DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS ON VIETNAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0001403425
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
June 22, 2015
Document Release Date:
June 19, 2009
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2007-00466
Publication Date:
September 23, 1964
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~:~ SEP 19f4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DCI
SUBJECT? DCT Congressional Briefings On Vietnam
Attached is a brief statement of the thrust of Mr. McCone's
remarks before congressional committees and Senators Russell and
Saltonstall on the dates indicated. If there is further that Y can do
on this9 would you please advise.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE:
03-25-2009
DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS ON VIETNAM
CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services
23 September 1963
The Director said there did not appear to be any cohesive
military group capable of ousting the D~ the then current regime hat
there appeared to be no replacement
which was capable of rurnniConsequently, the .Agency wa surging a
bably would be no Bette
cautious, slow approach to the problem.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
10 October 1963
"We have not seen a successor government in the wings that
we could say positively would be an impr ~ em c tedvcautiously, Tother-
fore, it has been our counsel that we mus p
wise a situation might flare uP would olme out the victor erely by
civil war, and the communists. w
sitting on the sidelines . "
Far East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs
23 October 1963
A successful coup may or may not be an improvement, and
discouragement was indicated ?~ etee confidence of the p Dille. rOnme
reforming its ways and regami g
the other hand, there seemed to be no replacement government waiting
in the wings and the generals fo someemr t acted per'od of politicaleconnce.
Hence it might be assumed that and the effect that this might have on
fusion would result from a coup,
the future of the war could not be determined.
CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and
Senate Appropriations Committees
29 October 1963
No statement regarding future prospects of the war in
Vietnam noted in the Memorandum for the Record.
Briefings of Senators Russell and Saltonstall
1 November 1963
In reporting on the coup then in progress and its effect on
the war, the Director indicated that a structure had been built to
prosecute the war and political events in the city had not yet signifi-
cantly affected the war. It was not expected that the war would
collapse because of the coup, noting it had not been the CIA view
that the war would fail if Diem stayed in power.
CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations
6 November 1963
Regarding the specific circumstances of the coup, the Director
noted that the political situation would have to be watched most care-
fully and inevitably there would be considerable confusion for a time.
No specific remarks were noted with regard to the general future
situation. At that time it was not known what kind of new government
would come forth.
CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services
? November 1963
Same as 6 November 1963.
CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations
6 December 1963
The Director stated he was extremely worried about the
situation in Vietnam pointing out that the government of Vietnam
could not get congealed and there was some dissension within the
ruling forces. He commented there was not full rapport between
the leaders and indicated that civilians were not fully brought into
the government at that time. Those who had been brought in had
unclear authority. The war effort had not been improved by the new
government and Viet-Gong activities had increased. The DCI noted
that his concern with the situation did not mean that it was in danger
of going down the drain or that it was desperate. On the other hand,
he indicated he saw little forward thrust. The DCI indicated that the
U. S. should not go in with its own forces and fight this war,
U. S. strategy to train South Vietnamese to do their own fighting is
sound. On the other hand,. the U. S. could not simply pull out of
South Vietnam and should "play the hand out. " With respect to the
then current Vietnam leaders, it was indicated that many of them
are responsible and with considerable abilities but reiterated there
is evidence of developing tensions and rivalries.
2T September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE R ECORD:
On 16 April 1964 the DGI briefed the CIA. Subcommittee of the
House Appropxiations Committee. The Director- indicated that the
situation. in South. Vietnam was not good and that there are more
reasons to be pessimistic than optimistic. On the favoxable side
he pointed out-that Khanh has shown potential sagacity and has a
substantial governxnent. But on the unfavorable side he pointed
out that over the last six months the Viet Cong have stepped up
their attacks and inereas ed their military effectiveness. In addition,
the Viet Cong are taking actions i.n the political and civic action.
fields and today control larger areas. Consequently, the people are
getting discouraged and more apathetic.
21 September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:
On 19 May 1964 the DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittees of the
Senate Armed Services and Sanhtt~okp verrthe gove-rnmenttin Saigon
Director stated that since Kh
he has shown considerable leadership and political sagacity. However,
he has a number of problems involving a number of leaders in the
government; leaders of the military and the provisional chiefs and
the heads of the four Corps areas. The Director noted there were
beaurocratic rivalries and some of the civilian mud ment,f there are
do not have sufficient authority. Hence, in my j g
rmre reasons to doubt the future of the East under present programs
and moderate extensions to existing progr ems; `than ~~h.ere arenreasons.
sabotage against NV N, border crossings, )
to be opti.rnistic about the future of our Corps in South. Vietnam.
21 September 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:
On 18 June 1964 the DCI bx?iefed the CIA Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services. The Director noted that the Viet Cong still
hold the initiative throughout most of the cotultry. DCI said the
governments position is mc3st serious and that densely populated areas
around Saigon and that the Government's large and small scale operations
against the Viet Cong has been showing some lag in the past few weeks.
~L September 19~~
MEMOR.ANDUNI FOR THE RECORD:
On 12 August 196 the DCI briefed .Defense Subcommittee of the
H_~use Appropriations Committee. The Director commented on the
He indicated that there had
been many disappointments with these operatiuns,~
The DCI
pointed out that he was not offering this criticism but that it is disturbing