MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOME ASPECTS OF AN OPERATION TO DESTROY ENEMY MISSILE SUBMARINES
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0001430712
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Publication Date:
August 23, 1983
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
AR 70-14
23 August 1983
MENORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Aspects of an Operation
to Destroy Cnemy Missile Submarines
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a serie
now in preparation based on the SECRET Soviet Ministry of Defense publication
Military-Theoretical Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought".
This article briefly discusses the methods to be used by the Soviet navy to
detect and destroy enemy SSBNs with either conventional or nuclear weapons at
the outbreak of a war. A two-phase operation is described in which a massed
search is instituted by Soviet naval forces consisting of nuclear attack
submarines, diesel submarines, long-range ASW aircraft, surface ship hunter-
killer groups, and shipborne ASK helicopters. In a nuclear war-fighting
scenario, the Soviet navy would be supported by land-based ballistic missiles
and long-range aviation from the strategic rocket and air forces, respectively.
This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (6) for 1975.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document
should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For
ease of reference, reports from this publication have also been assigned the
Codeword
V. . te
Director for Operations
??.?
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
EL S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Soviet Analysis
Director of Scientific and Weapons Research
Director of Imagery Analysis
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RET
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Mid-1975
WIC DOCUMENT KM' NOT DE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special? Report
SUBJECT
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DATE
23 August 1983
//MILITARY THOUGHT ()USSR): Some Aspects of an Operation to Destroy Enemy
Missile Submarines
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (6) for 1975 of the SECRET USSR. Ministry of Defense
publication Military-Theoretical Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". This article, by Rear Admiral V. Saakyan, briefly describes the
methods to be employed by the Soviet navy in a two-phase operation to detect and
destroy enemy (M, British, or French) SSBNS with the use of either conventional
or nuclear weapons at the outbreak of a war. The first phase of the operation
involves a massed search by diversified Soviet naval forces consisting of
nuclear attack submarines, diesel submarines, long-range ASW aircraft, and
surface ship hunter-killer groups having ASK helicopters -- with all elements
operating jointly. Weapons to be used are torpedoes, mines, depth charges, and
special (i.e., nuclear) warheads. The second phase of the operation is a
strictly nuclear war-fighting scenario in which the Soviet navy targets land-
based ballistic missiles from the strategic rocket forces and long-range
aviation from the air forces against detected enemy SSBNs and, in some cases,
distant straits and narrows.
End of Summary
Comment.
According to available sources, author Saakyan is an Armenian born in either
1922 or 1928. For most of his naval career he has been a surface ASW
specialist. From 1974 to 1976 he was the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet.
In 1977 he was promoted to vice admiral.
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SCHE ASPECTS OF AN OPERATION '10 DESTROY ENEMY MISSILE SUIMARINES
Rear Admiral V. SAAKYAN
In the aggressive plans of the military leadership of the US and NATD, an
rtant role is assigned to the naval forces, primarily to nuclear missile
rines /SSENs/ which are included in the so-called sea-based strategic
missile/nuclear system. In the US, Britain, and France such systems makeup a
significant portion of the strategic attack forces. They have been designated
Polaris/Poseidon in the US and Britain, and MSPS (naval strategic ballistic
missile) in France.
At present the American sea-based missile/nuclear system includes 41 SSBNS.
As a result of the work begun in 1968 to develop the new Trident SSBN system, it
is anticipated that the first submarine accommodating 24 Trident II ballistic
missiles, /each/ with a firing range of 12,000 kilometers, will be launched in
1978. Each of these missiles will have aMIRVed warhead. The submarine's.
nuclear reactor is designed to operate for 20 years without refueling.
Britain has four SSPNs (built in cooperation with the US) which are armed
with Polaris Ara missiles. Since 1964, France has been building SSBNs, three of
which are in commission and another two under construction. These submarines
are armed with French-made missiles.
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Judging by the relative proportion of SSBNs in the overall balance of
strategic nuclear forces, their role in a nuclear war will be enormous: SSBNS
account for 656 (38.6 percent) of the 1,704 US strategic missile launchers.
That being the case, in terms of the number of nuclear warheads, the relative
proportion of sea-based missiles is 62 percent. This is due to the fact that
missiles installed in nuclear submarines have a number of significant advantages
over land-based missiles, the most important of which are great survivability
and the capability to reduce considerably a missile's flight time to the strike
target. If work is completed according to the projected plans for further
increasing the nuclear potential, the relative proportion of missile submarines
in the overall complement of US strategic nuclear forces will increase
significantly.
The magnitude of the damage caused by SSENs, the vast areas of the world's
oceans over which their sphere of operations extends, as well as the secrecy of
their actions, their survivability, maneuverability, sufficiently high level of
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coMbat readiness, and the precision of hitting targets inherent in sms
predetermine that a special naval operation will have to be conducted to combat
them and that appropriate (and, moreover, very substantial) forces of the
different branches of the armed forces will have to be allocated for
participation in it. And, in terms of the conditions of employing the forces
participating in the operation, the unix* features of their actions, and the
extent and nature of the measures to comprehensively support them, it is one of
the most complex naval operations. Therefore, it is understandable that various
publications, including the Military-Theoretical Collection of Articles from
the Journal "Military Thought," are showing suat theoretical and practical
interest in it.
In order to more clearly illustrate the most characteristic features of
conducting an operation to combat SSENs, it is advisable to examine, albeit
briefly, our capabilities to detect and destroy than. Thus, a. number of
identifying physical fields appear and are retained for a fairly long period
around submarines when they depart from their bases, proceed to an operations
area, and also maneuver and launch missiles. Included among them should be such
fields as hydroacoustic, thermal, hydrodynamic, magnetic, radioactive, luminous,
biological, and certain others. Moreover, the intensity of these fields depends
not only on the operation of machinery in the submarine, its speed, depth of
submergence, etc., but to a great extent also on the salinity and temperature of
the water, the amount of plankton, the temperature gradient, the presence of
underwater sound channels, and a number of other phenomena which have not yet
been fully studied to a sufficient degree. Intercepting and recording physical
fields make it possible to detect submarines, classify them, determine their
position, course, speed, and all the other parameters required to work out the
basic data for employing antisubmarine /ASIV weapons.
Destroying a detected submarine is a less complex task than detecting it
initially and maintaining contact with it up to the moment of attack. However,
accomplishing this task also presents a number of specific requirements which
pertain primarily to weapons. In particular, the weapons employed to destroy
SRNs (torpedoes, depth charges, mines, special warheads, and various explosive
devices) must withstand the extremely severe pressures that occur at great
depths. The increased speeds of nuclear submarines and their relative freedom
to maneuver uten evading attacks often lead to substantial errors in determining
when to employ the means of destruction, which is responsible for having to make
repeated and, moreover, combined use of various ASW weapons.
*P. NAVC/TSEV, "Modern Naval Operations to Destroy Groupings of Enemy Naval
Forces," Military-Theoretical Collection of Articles from the Journal "Military
Thought," 1973, No. 2, pp. 100-03.
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For the successful conduct of an operation to combat an enemy's SSENs, it is
most advantageous to direct our actions toward preventing the launch of his
missiles and toward establishing conditions which make the launch of enemy
missiles as difficult as possible and, at the same time, provide our forces and
means with the opportunity to destroy those missiles in flight to the target.
Hat regardless of how the tasks of the operation are to be accomplished, what is
needed first of all is to conduct a well-timed, massed search for the SSBNs and
maintain constant contact with then, which presupposes that diversified ASW
forces -- surface ships, aircraft, and submarines -- be employed according to a
unified concept and plan.
It follows from the foregoing that an operation to destroy enemy SSENs can
be described as the series of acti2nE, coordinated and interrelated according
target
target and time of the different bfinches of the armed forces under the iiding
role of the naval forces, which are conducted in the areas aere submarines are
assumed to be located, in order to detect and destroy the maximum number of
them. In terms of the conditions of employing the forces participating in the
operation, the unique features of their actions, and the extent and nature of
the measures to comprehensively support then, the operation to destroy SSBNs can
be arbitrarily divided into twv phases.
The first phase of the operation to combat SSBNs involves a massed search
for diem. During this time, static means of submarine detection are put in
place and ASW minefields are laid. Since SSENs practically-have an unlimited
range of operation and great maneuverability and can, in essence, remain for
long periods of time in any area of the world's oceans, the principal role in
searching for them is assigned to nuclear ASW submarines, whose capabilities are
the same as those of the target of the search. Considerable search capabilities
are possessed also by modern, long-range ASW aircraft, whose most valuable
feature (in comparison with all other ASW forces) is their ability to rapidly
interpret the underwater situation in the vast areas patrolled by a submerged
enemy, to detect him, and to transfer the contact to other ASW forces.
Combat training experience indicates that searching for submarines requires
a large detail of forces which can, in our opinion, be employed in the following
manner.
First of all, it is necessary to endeavor to employ diversified ASW forces
in close cooperation with each other in the search for enemy submarines.
Mbreover, the actions of these forces must be extended to the depth of the
theater, covering if possible all the most likely SS BN patrol areas. In
distributing the efforts of ASW forces throughout the areas of the theater, it
is desirable to proceed on the assumption that most, or even all, enemy
submarines have been deployed to their launch stations.
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In order to prevent the buildup of enemy efforts from forward bases and
hinder the redeployment of SSENs from areas where they routinely stay to patrol
areas and missile launch stations, it is advisable to concentrate (deploy) part
of the ASW forces at the ASW barriers in straits and DALIVW passages.
For convenience it is advisable that the areas selected to search for a
submerged enemy be divided into corresponding smaller areas for sweeping by a
particular arm of ASW forces in a manner proportionate to its search
capabilities. Ignoring this recommendation can lead to erratic observation of
the areas and to reduced effectiveness in combat against enemy SSBNs.
It is best to position surface ships in the area located between the areas
being searched by ASW submarines and ASW aircraft. Such positioning compels
SSBNs to evade the surface ships and thereby to inevitably move out at higher
speeds to the positions of forces conducting a covert search. Moreover, we
should also endeavor to employ active means of detection (under-the-keel,
dipping, and towed sonar arrays) as well as passive means (direct-listening
sonar sets, radiosonobuoys, wake-detection gear). Calculations show that using
search means in this manner markedly increases the probability of detecting a
submerged enemy.
Cooperation during the search must be organized primarily in support of
those forces which are capable of carrying out prolonged tracking of SSBNs.
An analysis of modern ASW forces and means and the conditions of their
employment indicates that shipborne hunter-killer groups cooperating with long-
range ASW aircraft and ship-based ASW helicopters have the greatest search
capabilities. Therefore, when search operations are being planned, it is
particularly necessary to make provision for a detail of aviation to participate
in prolonged tracking of SSENs.
It is most advantageous for shipborne bunter-killer groups to conduct a
search from different directions, setting up a sort of "vise" from which it is
difficult for any target to escape.
When search operations are being conducted, special attention should be
given to ensuring their secrecy and surprise through the of feint maneuvers,
deception, and all types of camouflage. In this case, the deployment of ASW
submarines to their assigned search areas should be carried out, as a rule, only
in a submerged condition, with strict observance of complete radiotechnical
silence as well. As regards surface ships, they are to rapidly occupy the
search areas and it is advisable that this be accompanied by maneuvering at full
speed along fake headings.
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For the successful conduct of search operations under modern conditions, it
is exceptionally important to organize radioelectronic warfare, which provides
for the reliable neutralization of shore-based enemy control systems and the
destruction or incapacitation of communications centers, radio navigation
systems, underwater sonar arrays, beacons, and all other means supporting SSBNs.
Moreover, the possibilities of this warfare and its organization depend
primarily on the condition our enemies are in before the commencement of the
operation to destroy SSINs. In addition, the effectiveness of this operation is
largely determined by the possibilities of concentrating in it the efforts of
both naval and non-naval means.
In particular, these forces must first of all prevent the enemy from using
airborne and shipboard radioelectronic means to search for and track our ASW
submarines. Therefore, the surface ship groupings which ensure the stability of
our ASW forces must have sufficiently powerful radioelectronic warfare means.
This requirement can be realized to a certain extent by using diesel
submarines to operate in unified search formations with nuclear submarines. The
essence of such joint actions lies in the fact that in the assigned area the
nuclear submarines maneuver at the slowest possible speed in a zigzag pattern,
while the diesel submarines located on the flanks conduct the search on straight
courses. In this case, in order to provide them with the largest field of
observation (search zone width), the bearing of the formation must be equal to
the assumed (most probable) evasion heading of an enemy SM. Mbreover,
organized in this manner, the diesel submarines will occupy favorable positions
for attacking multipurpose enemy submarines.
In cur opinion, another method of increasing the combat stability of nuclear
ASW submarines is to organize the search for a submerged enemy jointly with
surface ships in a single search formation within the range of underwater sound
communications. In this case, the nuclear submarines must be positioned at the
head of the search formation at acute course angles relative to the ships of the
hunter-killer group. If underwater sound coamunications exist between the ships
and submarines, reliable control of all the forces can be carried out from the
command post of the hunter-killer group.
When submarines and surface ships are engaged in a joint search, the
reliability-and rapidity of classifying the contacts which are recorded by the
search equipment of the submarines through comparison with the contacts recorded
by the search equipment of the surface ships also increase sharply. During the
joint search it is very important also that there be continuous communications
between the surface Ships and the submarines, without the latter's coming to the
surface. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that without cover
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against air attacks the surface ships are practically doomed, which means that
the submarines will not fulfill their mission.
In examining the maintenance of the combat stability of forces during search
operations, we should pay attention to the special features of ensuring the
stability of surface ships in the face of enemy air attacks when it is
Impossible to organize their air cover by fighters. Research indicates that in
such a situation it is advisable that the ships be rearranged into circular air
defense formations utile the search continues. In this case, the search
capabilities of the ships are reduced slightly but their combat stability is
increased several times. In addition, it is useful to form hunter-killer groups
by including ships of different classes in them, since in this case the weak
points of some ships will be compensated by the strong points of others.
Provision should also be made for the extensive use of mines by diesel
submarines. Calculations show that under certain conditions minefields can be
established by such means over extensive areas, thereby restricting the freedom
to maneuver of enemy SRNs and frequently depriving them of the chance to
redeploy frca some areas to others.
Thus, even on the basis of a by no means complete examination of the special
operational features of ASW forces, it is apparent that success in searching for
enemy SSENs is based on skillfully organized actions, whose purpose is not
merely to detect those submarines but to bring about conditions that maks it
possible to destroy them at the very beginning of a war before they can use
their weapons. This task can be successfully accomplished in the second phase
of the operation to destroy SSEVs, and only on condition that the additional
efforts of the /strategic/ rocket forces and long-range aviation be concentrated
/in it/.
The second . =-e of the ation to destro SSENs consists in destroying
them ? co ect ye e orts in con unct on ua ? e roc et forces and long-range
aviation. Moreover, the leading role in this phase of the operation is retained
by the naval forces, which have the capability to more effectively influence the
situation occurring during armed combat at sea than any other forces.
It has already been pointed out above that it is not a difficult task for
naval forces to destroy a detected submarine with which constant contact is
being maintained.
/// c"-Ai study.* the capabilities of ballistic missiles reveali that in a number
of instances they can be used in a nuclear war against those SSENs whose
maneuver areas are well known. In addition, the use of such missiles is
warranted also in situations where prior to the beginning of combat actions ASW
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forces had contact with enemy SHIM; but have since lost it, and therefore it is
possible to determine the areas in which these submarines are located with
sufficient accuracy for ballistic missiles /to be used/. Mbreover, the number
of missiles required in this case depends on how long contact with a previously
detected enemy submarine was lost.
It is advisable in a number of instances to combine the employment of
ballistic missiles directly against SSENs at sea with a strike by them against
submarines located at bases and also against shore-based control posts or
navigation support stations. Possibly in same instances it will be permissible
to use ballistic nisqllts_Also to destroy major enemyy targets located far from
cia?forces==-Ki., support ships, airfields, industrial installations and
? depots which support SSBNs, training centers for submariners, etc. It is not
ruled out that ballistic missiles will have to be used when naval forces that
have detected an enemy SUN are unable to deliver an effective strike against it
in the shortest time possible. For instance, such circumstances may arise if
the enemy is detected by naval forces at distances significantly exceeding the
ranges at which their weapons can be employed, by ships not having the necessary
means to destroy submarines, and also by fixed underwater means of watching the
situation.
The use of ballistic missiles may be warranted in a number of cases when it
is known with sufficient accuracy at what time SSENs pass through distant
straits or narrows. Moreover, in all cases without exception shore-based
ballistic missiles can be used directly against enemy SSBNs only in accordance
with the target designations of the naval forces. In this case, organizing the
withdrawal of our own forces from under the missile strike takes on important
significance.
A study of the capabilities of long-range aviation reveals that, unlike
ballistic missiles, it can be used under certain conditions in the first and
second phases of the operation. In addition to actions against SSBNs in the
seas and oceans, it is capable of successfully delivering strikes also to
certain targets against which land-based ballistic missiles are effectively
used. At the same time, the best conditions for long-range aviation are
attained when it cooperates with naval ASIlfaviation. That being the case, the
most advantageous form of organizing cooperation is to allocate the targets of
action within the framework of the combat against SSENs in accordance with the
actual capabilities of all the forces participating in the operation.
As regards the operational disposition of forces, it must promote the
destruction of a submerged enemy regardless of how the war begins --with
nuclear weapons or with the use of conventional weapons alone. But since it is
impossible to determine in advance how a war will begin, the forces
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participating in the operation must always be prepared to use either /type of/
weapon. Therefore, the makeup of munitions on ships, submarines, and aircraft
must constantly satisfy this most important modern requirement.
It is entirely clear that the employment of a large number of forces
operating, moreover, in vast areas of the seas and oceans is impossible without
purposeful and flexible control of them. Meanwhile, the lack of perfection in
mutual identification among the diversified ASW forces located in contiguous or
identical areas causes a series of extremely serious difficulties which can be
overcome essentially only through the strict centralization of control over
then.
We note in conclusion that it was not the purpose of this article to cover
all aspects of an entirely new naval operation such as that to combat nuclear
submarines. This would not be possible. The author has endeavored to reveal
only some of its unique features and to express his opinion about certain of the
most important matters in the hope that a discussion of them by a wide circle of
readers from our fleets and troops will aid in working out a unity of views
concerning combat against enemy SSW's.
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