(EST PUB DATE) CIA PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE DRUG CONSPIRACY STORY

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001372115
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: October 23, 2006

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Managing a NightmareCIA Public Affairs and the DrugConspiracy Story  (b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(c)In the world of publicrelations, as in war,avoiding a rout in the faceof hostile multitudes can beconsidered a success.4b)(3)(c)/9is in theDirectorate of Intelligence.The charges could hardly be worse.A widely read newspaper series leadsmany Americans to believe CIA isguilty of at least complicity, if notconspiracy, in the outbreak of crackcocaine in America's inner cities. Inmore extreme versions of the storycirculating on calk radio and theInternet, the Agency was the instru-ment of a consistent strategy by theUS Government to destroy the blackcommunity and to keep black Ameri-cans from advancing. Denunciationsof CIA?reminiscent of the 1970s?abound. Investigations aredemanded and initiated. The Con-gress gets involved.But, after this surge of publicity thatquestions the Agency's integrity, themedia itself soon begins to questionthe veracity of the original story. Acompletely one-sided media cam-paign is averted, and reporting onthe issue becomes polarized ratherthan wholly anti-CIA. By one count,press stories skeptical of the chargesagainst CIA actually begin to out-number those giving the storycredence. A review of the CIA drugconspiracy story?from its inceptionin August 1996 with the San JoseMercury-News stories?shows that aground base of already productiverelations with journalists and aneffective response by the Director ofCentral Intelligence's (DCI) PublicAffairs Staff (PAS) helped preventthis story from becoming an unmiti-gated disaster.This success has to be viewed in rela-tive terms. In the world of publicrelations, as in war, avoiding a routin the face of hostile multitudes canbe considered a success- Obviously,it is not an ideal situation. We wouldrather promote CIA and its missionsand people all the time, stoppingoccasionally only to correct errors ina reporter's story?but that is notrealistic. As an important public rela-tions resource book advises:1Crisis and controversy can strikeany organization, regardless ofits size or line of business.., therule is: Anything can happen.No organization with the remot-est chance that its regimen couldbe upset by surprise happeningsshould fail to keep at least oneeye open for the unexpected....No organization can expect to beimmune to events that engagepublic attention, affect  keyconstituencies, and arouseemotions.With the drug conspiracy allega-tions, public attention was certainlyengaged, as the story was carriednationwide by major and local press,TV, and radio. Emotions werearoused. The more virulent of thepublic attacks against CIA chargedthe Agency with engaging in "chemi-cal warfare," "systematic genocide,"and "attempted mass murder"against black Americans.2 Were "keyconstituencies" affected negatively bythe story? Inasmuch as the Americanpublic is the ultimate "constituency"for any element of our democraticform of government, the answer hasto be yes. The Congress?a constitu-ency for CIA due to its budget andoversight responsibilities?alsobecame involved. Finally, the menand women who work for CIAApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Drug Conspiracythemselves are a constituency; we allarc affected to some degree by suchallegations, and many of us havebeen confronted with questionsabout it from friends, neighbors, andothers. By anyone's definition, theemergence of this story posed a genu-ine public relations crisis for theAgency.3Alarming AllegationsThe firestorm began when the SanJose Meretay-News ran its three-partseries, "Dark Alliance," by staff writerGary Webb. In the series, Webballeged that the US-backed Contrarebels in Nicaragua forged a "union"with gangs in Los Angeles to sell tonsof cocaine in black neighborhoodsand to use "millions" of dollars inprofits to fund the Contras' waragainst the Sandinista regime. "DarkAlliance" did not state outright thatCIA ran the drug trade or even knewabout it, but CIA complicity washeavily implied by the graphicsaccompanying the story and by thefrequent use of the phrase "the CIA'sarmy" to describe the Contras andanyone working with them.The series appeared with no warn-ing. Generally speaking, reportersworking stories on CIA will call thePAS for comment, background, spe-cific information, or requests tospeak with retired Agency employ-ees. Part of Public Affairs' planningfor crisis involves an ongoing, activeengagement with media representa-tives. The telephone and faxnumbers for CIA Public Affairs arewell known among US and foreignjournalists, as evidenced by the quan-tity and variety of calls fielded everyday by the Agency's media relationsspokesmen. Webb, who reportedlyinvestigated this story for a year,would later claim?during the media10Because of the ongoing IGreview, CIA was limited inits response, and requestsfor CIA spokesmen toappear on talk radio or TVprograms had to beturned down.criticism that emerged in the comingweeks?that he cried to call theAgency but was unsuccessful: "Essen-tially, our trail stopped at the door ofthe CIA. They wouldn't return myphone calls."'CIA was caught unawares by theMercury-News series because GaryWebb had never called or spokenwith anyone on the PAS. Touted asan investigative journalist?Webbwas named Northern California'sJournalist of the Year for this series?he apparently could not come upwith a widely available and well-known telephone number for CIAPublic Affairs. It is difficult to escapethe conclusion that he spoke to noone at CIA because he was uninter-ested in anything the Agency mighthave to say that would diminish theimpact of his series.'The story quickly spread throughwire services and the Mercury-Newswebsite. CIA complicity in drugsmuggling into US cities was morestrongly implied or explicitly statedwith every "bounce" of this story.Public Affairs received its first call onthe story from a journalist on 21August, the day after the series ended.In the first few days, CIA mediaspokesmen would remind reportersseeking comment that this series rep-resented no real news, in that similarcharges were made in the 1980s andwere investigated by the Congressand were found to be without sub-stance. Reporters were encouraged toread the "Dark Alliance" series closelyand with a critical eye to what allega-tions could actually be backed withevidence. Early in the life of thisstory, one major news affiliate, afterspeaking with a CIA media spokes-man, decided not to run the story.Gaining MomentumThe story languished with little atten-tion for a week or so, during whichDCI John Deutch received a letterfrom Representative Maxine Watersof California, who had asked for aninvestigation into the charges. In hisresponse, the DCI reiterated hisbelief that the allegations weregroundless: at the same time, he said,he was requesting a review by CIA'sInspector General (IG), in light ofthe serious nature of the charges.The Director sent a similar letter toSenator Barbara Boxer of Californiaand to the chairmen of the Houseand Senate intelligence committees.At this point, the story began to pickup steam.Because of the ongoing 1G review,CIA was limited in its response, andrequests for CIA spokesmen toappear on talk radio or TV programshad to be turned down. Neverthe-less, Public Affairs emphasized tocallers the independence of CIA's IG(although press commentary oftendistorted the IG review as an "in-house" or "internal" investigation)and that the Agency would willinglycooperate with any external investiga-tion. Public Affairs also began todistribute to media contacts copies ofthe Director's letter to Waters, and,beginning in early September, manystories made use of the DCI's words.6On 11 September, activist DickGregory and local Washington talkradio host Joe Madison were arrestedApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115at CIA's front gate when theyinsisted on personally delivering a let-ter to Director Deutch. Thisincident added momentum to thestory. Overall coverage peaked overthe next two weeks. Of particularconcern to the CIA community wasthe fact that the majority of stories orcommentaries in the press seemed togive credence?implicitly or explic-itly?to the allegations of CIAcomplicity in drug smuggling.7This heightened media interest wasaccomplished by a surge in the num-ber of calls by journalists to CIAPublic Affairs. This reflects the factthat most journalists are professionalsgenuinely interested in getting thestory right. By the middle of Septem-ber, Public Affairs was fielding callsfrom a variety of reporters who wereskeptical of the allegations and whowere planning to write articles castingdoubt on the Mercury-News series.But the more balanced media treat-ment was still days or weeks away.Meanwhile, CIA continued to gethammered. Joe Madison made CIA's"leading role" in the inner-city crackepidemic a daily subject in his localtalk show. One nationally syndicatedcolumnist pointed to DirectorDeurch's "typical vague denial" andcalled for "an investigation that canwring the truth out of the CIA,where coverups and 'plausible deni-als' are standard operatingprocedures.' Newsweek quoted Max-ine Waters saying "I think it isunconscionable that... the CIA couldthink so little of people of color thatthey would be willing to destroy gen-erations in order to win the war inNicaragua."8The DCI addressed the charges on19 September, when he testifiedbefore the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence (SSCI). That same6 6. . . most journalists areprofessionals genuinelyinterested in getting thestory right.99day, he met for an hour with theCongressional Black Caucus (CBC),members of which were denouncingCIA and seemed to be accepting thewider allegations?that CIA was partof an antiblack conspiracy--at facevalue.) Wire services and othersbegan to claim that the CIA's IGreview came about because of pres-sure from the CBC. This connectionwas false; as noted earlier, the Direc-tor had ordered the IG review inearly September.Spreading SkepticismThat third week in September was aturning point in media coverage ofthis story. Respected columnists,including prominent blacks, beganto question the motives of those whouncritically accepted the idea thatCIA was responsible for destroyingblack communities. Others took ahard look at the evidence providedby the Mercury-News--somethingPublic Affairs encouraged from thebeginning?and found it unconvinc-ing. A New York Daily News reporterconcluded the Mercury-News series"just doesn't say what everybodyseems to think it says." The Balti-more Sun, after running articlesgiving credence to the allegations,reported that the series was "weak"in documentation; the Sun alsoquoted a CIA spokesman to theeffect that the San Jose Mercury-Newsnever called CIA for comment andshould have called "in the interest offair and balanced reporting." TheWeekly Standard published a piecethat discredited the Mercury-NewsDrug Conspiracyseries. The Washington Post ran twoarticles by leading journalists thatcriticized the assumptions and con-nections made by the original series.Public Affairs made sure that report-ers and news directors calling forinformation?as well as formerAgency officials, who were them-selves representing the Agency ininterviews with the media?receivedcopies of these more balanced stories.Because of the Post's national reputa-tion, its articles especially werepicked up by other papers, helpingto create what the Associated Presscalled a "firestorm of reaction"against the San Jose Mercury-News.1?The Mercury-News soon found itselfthe target of so much media-gener-ated criticism that it resorted to theunusual measure of scrutinizing itsown series, addressing the criticism,and conceding the paper might havedone some things differently, includ-ing calling the CIA, not using theCIA logo, clarifying its use of theterm "CIA's army," and including astatement that the paper found noevidence that CIA ordered or sanc-tioned the drug trade." Onereporter of a major regional newspa-per told Public Affairs that, becauseit had reprinted the Mercury-Newsstories in their entirety, his papernow had "egg on its face," in light ofwhat other newspapers were saying.By the end of September, the num-ber of observed stories12 in the printmedia that indicated skepticism ofthe Mercury-News series surpassedthat of the negative coverage, whichhad already peaked. In fact, for threeweeks the number of skeptical or pos-itive pieces observed in the mediaconstantly exceeded the number ofnegative treatments of CIA. After abrief surge in negative reporting inmid-October, the observed numberof skeptical treatments of the alleged11Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Drug ConspiracyCIA connection grew until it morethan tripled the coverage that gavecredibility to that connection. Thegrowth in balanced reporting waslargely due to the criticisms of theSan Jose Mercug-News by The Wash-ington Post, The New York Times,13and especially The Los Angeles Times.In its own three-part series, The LosAngeles Times debunked GaryWebb's claims and insinuationsregarding the alleged role of CIA indrug smuggling, the amount ofmoney that went to the Contras, andeven such basic elements of the storyas the chronology of events. Pub-lished almost exactly two monthsafter the San Jose Mercury-News sto-ries, The Los Angeles Times series Iitself became a newsworthy story andwas picked up by many media out-lets across the country.By the time the SSCI ended its firstround of hearings on the matter inlate October, the tone of the entireCIA-drug story had changed. Mostpress coverage included, as a routinematter, the now-widespread criticismof the Mercuiy-News allegations.DCI Deutch's much publicized"town meeting" in Watts in mid-November, other than sparking asmall surge of stories, ironicallyseemed not to have made much dif-ference on the generally factualcharacter of news reporting?otherthan possibly generating some publicsympathy for the way he was treated.The Role of Public AffairsOf the journalists and columnistswho wrote pieces skeptical or criticalof the CIA-cocaine connection,about one-third called Public Affairsbefore going to print. Some called to1266Because of CIA's secrethistory and public interestin its work, whatever CIAspokesmen say?evendenials?can make news.99check facts; many called for an offi-cial CIA comment; most called forfurther information.It is in providing information thatPublic Affairs can best do its job. Ihave spoken with some CIA employ-ees who are angry that Public Affairs"does not do more" when adversepublicity bits the papers; a few evenseem to think CIA can and shouldwrite the media's stories for them. Itis important to reiterate that the PASaims above all to inform rather thanto pressure or to persuade. Whendealing with the media, the rule prac-ticed by Public Affairs is to provideas much information as possible, con-sistent with the need to protectsensitive information, sources, andmethods. Often, CIA spokesmen can-not comment. Frequently, they cansay something to the media, but itcan take days to figure our within theAgency what it is that can be said.For example, in order to help a jour-nalist working on a story that wouldundermine the Mercury-News allega-tions, Public Affairs was able to denyany affiliation of a particular individ-ual?which is a rare exception to thegeneral policy that CIA does notcomment on any individual's allegedCIA ties. But coordinating thatresponse took time.Because of CIA's secret history andpublic interest in its work, whateverCIA spokesmen say?even denials?can make news. So Public Affairsfields a lot of calls from journalists?up to 300 a month, if CIA is havinga particularly bad time?and thesejournalists tend to pay attention tothe information CIA provides. CIAbenefits from the good track recordthe PAS has with journalists forreturning phone calls promptly, pro-viding background briefings onoccasion, and helping journalists asmuch as possible. This record givesCIA a certain level of credibilitywhen a public relations crisis occurs.Public Affairs cannot dictate storiesto the media?nor would we want tolive in a society where that was possi-ble. CIA's relationship with themedia can be an extremely sensitivematter, as demonstrated by the pub-lic flap in 1996 over the possibleintelligence use of information fromjournalists. What CIA media spokes-men can do, as this casedemonstrates, is to work with jour-nalists who are already disposedtoward writing a balanced story.Even when dealing with a breakingstory that puts the Agency in a badlight, CIA Public Affairs can help thejournalist with information he mightnot have or a perspective that mightnot have crossed his mind. Theresult is a more balanced story: betterfor the reporter, because the facts areright; better for CIA, because theAgency gets a fairer hearing; and bet-ter for the public, which is betterinformed than it otherwise might be.In a few cases, it may be possible,through simply providing informa-tion, to change the mind of areporter whose initial inclinationstoward CIA were negative but who iswilling to listen to the other side ofthe story. The influence PublicAffairs wields has its limits, but atleast it exists,Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Some Self-PolicingWhat gives this limited influence a?`multiplier effect" is something thatsurprised me about the media: thatthe journalistic profession has thewill and the ability to hold its ownmembers to certain standards. Thisself-policing phenomenon reachedits apogee early in 1997, when theAmerican Journalism Review (AJR)published a skeptical piece on "TheWeb That Gary Spun." This piecealso revealed that some of GaryWebb's harshest critics were his owncolleagues on the Mercwy-News staff.The editor of the AIR later wrotethat the Mercury-News deserved allthe heat leveled at it for "Dark Alli-ance." The criticism from within thejournalistic community had itseffect; in May 1997, the executiveeditor of the Mercury-News madenationwide news by apologizing inprint for the flaws and shortcomingsof "Dark Alliance." This mea culpawas reported by every major newspa-per in the country.15The CIA-drug story has largely runits course. It is by no means a deadissue, however. The Mercury-Newsdisclaimer "didn't change things atall" for Representative Waters, andshe continued to conduct her owninvestigation.16 She and other criticspublicly disparaged CIA again in late1997, when the IG announced itsinvestigation came up with no evi-dence to support the charges. Aboutthe same time, Gary Webb resignedfrom the Mercury-News. He evi-dently is considering writing a bookin which he would expand his theo-ries to include the notion that thewar in Nicaragua--far from being abattle in the Cold War?was not areal conflict at all but rather a cha-rade to cover up drug smuggling byrogue CIA agents. As Howard Kurtzof The Washington Post remarked,"Oliver Stone, check your voicemail." 17A Question of TrustThere will be other public relationscrises with which CIA will have tocontend. As John Ranelagh sug-gested 10 years ago in his history ofCIA,1 8 the attitude of the Americanpeople toward the Agency parallelsits view of government generally;when the public's trust in politiciansand government institutions sinks,CIA can expect to be a target, withthe media the obvious delivery vehi-cle. If historians such as SamuelHuntington and Arthur Schlesinger,Jr., are correct, we can expect peri-odic displays of public distrust ingovernment roughly every 20 to 30years?and we are just beginningsuch a phase.19 In such times, evenfantastic allegations about CIA?JFK's assassination, UFO coverups,or importing drugs into America'scities?will resonate with, and evenappeal to, much of American society.At those times, it is especially impor-tant to have a professional publicaffairs staff help limit the damageand facilitate more balanced coverageof CIA.Societal ShortcomingsAs a personal postscript, I would sub-mit that ultimately the CIA-drugstory says a lot more about Americansociety on the eve of the millenniumthat it does about either CIA or themedia. We live in somewhat coarseand emotional times?when largenumbers of Americans do not adhereto the same standards of logic, evi-dence, or even civil discourse asthose practiced by members of theDrug ConspiracyCIA community.20 Venom against"CIA thuggery" can still be found inplace of reasoned discourse in thepublic square. "Freeway Ricky" Ross,whom all agree actually brought thedrugs into Los Angeles, was treatedwith deference and even respect ontalk shows, while CIA?which ishelping fight the drug scourge?wasdragged through the mud. Publichearings on the allegations?evenCongressional hearings?weremarked by jeering or cheers fromaudiences less interested in truththan in having personal beliefs vindi-cated. Journalists who wrote articlesskeptical of the charges against CIAwere pilloried in print--one wasaccused of serving as a CIA lackey?and even threatened with physicalharm over their articles.Because of episodes like the drugstory, some Agency employees mightconclude that there is scant publicappreciation of their dedication andhard work and of the fact, that as citi-zens themselves, they are just asoutraged as any other responsiblegroup in American society about thedamage done by drug trafficking.But most CIA employees probablywill see the drug story as yet anotherbum rap?one that, in this case, wasbelatedly acknowledged as such byreputable journalists.NOTES1. See the chapter on "Crisis Communi-cations: Dealing With theUnforeseen," in Robert Dilen-schneider and Dan Forrestal, TheDartnell Public Relations Handbook(Chicago: Dartnell, 1990), pp. 330-347; emphasis by the author.2. For example, "Stare NAACP VowsTo Act on CIA-drug Reports,"The Sunday Record (New Jersey),13Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115Drug Conspiracy29 September 1996. See also PaulShepard, "CIA Drug AllegationsRevive Black Fears of Anti-BlackConspiracy," Associated Press,5 October 1996.3. In October 1996, I went on a speak-ing tour to Brigham YoungUniversity, Washington andJefferson College, and the US CoastGuard Academy. While I encoun-tered no hostility at any of theseinstitutions, one of the first questionsraised in Q&A was the drug conspir-acy issue.4. Quoted in Howard Kurtz, "RunningWith the CIA Story," The Washing-ton Post, 2 October 1996, p. Bl.Emphasis by the author.5. According to journalism's primarytrade journal, Webb's formeremployer, the Cleveland Plain Dealer,lost a libel suit and was assessed over$13 million in damages because ofstories Webb wrote that allegedimproprieties surrounding theCleveland Grand Prix. See SusanRevah, "A Furor Over the CIA andDrugs," Ainerican Journalism Review,November 1996, p. 11. Those whofollowed General Westmoreland'sunsuccessful suit against CBS severalyears ago can appreciate how difficultit is to win a libel suit against thepress.6. For example, "Deutch Orders CIAProbe of Drug Reports," The Wash-ington Post, 7 September 1996, p. Al.7. Typical pieces induded: AndreaLewis, "A CIA Plot Against BlackAmerica? Crack Sales May Not BeJust a Case of Paranoia," TheBaltimore Sun, 15 September 1996,p. El; Annette Leslie Williams,"Probe CIA Drug Ties to BloodyL.A. Gangs," USA Today, 13 Septem-ber 1996, p. 15A; and Jesse Jackson,"Did the CIA Trade Lives for ContraFunds?," The Los Angeles Times,15 September 1996, p. M5.148. Jeffrey York, "Joe Madison, Leadingthe Charge," The Washington Post,17 September 1996, p. B7. Carl T.Rowan, "Some Answers, Please!,"The Baltimore Sun, 18 September1996, p. 19A. Gregory Vistica andVern Smith, "Was the CIA Involvedin the Crack Epidemic?" Newsweek,30 September 1996, p.72.9. Congressman Waters was only themost vocal of the Congressional crit-ics. For example, CongressmanCynthia McKinney on the Housefloor called CIA the "Central Intoxi-cation Agency." See Jim Wolf, "CIAon Defensive Over Drug-PeddlingCharges," Associated Press,18 September 1996.10. William Raspberry, "The CrackStory: Who's Buying It?," TheWashington Post, 23 September 1996,p. A19. Claude Lewis, "Even if theCIA Flooded Inner Cities withCrack, Blacks Didn't Say 'No","Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 September1996, p. A23. Lars Erik Larsen,"Contra-Coke Tale Is Not What It'sCracked Up To Be," New York DailyNews, 25 September 1996; MarkMatthews, "CIA's Dubious role inCrack Deals," The Baltimore Sun,27 September 1996, p. 2A. TuckerCarlson, "A Disgraceful NewspaperExpose and Its Fans," The WeeklyStandard, 30 September 1996,PP. 27-30. Howard Kurtz. "Runningwith the CIA Story," The WashingtonPost, 2 October 1996, p. BI. RobertSuro and Walter Pincus, "The CIAand Crack: Evidence is Lacking ofAlleged Plot," The Washington Post,4 October 1996, p. Al. The Associ-ated Press reported on TheWashington Post's critical treatment ofthe story, which in turn receivedsome "bounce" among newspapers:see, for example, "CIA Drug LinkReport Challenged," Miami Herald5 October 1996. See also AssociatedPress, "Mercury News Has ReporterEvaluate CIA-Contra-Crack Series,"21 October 1996.11. Pete Carey, "Dark Alliance' SeriesTakes on a Life of its Own," San JoseMercury-News, 13 October 1996.12. PAS Research and Services staff regu-larly clips articles relevant tointelligence and national securityissues.13. Tim Golden, "Tale of C.I.A. andDrugs Has Life of Its Own," TheNew York Times, 21 October 1996,p. Al.14. Doyle McManus, "The CocaineTrail," three-part series, The LosAngeles Times, 20-22 October 1996.15. Alicia Shepard, "The Web ThatGary Spun," American JournalismReview, January/February 1997. RemRieder, "The Lessons of Dark Alli-ance," American Journalism Review,June 1997. Jerry Ceppos, "To Read-ers of Our 'Dark Alliance' Series,"San Jose Mercury-News, 11 May 1997.16. Robyn Gearey, "Troubled Waters,"The New Republic, 30 June 1997.17. Eleanor Randolph and John Broder,"Cyberspace Contributes to Volatilityof Allegations," The Los AngelesTimes, 22 October 1996, p. 14.Howard Kurtz, "A Webb ofConspiracy," The Washington Post,28 October 1996, p. Al2.18. John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Riseand Decline of the CIA :New York:Simon and Schuster, 1986),pp. 532-533.19. Samuel Huntington, AmericanPolitics: The Promise of Disharmony(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1981); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,The Cycles of American History(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986).?O.(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 001372115