain the same and thus
 the IIAGE, Interagency Intelligence Advisory Group on Exchanges was born.
The DCID was rewritten to reflect this chance and life continued with one
difference. At the recruest of the military members the Secretariat of the
IIAGE became the channel from the services to SE!; for "military security
opinions". A military security opinion sin-ply addresses whether a given
visit or itinerary would put a SovBloc visitor into contact with a DOD
funded contract. Thus two "opinions" are forwarded to State-thp intel-
ligence opinion (weighinq of US technolocgicil and .intelligence loss and
gain) and the military security opinion. iI
Therefore, the Committee, by whatever.; name, has through the years
served as the intelligence advisor to State. on all exchange matters.
Under DCID 2/6 its main tasks are to maximize the intelligence yield from
exchanges and, on the defensj/ve side, to minimize the US intelligence and
technological loss within tye stated US national Policy. These activities
continue to the present.
However, today, the xchanges Agreement is not the only piece of paper.
outlining activities bet4een the US and USSR. Confusion resulted from
the Moscow Summit of Mays 1972 which marked the signing not only of the
new Exchanges Agreement but of several "Agreements on Cooperation" in
various fields. The June 1973 Washington Summit witnessed several
other "bilaterals" as we have come to nickname them.
The "bilaterals'are ongoing projects, five years in length except
for the ten year one on Atomic Energy. Each may include exchanges of dele-
gations, joint symposia, long term exchanges of scientists, and exchanges
 of technology. The "bilaterals" are in the following/ fields*
a. Environmental Protection
b. Medical Science and Public Hea'_th
c. Exploitation and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
d. Science and Technology
e. Agriculture
f. world Ocean
g. Transportation
h. Atomic Energy
Each of the above has an executive agent, i.e. a US government
department or agency responsible for the implementation of its bilateral;
for example, EPA, IIE[?l, HASA, TISF etc. ':hus State's-,function which was
and is one of "direction" under the Exchanges Agreement is more 6IM'
"monitoring" under the bilateral program.
Now, most of you are, aware of the proliferation of working groups,
sub working groups, topics and sub-tonics under the various bilaterals.
A quick example: The S&T Bilateral can include any S or T area agreed
upon by both sides. At the moment it contains some 12 or 13 topics ranging
from Microbiology to Science Policy to Use of Computers in Management to
Electrometallurgy. Lot's take the topic "Energy", one of the original
topics of the S&T bilateral. "Energy" has some 8 or 9 sub tonics deperiding
on how you count Diem. These sub-tonics include among others the fields of
MUD, solar, and geophysical energy. Each of these sub-topics has a working
-G-
 group. Working groups can have varying numbers of memhers and may be
composed of individuals representing the governmental, academic, and
private sectors of the US. A more or less similar Structure would exist
on the Soviet side. I think you can see the ramif3.,:;ations of this.
In closing, I would like to stress that the long period, mid 55 to
January 58, during which the US government discussed, argued, decided
and made policy concerning the implementation of an exchanges proaran,
was lacking prior to the signing of the bilaterals. -The discussions are
i
happening after the fact. This meeting is
and others.. Discussions aftf.z the fact are much more difficult.
t of it, as are the Deputy
Assistant Secretary Armitage memorandum to Mr. Nelson; The Admiral
de Poix memorandum to the Chairman, USIB; the DOD Ad Hoc: working Grout)
on East West Travel; USIB Human Sources Committee discussions; Intelli-
gence Community Staff concern; Commerce concern on transrcet f,technology