OPERATIONS ANALYSIS: A NEW DI TRADECRAFT FOR PARTNERSHIP

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001407020
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: February 8, 2007

rs:y.T;11.9,rOperations Analysis: A New DI TradecraftAR.P. Release: 2014/07/29 001407020?Overcoming Old Barriers(b)(3)(c)Operations Analysis: A New DI Tradecraft forPartnership(b)(3)(c)"Partnership" and "collocation" are the hottest buzzwords today in CIA's lexicon. Former Director ofCentral Intelligence (DCI) Woolsey stated in November 1994 before the DCI Seminar that partnershipsignals a "change in the way we approach our mission to be the intelligence organization of choice inthe United States Government." As a Directorate of Intelligence (DI) officer who spent four yearsworking in a Directorate of Operations (DO) operations branch in the Counterterrorist Center (CTC), Ibelieve that the CTC provides a prototype for partnership. The distinguishing feature of the CTCwhich makes it useful for developing a broader program of DO-DI partnership is what I call"operations analysis." This analytical methodology is the vital ingredient for making partnership andcollocation work for the two directorates. Operations analysis offers the DI a new mission that willbenefit the directorate, the DO, and the Agency.A Laboratory for PartnershipThe assumption underlying partnership and collocation is that, despite the challenges, the DO-DIpartnership will result in better intelligence operations and reports and, ultimately, better analysis.Many, if not most, officers probably sense that there are advantages to be gained through partnership.Thus far, however, much of the dialogue on the benefits seems to revolve around anecdotal commentsand speculative observations. Much remains to be done to define exactly how better operations andbetter finished intelligence will come about through partnership. Cooperation between the DO and DIis as old as the Agency, but the nature and modalities of formal interaction between the twodirectorates have yet to be spelled out.The CTC offers a current example of partnership and collocation in action. DO and DI officers havebeen working together in close quarters in CTC since the Center's creation in 1986. Although the CTCessentially operates as an office of the DO in terms of its crw,' rni..ion of penetrating terrorist groups,collecting threat information, and preventing terrorist acts,  )(c) officers working in theCenter as of May 1995 were from the DI. CTC has been at the forefront of hosting experts fromdifferent directorates and from other US Government agencies for the purpose of tacklinginternational terrorism. It would be fair to say that most officers who have worked in the CTC viewDO-DI cooperation in the Center as a successful experiment.The establishment of effective, cross-directorate working relations within the CTC has not beenwithout difficulty. Working in CTC at Headquarters can be the first occasion where DO and DIofficers share workspace and professional responsibilities. DO and DI officers will come to the Centerexpecting to witness the worst stereotypes of officers from the other directorate and act accordingly.More often than not, however, DI officers discover that DO officers can write cogently, and DOofficers realize that DI officers can fathom the mysteries of agent operations. In a sense, partnershipbetween the DO and the DI in the CTC must be re-established continually as new officers from bothI of 6 2/8/2007 3:34 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020rOperations Analysis: A New DI TradecraftiMPov_ed for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020(b)(3)(c)services rotate in and out. In my view, time and the clear mission of the (JIG have slowly reduced thequalms that DO and DI officers hold about the Center and its institutional strength within the Agency.The CTC experience also demonstrates that partnership does not automatically follow fromcollocation. Indeed, there are different degrees of collocation and partnership even within the Center.(b)(3)(c)The expectation in CTC, however, is that the DI officers in operations branches will provide asubstantive skill and perspective on a region, state, group, or intelligence issue that may not otherwisebe available in the branch. They are to bring to the operational milieu their ability to organize andanalyze data and to package this analysis for briefings or other operations-related, orfinished-intelligence-related, purposes. If this type of DI officer in CTC is the model for future DO-DIpartnership, then the likely result would be full collaboration, but with the attendant risk of possibleabsorption of the DI into the DO. The CTC experience suggests that the right mix is a DO-DIrelationship that is a compromise between the two models cited above.Operations AnalysisWhat, exactly, is the "value added" work of the DI officer serving in the CTC, either as an analyst inAIG or as an officer integrated in an operations branch? Can this service be replicated throughout theDO and DI in the new partnership scheme? The answers are that the DI officer in CTC provides whatcan be termed operations analysis, and that this type of analysis is precisely the kind of assistance thatthe DI can provide to the DO across the board.(b)(3)(c)2 of 6 2/8/2007 3:34 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070201Operations Analysis: A New DI Tradecraft Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070203 of 6(b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070202/8/2007 3:34 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020Operations Analysis: A New DI Tradecraft4 of 6(b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0014070202/8/2007 3:34 PMOperations Analysis: A New DI Tradecraft Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020(b)(3)(c)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Partnership and CompartmentationThe more intimate professional interaction between the DI and the DO, and the pursuit of operationsanalysis by the DI, inevitably runs up against the competing demand for greater compartmentation ofAgency operations in the aftermath of the Aldrich Ames case. No other issue in the move topartnership evokes such strong reactions on the part of DO and DI officers. Some DO officers fearaccess of DI officers to sensitive sources and information will lead to the compromise of assets andoperations. Some DI officers are concerned that their entry into the world of clandestine operationswill turn into a "Faustian pact" that will somehow compromise the DI's integrity and independence.Neither concern should be played down or dismissed, but neither should be exaggerated. The short buthonest answer to the question of whether partnership and compartmentation can be reconciled is thatthey cannot. I do not believe that the introduction of one or two--or even a handful--of DI officers to aDO operational case poses appreciable new risks, esneciallv when the identity of that asset is already  known by dozens of DO officers.  (b)(3)(c)The advantages of collocation and partnership, in which the DI provides operations analysis to theDO, are too many to let compartmentation stand in the way. The DO could use the help of DI officers,while the DI would benefit from new information and an important new mission. The status quo andthe traditional separation of services is a luxury that neither office can afford in this era of downsizing.For the DO, the end result should be a quantitative and qualitative improvement in intelligencereports. For the DI, partnership should result in better finished intelligence products that are moresuited to the needs of the Agency's consumers, a greater understanding of the subject matter, and abetter appreciation of what it takes to run successful clandestine operations.Operations Analysis and "Opportunity Analysis"There is a complementary relationship between operations analysis and "opportunity analysis," whichis the focus of the new "Tradecraft 2000" training program for DI officers. If opportunity analysis issupplying US policy officials with explicitly actionable intelligence support, then operations analysisis providing the same service to the DO.And the DO is no less a US foreign policy actor than other depart- ments and agencies of the FederalGovernment. To be sure, the DO fundamentally is a collector of intelligence, and the DI's support of5 of 6 2/8/2007 3:34 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020Operations Analysis: A New DI Tradecraft Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020$(b)(3)(c)the DO through operations analysis is different from DI opportunity analysis for US policymakers.The difference, however, is all too easy to overstate. In the discussion of opportunity analysis, the factthat the DO, in much of its activities, has a tremendous effect on the foreign policy of the US  Government is often overlooked.(b)(1)engages in an exchange of information and analysis with anotherintelligence service on a topic of interest to both parties, it has the opportunity to influence theattitudes of key foreign officials in a manner that may not be available to US diplomats or militaryofficers. Through partnership with the DO and operations analysis, the DI can better serve the overallinterests of both the Agency and US foreign policy.6 of 6 2/8/2007 3:34 PMApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001407020