PROBLEM OF COURSES OF ACTION - - SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001403412
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00466
• Publication Date: November 26, 1964

26 November 1964
Problems of Courses of'Action -- South Vietnam.
1, Stability of the ~uong Government,
I believe Sai~on agitations of the last several days are
more serious than we t~i:ought a few days. ago, apparently grow in
seriousness each day ~;nd could possibly force change in
government at any time. Amb. Taylor's Telex report of his.
meeting with Huong, e't al, is painfully reminiscent of similar
meetings. with Diem ar,d Minh. and Khanh before the fall of their
respective government,
i
I therefore believe th.e insecurity of the base and the
prospect of the Huong government being replaced by a government
less determined,, to fight the VC, less sympathetic with United
States objectives'n SEA and less interested in carrying the war
to the north should be considered as a possibility,
2, Reprisals for' each. act taken by the US/GVN against,
the north must be anticipated, The attack on the De SO'I{Q patrol
(Gulf of Tonkin incident) was a reprisal for SVN maritime operations.
The attao~ on the Bien H48 airfield (I November 1964) was very
possibly a reprisal for maritime operations conducted on
Reprisals on either a large scale (Bien Huo attack)
or a small scale such. as assassinations. of senior U. S, or GVN
officials, capturing of hostages, etc, , could have a very
serious effect, extremely difficult to anticipate,
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
03-24-2009
 ;; ~~~u
3. The U. S. publ~c generally, and most certainly world
opinion, both in friendly and antagonistic nations., will revile
the U. S. military action against the north except for. that action
limited to supply routes and installations. Certainly an attack
such as anticipated in JCS Action B or the more severe levels
of Action C (operations 8 through 11), would bring severe
criticism because these actions would result in damaging or
sinking ships of friendly nations, depriving friendly nations. of
trading activities- they consider legitimate, the injuring or
killing of inestimable numbers of civilians located in or adjacent
to the "94 target list" and finally condemnation for the lodgement
of US/SVN forces on the sovereign territory of NVN. The effect
of such violent criticism on the success of the venture; on the
determination of the United States to continue on its course of
action and on the psychology of the NVN; would be that ,public
opinion would force us to desist -- all must be weighed carefully
in considering Option C . In my opinion the reaction within. the
United States and among friendly nations to .Option B would be one
of anger, sorrow. and disgust.
4. An attack by the United States on a recognized
Communist state, North Vietnam, would in my opinion cause the
Communist World to temporarily at least patch up their
differences. and present a unified front. Soviet-ChiCom
ideological differences would not "disappear", but they would
be temporarily submerged in the interests of pursuing what they
would construe "greater purpose of World .Communism. Many
Communist leaders. in many states would begin to. doubt the
legitimacy of the coexistence arguments and veer towards
ChiCom violent antagonistic attitudes, minorities throughout the
Free World would us-e U. S.. military action against a Communist
state as a strong rallying point. Subsequent events such as
ChiCom entry into the fray and Soviet unwillingness. to commit
itself, thus risking nuclear war with. the U. S. , might destroy
the initial unifying trend, however this is a situation. that cannot
be accurately appraised at the present time.
The above random thoughts lead me to the conclusion
1. No course of action should be taken against
the north unless there is a determined effort to improve
conditions within SVN, coupled with a plan of action
and a proper organization, both .SVN and U. S. , to
implement the plan.
 2. Actions against the north should be limited to
reconnaissance and strikes Ilea lve denot ledineshof communication,
and supply operations which xnvo . P
etc.
3, There should be no approval of further or more
extended military operations against the north such as. the bombing
of the 94 target list, mining harbors, etc.
 OPERATION PLAN 34A
Operations 30 July - 1 November 1964
Date
Type Operation
Mission.
Accomplishments
30 July 64
Marops/Bomb.
Hon Me Island
Successful
30 July 64
Marops/Bomb. .
Hon Ngu Island
Successful
2 Auk 64
FIRST TONKIN GUhF INCIDENT
3 Aug 64
Marops/Bomb.
Vinh Son Radar
Successful
3 Aug 64
Marops/Bomb.
Ron Security Post
Successful
4 Aug 64
SECOND TONKIN GULF INCIDENT.
5 Aug 64
Air Strike
Vinh-Ben Thuy POL
Successfu1.90%
5 Aug 64
Air Strike
Depot
Hon Gay-Port
x
.
Successful
5 Aug 64
Air Strike
Loc Chao Estuary
Successful
5 Aug 64
Air Strike
pT goats
Quang Khe PT Base
Successful
3 Oct 64
.
Recon/Probe
Cape Vinh Son
No reaction
10 Oct64
Recon/Probe.
Cape Vinh Son
No ,reaction
15 Oct 64
Junk capture
uang Khe
Q
No junks found
28 Oct 64
Marops/Bomb.
Cape Mui Dao
Successful
28 Oct 64
Marops/Bomb.
Cape Vinh Son
Successful
31 Oct 64
BIEN HOA AIR BASE ATTACK