OPTIONA A PLUS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001403411
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00466
• Publication Date: November 25, 1964

APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE:
07-Apr-2009
Option A Plus
25 November 1964
"More of the same" - Option A - in Vietnam will not work. Before
moving to the dangerous option of military attack on North Vietnam, however,
we must consider whether other options exist within South Vietnam. This
requires a consideration of what "the same" has been and how it might be
transformed to "different".
While it is too early to assess the prospects that the present GVN leader-
ship can hold together, gain popular support and energize the national
administration to arrest or reverse the deteriorating military trend, there
are several factors on the positive side which should be given due weight.
ARVN with strong MACV support has achieved a military stalemate, compelling
the Viet Cong to remain a guerrilla force. The long-term economic effort in
Vietnam has made the population aware that a better life would be offered by a
free than by a. Communist victory. The equally long-term training and develop-
ment of a new generation of American rather than French trained military and
civilian leaders is beginning to show results. Lastly the Vietnamese are
fighting for their own independence, not for a colonial power. It cannot thus
be said that the situation is hopeless. It can be said that "the same" must be
replaced by "different".
The elements of a "different" approach might be:
a) Recognize the division of r,Aponsibility for counterinsurgency and press
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the civilian side. For good reasons in the past our major emphasis has been.
on the military side. In this "people's war" more emphasis must be placed on
the civilian approach, expressed in a territorial and political effort. The
civil power must become the central authority, with both civil and pacification
responsibilities, and its command structure, as in Malaya, follow the govern-
mental rather than the military chain. The military should continue to provide
military support thereto and continue operations against the Viet Cong main
forces and base areas. The economic effort now underway must be supplemented
by intensive efforts to develop a political purpose and structure, engaging and
organizing the maximum number of individual Vietnamese citizens in their own
defense and development.
b) Decentralize the pacification program to its territorial and local bases.
The province chief must be considered the key figure in the program, with the
national government and military in support. The weak central government
should be supplemented through American channels in order to provide maximum
support for any indications of local willingness to resist the Viet Cong, which
are most apt to arise for local motives. As provincial strength grows, the
limited importance of the Saigon governmental machinery to the pacification
program will become obvious, and the Saigon political situation may fall into
more appropriate focus.
c) Appoint an American civilian "Chief of Operations" with full authority
over all American civilian agencies engaged in the pacification program. This
 officer would be under the Ambassador and DCM, but have no diplomatic or
administrative responsibilities. He would be co-equal to COMUSMACV and
have a personal staff for planning, review and control of American civilian
pacification operations. He should have direct authority also over key American
civilian advisors to the government e.g. ministerial advisors, regional civilian
advisors, etc.
d) Transfer the Regional and Popular forces from the Ministry of National
Defense to the Ministry of Interior for support, and to province chiefs for
operational control. ARVN would retain its own chain of command for ARVN
operations with the mission of providing support to province chiefs' pacification
plans, reenforcement on request in the case of strong Viet Cong attack and
offensive operations against Viet Cong main forces and base areas.
e) The Strategic Hamlet program, or any euphemism thereof, should
be re-launched as the primary pacification tactic, operating on the oil spot
principle as presently contemplated. The "clear-secure-develop" sequence
which depends on military initiative should be replaced by a "defend-probe-
develop-defend" sequence placing main reliance on population engagement, local
auxiliaries, irregulars and police forces, with military reenforcement as needed.
The target would be the population, not the Viet Cong.
f) Initiate and support a variety of non-government popular political,
economic and social organizations, with emphasis on the rural areas, to serve
 AdOJE
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as vehicles to attract and organize the population through local leadership......._._
While this "different" Option A Plus is not necessarily exclusive of
Options B and C, it would offer an alternative to them.