MISC RE QUESTION AND ANSWER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001403424
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00466
• Publication Date: September 9, 1964

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
03-25-2009
pte-abe r 1964
QUESTION: Probable Communist Reaction to Specific U.,' *
Courses of. Action
ANSW E.R ' The NVN Coznrnunists, backed by the Chinese
Cornx untsts appear, ready toacceptconsiderable
risk of i mage to themselves rather than back down
The
and lose the i, itiative in Southey t Asia
Corni mists will not consider a temporary hat
t to,,,.
VC military and political.activity unleas convinced
that continuation would result i sustained an&Oevere
air attacks on North Vietnam.
QU4STIONN: Moderate 'step-up in .34* actions.
ANSWER: We believe that either moderate or heavy step-up in
34# aetIona. would do no, serious damage to NVN and
would cause Hanoi to react vigorcussly -with its own:
farces, raise. a propaganda attack against the U. S.
but Would not cal], for Chinese *nte'rventiora.
34A oporations- wouldprobablynot cause DRY aerial,
retaliation against South Vietnam and, eauld not.
affect DRY support of. andLao;s insurgency
activity.
III. t UESTION:
ad DE SOTO Patrol
ANSWER: We believe the :DRY would very probably. not attack
DE SOTO patrols outi ide'the l.2-mile' lirnit. It ].a an
open"question however whether the 12-mile. limit is
open
regulated by the island chains.or by the mainland
IV.. QUESTION
.NSWli R:-
ANSWER:-
,coastline .
If the DO SOTO patrols proceed close to -the shoreline,
the DRY will probably attack. Also, if the patrols are
relat sd to 34A operations, DRY would attack.'as. they
did in early August*
Air attack against Laotian infiltration t.r eta. in the orrido.r.
W"e doubt such bombing and strafing would. hamper VC
infiltration. Wo 'would expect DRY to.move in. A..A.A
. ar n-azrient at key points but we Would not expect the
DRY to co nx,it combat aircraft to de'fend>the La otian
Corridor.
 QUESTION. U. S.. or .LRVN air attacks on DRV Targets of Opportunity
ANSWER:. 3 RVwould: use their ate defense capabilities both day arid
night (the latter very lirrzited} and would call for ChiCom
assistance -,and ;tna.re Combat aircraft andanti: ai ?craft
equipment and crews.. Reprisals attacks againstVh3..
are a possibility. .ri intense propaganda campaign will be generated byHar i and Feipiang., M'e.would not
expect Chinese Cornnnunists to move in ground force's
nor c ould we expect Hanoi to call off the VC support in.
SVN.
VI. QUESTION:
A stepped- up U.S. .rnilitary.presence~ in outh"V;i.etnsru
ANSWER Increases in advisory activities would-probablyadcelerste
IIRV s ppo rt, of the VC throug the infiltration of tnen
and matt rial. Introduction. of large4scale U.,S ce~ ba.t
forces into South~Vietnan would possibly result in the
introduction: of Chinese ground forces'`into NVN and
t c poyment of NVN ground forces into strategic
laca:tion0, The VC would continue their
guerrilla, war of harra.samx3.ent -a;gainst both U. S. combat
forces and the SVN,
VII QUESTION'
Systematic air_ attacks against n t itary-related DRY
target.
ANSWER: 'anoi anal Peiping, U ;convinced that ih r attacks would
esuit in. the, destruction of much of T VN, Would rzzake
every effort to can X" k41 international conference in.
order to halt U. S,: assaults. Concurrently. they would
probably position DRV and: ChiCom troops end make
open preparations for . .ajor wary
.,If the assaults were sustained the reefter anvi might
halt VC.nd PL' -c tivitie s temporarily but would not
di s
ml. antle the apparatus. , Alternatively, if the political
sSti soon V vas unstable , the Cain itnista would be
tempted to move' overtly to unseat the tgpu Government and
po a sibly. the" government of" ,Laos d s well,
;