VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001403409
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00466
• Publication Date: November 25, 1964

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
07-Apr-2009
(bl61
(b131
25 November 1964
1. Out of the fog of medieval scholasticism
surrounding many months of discussion of Vietnam,
a ew simple propositions seem to me to emerge as
true. Most of the other subtle distinctions and
arguments I have heard do not seem to me to affect
the U.S. course of action.
2. The political and military situation in SVN
is bad. It may deteriorate rapidly at any time.
Enlightened and imaginative efforts to stabilize SVN
a 11 C1 defeat the VC by actions in SVN should made
whatever course of action the U.S. adopts. The odds
are these efforts will not succeed in reversing the
unfavorable trend in SVN, certainly not for a very
lonk time, during which the U.S. position and the
Stability of SVN would remain liable to sudden collapse.
3. In this unfavorable position, the U.S. can take
military action against NVN designed to achieve the
limited objective of causing the cessation of NVN
SUPAort (cadres and supplies) and direction of. VC
 insurgency in SVN. Even if successful, this action
would not in and of itself insure achievement of the
U.S. basic strategic objective of maintaining a stable
and effective non-Communist SVN, which is a valid and
essential requirement of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia
ti-y+0
and worldwide. It probably would buy time toAimprove
the security situation in SVN,:graduallywcontain and
eventually destroy the VC as an effective insurgent
?o
force, andAestablish a stable, friendly government.
4. The way achievement of this limited objective
of cutting off support and direction from NVN would
operate on the situation in SVN would be: (a) reducing
VC strength and military capability; (b) damaging VC
morale by making the prospect of early victory remote;a%o&
(c)greatly increasing SVN morale by demonstrating U.S.
commitment to our basic strategic objective in Southeast
Asia and eliminating the infiltration problem which
makes counterinsurgency efforts seem hopeless.
5. The first phase in any military course of
action aimed at causing the cessation of NVN support
and direction of the VC insurgency ought to center in
U.S. air interdiction of infiltration lines of communi-
and U.S. air strikes against infiltration-
cation
 associated facilities in Laos and inside NVN near the
borders of Laos and the DMZ.
6. The likelihood ofmextreme NVN or Chicom military
reactions againe,t .Such .,U,.S . ,.military action would be
small. There would be an intensive world-wide Communist
political and propaganda campaign against the U.S.
NVN would certainly try to defend its territory and
forces, and there is likely to be a vigorous NVN effort
at reprisals against U.S./SVN forces and facilities
within reach.
7. There is a chance, though less than an even
chance, that NVN would calculate that more damaging
U.S. attacks would follow. In that case, NVN ? ,:M!8~t
effect a cessation or a marked reduction of insurgent
activity in SVN and its support and direction thereof,
hoping to negotiate with the U.S. terms that would not
call for inspection and control arrangements-adequate
to prevent resumption of its support and direction at
a later date. This would be a gain for the U.S. provided
the U.S. insisted on adequate inspection and control and
did not commit itself not to make further air strikes
if NVN support and direction of the VC insurgency in
fact continued. It would be a helpful psychological
 factor working toward a reversal of the unfavorable
trend in SVN, and it might be the decisive one in
achieving such a reversal.
8. There is, of course, a chance, though small,
that NVN would react extremely with a frontal military
assault or that the Chicoms would intervene directly
on a large scale with air units and/or ground combat
units. The U.S. would have to be prepared to deal
with these eventualities, but should not be deterred
from military action by the risk. If, in fact, on
and reckless to us, NVN
with Chicom support responds in this way, there would
in fact be no way to avoid a direct military conflict
between the U.S. and NVN short of acquiescence in
Communist domination of SVN and the abandonment of U.S.
objectives in Southeast Asia which we
have agreed are valid and essential.
9. If NVN temporizes AK and makes no move toward
cessation of its support and direction of VC insurgency
in the face of the first phase U.S. military actions
as ~s w- sf liket ..
described;. a.ho`ve, the U.S. should proceed, after a pause
wig WOO, to a second phase which would extend
air attacks to infiltration associated targets deeper
 OfF
AO
within NVN, and in deliberate sequence to a third phase
involving blockade ("quarantine") of NVN. It is impossible
to estimate with confidence the situation that would
exist in these successive phases in either NVN or SVN,
and therefore impossible to estimate with confidence the
relative likelihood of the various possible Communist
reactions that might occur. The range of possibilities
would be the same, however, and the consequences the
same.
10. Generally, it is clear that-the chances would
increase at each step of increased pressure on NVN that
NVN would opt to negotiate a cessation of support and
direction of the VC insurgency on the most favorable
terms they could achieve. At each step the U.S.
bargaining position would improve. At each step the
chances of extreme NVN and Chicom reaction would increase.
Even at the extreme range of U.S. military actions
aimed at bringing pressure on NVN,-however, provided
they do not progress to the point of occupation of NVN
territory by substantial numbers of U.S. ground forces,
the Chicoms will be reluctant to become directly involved
in a military conflict with the U.S. and the chances
are therefore better than even that they would not
 introduce large-scale ground combat units into Vietnam
or Laos. As a consequence, the chances are also better
than even that NVN would not itself directly invade
SVN or Laos but would instead intensify its efforts to
negotiate on the best terms possible.
RAY LINE
Deputy Direc r (Intelligence)