ARAB NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: MIDDLE EAST
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001491625
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-01927
• Publication Date: August 12, 1958

 APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
16-Sep-2009
ARAB NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR IN THE
MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the present status of Arab nationalism as a factor in the Middle
East situation.
DISCUSSION
1. PRESENT SITUATION
1. With increasing rapidity over the past three
years, the Western-supported conservative
governments of the Middle East have seen
their influence and authority slip away. The
revolution in Iraq brought the strongest of the
conservative Arab states into Nasser's radical
Pan-Arab camp. This left its partner in the
Arab Union, Jordan, so unstable that even the
presence of UK troops may be insufficient to
maintain King Hussein on the throne. Leb-
anon, once the Arab state having the closest
connections with the West, has experienced
an insurrection, the outcome of which appears
almost certain to be the adoption of a position
of neutrality and of accommodation with
Nasser. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince
Feisal, now the dominant figure in the regime,
is moving toward closer relations with the
UAR as the result of his own Pan-Arab inclina-
tions and his belief that to swim with the tide
is the best means of preserving the Saudi
dynasty. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a
political upheaval in Saudi Arabia is consid-
erable. The Ruler of Kuwait, aware of the
popular feeling toward Arab nationalism
and Nasser in his own state and desirous of
reaching an accommodation with these forces,
is seeking a formula which would permit both
closer Arab ties and the retention of a rela-
tionship with the UK. The governments of
both Libya and the Sudan, which have been
friendly to the West, are threatened by in-
creased Egyptian subversion and radical na-
tionalist coups.,
2. US and UK intervention in Lebanon and
Jordan brought a degree of temporary sta-
bility in those countries and may have served
to deter Nasser and his supporters from en-
couraging immediate revolts elsewhere in the
area for fear of becoming involved with West-
ern forces. However, the net result of the
Iraqi revolt and other recent events has been
a strengthening of the radical Pan-Arab
position.
3. Moreover, the long-continuing opposition
between the radical nationalist regimes and
the Western-backed conservative regimes has
opened the way for the USSR to secure stead-
ily expanding influence in the area by backing
the radical regimes.
II. ARAB NATIONALISM -AIMS AND
OBJECTIVES
4. Arab nationalism is a movement of long
standing, with great emotional appeal, aimed
at a renaissance of the Arab peoples and the
restoration of their sovereignty, unity, power,
The problem of Arab nationalism in North Africa
has been discussed in SNIE 71-58, France and
North Africa, approved 29 July 1958.
 and prestige. Since World War II it has been
stimulated and encouraged by the drive
among the people of underdeveloped areas
throughout the world against "colonialism"
and for self-determination.. Both the older,
conservative nationalists and the supporters
of the new radical movement led by Nasser
have proclaimed the goal of eliminating
Western "imperialist" influence and have
made common cause against Israel. The con-
servatives, however, in fact often accepted
Western support and cooperated with the
West, despite the incubus of Western associa-
tion with Israel, partly because their commer-
cial or cultural interests lay with the West
and partly because they needed Western sup-
port in order to stay in power. The radical
nationalists, on the other hand, were far more
distrustful of the West, more determined to
eradicate the remaining Western controls over
Arab political and economic life, and far more
serious about achieving (rather than simply
praising) the goal of Arab unity. In addition,
the radical nationalists added a doctrine of
social revolution and reform to the older
tenets of Arab nationalism, and thus came
into conflict with the traditional upper classes
and social and economic systems of the Arab
world on which the conservatives' power
rested. Finally, unlike the conservatives, the
radical nationalists sought and received Soviet
Bloc support in their conflicts with the West-
ern Powers and with the pro-West Arab
regimes.
5. Arab nationalism has always been identi-
fied with loyalty to the Arab "nation" as a
whole, rather than with allegiance to one or
another of the existing, often artificially-
created Arab states. In practice, however,
the nationalist movement's ideal of Arab unity
was until recently blocked by the strength of
conservative leaders and overshadowed by
basic economic, geographic and cultural vari-
ations in the Arab world, as well as by clashes
between rival states and leaders. Political
and cultural incompatibilities divided Egypt
from the Fertile Crescent region to the north,
where Egyptian pretensions to Arab leader-
ship were challenged; and the conservative
Islamic culture of the Arabian Peninsula
found little in common with that of the more
secular, advanced states of the Mediterranean
seaboard. In the past two years, however, the
vigor of the radical nationalist movement and
the weakness of the conservatives in the face
of it have reduced the significance of these
divisive obstacles. This upsurge has been co-
incident with and in large part dependent
upon the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser as its
symbol and leader. Soviet support has con-
tributed substantially to Nasser's prestige and
capabilities. Under his aegis, steps have been
taken toward a degree of Arab unity which
seemed highly unlikely two years ago.
6. The ideal of unity has thus demonstrated
itself to be a formidable force with wide ap-
peal throughout most of the Arab world, and
one with a momentum not likely to be lost
in the near future. We do not believe, how-
ever, that a welding together of the Arab
states into a centralized and unitary empire
is possible in the foreseeable future. There
exist in the area certain conditions and atti-
tudes which would militate against the ulti-
mate success of a centralized Arab state
once Pan-Arabism had achieved its main
goal - the elimination of foreign domination.
Despite certain ethnic and religious similari-
ties, there are considerable nationalistic, cul-
tural, commercial and economic interests
which would serve as serious divisive factors
in any Pan-Arab unitary state, or indeed in
any type of federation. Syria and Iraq, for
example, have more in common, in terms of
commercial, economic and various other in-
terests, than either has with Egypt; and in
time these natural affinities may either work
against the acceptance of Egyptian primacy
or revive fears of Egyptian "imperialism."
Many makers of the Iraqi revolution may be
unwilling to accept Cairo as the ultimate and
sole source of authority in Iraqi affairs, and
conflict between them and the Nasserites may
develop. Furthermore, even though some of
the oil-rich countries may consent to share
some of their profits with the other Arab
countries, conflicts of interest are certain to
develop over this issue.
7. We are convinced, however, that the vari-
ous divisive factors in the area will for some
time to come be overshadowed by the powerful
S R E T
 SEI\RET
emotional appeal of the Arab unity movement,
particularly as long as parts of the Arab world
remain under Western control or influence.
Moreover, the existence of Israel will continue
to exert a strong cohesive influence on the
Arabs.
8. The Role of Nasser. Nasser gained his
position as the popular Arab nationalist hero
as a result of a series of events in which he
won, or at least appeared to win, victories for
Arab nationalism against its opponents, e.g.,
his success in acquiring Soviet arms, his na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal Company, his
recovery after the Israeli, British, and French
attack in late 1956, and the union with Syria.
He has also increased his influence in the area
through his skillful and ruthless use of sub-
version and propaganda. These are the nat-
ural weapons of a revolutionary movement,
and, regardless of the state of his relations
with the West, he is unlikely to forego their
use as long as his revolutionary aims are un-
fulfilled. He and the majority of his followers
regard most of the national boundaries of the
area and all the conservative governments as
artificial creations of outsiders and are there-
fore unimpressed by arguments for preserving
them. Furthermore, Nasser is convinced that
the West, and the US in particular, is engag-
ing in extensive subversive and propaganda
activity against him in the Arab area.
9. Even with his power and position, however,
Nasser's control over the radical Pan-Arab
movement, at least outside of Egypt and to a
lesser degree, Syria, is not absolute. In re-
spect to the internal affairs of the separate
states of the area, his power is far from com-
plete, and there is room for considerable dis-
sension. We believe that his influence rests
more on the emotional appeal of his program,
on his personality, and on the effectiveness of
his propaganda than on any organization,
subversive or otherwise, that he commands.
10. Nonetheless, we believe that for all practi-
cal purposes it is necessary to think of Nasser
and the mass of Arab nationalists as insep-
arable. He has become so clearly identified
with the greatest successes of Arab nation-
alism that no rival is likely to challenge him
unless he suffers a series of defeats. There
are no indications that any significant anti-
Nasser group exists within the Pan-Arab
movement. Furthermore, even in the event
of Nasser's disappearance, the Arab nation-
alist movement would be unlikely to exhibit
fundamentally different characteristics, since
Nasser is probably as much the instrument of
the movement as he is its leader. Indeed, a
successor might be less capable than Nasser
of exercising restrain upon the Arab nation-
alists and might be less cautious about Arab
relations with the Soviet Bloc.
11. Nasser's Objectives. We believe that Nas-
ser's position and his objectives are essentially
as he has stated them. He intends to elimi-
nate all vestiges of special foreign positions
and to bring the resources of the Arab world
completely under Arab nationalist control.
He aims at uniting the entire Arab world with
a common foreign policy and a common pro-
gram of modernization, development, and re-
form. We believe that Nasser, in pursuit of
these objectives, will continue to use the in-
struments of propaganda, subversion, and
assistance to local forces of Arab nationalism.
We do not believe that Nasser has a precise
schedule or a detailed blueprint for the uni-
fied Arab state toward which he is working.
We believe that he will wish to avoid direct
conflict with Western, Turkish, or Israeli
forces and will probably be prepared to accept
a considerable degree of local autonomy in
states which may affiliate with the UAR and
UAS.
12. The aims of radical Arab nationalism are
not invariably in conflict with US interests.
Thus, the Arab objectives of maintaining in-
dependence and of utilizing the profits of Arab
oil are compatible with two crucial US in-
terests - denial of the area to Soviet domina-
tion and maintenance of Western access to
Middle East oil. Other US interests, however,
such as the preservation of Israel, appear to
be in irreconcilable conflict with the goals
of the Arab nationalist movement. So also
are the maintenance of Western control over
(as distinguished from access to) the oil of
the area, and the use of military bases. More-
over, Nasser's ambitions are not confined to
the Arab world. He intends to try to elimi-
 R E T
nate European control in parts of Africa and they are a challenge to his own authorit
to bring them into his neutralist bloc Th
ere
is likely to be a continuing clash of interests
due to the impact of Nasser's revolutionary
influence in other areas of the Moslem
world - the Sudan, Libya, North Africa, other
parts of Africa, and Iran. In the longer run
he probably plans to create an independent
power center based on Egypt and raise him-
self to the position of an Afro-Asian bloc
leader.
13. We do not believe that Nasser is a Com-
munist or sympathetic to the Communist doc-
trine. He opposes Arab Communists because
He regards the Soviet Union as a great
o
p
wer
with interests and policies in the Middle East
which happen at this stage to coincide with
his own. He will continue to look to the USSR
for support and to be responsive to Soviet
allegations against the West. We believe that
he continues to hope that the integrity of the
Arab union he is trying to create will be pro-
tected by a balance of Soviet and Western in-
fluence in the Arab area, despite the events of
the past three years which have certainly
deepened Nasser's suspicions of the West and
probably reduced his distrust of the Soviets.