CIA'S ROLE IN THE PAN AM 103 INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001407030
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: February 8, 2007

CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigationApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030 (b)(3)(c)Breaking New GroundCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigationand Trial (U)(b)(3)(c)Oral History Program InterviewerOn 21 December 1988, Pan American flight 103, a Boeing 747, took offfrom London, bound forNew York City. As it was climbing on its northerly flight path, it exploded over Lockerbie,Scotland. All 259 passengers and crewmembers and 11 people on the ground were killed. One CIAemployee, Matt Gannon, (b)(3)(c)  was on board. After more than 11 years of determii(b)(6),estigation by many officials in manycountries, two Libyans were tried for the crime before a Scottish court convened in theNetherlands. One was convicted. This article focuses on the CIA's contribution to the investigationand trial, as it is remembered by Agency officers involved. The officers recount the CIA'sengagement in the hunt for those responsible, the discovery and assessment of key pieces ofevidence, and the successful prosecution. This is the story of a jigsaw puzzle's assembly bycooperating law enforcement, intelligence, and legal personnel. The officers conclude by offeringthe lessons they believe the CIA learned from the experience. (U)Below are excerpt rom interviews of seven Agency officers. Working for the CIA's Oral HistoryProgram(b)(3)(c) onducted the interviews in 2002, shortly after the trial. The interviewtranscripts are held in the CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence. (U)The Crime (U)(b)(3)(c) the senior Directorate of Operations (DO) officer responsible or thecase during its prosecution phase describes the attack and the apparent motive. (b)(3)(c) Chiefof the [CIA] Counterterrorist Center (CTC), always speculated that Pan  Am 103 was brought  down as payback for the US air raids against Tripoli (b)(1)  and that might well be the truth.]What emerged during the trial, in the testimony, and what was previously indicated in theindictment was that apparently a deliberate effort had been made to search for a way to bring downan American plane. Somewhere along the line, it's not clear just when the light went on,. . . theLibyans got the bright idea that they could insinuate a piece of luggage into the system at MaltaAirport--unaccompanied baggage--send it as checked luggage through the connector flight fromMalta to Frankfurt, have it automatically transferred to a Pan Am feeder flight from Frankfurt to1 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigationAPprovecl for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030,b)(3)(c)London, and finally have it automatically transferred to Pan Am 103, which originated in London.(U)The bomb was probably supposed to explode when the plane was over the ocean. It did notbecause of the weather that night. On that night, the jet stream was particularly strong from west toeast, at about 150 miles an hour. The plane could not take off over Land's End, as it normallywould, and fly straight out, from Heathrow straight out over the Atlantic. Instead, it headedoverland, due north, and it reached cruising altitude [30,000 feet] just over Lockerbie, Scotland,and was just beginning to turn left. Lockerbie is within sight of the Irish Sea. (U)They probably had just taken off the seatbelt sign and were just bringing out the drink carts. Inanother 90 seconds, that plane would have been over water. Had it followed the original flightpath, it would have been miles out over water. We would never have found any evidence. (U)There wasn't a lot of explosive in that bomb. There was only a couple of pounds, because it wasput in a fairly small Toshiba Boombeat, I think it's called, portable radio. And it's probably justpure serendipity that that plane was brought down as it was, because a 747 is a very robust aircraft.It normally would take a lot to bring down that aircraft with all of its backup systems. (U)From computer models and forensic evidence,the British and the FBI reconstructed just whathappened when that bomb went off. Theyknow precisely where the bomb was. Theywere able to pinpoint the exact luggagecontainer, which they found. Obviously therehad been an explosion in it, as it was shatteredoutward. They knew where in that luggagecontainer the bag with the bomb was placed,because they had records, actually, of whichbags went into what container, and they couldtell, again, from the forensic evidence where itwas. It was about two up from the bottom, andthey knew where in the aircraft that luggagecontainer was placed. And then they actuallyblew up some planes on the ground here toprove that theory. (U)They demonstrated that, because the luggage container was next to the wall of the aircraft, justunder the business class section, about row 14, the force of the explosion and the explosiveplasma, which came out from the bomb, had nowhere to go. It did not break the skin, the outerskin. It broke the inner skin, and then it spread up through the fuselage in a circular patternbetween the outer skin and the inner skin. And essentially it went all the way around the aircraft.And then burst out. And it just cut the aircraft. It was like taking a huge cleaver and chopping offthe nose of the aircraft. Which is why you had the cockpit section lying in the field, the famouspicture where the Pan Am logo was visible. (U)An engineer from the Air Crash Investigation Unit peersout from the reconstructed remains of the Pan amBoeing 747 that crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. (U)?Reuters 1998Initial Approach (U)2 of 18Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070302/8/2007 1:08 PMCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatiorAppr0ve0 for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030(b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)(b)(6)Where to Look? (U)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)The Break (U)(b)(3)(c) The sequence of events that really changed the focus to the Libyans [occurred] inthe fall of 1989. Months after the plane went down, the Scots discovered a piece of [circuit boardfrom] the timer that came from the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103. A shredded shirt [containingthe fragment] was found by a Scotsman walking his dog after the formal recovery effort hadended. (S)(b)(3)(c)Chief of the Litigation Division of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and the3 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigation Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030 (b)(3)(c)4 of 18supervising Agency attorney on the case during the prosecution, describes the moment in 1989that the key piece of evidence turned up in afield near Lockerbie: The shredded shirt. . . was somedistance off from the main crash site. This [fanner] saw this fabric, looked at it, knew, of course,the plane had crashed. . . and brought it to the attention of the Scottish police. The shirt had beendestroyed. However,. . . the label in the back of the collar had a tag that linked it to Mary's House,a clothing store in Malta. That's how [the Scottish investigators] were able to tie it to that store.The shirt was made of polyester fabric so the heat of the explosion had actually fused the timingdevice chip into the shirt so it didn't fall off when the man picked up the shirt. If he hadn't thoughtit was a piece of debris, or thought it was only a piece of litter and just left it there, we still mightbe searching to figure out what happened. (U)The Lockerbie police sent the shirt fragment to the Royal Armaments Research and DevelopmentEstablishment military laboratories, where, as they were pulling the scorched fabric apart, theyfound the piece of circuit board from the timer. (U)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070302/8/2007 1:08 PMCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigation Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030(b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)The Libyans who ultimately went on trial for the PanAm 103 bombing: Abd'a'. Basset. Ali Al-Megrahl (left)and Al-Amin Khalifa Fahitna. (U) (b)(3)(c)   the Scots had linked the shirt fragment to Malta and the Libyans:. . . [By Septernbr I 989,1 the Scots had begun their own investigations in Malta. They had come -across Tony Gau(.?,i, the shop owner who ran the Mary's House clothing store [in Valletta]. And he'sthe one who recalled tliat he had sold such-and-such articles of clothing, similar to what was foundat the crash site, to sol:tebod-y that he said he could identify as Libyan. He didn't know the name.5 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatioAPPrOved, for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030 (b)(3)(c)6 of 18He did not know whether they were connected to the Libyan Airlines office, or the Embassy, orwhat. But he said that just by appearance, by language, he recognized them as Libyan. Heidentified them when he was a witness at the trial. (U)Tom McCullough, the Detective Chief Superintendent from Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary,has been with this case since the night the plane went down. He was recovering bodies and was incharge of the temporary mortuary. Later, he emerged as the Chief Investigator and, in the last fewyears, has traveled to Libya., Jordan, Turkey, and all over Europe. McCullough has nominatedGauci for the [US] Department of Justice (DOJ) reward money in this case. McCullough says thatthe Scottish prosecutors viewed Gauci as probably the single most crucial witness in that wholeprocess. He was able to make the connection to the Libyans. While the forensic evidence mighthave pointed to a Libyan connection, Gauci was the one who was able to put a face on the plot. (U)CIA's Libyan Asset (U)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Abdul Majid Gaika, a Libyan intelligence officer,_  Majid had no connection with the Pan Am bombing, but_  he held another of the keys to the solution of the puzzle. No one realized what he could offer,however, until the investigation of the Libyan connection had deepened as a result of the discoveryof the circuit board piece and the account of the Maltese shopkeeper. )(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070302/8/2007 1:08 PMCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatioiApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030b)(3)(c)'7 of 18(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Majid Connects the Puzzle Pieces (U)Understanding of Majid's utility to the Pan  ziia ,'cfse and Al-Megrahi's role in the bombing(b)(1)unfolded over two years.(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070302/8/2007 1:08 PMCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatiotAPproved for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c) describes Majid's role: We had at that time no indication [Majid] knewanything about Pan Am 103, but we knew he had been a Libyan intelligence officer  (b)(3)(n)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)-(b)(3)(c) Oe more they [FBI] started investigating there in Malta, the more the leadswere tugging them away from the Palestinians and towards the Libyans. And Phil [Reid, of the  FBI] said that it wasn't really unti(b)(3)(n)ame out--and he was the first one to interview him\-that it became pretty apparent to him that this wasa Libyan job and wasn't a Palestinian job.48)Basically Majid's part in this was that he was connecting a lot of the pieces they had discovered,and that's why they called him "Puzzle Piece;" that was what the FBI's codeword for him was. (b)(3)(n) Then, whenthe FBI started interviewing him, and he started providing specific data and filling in some gaps,he put a number of things into perspective for them. This is when it become apparent that, yes, thiswas a Libyan operation.(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)8 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigationAPprovecl for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030 (b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)Supporting the Prosecution (U)(b)(3)(c) describes the evolution of the Agency's role in the prosecution and trial of theLibyans Al-Megraln and Fahima at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands : We [the Office ofGeneral Counsel] gave our first briefing to the DCI in early 1999, and, at that point, he lookeddirectly at all of us and said: "This is very important to me. I want you to be forward-leaning, doall that you can to help." And it was understood that there were things in this case [we were goingto have to do] that were counterintuitive to us in the intelligence business. We're used to protectingour secrets. And it was going to be a push, but he instructed us to go forth and cooperate as muchas we could.Artist's rendition of Libyan defendants Al-Megrahi andFahima as a witness testifie; :Jring the Pan Am 103 trialin the Netherlands. (U)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)(b)(1)9 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 ItivestigatiorAPPr_oved_for Release 2014/07/29 C01407030b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)(b)(1)When we were first told that Qadhafi had produced the defendants and we were actually going tohave a trial, the two Department of Justice attorneys, Dana Biehl and Brian Murtagh, sent a requestto us saying that, "We're going to need to see all of your files relating to Pan Am 103. Theprosecution is going forward. The United States government is going to be directly prosecuting thedefendants."We weren't happy about that. Then Justice became unhappy when they learned that they weren'tactually undertaking the prosecution, but there was an agreement made by the State Departmentand Justice to assist the Scots, who were conducting the prosecution, and we were to help in any _?way we could. So the Justice attorneys came to [CIA] Headquarters.  (b)(3)(n)/So they spent a lot of time going through that witha fine-tooth comb. They found the documents that they determined to be relevant to the case andhelpful to the Scottish prosecutors. At that point, we began the redaction process to declassify thedocuments that they asked for, which took awhile. DOJ came over, and we went back and forthwith the DO Information Review Officer to discuss the scope of the redactions.The Trial (U)(b)(3)(c) We had two issues that had to be dealtwith. One was our dealings with Majid, and how that was going to come before the trial. Thesecond involved the timers, and how we were going to prove that this little chip had something todo with or was connected to Libya. We couldn't obviously connect the chip to these defendants.But we could connect it to Libya and that was going to suggest it came from somewhere in theLibyan intelligence organization. j,.S?fThe Scottish legal system is much different from the US legal system. It requires much moresupported background information for [something] td get in [as evidence]. So, for example, theCIA's cables about its meetings with Majid . . . were going to be needed in this trial, becauseMajid's memory was sketchy, and he was not the world's best witness, by any stretch of theimagination. He was high-strung, and not overly bright, and there were some other issues, as well.And his testimony would not have been credible if the Court actually came to these conclusions.,(8?Majid's testimony and evidence were supported by these cables that would indicate that he said10 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatiorApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030 (b)(3)(c)what he said at a time when he had no reason to say anything else, unless you really believe in ahuge conspiracy theory. The cables would support what he said in 1988. There was a question ofwhether the Court was going to let those cables be used [especially if they were redacted to protectsecurity information]. We don't let our cables be seen by just anybody, and certainly don't wantthem being seen by foreigners, especially Libyans, who might learn about our sources and methodsand tradecraft,(erAt the time, we weren't going to acknowledge our presence [in Malta] and it wasn't [widely]known that Majid existed. I mean, we knew. DOJ knew. The Scots knew. But the rest of the worlddidn't know that Majid was a CIA agent, or that we had this particular specific information. Sothere was first the question of how was the CIA going to get involved in this at all. Next we werenot sure what it would take to get these cables introduced into evidence...(g)-'(b)(3)(c)The [Scots] are even more particular about authentication than we are. UnderScottish law, we would have to acknowledge that they were CIA documents. We would have tohave the cables revealed, and we'd have to have someone testify that they, in fact, had received theinformation from Majid, that they had then gone ahead and written down the information in thesecables. leg)(b)(3)(n)It took a seemingly unusual act offaith by the court to accept that potentially exculvatoryinformation had not been redacted from the CIA cables that were introduce(b),(3)(c)Ilescribeshow it happened: In this case, the Lord Advocate had never seen the minimally redacted cables,and he said [to the Court], "Well, these are the cables. This is all I've seen." The Court says, "Wethink there's more out there. . . can you go find out?" The Lord Advocate then came back to theCourt after reading the minimally redacted cables and said, "This is what we can have. I've nowgone through it. I sat down with the CIA and we went through them one-by-one. I am satisfied thatthe only thing that is left out is something that's actually national security." And the Court said,"Okay. We believe you." The defense whined about it, and the Court said, "Well, I'm sorry. This isthe way itWeighing Majid's Testimony (U)(b)(3)(c) testimony of the CIA asset, who took a pretty severe beating duringcross-examination : Because of the fact that [Majid] had never told us about the luggage [untillong after the bombing], he was crucified during cross-examination. But the FBI took him, put himin the witness protection program.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)11 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigationAPpr0ve0 for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)CIA Officers as Witnesses (U)Arran2-ing the appearance of undercover CIA officers required extraordinary measures .1-- (b)(3)(c) /Our witnesses were in disguise, in aliases, their voices werealtered, and, although the Court was open to the public, there was a closed-circuit TV that wasbroadcast to other parts of the Court, back to New York, DC, and London, where there wereoffices set up solely for the family members of the crash victims. You had to have a special pass toget in. There was also a media center, where the media could watch, but they couldn't videotape it.The media were only allowed to sketch and take notes.The judges, the defendants, the defense counsel, and the prosecution could see the witnesses.There was a screen put up when our witnesses testified to block them from the gallery and thepublic. And the closed-circuit TV cameras were degraded so you couldn't see the person. You?could barely tell it was a person, and their voices were degraded. . . they sounded like DarthVader. It was very unusual.Agency officers helped establish that the timer used in the bombing was of Libyan origin. Thisinvolved testimony not only from  (b)(3)(n)Ocer who had made the connection,(b)(3)(c)STAT The first [witness] was (b)(3)(c) intimer into the country.  (b)(3)(c)Senegal when the Libyans were arrested,(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)which didn't come out during the trial, so I think it's probably still classified,(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)When the Libyans got off the plane, the p ior? ,xuarpSenegal. The Agency was involved in that (b)(3)(n)the VIP Lounge at the Senegal Airport. Subsequently,Then he was involved in making arrangements(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)and arrested them as they were enteringaw them being arrested and taken intosaw them in prison a couple of days later.o examine the device and the12 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigationpproved for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030D)(3)(c)Aexplosives(b)(1)That was the substance of his testimony during the trial.The second Agency witness was the Agency officer (b)(1) Hetestified about and showed pictures of all the things that were taken out of the Libyan's briefcase--apistol, Semtex explosive, and the timer. Fortunately, he had gotten some pretty good pictures. Atone point, he had tried to take the timer casing apart, but the Senegalese wouldn't let him. Hetestified to all of that, which went pretty well. The pictures were very important to show that thesewere the same type of chip, same type of timer used to destroy Pan Am 103, and how it related tothe way the Libyans operate. So the Agency testimony was a big part of establishing that,(8?It didn't take a lot of work for the prosecution to (b)(3)(n)link the timer in Senegal to be exclusive with the (b)(1)Libyans once Messier and Bollier, the timer'smanufacturers, testified. They admitted to thefact that these were [MEBO] timers, which weresold to the Libyans, hut not exclusively. Theowners said they had sold a small number to theStasi, the East Germans. It's hard to prove anegative, that nobody else had them, but Bolliertestified that he had sold 25 of these timers to thLibyans. He had taken them there, and theLibyans had taken him out to the desert, and hehad done tests for them, and helped themconfigure the timers, and showed them how touse them. There's always the possibility the Libyans could have sold them to somebodythemselves, or something crazy like that could ave happened, but there was no evidencesupporting that theory throughout the trial.V(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)The trial got delayed or adjourned for three weeks, while they went chasing leads and trying toresolve some issues. I went back in late October, and, again, the night before, I sat down with theprosecuting attorneys. And this time, God bless them, they had a nice script all put together. Oneof the prosecutors said, "I'm going to talk about your  background. What your technicalqualifications are, then I want you to describe for me (b)(1) timer." He was using me as justa technical witness. "Forget about  (b)(3)(c)  coming to see you. We don't need that." Whatthey were trying to do was to essentially refute the defense's case before the defense had a chanceto present it. And so he says "I want you to talk about the technology here, the technology there,then compare the two." So I testified for about 40 minutes on the stand.13 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatiorAPPrOved for Release: 2014/07/29 C0140703013)(3)(c)14 of 18There were two defense attorneys, of course, one for Fahima, one for Megrahi. I had been warnedthat they were like a good cop, bad cop routine. Fahimah's was the nice guy, and he would askthese very nice questions, and then the other attorney would jump up and call you a liar andquestion your parentage and everything else, trying to get you upset, saying something like, "Weobviously can't accept any of that testimony." And he was very successful doing that with a few ofthe witnesses.48rSo the prosecution went through their routine, following the script, which was great, as I knewwhere they were going. [A prosecutor] had told me, "Don't give me more than what I ask you. Justanswer the question but don't elaborate. And if I want more, I know what you know, I'll ask youand I'll draw it out of you. Let me pull it out." So I knew where he was going and this was good, sowe went through the 40 minutes of testimony and Fahimah's attorney got up and said, "Noquestions, my Lord.')And then Megrahi's attorney gets up and asks, "Is it true today, and in fact in the 1980s, that anyelectronic equipment would contain electronic components?" My first question was what did theymean by that? And then I thought, that's not what he's trying to ask me. What is it he's trying to askme? But then I thought, no don't figure it out for him. I'm not here to help the defense, so myanswer was--and I thought I can't give him a smart ass answer either--so I said, "By definition, sir."That was my answer, "By definition." Electronic components, that's what makes it a piece ofelectronic equipment. And he says, "And therefore it would also contain circuit boards?" And Isaid, "Not always." And he says, "But in the majority of the cases," or "by far and away," orsomething like that. And I said, "Yes, normally it would." "No more questions." )(b)(3)(c) Drought to the trial was to differentiatebetween the PFLP-GC's altimeter timers and the MST-13. And that was very important, becausetheir whole defense was basically premised on the fact that the PFLP-GC bombed Pan Am 103 andnot the Libyan(b),(3),(c) rave reviews from the Scottish prosecutors and the Department of Justiceattorneys for his testimony. The Department of Justice attorneys stayed there the whole time,throughout the trial. They actualtvwere allowed to sit in the benches with the Scottish prosecution,which is very unusua1.(b)(3)(c; )   :estified, they came over, and one of the DOJ prosecutors saidthat he thotwht that was the best witness that he had seen. And I don't think he was just making usfeel goo((i1D)(3)(0 )  was very convincing, and very authoritative. He was our expert witness. Andhe, unequivocally, demonstrated that the timers the F'FLP-GC used, which are called(b)(1)  that the Libyans used.  achieving the conviction.Logistics (U)That was extraordinarily important to(b)(3)(c) We didn't know what to expect, we didn't know ifthere'd be a lot of media coverage. By the time our witnesses had to testify, everyone was boredwith the trial and there wasn't much media coverage at all. There was one reporter around, and noone was taking pictures. We ended up using all those support people, but I think there was athought that maybe we don't need to do this as extremely as it started.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070302/8/2007 1:08 PMCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 Investigatiorpproved for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030b)(3)(c)15 of 18(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)/We went to Scotland and we got a tour of the crash site. We spoke to the policeofficers who were there that night, who told us what they had seen. They took us to the evidenceroom and showed us all the suitcases and pictures. We met with the Chief Constable of Dumfriesand Gal(b)(3)(c)ho was responsible for the whole case  (b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c) preparations made to bring the agent's handlers to the trial and thep(b)(3)(n),n 's decision not to use them: . . the decision was made by the Crown Office not to put[Maji,(b)(3)(n) handlers on [the stand] . . Those officers each traveled to the trial two or threetimes. So each of them really went out of his way a  number of times to come and stand by, gothrough the whole security rigmarole, in disguise  (b)(3)(n) waiting, ready to go. And. . . thelead solicitor decided. . . that the prosecution had made their case adequately, they'd establishedthe facts they wanted to establish, and if they put these fellows on the stand, the defense wouldkeep questioning them until they got into areas that these officers could not talk about-8We all felt that it was unfortunate that they did not testify. They felt frustrated that they did notappear, because, had they appeared, they probably would have been able to bolster Majid'scredibility. They would have been able to corroborate and expand on a number of things that Majidhad testified about but on which he had been badgered and belabored and picked apart by thedefense. ) (b)(3)(c) observation about the unique circumstances in a foreign court: The othercomplicated thing about this case was the foreign soil facet. . . Actually the Scottish Court was a  country within another country,/(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Protecting Intelligence Secrets (U)(b)(3)(c) several of the accommodations that the Agency had to make at the trial:One was [acknowledgment] that the Agency had a station in Senegal, at least during "X" period oftime, and a particular Agency officer was res onsible there. One of the reall bi ones was that wewere runnin unilateral operations in Malta.(b)(3)(n)We had to admit everything involving our asset, Majid, and that, in Malta, weApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070302/8/2007 1:08 PMCIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigatiorAPPrOVeg for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030(b)(3)(c)recruited somebody out of the Libyan External Intelligence Service.01(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c)  Two things [of special note]: One, the provision of highly sensitive and criticaldocuments, that is DO operational cables, although redacted, but, in the end, redactedminimally--very minimally--in an international criminal trial--not a US trial--for the first time.And, second, passing them, essentially, to the Libyans, because they were given to the defense. Itwas the same as telling the Libyans what we were doing, how we were "reading their mail"through Majid. There were no questions about what the extent and nature was of our relationshipwith Majid. They knew previously that Majid had defected to this country, that Majid was going tobe a witness. But they certainly didn't know the details of his relationship with CIA that came outsubsequently. That was a real departure.,KAnother unique thing is, similarlhalf a dozen servin? officers-?roviding the witnesses. We were??a ed to i ut on the stand-which had never been done before. Then the whole facilitative,(b)(3)(n)piece had to be pulled together, which was probably the bulk of my effortand my contribution in this project. Beyond that, it was clear to everybody, it was clear to thejudges, it was certainly clear to the defense, clear to the public, that CIA was heavily invested inthis trial. That meant something. That meant CIA had something. We weren't just concocting thisstuff. I think the judges, realizing as they did that we had taken extraordinary steps in providingwitnesses and documents, probably tended to give a little more weight to some of the witnessesand some of the argumentation by the prosecution.,(.81Lessons (U)The Scottish Court presiding over the trial of the two Libyans announced its verdict on 31 January2001. Megrahi was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to no less than 27-years'imprisonment under Scottish law. His co-defendant, Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima, was acquited; theCourt concluded that the evidence in his case was insufficient to satisft the high standard of"proof beyond reasonable doubt." An appeal by Megrahi was rejected, and he remains in aScottish prison. The verdict also led the Libyans to openly acknowledge their culpability and tooffer compensation to the families of the victims. (U)Reflecting back on the long process,  (b)(3)(c) was proud of everyone who pitchedin to support the Pan Am 103 trial. Asked to reflect on lessons learned from the experience, hesuggested that CIA should remember its proper role: I think we have to recognize that we are anintelligence organization, not a law enforcement organization. We shouldn't be collectingevidence, except in those very narrow situations, counterintelligence situations, where we have acharter to do that. I think we have to be very careful about how we provide our intelligence and ouroperational information in support of law enforcement, if for no other reason than to protect it andour clandestine sources from the scrutiny that it's going to come under in a judicial setting, where itshould come under scrutiny. I think that intelligence is a marvelous mechanism to enable lawenforcement people to go after evidence and get evidence that can stand up in a court of law. But I16 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigationAPprove0 for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407039D)(3)(c)don't think intelligence is a substitute for that.,(.8?This was one of those extraordinary cases where, after sitting down and looking at it, and talkingto our lawyers, and talking to the Scottish investigators, talking to the prosecution, and getting agood perspective on this (b)(3)(c) who saw the strategic dynamic, that we had togive that information up, and it had to go out as evidence, because there was no other way that itwas going to be. . . that there was np substitute available. And without that, the verdict would nothave come out the way it did.(b)(3)(c) We got a guiltyverdict [for Al-Megrahi] and were able to provide a definitive answer to the family members of thevictims of Pan Am Flight 103 that the Libyans definitely were behind this. That was the lingeringquestion that we wanted answered by a court of law. And that's what we got. We accomplished itwithin the framework of Scottish Law. Indeed, it was a rather significant feat." e'r(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n) Iwe were determined to find  solutions and to take that extra risk so that this trial could take place./  (b)(3)(n to the lawyers, all of us worked long hours and weekends tosolve problems. "We can't do it" was never muttered. I can say that from the professionalism of theofficers I got to work with during this entire episode, I have no doubts that CIA is the best.intelligence serv:ce in the world. (b)(3)(n)  Footnotes:1 An exchange of tactical missiles between Libya and the United States during US navalmaneuvers in the Mediterannean in March 1986, and the subsequent bombing by Libyanoperatives of a discotheque frequented by US soldiers in Germany, led Washington to launch airraids against Libyan targets linked to terrorism on the night of 15 April 1986. (U)2 Trial testimony underlined the time it took Scottish authorities to process and evaluate the hugevolume of debris. The shirt fragment--a piece of collar--bearing the timer fragment was logged inas evidence in January 1989. The finger-nail sized piece of the circuit board was discovered inMay, among other pieces of plastic, metal, wire, and paper imbedded in the shirt fragment. InSeptember, the Scottish investigators asked for help from London in identifying it. (U)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)4 A CIA 201 file is the official file containing all biographic reporting on and references to anindividual of specific interest to the Directorateizif.4`,?ations, including personal history and  operational assessments.(b)(3)(c)5  (b)(3)(c) the Court didn't believe Majid on a lot of his points because the justicesnever saw a second, more extensive, batch of redacted cables, which would have confirmed muchof what he said in court. (U)17 of 18 2/8/2007 1:08 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030CIA's Role in the Pan Am 103 InvestigationAPproved for Release: 2014/07/29 C01407030:b)(3)(P)(b)(3)(c)served in the CIA's Office of General Counsel. (U)(b)(3)(c)18 of18 2/8/20071:08PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407030