ANALYSIS OF NFAC'S PERFORMANCE ON IRAN'S DOMESTIC CRISIS, MID-1977 - 7 NOVEMBER 1978

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: IRAN
• Keywords: DOMESTIC CRISIS
• Keywords: 1977-1978
• Keywords: NFAC
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001259322
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 186
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Case Number: F-2010-01276
• Publication Date: June 15, 1979

APPROVED FOR RELEASE^ DATE: 17-Aug-2010 Analysis of NFAC's Pe rform as nce On Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977 - 7 November 1978 I ;%p Srrecrat (b)(1) (b)(3)  Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis, mid-1977 - 7 November 1978 (U) John F. Devlin Robert L. Jervis  `OP SE ' E r Ambassador to Iran, 1892. "It has been explained to me that it would have been impossible for the Mullahs to have obtained this power to lead a large and successful protest movement had it not been for the general discontent which pre- vails throughout Persia which has led the people to hope that by following their advice some remedy may be found for the grievances from which they undoubtedly suffer. . . . It is evident that a severe blow has been dealt at English influence in Persia." British Iran. (Tehran 4355, 8 May 1978, "Either we are doing something wrong, or else [the protesters] are all crazy. But there are so many of them. Can so many all be crazy?" Shah of TOP SEGRE4  TOP n Er. ri r. m L 1 Note cussed what might have been done to improve it.) not analyzed the quality of that information or dis- F__ The purpose of this report is to address NFAC's performance in treating the Iranian situation from the summer of 1977 to November 1978, when it became clear that the Shah's regime might not survive. We have therefore examined only the information that was avail- able to NFAC at the time and discussed the inferences that were or could have been drawn from it. (We have ment of Iran's political crisis." (citation on p. 52.) We have ended our study in early November because by that time NFAC had concluded that the Shah might fall. Attempts to split the opposition had failed, strikes, especially in the oilfields, were endangering the economy, and major rioting had led to the installa- tion of a military government:, a step the Shah had been trying to avoid. Thus on 9 November the CIA appended the following comments to a DIA paper: "CIA considers that the Shah has delayed so long in taking decisive action that he has reduced substantially his earlier good chance of preserving the Pahlavi dynasty with powers like those of the past. We believe that the military government appointed by the Shah on 6 November may succeed in the near term in restoring economic activity and a modicum of public security, but that this will not form the basis for a negotiated settle- Tnn SECRET  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Intelligence Production Systems . . . . . . . . ii The Analytical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . viii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Inherent Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Information Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Nature of the Production System . . . . . . 21 The Daily Production . . . . . . . . . 21 Other Vehicles for Intelligence Production . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Selection of Issues to be Treated . . . 25 Correctives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . 27 Predictions as an Analytical Tool . . . . . 29 Simplistic Terms . . ... . . . . . . . . 31 Discussion and Review . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Estimative Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Reporting and Analysis - General . . . . . . . . . . 42 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 White Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 A Politico-Economic Problem . . . . . . . 53 The Shah's Liberalization Program . . . . . .. 56 Field Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 NFAC Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Conclusions and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . 65 --TOP SEG Ear,  TOP SL!"~D L'T J The Issue of the Shah's Willingness to Use Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Missed Warning Signs . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Events That Changed Minds . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Splits in the Opposition . Field Reporting and NFAC Analysis . . . . . . . 82 Spring and Summer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Late August - mid-September . . . . . . . . 86 Late September . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 89 Mid-October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Conclusions and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . 93 The Religious Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Information Available . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Underestimated Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Attacks on the Shah for the Way He was "Modernizing" . . . . . . . . . . 100 Second Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Third Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Fourth Element . . . . ... . . . . . . . 104 Conclusions and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . 105 The Shah's Position and How It Was Perceived . . . . 108 Reports From the Field . . . . . . . . . . 108 Conclusions and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Intensity of Anti-Shah Feeling . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Iran's Domestic Economic Situation . . . . . . . . . 120 Conclusions and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . 126 Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Utility of Contacts with the opposition . . . . 127 Utility of Contacts in the Wider Society . . . . 128  TOP ar.nnrm_ J Annex B - Perception and Evidence . . . . . . . . . 141 Annex C - Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 TOP cEGD'CT  November that the Shah was in deep trouble. ing the odds that NFAC would have concluded earlier than 1. In the case of Iran there was an obvious intel- ligence failure in that NFAC did not anticipate the course of events. There was also an intelligence failure in a second sense--bits of information were available during summer 1978 that indicated that the Shah was in serious trouble, but they were not recognized nor were any warnings conveyed. However, it is much harder to tell whether there was an intelligence failure in a third sense of the term--i.e., given the information available, did NFAC ignore or misinterpret events in ways and to an extent that consumers can legitimately expect should not and will not occur? No short answer to this is possible. but much of the discussion below addresses this point. 2. What went wrong? First of all, the events in Iran were very unusual. Second, in this case, as in most other examples of intelligence failure, the problem lay less in the incorrect interpretation of specific bits of information than in a misleading analysis of the general situation which pre-dated the crisis. Like all pre-exist- ing beliefs, these had to strongly color the perception of events, especially when the information from the field was thin and ambiguous. Most NFAC analysts started with the belief that the Shah and his regime were strong and the opposition weak and divided. Given these con- ditions, it is not likely that NFAC could have realized the situation was extremely dangerous much before some time in September, and it is not surprising that recogni- tion did not come until early November. Even so, examina- tion of this case reveals serious deficiencies in the system under which analysis is carried out in NFAC. Had better methods of analysis been employed, the chances of discovering inconsistencies between beliefs and certain items of evidence would have been greater, thereby increas-  3.. The information that came in from the field was limited by the fact that Iranian domestic politics had had a low priority in the intelligence community for several years. Furthermore, what was:. needed was not in- formation about views of members of the elite, but the opinion and intensity of feeling among wider segments of society. This was not available. NFAC added to these handicaps by not being in touch with xion-governmental experts on Iran, some of whom had views that differed with those dominant in the government;: and possessed information about the opposition and ton-elite segments that NFAC did not have. Intelligence Production System 4. Many of the problems in this case can be traced to the way in which NFAC produces intelligence. Finished intelligence generally did a good job. of summarizing and synthesizing the field reporting. NFI\C used the data that was available, although scattered items of informa- tion--some fragmentary and ambiguous-which we can now see were significant were ignored. There is no instance where NFAC overlooked any substantiallbody of data. On the whole NFAC's political reporting had a more pessimis- tic tone than that of the Embassy in :Tehran. 5. What was needed in the Iranian situation, how- ever, was sustained and thorough evaluation of the most important questions--e.g., the Shah's ability and willing- ness to follow a coherent course, the:.nature and depth of the opposition, and the ability of::the opposition groups to work together. Such analysis should have examined alternative interpretations of events and mustered all the evidence that could be found.; Instead-, the format of NFAC production and the informal norms of the intelligence community led to intelligence that focused on the latest events and reports, that presented one view, and that adduced little evidence. 6. The problems are greatest with the NID, which concentrates on telling what has happened and only rarely contains analysis or forecasts of political trends and developments.. NID items on Iran ofteb drew conclusions, ~j ii  mev oicr~R Err J but did not explain how the conclusion was reached or what alternatives have been rejected. Almost all arti- cles are short, since no more than two longer and more analytical articles were run in each issue. Most NID items that are more than a few paragraphs long cover several topics. The result is not only that none of the topics receive in-depth t, but often that the items lack emphasis. as the key messages. 7. In addition, because the system requires that political NID items be tied directly to reporting and because items normally must be coordinated with INR/State and DIA, analysis often stops short of stating the full implications of the information presented. For example, several stories in the NID in mid-September 1978 implied that the Shah's efforts to win over the religious mod- erates would not succeed. This is especially true if one takes all the stories together rather than reading just one of them. But of course they did come to readers one at a time, and the pessimistic inferences had to be drawn from the stories, rather than being presented more basic questions will be sufficient. 8. This type of intelligence production is necessary for tracking a rapidly changing situation. If the premises on which the discussion is based are correct and remain so throughout the period, this mode of analysis will serve the community and the consumers well. But given how fragile observers' understanding is of most other countries, it is rarely wise to assume that discussing the most recent developments without reflecting on the 9. It seems to us that there was a failure at man- agement levels to see that proper attention was paid to those topics which bore most directly on whether the Shah would survive. Indeed it is striking that throughout the period no papers were produced which had as their main focus the question of whether the regime could be overthrown. We think it is not only hindsight that leads to the conclusion that as the protests grew, analysts and managers should have sat down and tried to locate the important questions, many of which were not pegged to the iii TOP sEeRET  latest events. In retrospect, it is obvious that it would have been extremely valuable to have had discussions of such topics as: when and whether the shah would crack down; the conditions under which the opposition would split; the depth of the feelings against the Shah; and 'lities and dangers of political liberalization. 10. From reading most NFAC documants one cannot tell how the analysts reached their juigments and what evidence they thought was particularly important. At any number of points in the draft NIE and other NFAC products one can find unqualified assertions without supporting evidence presented. Space Limitations explain the paucity of evidence in the NID, ani reader impatience is an important factor in the minds of those preparing other publications, but the result is :infortunate. Here, as in other areas, we recognize that a'-Yail-able resources set limits to what can be done, and that other equities have claims on those resources. But t:4lme spent on a systematic exposition of the evidence:-or and against a particular belief may well be more valuable than an equal amount spent on reporting the la-:est events. 11. In addition to producing evidence, or rather as part of the same process of demonst:-ating why a con- clusion is valid, discussions will oftb'n be of greatest value when they include explicit consideration of alterna- tive interpretations. Most NFAC analysis on Iran did not do this. At times, it admitted puw:zlement. But usually it gave a single quite coherent: explanation. What is most important is not that many of those explana- tions turned out to be incorrect--since the evidence was often skimpy and ambiguous--but that a. range of interpreta- tions was not presented. We think this should be done on a regular basis, with evidence ed for and against each of the alternatives. 12. The number of questions on wt.ich this can be done and the number of alternatives th.t could be developed are theoretically 'limitless, but it is often possible to find a relatively small number of crucial ones, which, if answered differently, would most alter one's understanding of the situation and the predictions ore would make. Feed- back from policymakers would help in choosing the alterna- iv TOP" sReRtT  beliefs. 15. The case of Iran reveals a need for analysts to make sharp and explicit predictions. The point of this is not to exaggerate how much we know or to develop a scorecard, but to help the analysts understand the full implications of their beliefs. Explicit predictions would have been especially helpful in the Iranian case because, as we discussed in other sections, much of the discrepant information arrived bit by bit over an extended period of time. Under these conditions it is very easy to fail to notice that sorts of events are occurring which would have been unthinkable a year before. Systematic procedures are needed identifying the gaps that may be developing between the events and the implications of their basic tives will lead to better analysis. 14. One obvious difficulty is that seeing things from a different perspective or discussing possibilities that others have not seen or have rejected is not likely to occur unless it is rewarded by the organization. This would involve a recognition that in many cases the effort will not have direct benefits. Usually the dominant view is correct, or at least closer to the truth than many of the alternatives. It is now easy to see that alterna- tives should have been raised about Iran, but the case must not rest on the claim that the dominant view was wrong, but on the argument that examining several alterna- in the manner we are suggesting. 13. The point of this exercise is threefold. First, it would encourage the analysts to be more explicit about their reasoning processes by making them contrast their views with the ones they have rejected. Second, it would lead them to marshall their evidence in a systematic way. Third, the process of working through the alternatives and the evidence should encourage the analysts to think more thoroughly about some of their important beliefs. Some of the problems we located in the dominant interpretations could have been addressed if the analvsts had proceeded 16. A related problem with the process by which finished intelligence was produced in the case of Iran was that there was little sharp and critical discussion  among the analysts. NFAC does not have any institutions that provide the functions of both evaLuating and stimulat- ing the analysts that are performed in the academic world by peer review. In practice, coordination of finished intelligence rarely leads to discussion: of fundamental judgments.. Analysts are then not chal:._enged and confronted with conflicting views and counter-arguments as much as they could be. Generalists not directly concerned with a particular issue may be of help in thi V; they usually find it easier psychologically to take a fresh view. Peer review is certainly no panacea, but it can both help evaluate the quality of work in instances where consumers are not experts and can help the anlay>ts by leading them to see where their arguments might be altered or strengthened. It is hard to do good work in the absence of mechanisms for performing these functions. NFAC Las all the require- ments for peer review except appreciation of its value. Many analysts and ma e s appear to consider it threatening rather than helping. 17. The lack of a "community" of analysts dealing with this problem is noteworthy. The icivision of NFAC and its predecessor by discipline contributes to the absence of community. So does the traition in ORPA's predecessor office of analysts working on "their" country, building a psychological fence that otf:ers won't cross. In the view of one of us probably more important is the absence o an institutional competition and the supportive criticism it can provide. The mechanism that once existed where a current office and an estimative office looked at issues from their different perspectives was not a cure-all, but it did offer or.a regular basis opportunity for different approaches tc surface. No such opportunity exists, nor did it during the period we are reviewing. 18. The size of the relevant community was further reduced by the isolation of the ORPA analysts. They had few close contacts with academics or other informed experts outside the government; they had few conversations with people in State or NSC; even durinq the fall they were not involved in any of the inter-agency meetings that considered the Iranian problem, except for ones involving vi r, l  J ~ 'TROD SECRET I in Iran. the NIE. (NFAC was represented by the NIO or his deputy.) The problem is not only in the lack of discussions between NFAC analysts and those from other agencies--ORPA and OER analysts rarely had thorough talks about what was happening 22. In retrospect, it is apparent that the government would have been better served by a paper that did address the shorter-term questions. To have asked for such a written by the several drafters were stapled together. The ideas of the drafters were not challenged by one another. Judging from the changes in the successive drafts of the abortive NIE, most of the energy of this process went into subtle wording changes that would be apparent only to someone who had seen several versions. . 21. The estimative mechanism, as it functioned during the period under review, did not much help to compensate for the.problems we have located in the process. Drafting of the prospective NIE on Iran did not lead to a fruitful discussion of important issues. By and large, the sections not in immediate production. 19. When the number of NFAC analysts working in an area is small, as it was in Iran, the danger that alterna- tive views will not get raised is especially great, and so it is particularly important that all the resources of the community be employed. This is primarily a matter of informal relations and depends to a. large degree upon ad hoc arrangements and the compatibility of the in- dividual personalities. 20. We also think it is important for analysts to have as extensive contacts as possible with outside experts from a variety of fields. Without this the analysts may not come to grips with the range of pos- sible interpretations of events and may even end up presenting facts and interpretations that are far removed from what other knowledgeable observers believe. In our judgment, NFAC should make strenuous efforts to assure that its understanding of various countries; i.e., the crucial background beliefs against which the interpreta- tion of specific events is done, is as deep as possible. As with employing alternative arguments (above), the activity that can build such understanding must be valued and rewarded by NFAC; results will appear in the long-term, vii  paper, however, would have required a recognition that the Shah was in serious trouble, and given the prevailing beliefs, that could not have occurred until the end of August at the very earliest. Indeed, IVR called for such a paper on 12 September. But it took a .week for NFAC to decide that such a paper should be produced and another 10 days for the State Department to draft it. Apparently influenced by the mid-September lull, the paper concluded that "The Shah no longer appears to be in immediate danger of being overthrown. There is considerable question, however, of his ability to survive in power over the next 18 to 24 months." Whether this paper would have served a useful purpose is difficult to determine. In any event, D/NFAC decided not to pursue: it but to write a shorter NIE that dealt with both short.- and long-term problems. Such a draft was prepared by the NIO's office at the end, of October. but by this time.. it was no longer relevant. 23. It is obvious that a lot of time and energy was expended in these efforts. We think:. that managers could have done a better job of focusinc NFAC resources on the timely analysis of the most important questions. The analytical deficiencies in NFAC's handling of some of those questinns are cussed in the following paragraphs. The Analytical Issues 24. Two of the beliefs that underpinned the expecta- tion the regime would survive were thatithe opposition would split and that the Shah would use. force if things became really serious. One problem is that almost no events short of those which actually shook the founda- tions of the regime could bring these beliefs into question. Just because the opposition was united today did not mean that it would not split tomorrow; the Shah's refusal to use force today did not prove he would refrain from repressing the next demonstration.. (Indeed the Shah's refusal to use force reinforced the conclusion that the situation was not that serious.) This meant that unrest could grow quite large withtut leading analysts to reexamine the basic beliefs which supported their optimism. 0 viii TGP C~,lrT r?r+  TOPSECRET been placed in this expectation. 25. It was generally agreed that "The government [of Iran] has the ability to use as much force as it needs to control violence, and the chances that the recently widespread urban riots will grow out of con- trol is [sic] relatively small." (Draft NIE, 6 Sep- tember 1978, S/NF) This view was supported by logic and past history. But because it was impervious to a great deal of evidence (i.e., the Shah's previous hesitation to use force did not show that he wouldn't act if the situation deteriorated), NFAC should have made especially strenuous efforts to probe the available evidence and should have alerted consumers to the danger that informa- tion that disproved the belief was not likely to come available until the situation became extremely serious. Furthermore, NFAC could have indicated that this problem put an inherent limit in the confidence that should have 26. There were important signs that the Shah would not crack down--through 1978 he had vacillated; he said his commitment to liberalization precluded extensive repression; and the United States was urging the Shah to maintain this commitment and use as little force as necessary. The events in late September and October finally undermined the belief that the Shah would clamp down. Some people became convinced that the Shah lacked the will. Others came to believe that it was nate, and that even extensive force might not work. 27. NFAC produced no papers that focused on whether the Shah would crack down. While the Shah's moods were commented on, the possible implications for his decidin We think the the incentives to challenge this belief were slight be-~.., cause it was shared by all NFAC analysts, was very plau- sible, and fitted with the pre-existing view of the Shah. Most observers outside the government also shared this view and even in retrospect it is hard to say why he did not crack down. Second, this belief did not need to figure in the reporting or analysis of most day-to-day events. When the Shah cracked down it would be news;  until then the possibility still remained open. Only when the unrest grew to enormous proportions did his restraint seem important in explaining what was happening. So the analysts' main task of dealing with the latest events did not make them look more carefully at this crucial belief. 28. Another belief subject to the same problem as the expectation that the Shah would exercise control if things really got serious was that the opposition would split. Furthermore, this belief did not sit too well with the companion belief that the Shah could clamp down when he needed to. Repression would presumably unite the opposition and the longer the Shah waited for the opposition to split the harder it would be for him repress because the unrest was growing stronger. 29. The belief that the opposition would split was widespread throughout the period under consideration. It can be found at all levels of NFAC. While there were many ways in which the opposition might have split, the key issue became the division that the Shah wanted to bring about in the religious leadership and consequently in its following. 30. We do not think this issue was treated well in the finished intelligence. In the spring it received little attention because the production Concentrated on explaining the general causes of the unrest, reporting disturbances as they occurred, and discussing the danger that the Shah might use excessive force in controlling it. After late August with the appointment of a new Prime minister, one of whose major tasks it was to strike an accommodation with the religious leaders, finished intel- ligence not only summarized the latest reports but was more pessimistic and accurate than most other reporters. Nevertheless, problems remained. The articles left important parts of their messages implicit. They did not point out that much of their reasoning undercut the common optimistic assessments, conclude that an agreement between the government and the clergy was unlikely, or point out that the Shah might soon face the choice of repression or abdication. This was, perhaps, a matter of style and norms--analysts have been conditioned over the years to keep as close as possible to the facts and reports ~r~n oEr-~n r. ?r Z  can do for themselves. rather than draw out the implications which consumers analyzing the fundamental problems. 31. Furthermore, NFAC did not clarify the lines of argument, highlight inconsistencies, or pull together the existing evidence (which here, as on so many other points, was not extensive). This was particularly true in respect to the question of whether the moderates could afford to reach an agreement that Khomeini would de- nounce. Several field reports indicated that they could not. Finished intelligence summarized some of these re- ports and did not challenge their validity, but neither did it explain how, if they were true, conciliation was possible. It did not take hindsight to see that what was crucial was both the desires and the capacity for inde- pendent action of the religious moderates. Neither point was singled out for special attention. No definitive answers were possible, but a more thorough weighing of the evidence and a more penetrating analysis of the prob- lems were. Here as at other points the felt need to re- port daily events seems to have distracted NFAC from economy after mid-1977. 32. The analysis of the difficulties of staging a "white revolution" was a bit superficial and over-optimis- tic. Perhaps NFAC was misled by the Shah's many suc- cesses--real and apparent--and so lost sight of how hard it is to modernize, liberalize, and yet maintain control. The impact of the huge influx of oil money on Iran was not analyzed well. On this point as on others NFAC's product suffered badly from the separation of economic and political analysis. Little was said about the crucial political impact of rapid economic change--e.g., inflation, deterioration of life in the cities, the growing income gap, the bazaaris'loss of economic power to newer people, or the unemployment produced by the slowdown of the 33. NFAC analysts were alert to the general problems posed by liberalization quite early and they generally did a good job of summarizing the reports from the field, adopting in the process a slightly more pessimistic--and more accurate--view than the Embassy. But intelligence xi TOP sEePCET  production stayed too much on the surface of events and did not come to grips with the basic problem of whether the Shah's dictatorial regime could safely per- mit a high level of political freedom. In the fall many in NFAC accepted the optimistic report.: that the com- bination of martial law and free political debate was directing dissent off the streets and ? into political channels. This view made some sense, l,ut was not subject to careful scrutiny. The possibilities that liberaliza- tion was being taken by Iranians as a sign of the Shah's weakness, that the Shah's commitment tc liberalization showed that his pattern in previous years of using force and liberalization undercut r ther_ t ar- reinforced each other were barely mentioned. 34. Among the factors accounting: for the deficiency are inadequate information. Reporting:. from the field was not particularly good nor was non-governmental reporting. In addition, some of the dilemmas of liberalization were not unique to Iran and could have been illuminated itf persons familiar with other countries'. attempts to lib- eralize had been called in, but the us of such general- ists has not been customary in NFAC. Finally, there was an operative belief that the limited freedoms the Shah was willing to permit would be acceptal.le to the opposi- tion because it was reasonable enough to see that the con- siderable gains would only. be endangerbd by pushing for more. In effect it made eminent sense for a compromise to be struck on the major program of liberalization. 35. The issue of the nature and strength of the religious opposition itself presents a:different sort of problem. Some in NFAC were atuned to the importance of religion in Iranian life. The senicr political analyst was especially so. Be felt strongly about the deficiencies in information and had consistently called for increased collection on this subject. Lack. of information was an important part of the problem. NFAC did not know the extent to which Khomeini had established a network, did not know his power as ccnipared to that of the moderates, and did not even know wt-at he was saying in the recorded messages that were available within the country or how widespread the circulation of those tapes xii TOP SE6RF_1T_ V 11141  J TOP SECRET perhaps not given sufficient stress. 36. Nonetheless, there were four aspects of the religious opposition movement that contributed to its appeal and that were not well covered in finished intel- ligence. First, NFAC saw Khomeini's appeal as almost entirely rooted in his argument that modernization was undermining the hold of Islam on the people. In fact, much of his fire was aimed at the Shah's politico-economic program and the degree to which it aided the rich over the poor. Second, NFAC did not see that nationalism was an important part of Khomeini's appeal and attracted many who disagreed with him on other issues. Many in Iran saw the Shah not only as a tyrant, but as a foreign tyrant. Khomeini stressed this theme. Third, NFAC said little about the "populist" tradition of Shi'ism. Since the Shiites do not have an established hierarchy, religious leaders gain their authority by becoming recognized by their followers as men of wisdom and piety. This encourages them to articulate what they think are the desires and grievances of their people and gives them incentives to be on the forefront of popular movements. A fourth factor, the illegitimacy of governments in the eyes of Shi'ites, was explained by finished intelligence but 38. In the course of 1978 a number of reports on the Shah's mood as events unfolded in his country were received. In retrospect they assume considerable importance because, when removed from the background noise of other voluminous data, they begin to show a pattern. There are two themes. Over a period of several months persons who saw the Shah found him more often than not behaving differently than usual. Instead of being forceful in the finished intelligence. 37. NFAC's outlook did not give credence to the links between religious leaders and the grievances of a wide range of the general population. This outlook powerfully influenced the interpretation of incoming information and led the analysts to be insensitive to the possibility that the opposition could unite behind Khomeini. We wish to stress that it could not have been clear at the time that the analysts' position was in- correct. Data was skimpy; several lines of analysis were possible. But we think it is more than hindsight to sug- gest that an alternative view could have been discussed xiii TE)P '~.JRE 1  and authoritarian, he was depressed, dispirited, and un- certain. Second, his efforts to liberalize the political system without surrendering his essential authority sowed confusion in the minds of his supporters who were accustomed 39. NFAC production, beginning in late August, re- flected the reporting on the shah's mood, which seemed improve in September and October in the view of the Ambassadors who saw him frequently. It did not, how- ever, discuss what his untypical failure to exercise leadership might do to the morale of his supporters (which, we should note, stayed remarkably high until well into the fall) or to the opposition. We are not sure why the issue did not receive more prominence, but the belief that the Shah was strong and able to crack down if he judged it necessary, the format of pu.:lication-s that militated against speculation, and the press of events in the fall are among the likely reasons. other Iranians to believe that he was losing his grip. to firm direction. His overall behavior led them and m 40. Iran's domestic economic situation received relatively little attention in finished intelligence until mid-1978. It is clear that political protest grew in some part,out of societal dislocation caused by a develop- ment program, and we think it not unfair to suggest that managers and analysts should have been alert to the inter- action between the two. There was no assessment of the political effects of the economic slowdown instituted by the government in mid-1977. We are aware that management now recognizes the absence of political economy as a problem and that solutions to it are bei-g pursued. They are not easy to come by, but in our view the lack of a systematic method of relating politics to economics (both terms used in the broadest sense) contributed to NFAC's failure to assess correctly the clourse of develop- ments in Iran. 41. Until the fall of 1978 the direct contacts between members of the opposition and US officials were very few. Thereafter, information improved only slightly. This meant that NFAC did not know about the extent to which the opposition was organized and coordinated and had only limited information on what goals i-_ sought and what appeals it was making. But even more of a handicap xiv TER SECRET  TOESE TF becoming precarious. 42. We found no evidence that analysts distorted what should be objective judgments to support official policy. Intelligence production generally was consistent with US policy but this does not mean that the latter was influencing the former. If such an influence were present, the analysts were not aware of it. But we can- not completely rule out the possibility that the subtle influence of US policy may have made it a bit harder for the analysts to realize that the Shah's position was of the Shah's modernization program. was the lack of contact with all segments of Iranian society outside of the elite. In this case, those were the important arenas, and we were ignorant of them. In the absence of information analysts were forced to make assumptions about how groups and classes would respond, and these seem to have been largely based on the belief that most people appreciated the benefits 43. To conclude, NFAC did not anticipate the course of developments in Iran. The belief that the Shah was in a strong position helped to blind analysts to the implications of discrepant information that came in to NFAC from mid-summer on. The system under which NFAC produces finished intelligence diverted analytical attention to current reporting and away from consideration of the important questions which bore most directly xv TOP CEng ET  TOP crnn ~m SECRET TOP INTRODUCTION 1. NFAC failed to anticipate the course of events in Iran from late 1977 to late 1978. It was not alone. It was no further off the mark than its main source of information, the Embassy in Tehran. Indeed few observers expected the protest movement to be able to bring down the Shah. Some academics and journalists thought the Shah was weak, but we have seen no published articles indicating that they expected him to fall by early 1979..* By the end of August 1978 some countries were becoming more pessimistic than NFAC, but the differences were mainly of shading and tone. The State Department, and particularly the Iranian Country Director, had a more accurate view than did NFAC, but little of his view was passed on to the Agency. (For a further discussion of this point, see pp. 34-35, 68) 2. There was also. an intelligence failure in a second sense--there was evidence available at the time which pointed to the Shah's vulnerability. With hindsight, much of it stands out and is reported below. Because this information was scattered. and ambiguous and because there were good reasons to expect the Shah to survive (these are discussed below), it is much harder to say whether there was an intelligence failure in the third sense of the term--i.e., given the information available at the time, was NFAC's judgment unreasonable? Did NFAC ignore or misinterpret events in ways and to an extent that consumers can legitimately expect should not and will not occur? Although we cannot give a short and precise answer to this question, much of the discussion below addresses this point. In addition, we will try to explain why the analysts went wrong, note the ways in which the intelligence production processes inhibit good analysis, and discuss ways in which NFAC might do better in the future. _*-Me comparison to academics and journalists is appropriate because in this case, unlike many others, little of the important information was secret and available only to governmental analysts. TOP SEG Em r  .j-.OP nr. Gn r.~m RE1 3. By looking only at a single case, many questions cannot be answered. These deal with how common some of the problems we have detected are and the importance of factors which can only be examined in acomparative con- text. For example, if one wanted to look with care at the question of the degree to which analysis was hampered by lack of information derived from contacts with opposi- tion forces, one would have to compare the evidence avail- able from Iran (and other cases in which.intelligence collection was similarly restricted) with that available in countries which are roughly similar but in which in- telligence did have extensive contacts. In the same way, if one wanted to explore the subtle aspects of the question of whether intelligence was influenced by policy one would have to look at the analyses made by people or governments who had different policy preferences or com- pare NFAC's analysis of Iran with its treatment of unrest in a country that was not supported by the United States. Similarly, one reason for the error in Iran may be that NFAC tends to overestimate the staying power of right-wing regimes. But this question could only be explored by com- paring its analyses of these regimes with those it makes of radical ones. To take an issue touched bn in the body of this report, if one wanted to explore the problems created by the lack of disagreement among the analysts on Iran, a comparison between this case and one in Which there were mailo di 7 putes within the community would be in order. 4. Comparisons could also shed light on defects in intelligence if we did post-mortems on successful cases and also examined "false alarms. As it is, the rare post- mortems that are undertaken concern failures to predict untoward events. Useful as they-are, these may give a skewed view. By focusing on cases where-intelligence failed to detect danger when it was present, they imply that this is the most common and important problem. But it may be that there are lots of errors of the opposite type, cases where NFAC expected a government to fall and it survived, or instances in which it expected another state to take a hostile action and the state refrained from doing so. Intelligence may not systematically err on the side of being too complacent. Itfwould both be useful to know whether or not this is tripe and to learn what factors are responsible for the false alarms. For env eEGn rs  example, does intelligence systematically underestimate the staying power of certain kinds of regimes? Do the problems in the analysis that we have detected in the Iranian case crop up in the "false alar " r are the difficulties there quite different? 5. It might also be worthwhile to look at some cases where the Agency was right. The obvious point would be to try to see if there were differences in the information available or the process of analysis employed that distinguish these cases. The most useful finding would be that better intelligence is associated with certain procedures and ways of treating evidence which can be applied to a wide range of cases. But al- most anything that was found to discriminate cases in which the Agency did well from those in which it did badly would be useful, even if it only reminded us of the large role played by luck, skill, and the particu- 61 larities of the individual cases. he appeared to be close to quitting. 6. In a post-mortem one obviously focuses on what went wrong. This produces an unbalanced account, even if one tries to distinguish between what only could have been clear from hindsight and what people might reasonably have been expected to see given the information available at the time. We wish to at least partially redress that imbalance by noting that several potential problems were correctly downgraded by the analysts. Little attention was paid to the role of the Tudeh Party and although terrorist activities were constantly tracked, this concern did not overshadow the more important one of general political unrest. The analysts easily could have been distracted by these topics, but were not. Furthermore, the analysis of the unity and morale of the armed forces--a particularly important topic--was proven to be essentially correct. The armed forces stayed loyal to the Shah and remained willing to execute his internal security orders until very late in the year; they began to waver and defect only when 7. The extent to which a restrospective examination distorts the situation is hard to determine. The conditions under which people worked fade and become obscure even in their minds and can never be known by the reviewer. Such. a person knows what the outcome of the events is, and he cannot fail to be influenced-by that knowledge. Moreover,  the material that he reads in order to determine what happened, what people knew, and what they wrote about it comes to him in a form much different from the way it comes to the intelligence analyst. The reviewer has the opportunity to read material through in a coherent order. For the analyst working on events as they happened, ma- terial or information must be absorbed as it comes in-- sometimes in fragments, often not in a timely fashion. The necessity of meeting publication deadlines can and frequently does force the intelligence analyst to commit himself to paper with substantially less th.n the optimum amount of information. 8. At many points in this report we will note which analysts were closer to being correct than others. Here we should stress that those who were more accurate in this case are not necessarily better analysts than those who continued to believe that the Shah would.survive. One can be right for the wrong reasons and one can carefully examine all the relevant evidence and still reach the wrong conclusion. A further discussion of this point is provided in Annex B. In this case it seems that what distinguishes those analysts.in and outsile of the govern- ment who, as events unfolded, thought that the Shah was in serious trouble from those who thought he would sur- vive were general beliefs about Iran which long predated the recent protests. As a generalization, those who thought the Shah was weak and had not been a good ruler took the unrest very seriously whereas those who believed he was strong and, on balance, had done a great deal to benefit Iran thought he would have little trouble riding out the disturbances. Members of the former group were correct this time, but we suspect that if we looked at their previous predictions we would find :a number of occasions in which they incorrectly expected the Shah to fall, or at least to suffer significant diminutions of power. It can be argued that even if these people were wrong on important questions of timing, at least they had a better understanding of the underlying situation than did others. But even this may not be right. The underlying situation may have changed, especially as a result-of the oil boom, and so the valid :grounds for pessimism may have appeared only more recently than the pessimism.  9. If what distinguished "optimists" from "pessimists" was their longstanding views of the regime, would it have been useful for these differences to have been discussed at an early date? Perhaps, but the main "pessimist" in the government was the State Department Country Director for Iran who was not a member of the intelligence community. The other."pessimists" were outside of the government. Even had such discussions taken place, it is far from certain that the participants would have learned a great deal. Judging from the differences of opinion outside the govern- ment, it appears that beliefs about the strength of the regime were related to, although not totally'determined by, whether the person is liberal or conservative. When dis- agreements are is deeply-rooted, discussion often proves unenlightening. 10. In this case, as in most examples of intelligence failure, the problem lay less in the incorrect interpretation of specific bits of information than in a misleading analysis. of the general situation which pre-dated the crisis and strongly influenced perceptions of the events. Almost every- one in the government overestimated the stability of the regime. They overestimated the Shah's strength and under- estimated the number of groups and individuals who opposed him and the intensity of their feelings. The Weekly Summary of 18 November 1977 said, ". . . there is no serious domestic threat or po itical opposition to the Shah's rule. At 58 he is in good health and protected by an elaborate security apparatus; he would seem to have an excellent chance to rule into the next decade." Similar 'udgments were ex- pressed in the NID of 14 November 1977 and in a memo- randum of 12 October 1977, "The Political Situation in Iran" The Embassy in Tehran, which held a simi ar judgment, listed "several verities," two of which were that "the Shah is widely recognized as probably the only viable governor of Iran today even by many of his opponents"'and that "he is firmly in control." (Tehran 11408, 27 December 1977 , As the draft NIE put it: "Because the Shah still s the reins of power, most of what Iran does, how it feels, reacts, or goes, is how the Shah wants it." 11. At bottom most observers, official and unofficial, found it hard to imagine that the Shah would fall. Although there were many specific reasons for this belief--and they are analyzed below--it is hard to escape the feeling that if  those reasons had not influenced beliefs, others that supported the same conclusion would have. The idea that one of the world's most powerful monarchs could be over- thrown by an unarmed mob of religiously-inspired fanatics was simply incredible. Furthermore, it probably would have been incredible even had observers grasped the depth of popular discontent in Iran. 12. Other general beliefs, some of ahem probably held more implicitly and explicitly, may have also been operating--e.g., that serious menaces to:American-supported regimes always come from the left and that religion is not an important motivating factor. Some, more specific. biases or predisposition are discussed in` the chapters that deal with the events in Iran and how they were per- ceived. * 13. Anyone holding these preexisting beliefs would inevitably miss or misinterpret many events that we now see as evidence that the Shah was in serious trouble and that were so interpreted by those contemporary observers who started with different mind-set. In this study we can- not analyze how and why this belief formed, but it seems sufficient to note that it was almost universal within the government and widespread outside it and"that, even in restrospect, it was far from unreasonable. But given this belief, it was inevitable that observers would be slow to grasp the situation. The specific problems discussed be- low delayed recognition even further, but only those who were convinced from the start that the Shah's position was weak could have concluded before late. August that the Shah might not survive. 14. Lack of time and of expertise prevent us from providing a full evaluation of the validity of the general beliefs about Iran held by the analysts at the start of the crisis. We think that their beliefs fall within the *Another belief explains what to some observers might seem like an add distribution of NFAC's attent7on. Most people thought the main problem would come in th.i mid-1980e when oil production started to drop, difficulties caused by in- dustriaZization accumulated, social divis'ons sharpened, and the Shah began implementing a transition for his son. Thus several long NFAC papers laid the ground work for nab Zuzin the expected trials of the regime in this. period. T^D BEC E 1  broad parameters of belief held by non-governmental students of Iranian affairs, but we want to note that as non-experts we have to take a number of important points at face value. This influences to a degree what: we can say here. T^-ITT] : r  2. First, intelligence was dealing with a country .with which the United States had had prolonged and close contact. Although Iran's importance to the United States has increased since the rise of oil prices, the US interest dates back to'World War II. standing of the situation. 1.? A number of common explanations for intelligence failures do not apply in this case. Indeed, there were many factors here which militated in favor of an under- -and many Iranian officials travel this country, giving further opportunities for gleaning an understanding of the situation. Business contacts were also extensive. 3. Second, most of the NFAC analysts had been work- ing on Iran for a few years. The senior political analyst, extremely well this kind of in-depth analysis. 5. Fourth, prior to the late summer of 1978, the pressure for current intelligence was not so great as to squeeze out time for broader and longer-run considerations. Indeed NFAC produced several long papers on such topics of general importance as Elites-and the Distribution of Power in Iran and Iran in the s. Although we have not made "Ethorough canvass, our impression is that on few other countries of comparable importance was there as much of for the country.as can possibly be expected. 4., Third, and linked to the previous point, although ethnocentricism is always a danger, the analysts' experience reduced this problem. The leading political analyst was steeped in the culture of the area and, without becoming "captured" by it, seems to have had as good a_ eneral feel  TOP cicnn Em J 6. Fifth, the developments NFAC was.trying to anticipate were not sudden ones which adversaries were trying to hide from us. A number of the problems that come up in trying to foresee coups or surprise attacks did not arise here. There was time in which to assess developments and to re-evaluate assumptions--indeed an NIE was in process during many of the months in which the crucial events were unfolding. Although the way in which NIEs are written may not provide the best possible forum for addressing important questions,..it still gave NFAC an opportunity often absent in cases of intelligence failures. Furthermore, analysis did not have to contend with possible concealment and deception. 1963. 7. On the other hand, the nature of.the case pre- sented some special problems. First, and:most important, the Iranian revolution was a major discontinuity. Indeed, we believe that it was unprecedented. And no one does a good job of understanding and predicting unprecedented events. We can think of no other case in=recent times in which a mass uprising overthrew an entrenched regime that had the support of large, functioning, and united security forces. Similarly, we cannot think of a single other case in which very large numbers of unarmed men and women were willing to repeatedly stage mass demon- strations with the knowledge that many of'them might be killed. The common pattern of unrest is that once one or two mass rallies have been broken up by gunfire, people refuse to continue this kind of protest and large unarmed demonstrations cease. The other side of this coin was also unusual if not unprecedented--the Shah did not use all the force at his disposal to quell the unrest (for a further discussion of this point, see below, Force Section). Most dictators would have done so; the Shah himself did in Intensity of feeling, however, is difficult to determine Khomeini. (Tehran Airgram A-105, 1 August 1978, it seems clear that millions of Iranians hated the Shah, yet the word "hate" never appears in official documents-- except for the report that Ayatollah Shariat-Madari hated 8. A second problem was that of correctly estimating the intensity of the opposition to the Shah. In retrospect, TOP nr6nr.-s.  min cr`nn Em J ferences that were drawn. (,leaving aside the point that no concerted efforts were made to assess it). What NFAC needed to know was the lengths people would go to overthrow the regime; what costs they would bear. It is very hard to estimate this short of the actual test. Indeed the individuals them- selves often do not known how far they are willing to go. On pages 115-119 below we will discuss the evi- dence that was available on this subject and the in- usually do. NFAC had to gauge many segments of society, 10. Fourth, and related to the previous problems, an understanding of this case called for the sort of po- litical and even sociological analysis that NFAC does not detect its depth and breadth. 9. A third problem is linked to the second. Much of the opposition was based on religion and it is difficult for most people living in a secular culture to empathize with and fully understand religious beliefs--especially when the religion is foreign to them. Most modern analysts tend to downplay the importance of religion and to give credence to-other explanations for behavior. Moreover, Shi'ism is an unusual religion, being a variant of Islam and therefore presenting a double challenge to understand- ing. We cannot generalize about how people in NFAC con- cerned with Iran--managers and analysts--viewed the role of religion in this situation. NFAC's senior Iranian analyst was sensitive to the importance of religion as.a political factor. But we suspect that many others were not so sensitized and that, had the opposition been purely secular, observers would have been quicker to not just a few familiar individuals and institutions. 110 A fifth inherent difficulty was that the opposition developed gradually from the fall of 19.77 on. Studies from psychology and examinations of previous cases have shown that people are almost always too slow to take account of the new information under these circumstances. Sudden and dramatic events have more impact on peoples' beliefs than do those that unfold more slowly. In the latter case, people can assimilate each small bit of in- formation to their beliefs without being forced to reconsider -TOP SEGRET-  the validity of their basic premises. They become accustomed to a certain amount of information which conflicts with their beliefs without appreciating the degree to which it really clashes with what they think. If an analyst had gone into a coma in the fall of 1977 and awakened the next summer, he would have been amazed by the success of the opposition and the inability of the Shah to maintain order. The discrepancy between his earlier belief in the stability of the Shah's rule and the evidence of strong and sustained opposition probably would have been enough to make him question his basic assumptions. times before; it was not likely to do so again. 12. A sixth obstacle to understanding was the history of 15 years of unbroken royal success. As ORPA's senior political analyst pointed out in early 19:76, "The Shah of Iran has been on his throne 34 years, far longer than any other leader in the Middle East. He has not only outlived most of these rulers, but has outlasted the many official and unofficial observers who, two decades ago, were confi- dently predicting his imminent downfall." (Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran, Fe ruary 1976, age 14 . We think it likely that the,: knowledge that the Shah had succeeded in the past against all odds and contrary to most analyses made observers especially hesitant to believe that he would fall this time. The past challenges seemed greater; the Shah had seemed weaker. Indeed the NIEs of the late 1950s and early 1960s had said that the Shah probably could not survive. Intelligence underestimated the Shah many But the exposure to a steady stream of events, few terribly startling when taken one at a time, had much less impact. If the analysts had been able to step back and re-read the information that had come in over the previous six months, the cumulative impact of the discrepant information might have been greater. But the pressure to keep up with the latest events militated against this. Furthermore, the growth of the opposition was not entirely steady. Lulls were common. And many ex- pected (and perhaps planned) demonstrations failed to occur. As a result, analysts could always believe that a curr t peak of opposition would subside, as earlier ones had. TOP cEGRET A  13. A seventh factor that inhibited an appreciation of the danger to the regime was that riots were not uncommon in Iran. Student demonstrations were frequent, and so no cause for alarm. Demonstrations by other segments of the population and linked to religion were less common, but still not unprecedented. The important opposition of this kind occurred in 1963 and forced the Shah resort to brutal, but short and effective, repression. Information Available 14. The information that came into NFAC was not all that could have been available on Iran, but it was what the analysts had to work with. The subject of collection is beyond the scope of our investigation but an understanding of the problems facing the analysts requires at least a brief mention of several deficiencies in the information available. First, partly because of decisions made in the 1970s, NFAC received little information about the opposition or indeed about anyone outside the elite. Further discussion of this point can be found on pp. 127-129 below. This meant that NFAC not only lacked current information during the crisis, but also had not had important background information on the earlier trends in popular attitudes that set the stage for the revolution. Second, domestic politics were deliberately given a low priority Contacts with oppose ion a ements by official---- Americans were limited; in view of other important US in terests in Iran, such contacts were considered to be not worth risking the Shah's ire if exposed- i car. r`~ r. rr O -TOP ._E_R  TOP nr?6Rr, m There was an obvious circularity here. As long as domestic politics were believed to be stable, they would be given a low priority. And as long as NFAC knew little about what anyone outside of governmental and elite circles was saying and doing, there would be little reason to question the prevailing faith in the stability of the..regime. 15. On Iran, as in most countries, the Embassy provided the bulk of the political reporting. The FOCUS Iran memorandum of 4 November 1976 said that "Generally speaking, reporting from the Mission on most topics is very satisfactory." (page 2, S) An update of 10 August 1978 stated that "Reporting on domestic -political concerns has been 'first rate,' rf+llri [+r. nr ,n j  -T-OP-SECIRE IT This subject is beyond our concerns here, but we should note that the Embassy had contacts. only with a narrow segment of society. Furthermore, if there were biases or'inadequacies in Embassy accounts of what was happening, they would greatly hamper the analysts' job. .19. Fifth,. the analysts only had limited opportunity to debrief Embassy and station personnel who returned from the field. For example, they did not see the Ambassador when he was in the US in the summer of 1978. They had more contact with lower-level officials, but even this was  from other countries' Embassies 2"0. Sixth, only limited information was available counterparts in talking to returnees. chancy. It depended on the analysts hearing of returning travellers through the grapevine. The economic analysts seem to have done somewhat better than their political If the Embassy exchanged views with others on scene, the analysts were not told what was learned.  rT+()ri SECRET J 23. Finally, the sources of material on Iran in 1977 and 1978 show considerable bias. Public material to a very large degree tended to be polemical--either strongly against the Shah or putting the best face possible on the government of Iran's activities. This is of course a normal problem of evidence in analytical writing, but it is worth mentioning because some of those in the government structure who read raw intelligence are not knowledgeable enough to assess the validity of the evidence and may at some point in the process have had an effect on what appears in the formal printed record. The Government of Iran itself put out highly inaccurate reports of its p vents; so did various opposi- tion spokesmen. 7 24. Four general observations about the information. available to NFAC are in order. First, the analysts feel they have little influence over the information they re- ceive. Although they participated in the FOCUS review and have some input into the determination of collection priorities, this does not have great impact on the depth or breadth of reporting that results. Of course the de- cisions on what information to collect must involve many factors, but it seems to us that the analysts should have 25. Second, the availability of some information from other agencies is strongly influenced by informal arrangements. Information obtained or perceptions formed by persons in agencies outside the intelligence community may not reach NFAC analysts. (For further discussion, a stronger'voice. see pp. 34-35.) 26. Third, with the exception of a few reports from the consulates (which were in touch in their districts with a broader slice of Iranian society), official sources yielded no information about non-elite segments of the population. JA occasional newspaper report provided a scrap of information, but by and large the analysts could only rely on their Tl1 -  mOri EGRET. a priori assumptions of how various kinds 'of people would react to the situation. This meant, for example, that there was no information about the organization and make- up of the protest demonstrations. No one talked to a single rank-and-file dissident to try to find out what his grievances were, what leaders he respected, and what his hopes were. Of course given the Shah's sensitivities and beliefs about American instigation of the opposition, gathering such might have been prohibitively risky. But without it the analysts were at a major disadvantage. Even when Embassy and Agency personnel met-opponents of the Shah, these people almost always were members of the Westernized elite. Many of them shared the Western views about the role of religion in society. They did not share, and could not convey the feelings of those who went into the streets to bring down the regime. (The general topic of information derived from contacts with the opposition 27. Fourth, there were some untapped: sources that could have led to a better understanding of the opposition. One was the opposition press, published in this country and France. Of course this would have been mining low- grade ore.. Before the summer of 1978 it might have seemed not worth the effort because the opposition was unimportant; after then the analysts. had no extra time. It might have been more efficient to have been in contact with those Americans who had good relations with the opposition. Of course only that information which the opposition wanted the US Government to know would have been available through these channels. There were a number of Americans, often academics, who had good relations with the opposition. 28. Fifth, although it would have been difficult, the analysts might have tried to probe the differences in views on the domestic situation they knew to exist among members  29. A related question is the level of attention paid to domestic Iranian politics as opposed to the other areas of concern and whether this balance should have been altered. The treatment of 'Iran's domestic politics in finished intel.linance reflected the priority it had in should,, it would seem, merit a high priority. In retrospect, more resources should have been devote to domestic politics, but given all the other US interests in Iran it is not easy to say when the balance should have shifted or what should have received less attention. We do think, however, that the question of priorities for both collection and analysis should receive more explicit attention.. The domestic sta- bility of a country of great importance to the United States 1 -1 fm of alternative perspectives and opportunities ana y But two points can be made. First? the allocation of resources seems to have evolved rather than being the product of reasoning. Second, when the number of analysts in any areas is very low, the quality of analysis is likely to be suboptimal because of the lack of presentation 1 sts eir ideas with critical and informed colleagues. -Top- SEGR-F4'1  - - RE if fewer NID items had been produced. 2. In the case of Iran, the system produced a steady stream of summaries of recent events with a minimal degree of commentary, analysis, and prediction. This mode of analysis may work adequately in ordinary situations; it cannot cope with the unusual. It seems to work when the information from the field is good. It cannot do as well when much of the information is in'unofficial channels (i.e. through nongovernment experts) and, more importantly, when what is needed is a real reworking of the information, a stepping back. from the flow of day-to-day events, an in- depth analysis of selected, important questions, a presen- tation of alternative interpretations, and an attempt to go beyond the specific information that is coming in. This is not what the system appears to have been designed to do and if it is to be done, the working level analysts cannot be expected to take the initiative in shifting from the normal mode.of analysis to one that is more appropriate to the situation. Indeed when events come most rapidly the greatest pressures are for short reports--i.e. NID items. If more than reporting and superficial analysis is to be done, NFAC management must take the burden of reordering the priorities and ordering that selected in-depth studies be undertaken. Of course this is a gamble, since it is difficult to determine at a given time which questions are most important and what alternatives need to be examined. Furthermore, there will have to be a cost in terms of NFAC's ability to follow in detail more recent events. These problems and costs need more careful examination than we can give them here. But it is our impression that at least in this case.no one would have greatly suffered til early November. Introduction 1'. Many of the problems in this case can be traced to the ways in which finished intelligence is produced. NFAC tracked specific events and the flow of field reports quite well. Given the preexisting beliefs about Iran, the Shah, and the opposition; given the paucity and ambiguity of the information from the field; given the normal NFAC procedure; and given the inherent difficulty of predicting a very unusual series of events, it is not surprising that the full dimensions of the problem were not recognized un-  Nature of the Production System 3. What was needed was sustained and thorough evalua- tion of the most important questions--e.g. the Shah's ability and willingness to follow a coherent course, the nature and depth of the opposition, the ability of the opposition groups to work together. Such analysis should have examined alter- native interpretations of events and mustered all the evi- dence that could be found. Instead, the format of NFAC production and the informal norms of the intelligence com- munity led to intelligence that focused on the latest events and reports, that press one view, and that adduced little evidence. 4. The NFAC product can rarely be faulted for failure to convey the information in the latest field reports. But there was much less discussion of the forces that were affecting events and that would influence whether the latest lull was merely a temporary respite or: something more lasting; whether the latest cable saying that the moderates were afraid that the protests were getting out of control indicated that an agreement with the government was likely. The analysts' pre-existing belief that the regime was very strong and that the opposition was weak and divided did not prevent them from seeing and passing on the disturbing reports from the Embassy and the station. But the belief may have been re- inforced by the requirements of current intelligence and made it more difficult for them 'to get ;beyond the specific events and see what patterns were emerging. 5. The Daily Publication. The problems are greatest with the NID, which concentrates on telling what has happened and only rarely contains analysis or forecasts of political trends and developments. This publication absorbs a great deal of the analysts' time, accounts for a high proportion of the intelligence that NFAC produces, and is considered by most ORPA analysts to be the most important NFAC publication after the PDB. (OER analysts are rewarded not so much for NID items as for publishing in the EIWR.) Even on days when NID items are not being prepared, analysts must take quite a bit of time to be ready to write for it in case they are asked to do so. Almost all articles are short, since no more than two longer and more analytical articles are run in each issue (e.g. the two-part feature carried on 12 and 14 November 1977 on the occasion of the Shah's visit to T9n Si?Gn r. m  TOP SECD ET it Washington.). Most NID items that are more than a couple of paragraphs long cover several topics. The result is not only that none of the topics can receive in-depth treatment, but often that the items lack emphasis. For example, a long NID article on 14 September 1978, "Iran: Prospects for the Shah," covered the following subjects: one summary paragrap , two general introductory paragraphs, three paragraphs on the Shah's mood, four paragraphs on the loyalty and morale of the armed forces, and five paragraphs on the opposition. Each paragraph is about two or three sentences long. This format is not compatible with any but the most superficial analysis. Furthermore, stories in the NID, like those in the news- papers which the NID so strongly resembles, generally do not assume.that the reader has been closely following events. They therefore do not build on what the analysts have said before, steadily producing a better understand- ing of the underlying forces or the dynamics that are be- lieved to be at work. Thus none of the subjects that are touched on in successive NID items are ever examined in much detail. 6. This type of intelligence production is necessary for tracking a rapidly changing situation. if the premises on which. the discussion is based are correct and remain so throughout the period, this mode of analysis will serve the community and the consumers wel:L. But given the fragility of observers' understanding of most other countries, it is rarely wise to assume that discussing the most recent de- velopments without reflecting on the more basic questions will be sufficient; questions that do not lend themselves to treatment in terms of the latest demonstration, the latest lull, or the most recent event 7. NID items often draw conclusions, but do not explain how the conclusion was reached or what alterna- tives have been rejected. In addition, because the system requires that political NID items be tied directly to reporting, analysis often stops short of stating the full implications of the information presented. For example several stories in the NID in mid-September 1978 implied that the Shah's efforts to win over the moderates would not succeed. This is especially true if one takes all the stories together rather than reading just one of them. TOP sEeREF  TYlp SEi-+RTm But of course they did come to readers one at a time and the pessimistic inferences had to be drawn from the stories rather than being presented bluntly. Simlilarly, in late September and October there were frequent articles about the strikes and continuing unrest. But each event was treated in relative isolation and explicit judgments about whether the regime could survive these strains were es- belief that this publication does not have much impact. keep the treatment as short as possible and part may be a 8. Other Vehicles for Intelligence Production. The incentives for analysts to write for the-NID are stronger than for producing articles for the Middle East and South Asia Review, a weekly ORPA publication, Kthough the format of the latter is better suited to good analysis. This pub- lication includes pieces that can be longer and less tied to the latest cables, thus permitting thc. treatment of im- portant topics and questions, with a good deal of evidence and alternative interpretations. But this was not done in the case of Iran. Part of the reason may be the desire to 9. From September 1977 through October 1978, 23 articles dealing with domestic politics in Iran appeared in the Middle East South Asia Review or other periodicals. In addition, eight memos were issued. Ir length these were much like those in the Review.. They were a mix of office-initiated items. and responses to specific requests, the memo format being used when timely publication is required. Of the reviews and memos written in 1978, five were like NID items in that they reported recent events and had only the briefest analysis (issued on 7 April, 14 April, 2 June, 9 August, 20 September). Three others were interesting, but dealt with subjects that were not relevant to the political unrest. (3 March, 7 April, 9 May) Only four of the Review and memorandum group were of a type, in terms of subject examined and depth of .analysis, that could have probed the subject in any depth.  --TOP SECRET summary (October 1977)--are discus se at severs p ac this report.. The other, Iran After the Shah (August 1978, 10. NFAC produces some longer analytical papers. Two on Iran appeared during the period under review. One, Iran in the 1980s (August 1977, --and its executive 1 1 es in been more thorough. One of these treated the religious bases of opposition, and we have discussed it at several places in this report. The others were "The Situation.in Iran" (an evaluation of the first ten days of Sharif-Emami's government (7 September 1978, "Iran: The Prospects of Responsible Government" (the outlook in late October (20 October 1978, 5)); and "Iran: Roots of Discontent," (the underlying ca particularly rapid modernization (20 October 1978 "The Situation in Iran" and "Iran: The Prospects of Responsible Government," were like NID stories in their approach of summarizing recent events and looking into the immediate future. They were valuable in telling their readers what was happening, but did little to develop evi- dence and arguments about the central issues.. Only two articles fit this description: "Iran: Some Observations on the Bases of Religious Opposition (10 February 1978 and "Iran: Roots of Discontent." The former was an ex- cellent start, but was not followed up, and the latter would have been more useful had it appeared earlier and appropriate as of late August to issue this paper. was no questioning at any level as to whether was orderly succession to the Shah under certain specified assumptions. Completed in early summer, it was not designed to deal with;the developments of 1978. Three sentences in its preface said: "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'prerevolutionary' situation. There are substantial prob- lems in all phases of Iranian life, but the economy is not stagnant and social mobility is a fact of life. There is dissatisfaction with the Shah's tight control of the political process, but this does not at present threaten the government." (These were widely quoted in the press and attributed to the prospective NIE.) Apparently there 11. These papers, and an earlier one on Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran (February 1976, are more descriptive than analytical. They pulled together 24 - r TEW  J TOP SECRET a large amount of data that was not known to most readers.. Elites was particularly successful in this regard. They may have served their purposes but they' did not train either analysts or consumers to think 'carefully about the sorts of issues that arose in 1978. 12. Selection of Issues to be Trtlated. It seems to us that there was a failure at management levels to see that proper attention was paid to those: topics which bore most directly on whether the Shah woulc survive. Indeed it is striking that throughout the period no papers were produced which had as their main focus the question of whether the regime could be overthrown. Part.of the ex- planation may be that opinions shifted fairly suddenly-- until mid-October almost everyone thought the Shah would survive and by early November almost everyone thought he was in very serious trouble--and part way be the lack of a suitable procedure and format. But whatever the cause, we think it is not only hindsight that leads to the con- clusion that as the protests grew, the analysts and managers should have sat down and tried to locate and analyze the important questions, many of which were not pegged to the latest events. In retrospect, it is obvious that it would have been extremely valuable to have had discussions of such topics as: when and whether the Shah would crack down; the conditions under which the opposition would split; the depth of the feelings against the S:iah? and t possi- bilities and dangers of liberalization. 13. Such questions deserved special attention because the answers to them were closely linked to predictions about the future of the regime. As it was, t:zese topics were mentioned in passing, but never were examined in depth. Presumably, this could not have been done without either adding analysts or diverting some of their efforts away from the current reporting. The obvious question is whether it is so important for NFAC to provide as much coverage of the latest events, and this subject is beyond the scope of this report. In the absence of such an increase or diversion of resources, however, most finished intelligence on Iran was strongly driven by the latest event:;. 14. As NFAC operated in this case. we wonder if papers like these would have been produced even had the analysts had more time. First, they would have required someone to determine what subjects needed close examination. -r()()P earn t _T  The analysts of course can and should have a hand in this, but they are likely to be too close to the daily events to do this on their own. Furthermore, the selection of topics must be guided in part by the problems that are of concern to decisionmakers and the chains of reasoning that decisionmakers are employing. People who are aware of what these people are thinking must be involved in the process. Second, the analysts may lack the training and experience in this kind of work, because most of what they are called on to do in the normal course of events is largely descrip- tion and summarization. When people are not used-to writing analytical papers one cannot expect them to be able to do so*when the need arises. Frequent experience is necessary to develop the needed skills. Third, such papers would probably not have been as good as they could have unless there was a community of analysts--both Iranian experts and good political generalists--to provide suggestions and criticisms. As we will discuss below (pp. 33-34). in the case of Iran there was no such community. 15. In the case of Iran, there was also a failure of what can be called intellectual or analytical management in the absence of substantive review of what the analysts were writing. Others in NFAC did not go over the political analysts' arguments with them, probing for weak spots and searching for alternative interpretations that needed to be aired. * Correctives 16. Evidence. From reading most NFAC documents one cannot tell how the analysts reached their judgments or what evidence they thought was particularly important. One does not get a sense for why the analysts thought as they did or what chains of reasoning or evidence might lead one to a different conclusion. At any number of points in NFAC products one can find unqualified assertions without supporting evidence presented. Space limitations explain the paucity of evidence in the NID and reader im- patience is an important factor in preparing the other publications as well, but the result is unfortunate. For part of tie explanation, see subsection, Discussion' and Review (pp. 32-37) below. -TOP c c. Gn E+  -TOP SEeRE 17. To put this point a slightly different way, if one started with the belief that the Shah's position was weak, there was almost nothing in the finished :intelligence that would have, or should have, led one to change one's mind. Reading NFAC production would show that other people had a different view., but not why this view was valid. Most often one finds assertions, not arguments supported by evidence. Often it is only their inherent plausibility that would lead one to accept the conclusions. 18. Of course the consumers do not have time to read a full account of the evidence on which judgments are based. But such a development and presentation would still serve important functions within the intelligence community. In- dividual analysts may not fully realize how much--or how little--evidence supports a given position unless they work through it systematically. And doing so-, can yield new in- sights. Analysts in other agencies can read fuller versions and so both be better informed and be in a better position to offer criticisms and conflicting views. Pliddle-level NFAC managers could also work with papers that had fuller evidence and would be able to see what judgments seemed questionable, where the arguments were weak, and where' alternative explana- tions needed presentation and exploration. Here, as in other areas, we recognize that available resources set limits to what can be done, and that other equities have claims on those resources. But time spent on a systematic exposition of the evidence for and against a particular belief may well be more valuable than an equal amount spent on reporting the latest events. 19. Alternative Explanations. In addition to producing evidence,' or rather as part of the same process of demon- strating why a conclusion is valid, discussions will often be of greatest value when they include explicit consideration of alternative interpretations. Most NFAC analysis on Iran did not do this. At times, it admitted puzzlement. But usually it gave a single, quite coherent, explanation.* What is most important is not that many of those explanations turned out to be incorrect--since the evidence was often skimpy and ambiguous--but that a range of interpretations was not presented. notes that the single coherent explanation has Long been the preferred analytical style n NFAC and its predecessors. Alternative explanations have been employed from time to time, usually at the expendi-ure of great effort and with senior management support. - 27 - TOP err-~inrs __ ._---  PTA the questions. We think this should be done on a regular basis, with evidence present for and against each of the alternatives. (U) 20. The number of questions on which this can be done and the number of alternatives that could be developed are theoretically limitless, but it is often possible to find a relatively small number of crucial ones, which, if answered differently, would most alter one's understanding of the situation and the predictions one would make. The avail- ability of feedback from policymakers would help in choosing likely to be accepted. 22. One obvious difficulty is that seeing things from a different perspective or discussing possibilities that others have not seen or have rejected is not likely to occur unless it is rewarded by the organization. This would involve a recognition that in many cases the effort will not have direct benefits. Usually the dominant view is correct, or at least closer to the truth than many of the alternatives. It. is now easy to see that alternatives should have been raised about Iran, but the case must rest not on the claim that the dominant view was wrong, but on the argument that examining several alternatives will lead to better analysis. But unless this mode of argumentation is valued and rewarded by NFAC, it-is not likely to thrive because it asks analysts to discuss positions that they disagree with and which they know are not NFAC had and the inferences that were being made about him. 21. The point of this exercise is three-fold. First, it would encourage the analysts to be more explicit about their reasoning processes by masking them contrast their views with the ones they have rejected. Second, it would lead them to marshall their evidence in a systematic way. Third, the process of working through the alternatives should encourage the analysts to think more thoroughly about some of their important beliefs. Some.of the problems we located in the dominant interpretations could have been addressed at the time if the analysts had proceeded in the manner we are sug- gesting. For example, it might have become clear that the belief that the Shah would crack down if the situation became very serious was impervious to almost all evidence short of that which would appear at the last minute. Similarly, a thorough analysis of what was believed and why might have shown the importance of what Khomeini stood for and thus led to systematic efforts to gather more evidence on this question +E) SEGRET  23. Predictions as an Analytical Tool. As Richards Heuer has pointed out,* studies in psychology show that people tend to maintain their beliefs and images in the face of what in retrospect is an impressively large amount of discrepant information. We all tend .to see the world as we expect to see it and so are slow to change our minds. As the open literature has discussed at length, this tendency is not always pathological since much evidence is so ambiguous that we could not make any sense out of our world unless we allowed our interpretations to be strongly guided by our ex- pectations.** But there is an ever-present danger that the analyst will fail to properly interpret, or even detect, evidence that contradicts his beliefs and so will maintain his views--perhaps even failing to see the alternative--in the face of mounting evidence that is incorrect. 24. The case of Iran reveals a need for analysts to make sharp and explicit predictions as a partial corrective for this danger. The point of this is not to exaggerate how much we know or to develop a scorecard, but to encourage the analysts to think about the implication of their beliefs and to have them set up some indicators of that events should not occur if their views are correct. This can sensitize them to discrepant information which they would otherwise ignore. Of course having a prediction disconfirmed does not mean that one should automatically alter the most basic elements of one's beliefs. The fact that demonstrations grew larger than most analysts thought they would does not mean that they should have jumped to the conclusion that the Shah was about to fall. But since most people correct their beliefs too little rather than too much as new information appears, paying special heed to events that do not turn out as expected can be a useful 25. Explicit predictions would have been especially helpful in the Iranian case because, as we discussed in other sections, much of the discrepant information arrived bit by bit over an extended period of time. Under these conditions it is very easy to fail to notice that events are occurring which would have been unthinkable a year before. Systematic procedures are needed to make analysts reflect on the gaps that may be developing between the events and the implications "Cognitive Biases in the Evaluation of Jntelli enee Estimates," "Analytical Methods Review," October 1978. **Robert Jervis, Perception and Mzaperc Lion in international Politics, Chapter 4.  ? AT/1T Y?~ J TOP of their basic beliefs. Thus it might have been useful if shortly after Sharif-Emami was appointed Prime Minister and made significant concessions to the opposition, the analysts had made explicit predictions about their impact. Without this, it was too easy to overlook the degree to which the developing events did not fit easily with an optimistic assessment. Similarly, analysts could have tried to clarify what level of intimidation they thought would be effective in discouraging the opposition and the size of protest marches and demonstrations that they thought the dissidents could muster. We think that one reason why the analysts did not see the full significance of the number, intensity, and nature of the demonstrations was that they became too accustomed to them. The size of the demonstrations and the number of casualties were implicitly compared to what had occurred in the last weeks or months rather than being matched against expectations generated by beliefs about how serious the situation was. Thus as the scope of protests increased, the amount of unrest that the analysts implicitly accepted as . being consistent with their belief that the Shah could survive also increased. Had they made explicit predictions at-various points in the spring and summe might have been quicker to reevaluate their position. underlying beliefs.* 26. The belief that the Shah would crack down if it became necessary might also have been subject to great doubt if explicit predictions had been made about the level of dis- order they thought the Shah would permit. Since the initial statements about a possible crackdown occurred in December 1977, it appears that when the unrest started many observers thought that this level was fairly low. Throughout 1978 NFAC received and occasionally made similar statements. No one noted that they had been made before, when the protests had been much milder. If analysts had been pushed to say not only that a crackdown would occur if things got serious enough, but how much protest would be required to trigger repression, their predictions would have been disconfirmed and they would have been more likely to re-examine their little impact. 4T he Embassy came close to doing this when it noted that the "initial...GOI reaction to the Tabriz riots is surprising and somewhat cheering. GOI has not gone into repress' mode... as many feared." (Tehran 1879, 23 February 1978, But be- cause everyone was focused on the possibility of e Shah's "overreacting" and the possibility that things might get out of control was remote. the disconfirming of a prediction had --T OF CoD  relevant groups could accept. 27. Not only predictions, but some ways of reminding people of them, are necessary. To use an example from the Embassy, it argued that the moderates might be satisfied if Prime Minister .Amuzegar and some of his leading cabinet members were replaced and if.a serious anti-corruption cam- paign were undertaken. "Concessions of this nature might at least bring the moderates into the political process and permit the GOI to direct its police and intelligence efforts against extremists..." (Tehran 7882, 17 August 1978, S/NF) Within a few weeks the new cabinet of Sharif-Emami had gone much further than this and yet the moderates remained un- appeased. Recalling the earlier analysis might have stim- ulated a closer examination of the belief that the moderates could be conciliated, thus separating them from the extremists and permitting a compromise that the bulk of the politically 28. These predictions need not be made in official papers and would not be for the purpose of attempting to foresee the future. Rather the process of making the predic- tions would help the analysts understand the full implica- tions of their beliefs, and the predictions themselves could serve as benchmarks which could help the analysts avoid the common trap of seeing too many events as consistent with 30. Happily NFAC production on Iran..did not err griev- ously in-this area. In describing the religious opposition to the Shah, NFAC publications used "fundamentalist," "con servative," and occasionally "dissident" as adjectives. When a new term that becomes equally resistant to change. to authoritarian LDCs. "Extremist" and "moderate" are 'troublesome in that they may reflect more-of the attitude of the user than of the person or institution described. Very often such an outmoded or incorrect term is so deeply embedded in the lexicon that only heroic efforts by strong- minded people will root it out. Usually it is succeeded by 29. Simplistic Terms. Intelligence: publications have a long history of using shorthand terms. They have the advantages of brevity and of conveying understanding to a readership not necessarily familiar with the country or subject being discussed. But there are traps in such usage. Shorthand terms such as "left-wing" or "right-wing," derived from Western political processes, are usually not applicable  TOP t+r. G'n r. m : to an analyst was not constricted by length re uirements he has attempted to define the terms he used. formation to consumers through the use of shorthand terms are many. We think that all those involved in the production process--managers, analysts, and editors--need constantly to keep in mind the prospective readership of the document they are working on and to question whether a given term will give a reader a correct, and not just a brief, understanding of the phenomenon it purports to characterize. 32. Discussion and Review. A basic problem with the process by which finished intelligence was produced in the case of Iran was that there was little sharp and critical discussion among the analysts. NFAC does not have any institutions that provide the functions of both evaluating and stimulating the analysts that are performed in the academic world by peer review. Analysts are then not chal- lenged and confronted with conflicting views and counter- arguments as much as they could be. In practice, coordina- tion of finished intelligence rarely leads to discussion of fundamental judgments. Peer review is certainly no panacea, but it can both help evaluate the quality of work in instances where consumers are not experts and can help .the analysts by leading them to see where their arguments might be altered or strengthened. It is hard to do good work in the absence of mechanisms for performing these func- tions. NFAC has all the requirements for peer review except appreciation of its value. Most analysts and managers ap- pear to consider it threatening rather than helping. The reception of NFAC's long papers on Iran is an illustration of. the problem. Although the State Department's Country Director for Iran said that Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran "should be required reading for newcomers to the Iranian scene" (the Iranian analyst in INR and a senior Pentagon official were equally laudatory), almost no one offered substantive comments and criticisms. Without claiming that criticism automatically leads to better analysis, we' would have been more properly characterized as a group prepared to acknowledge a role, albeit limited, for the Shah and desiring greatly enhanced powers of their own. 31. The possibilities for conveying misleading in- Nonetheless, there were unclarities; the "moderate" religious opposition  think that its absence renders learning aond improvement very difficult. The analyst is operating in something of a vacuum. He cannot easily see alternatives to his own perspective. He does not have colleagues to point out information he may have missed or interpretations he should consider. 33. The lack of a "community" of analysts dealing with a problem, a subject, or a country is noteworthy. The division of NFAC and its predecessor by discipline contributes to this. So do the small number of analysts and fragments elsewhere) and the infrequent communica- tion across disciplinary lines. An additional factor is the tradition in ORPA's predecessor office of?analysts working on "their" country, building a psychological fence that others 34. The effective size of the community was even smaller than these numbers indicate. Within NFAQ, the senior politi- cal analyst was-generally deferred to because of his long experience in and deep knowledge of Iran. The consequence was not only that one voice carried great weight, but that this analyst did not have the opportunity to test out his ideas on others who might disagree with his conclusions or make him fully articulate his assumptions and reasoning processes. 35-. L Iwho has seen finished intelligence produced by a variety of organizational forms, notes the importance of the current absence of institutional competition and the supportive criticism it can provide. The mechanism that once existed where a current office and an estimate of- fice looked at issues from their different perspectives was not a cure-all, but it did offer. on a regular basis opportunity for different approaches to surface. The exchange involved sharpened argument and caused people to examine assumptions. No such opportunity existed during thud we are reviewing. Its demise is a considerable loss. 36. The size of the relevant community was further reduced by the isolation of the ORPA analysts.* They had few close OER analysts were not as isolated becauae OER is the largest, and probably the most important, of the government groups work- ing on other countries' economies and is..plugged into a network of economic analysts in other agencies. , ' Phe establishment of the Iran Analytic Center (mid-November) may have alleviated some of the problems of analysts' isolation which are discussed below. 33 - a TJL  .rnn ~(3EGR ? 1 38. Relations with people at State were not close. Several years ago the Iranian desk officer had weekly meet- ings of Iranian specialists throughout the government con- cerned with'policy and with intelligence, but when a new further inhibits trying to develop such contacts. outside the government are of course hesitant to talk to anyone from the CIA, and the expectation of being rebuffed 37. The senior political analyst knew several outside experts fairly well, but not so well as to be in close touch with them during the crisis. This is especially striking because many of his concerns were "academic." But, until only a few years ago, close contacts were encouraged by only a few offices in the DDI (NFAC's predecessor); most analysts were not urged to meet outside experts or given travel money to go to meet them--and old attitudes die hard. Many people had thorough talks about what was happening in Iran. contacts with academics or other informed experts outside the government; they had few conversations with people in State or NSC; even during the fall they were-not involved in any of the inter-agency meetings that considered the Iranian problem, except for ones involving the NIE. (NFAC was represented by the NIO or his deputy.) The problem is not only in the lack of discussions between NFAC analysts and those from other agencies--ORPA and OER analysts rarely desk officer was appointed this pattern was broken. Once broken, it was. hard to re-establish. The NFAC analysts felt they could not re-establish it, in part because of the obvious difficulty of getting people to come out to Langley, in part because meetings sponsored by NFAC would be of limited interest to many potential participants because they would not deal with US policy. The OER analysts frequently talked to their opposite number on the Iran desk in State and they have. told us that these exchanges were very bene- ficial, both for the information and the ideas that were gained. There were few conversations between the ORPA analysts and the desk officer, however. This was especially unfortunate because the latter was probably the most pessi- mistic official in the government. The analysts had fairly frequent discussions with George Griffin, Chief of INR/RNA, South Asia Division, but these almost always concerned specific pressing questions and did not lead to a general exchange of views on such topics'as whether the opposition would split or whether the Shah would act decisively. Furthermore, most  qrnP SECRET conversations were carried out via regular. telephone lines (INR offices do not have, secure phones at hand) and so had to be very restrained. 39. Thus the differences between OR?A and INR were never argued out. Griffin (and presumablx! Precht) read the NID (and several long NID items in the fall of 1978 were concurred in by INR), NFAC analysts read .NR's dissenting footnote of 11 September and its slightly pessimistic IIM of 29 September. Bu ey never sat down together to learn exactly where they differed and why_ 40. There was no contact between thca analysts and people from the NSC. Again the analysts felt they could not take the initiative, and since they almost never saw the rel- evant NSC staffer there was no opportunit.? for them to de- velop habits of exchanging views. 41. As the crisis developed, inter-agency meetings.were devoted to Iran. As noted above., NFAC wav represented by the NIO or his deputy and the "working level".analysts were not present. Furthermore, the NIO did not tell the analysts of what was said at these meetings, what people in other agencies were thinking, where the arguments they were making in the NID might be revised in light of other opinions, or what assump- 42. As the NIO became more pessimistic during October, he understandably lost faith in the political analysts' judgment. As a result, he did not engage; in full exchanges of opinion with them. The analysts suffered by missing the knowledge that others in NFAC and outside disagreed with them and losing opportunities to have their arguments chal- lenged and rebutted; the NIO suffered by losing some of the information and insights held by the analysts and by not being able-to develop his arguments by testing them out on an expert 43. Several NFAC analysts mentioned that throughout most of the period of growing unrest, they reinforced each other in their beliefs that the Shah could survive. They were not wrong to draw added confidence from the fact that there was a high degree of consensus, but given the fairly-small number of analysts involved and the difficulties in`Predicting what would happen, it might have been helpful tD have sought wider TOPGE* 'F  4'1nn eF1nn rs J tion that does not fit the prevailing views. views. There was one such meeting with outside experts in late October 1978 sponsored by State, and several of the analysts later remarked on the range of information and contacts which the, academics had and were struck by the latter's general pessimism.* Without resorting to the arti- ficial device of devil's advocates, the bringing in of a wider circle of analysts might serve the function of chal- lenging assumptions and increasing the sensitivity to informa- point, see above, p. 27.) 44. Because so much of the analysts' time and attention must be focused on summarizing and simplifying the confusion and complexity in the area of their specialization so that it can be understood by harried generalists, there are few in- centives and opportunities for the analysts to develop more fully their views in as much sophistication and depth as they are able. In calm times, the kinds of papers we think were needed in the summer and fall of 1978 probably will be of little use to consumers. The audience will have to be others in the intelligence community and perhaps FSO's on the country desk in the State Department. But without greater incentives for the analysts to write for their colleagues as well as for their superiors, we wonder if they can be prepared to foresee crises and deal with them when they arise. (For a related 45. Especially when the number of NFAC analysts working in an area is small, we think it is important for them to have as extensive contacts as possible with outside experts. With- out this the analysts may not come to grips with the range of possible interpretations of events and may end up presenting facts and interpretations that are far removed from what other knowledgeable observers believe. This problem is especially great when one deals with countries which consumers know relatively little about. Any number of important facts could be mis-stated or omitted and very questionable interpretations could be asserted as though they were universally agreed-to without consumers being able to detect the problem. For example, Iran in the 1980s, (August 1977, reaches quite favorable judgments about the GOI's programs in such areas as family planning, education, and the economy. It 'EOther participants detected no substantial difference between government and outside discussants.  TOP SErn R r. m l~ ? a claims that "Iran will probably come close to the Shah's goal of a per capita GNP equal to that of Western Europe by the - " (p. 30) Iran-After the Shah, (August 1978, states that "There is tittle in the Shah's overall reform program that would be objectionable-except to the most reactionary and conservative groups.... The reforms have generally been a success because the Shah has had enough authority to push them in the face of the usual bureaucratic inefficiency and lethargy." . 21); also see NIE draft of 6 September 1978, p. I-14, These judgments may be correct and may even be area vy all experts in the field. But without drawing on a wider circle of-experts there is no way of assuring that this is the case. In our judgment, NFAC should make strenuous efforts to assure that its understanding of various countries; i.e. the crucial background beliefs against which the interpretation of specific events is done, is as deep as possible. As with employing alternative argu- ments (above), the activity that can build such understanding must be valued and rewarded by NFAC; results will appear in the long-term, not in immediate production. 46. Although contacts with outside experts may be of some assistance if made during a crisis, they will be most fruitful if the analysts have developed working relations with them over an extended period of time. Of course this is difficult when the turnover of analysts is high and in any event requires NFAC management support for travel anc 47. In addition to maintaining close contacts with outside experts, NFAC could have involved some people wit1xin the Agency who had not been deeply involved with Iran. Such persons, even if they shared the basic predisposition that the Shah was strong and the opposition weak and divided, might have been quicker to notice.the discrepancy between their views and the evidence of growing demonstrations. Having no stake in the previous predictions, they could have found it psycho- logically easier to take a new look at things. And because they would not have been experts on Iran, they would have been more likely to focus on some of the basic questions which the more experienced analysts by now took for granted. It may have been no accident that by early October the I was relatively pessimistic, and he was new to his job. .. 37 -  TOP SECRET T _ - -- R The Estimative Mechanism 48. While unrest was building in Iran, a proposed NIE on the future of that country was being drafted. The process had started early in 1978 because it had been several years specific events. 49. The drafting of the NIE did not lead to a fruitful discussion of important issues, perhaps because there was a great deal of agreement among the participants.* The last draft of the paper does not reveal tighter arguments, more .and sharper alternative perspectives, or more carefully de- veloped evidence than does the,first draft. The scheme of organization changed, some topics were added and some were *INR was more pessimistic, as is most clearly shown by its footnote of 11 September 1978 INR's differences ap- parently first surfaced at the initial coordination meeting of 28 July, but not in strong enough form to have an impact on the NIEL, and were repeated more vigorously at the 30 August TOP SECRET  J --TOP SECRET attention on major judgments. deleted, and minor alterations allowed individual positions to become community-wide ones. But by and large, all that happened was that separate parts of the drafts were paper- clipped together rather than integrated (e.g. the political and the economic sections). The NIE suffers from a rambling style which lacks tight organization and well-crafted argu- ments. In many places the paragraphs often seem to be placed at random; even, paragraphs themselves lack any clear line of march. The document is hard to read and?arder to remember. Partly for these reasons, the,NIE did not focus the reader's 51. Judging from the changes in the successive drafts of the abortive NIE, most of the energy of this process went into subtle wording changes that would be apparent only to someone who had seen several versions. To show this, we have reproduced a paragraph from the 21 July and 6 September drafts, underscoring the changes.. The Shah is supported sometimes without great enthusiasm, by all significant elements of the cur- rent power structure. The cabinet,lparliament, the bureaucracy, the security forces and most of the busi- ferent light. 50. The reports of the analysts confirm the impression produced by reading the drafts: they did not learn much from putting the paper together. Their ideas Were not challenged by others in the community; they did not have to probe their own pre-existing beliefs or the evidence .they had felt was significant; no flaws in what they had thought were brought to the surface; no one made critical and penetrating comments on anyone else's analysis; no one was led to see things in a dif- nes-s and commercial community are all on his side. Although many might abstractly prefer a more dem- ocratic system, even those who are lukewarm about the monarchy, the Pahlavi dynasty or both are uneasy The Shah is supported, often without great enthusiasm, by most significant elements of the cur- rent power structure. Influential persons in the cabinet, parliament, the bureaucracy, the security forces and the business and commercial community when they consider the uncertainties about t acter of a government without a strong Shah. rrrW SECRET a  TOP OECD ET i 53. In retrospect, it is apparent that the government would have been better served by a paper that did address the shorter-term questions. To have asked for. such a paper, how- ever, would have required a,recognition that the Shah was in serious trouble, and given the prevailing beliefs, that could not have occurred.until the end of August at the very earliest. Indeed, INR called for such a paper on 12 September. But it took a week for NFAC to decide that such a paper should be produced and another ten days for the State Department to draft it. Apparently influenced by the mid-.September lull, the paper concluded that "The Shah no longer appears to be in immediate danger of being overthrown. There is considerable question, however, of his ability to survive in power over the next 18 to 24 months." The paper was much more sharply focused than the NU, u still failed to address several of the questions mentioned in other sections of this report which would strongly influence the Shah's fate. Whether this IIM would have served a useful purpose is difficult to determine. In any event, D/NFAC decided not to pursue it "on the grounds that it considers too immediate a time frame; what.is needed is a new draft NIE that... considers both near and long-term problems." (Chronology of Iran NIE, page 4, 1,7 wt......vn'h e r 107Q alone absorbed, by the policy-makers. 52. Part of the reason why the important issues of who supported the Shah, and with what intensity, did not get ana- lytical treatment in this forum may have been that the partic- ipants do not see the NIE, and especially the body of the paper, as opposed to its principal judgments, as particularly important because they doubt whether it would be read, let strong monarch. are generally on his side. Although many would prefer a more democratic system, even those who are lukewarm about the monarchy, the Pahlavi dynasty, or both, are uneasy when they consider the uncertainties about a government without a important questions. 54. it is obvious that a lot of time and energy was ex- pended in these efforts, with little to show in terms of re- sults. We think that managers could have done a better job of focusing NFAC resources on the timely analysis of the most of October, but by this time it was no longer relevant. TS) Such a draft was prepared by the NIO?s Orrice aL LzL - 40 - ~~1  9FeP EGR iT culties in this case. 55. At the risk of a ea in rochial, one of the authors of this report wishes to point out that the intelligence community once had as estimative mechanism which could and did produce analytical papers (SNIEs) on issues such as that of the Shah"s position and short-term prospects in a few days or a weak. Such produc- tion forced analytical attention on what management and policy-makers (if they asked for a paper) considered to be the important issues. The present lack of an institution with such capacities may have contributed :0 the diffi-  1. This section presents a general survey of the way in which NFAC intelligence production used the information .available to it on Iran. Issues which are discussed at length in separate sections below are noted only briefly here. Most of those issues relate to the 1978 period, and because so much happened in 1978, we have provided (Annex C) a chro- nology of events, official reporting, NFAC coverage, and public commentary for 1 January - November 1978. 2. During July-September 1977, reporting on domestic political affairs focused on several events. a) The Embassy reported (Tehran 7086, 10 August 1977,0 and A-124, 25 July 1977,Oon three petitions by men of letters, lawyers, and members of the dormant National Front. A-124 was a general assessment of intellectual and religious opposition as of mid-summer; we refer to it below in the Religious-based Opposition. b) The appointment of a new prime minister and changes in the cabinet were anticipated by Embassy re- porting although the Embassy did not identify the winning candidate for prime minister. The Embassy reported that the change in prime ministers was a response to criticism of electricity shortages and that it emphasized the role of the sole legal party. which was headed by the new 3. The potential for terrorist activity was discussed and assessed. by the station, Embassy and Defense Attache. All three were concerned with whether the year-long lull in such activity might be broken. 4. Embassy reporting (Tehran 6991, 7 August 1977, 0 Tehran 7074, 10 August 1977,0 and Tehran 7494, 22 August 1977,discussed reasons for the changes in certain cabinet minis ers. They indicated the Shah's awareness that Iranian agriculture was in trouble and that the extensive outages of electrical power had begun to have a serious effect on the population in Tehran and other cities. The Shah's speech to Parliament in September stressed that agriculture must be developed and laid blame on the planning organization for. many of the problems in the development process and resulting stresses that were becoming apparent in Iranian society. - 42 -  --TOP en'nn r. T J 5. The reporting conveys a general sense of business as usual, that the Shah is in control, and that he continues, as he has for years, to make all major and most minor deci- sions. There is some expression of concern over the possibility of student demonstrations after the universities opened in late September. There is clear evidence of concern over a resur- gence of terrorism which had taken six American lives some years earlier. 6. The NFAC (then DDI) publications fall into four categories: a) A major study, about a year ;in the making: Iran in the 1980s was published in August. It was substantially completed in May, though minor updates were made in July. b) The NID carried ten items ors: political matters relating to Iran of which eight were?tn Iranian inter- national relations, one was a short piece on the appoint- ment of the new prime minister and another reported the attempt to assassinate the Shah's sister in France. c) There were 11 items in the O;RPA periodical for regional specialists on the Middle East and South Asia--six were on international affairs and five on domestic affairs. d) Miscellaneous publications included a mention in the Human Rights Weekly Review for 15-21 July of an anti-discrimination bill making its way through the Iranian Parliament. There was also a typescript memorandum--"The Terrorist Threat Against Americans in Iran"--which concluded that terrorist organizations "do not at this time pose a threat to the stability of the Shah': regime but they do remain a major security problem. ,The threat of ter- rorist attacks against US citizens and Iranian officials remains high in spite of the lull . : . this ear." 30 September 1977 7. The five articles in the ORPA periodical which dis- cussed domestic political developments draw on field reporting to discuss the Shah's liberalization program, the limits to criticism of his policies that would be permitted, and the problems posed for the Shah if criticism Were to exceed established bounds. The analysis notes that over the previous - 43 - T012 SL`Gn r. rr~ 1\L 1  TOP SEC Shah is completely controlled b the US." Another article in RET of the regime had softened. July 1977,F reported the emergence in pub is after an absence of more than a dozen years of National Front politicians. "Iran: More Dissident Activity" 17 August l977,___ analyzes the three petitions of criticism making the judgme hat the demands of the National Front "are completely unacceptable to the Shah." This publication notes that many of the National Front leaders "accept as an unchallengeable fact that the year or so official Iranian attitudes toward public criticism (17 August 1977, assessed the Shah's effort to get a tun6tioning political ty established, noting the prevailing view in Iran "will cynically assume that this is just the latest of a long series of artificial creations to give the appearance but not the reality of political freedom." Finally 14 September 1977 discussed the petitions of protest, noting that the Shah's objectives ap- peared to be either to let people criticize, to force critics into his tame political party or to suppress all objectionable criticism. The paper judged that "he would take this [last] course if criticism exceeded permissible limits and attacked the institution of the monarchy on a regular and systematic 8. Reporting on domestic matters in Iran in the fourth quarter of 1977 focused extensively on demonstrations by uni- versity students, changes in Iranian planning for economic development, the potential for terrorist violence, and, they relate in the period, the potential for anti-Carter mani- festations. The last was in preparation e President's brief visit to Iran, 31 December 1977.1 9. In October there was a flurry of reporting about demonstrations by university students demanding that female students be segregated on university campuses. The Embassy, noting that "University demonstrations . . . are old hat in. Iran," stressed a genuine congruence of government policy and feelings of most students that the demonstrations were tionary. (Tehran 9082, 13 October 1977 H mysterious circumstances.) religious opposition . . . is still a force to be reckoned with." (An unreported event was the death of Ayatollah Khomeini's son in Qom under what,the Ayatollah considered. (:28 October 1977, commented that "the disturb- ances . . . served to remrn the Shah that conservative sEe~'  T_ P-&PBRET- 10. More violent, larger, and decidedly anti-government demonstrations took place for several days beginning in mid-November. Demonstrations in several;; universities in Tehran and in the provinces were large and violent but not out of the ordinary by Iranian standards. Early reports that students had shot policemen turned out to be false. These demonstrations took place at the soLme time as the Shah's visit to the United States, during which violent demonstrations involving thousands took place here in Washington. (NID, 18 November 1977, Student disturbances quieted down by early December, andite concern that 7 December, a traditional anniversary for Iranian student demonstrations, would prove violent, the:: day was fairly peaceful. 11. As of October 1977 the Shah's policy of allowing some discussion and criticism of government policy and action, usually referred to in field reporting under the shorthand of "liberalization," had been in effect for about a year. There were indications at the beginning of the quarter that the tolerance of dissidents:; was continuing. (Tehran 9623, 1 November 1977 More letters and peti- tions criticizing government ac. ion and policy were reported (Tehran 10064, 14 November 1977,Fland, particularly Tehran 10216, 18 November 1977 The atter contained a list of ten demands by 56 oppose ion figures. The demands--including freedom of press and publications, free :elections, freedom for political association--went far beyond what in the Embassy's opinion the Shah would be wiling to permit. Around the end of November the government took steps indicating that the limits of criticism had been re,ached. A SAVAK goon squad broke up a meeting of National Front people held on private property on 22 November. commented that this showed how much the government feared the National Front. s noted that 8AVAK decision to use force was effective in the short run, but would be counter-productive over the long term; it would work to encourage people to turn to violence against the regime. reported that the National Liberation Front as of early November had gotten the agreement of all major elements of the nationalist dissident movement and ---TOP [r r. /~ r~ r. ~n 8ECRE i  TOP SECR Ems` TOP most of the terrorist organizations to work against the regime by peaceful means and that it was workin with sympathetic religious figures. A later report the minutiae of some demonstrations. carried considerable information. They also reported on 13. In the area of the potential for terrorist activity, messages originating from US military installations in Iran path of swaying the regime by peaceful means. noted that SAVAK violence against the National Front on 22 November might turn extremist elements away from the noted a slight upturn. in ter- "W ror st activity but no ing of an alarmist nature. material we reviewed.) (Tehran 11408, 27 December 1977, observers did not notice and which is not reported in the 14. A year-end wrapup on recent student and dissident disturbances noted that university disturbances had become an annual fall occurrence although "repression in the period. 1972-74 resulted in fewer such disturbances in 1975 and particularly 1976. This fall all signs indicate students were encouraged to demonstrate by Shah's visit to US and well advertised liberalizations of local regime controls which preceded it." The cable further noted that the lack of reaction by the government to various petitions during the summer and fall encouraged both their signers and many old oppositionists to hold the meeting on 22 November which incurred government-sponsored violence. The cable also said "obscure and puzzling have been the circumstances sur- rounding demonstrations by religious persons or in the name of religion," two of which called for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini. (Khomeini circulated a letter in December blaming the regime for his son's death; an event which most Western note that "support for the idea of a constitutional monarciy and a general cleanup of corruption in government is strong. In the provinces, dissatisfaction with the government centers around economic and religious issues." reported that middle-level government officials believe t at "The Shah is concerned, but not gravely concerned about the present situation." He also is reported to believe that religious oriented dissent represents a serious threat.  9POP Jrim 16. NFAC coverage of Iranian affairs included a sum- mary of the memorandum, Iran in the 1980$ which had been .issued in August. Coverage in the NID consisted of a two- part assessment (12 and 14 November.1977y_of the Shah as a ruler timed to appear when he visited Washington. in addition to an article on 18 November:. 1977, the NID on 30 December also contained a brief item on a bomb explosion in a ranian American Society building washroom in December. 17. The analysis essentially says tnat the Shah is in control and is likely to stay in control. If. . . there is no serious domestic threat to the Shah's rule. At 58, he is in good health and protected by an elaborate security apparatus; has an excellent chance to rule well into the next decade." (NID, 14 November 1977 , The analysis;does mention the fears and concerns of Muslim conservatives. It recognized that the middle and lower classes are very dubious about what the Shah's drive toward modernization is:doing to traditional values. It, as early analysis had done=recognizes that problems will, over time, be created. It judges that the Shah is able to cope-but that his successors "will undoubtedly be hard-pressed to meet mounting pressures within the system." 18 November 1977, In this and in earlier docu- me~there is a clear r cogn ion that there are stresses, that they are severe, but that it will by some time before they get unmanageable. These judgments Flo not differ from those held by the Embassy as reportod in Tehran 11408 (27 December 1977, C). 18. The events which ultimately brought down the Shah began with demonstrations in Qom on 9. January 197.8 which re- sulted in a number of dead. The government's initial explanation was that rioters had attackeo a police station. Later information indicated that the pol.Lce had panicked and fired into a crowd nowhere near a poLice'station. The Embassy described this event as the worst: of its kind in years. (Tehran , 11 January 1978,7 and Tehran 0548, 16 January 1978, NFAC covered this event on 20 January, noting that there ad been greater loss iof life than the government had indicated.and judging that "religious dis- sidents would be considered a more serious threat if they were thought to be allied" with other opposition elements. The item notes that such an alliance ispiossible but that. information is scarce. (NID, 20 January 1978 47 - S-EGIRE1111  10 February 1978, 19. As is now well known, demonstrations and rioting followed a 40-day cycle during 1978. Prior to the first repetition at Tabriz on 18 February, ORPA's periodical publication carried an analytical piece explaining the bases of religious opposition to the monarchy. It noted the dilemma that the Shah faced; i.e., if he permitted his basic programs to be challenged demonstrations would continue and probably intensify; if he crushed demonstrations he would be accused of suppressing liberties. After explaining the antipathy between government and Shia clergy and referring to a decision by Khomeini in 1975 that participation by Muslims in the Shah's newly formed Resurgence Party was evil and therefore forbidden, the article concluded by saying "it seems likely that tension will continue between secular authority and the religious community with violence breaking out from time to time. Neither side will prevail completely but neither 20. Rioting in Tabriz on 18 February was extensive. Tehran 1710 (18 February 1978,0 said that the "level of violence is surprising." The Consul in Tabriz took a par- ticularly gloomy view of the situation saying that the door that had swung open for religious and social forces would not be easily closed. The "Embassy believes situation not that difficult." (Tehran 1879, 23 February 1978,] The Tabriz events were reported in the NID (21 Februar' y 1 78, and the possibility that they might presaae a rise in Azerbaijani nationalism was explored in March 1978, 21. Some disturbances occurred at the end of March and early April and a divergence in field reporting on them ; noticeahlp In this judgment it was in agreement wi the F-inancial Times widespread dissatisfaction on the part of conservative reli- gious elements. It judged that "the riots, demonstrations and sabotage in many cities and towns in recent weeks are no give an impression that the violence in a arge number of Iranian cities and towns was fairly serious. Embassy reporting (Tehran 3146, 3 April 1978, C) gives a more reassuring picture of "low level violence" with small groups attacking banks, public buildings, movie houses, etc. NFAC covered these events reporting that they grew from - 48 - -9FO-P SECRET  of 14 May and wa from an article in the New York Times of 18 May. Both the NID of 5 May And the Human Rights Review o 4 May no ezi that the Shah was going to take a hard line with issidents' and troublemakers. 22. In anticipation of a new outburst on the 40th day llowing the early May troubles the NID (17 June noted that the Shah was trying to improve rela- obstacles on the way to a durable compromise. tions with the religious leadership but that there were many 23. After some two months of relat#ve quiet, the Iranian scene had begun to heat up in late July and early August; dis- turbances individually were not very serious, save in Isfahan, which was put under martial law on 11 August, but they came to occur on a daily basis as the month wont on. The anti- regime repercussions from a movie-theater fire in Abadan a few days later, which killed some 400 people were strong. The regime tried to pin blame on elements al.ied with religious opposition; the latter with considerable success in the public politics. (NID, 10 August 1978, As it happene events quieted down .n Iran after mid-May. The 40th day comrgemorations in June were peaceful stay-at-home events, and it was not until late July that matters began to heat up again.' the occasion being the death in a road accident of a Shia clergyman. There was no NID coverage from mid-June until earl, August when the Shah's promise of free elections was anayzed. The analysis noted that this promise was part of his timetable for develop- ing the Iran he wanted, that there never had been free elec- tions, and that the Shah would have continuing problems with the National Front and the religious opposition. His success would depend greatly on "the willingness~of a generally ir- responsible opposition" to forgo violence in favor of - 49 - T`!~ri nrl~~n r. m  TOP nr.nnrm demonstrators in Tehran by troops later that day. 8 September and the killing of a large number (c. 300 mind put the blame on the regime. The repercussions showed the Shah that religious elements needed to be placated. His decision was to appoint an elder politician with reputedly good connection with religious leader, Sharif -Emami. NFAC noted that this appointment showed how seriously the Shah viewed the situation, but also that the appointment might be taken b Muslim leaders as a capitulation. (NID, 28 August," There is reason to believe that some of them did. At any event, religious leaders organized a massive, peaceful protest on 4 September (a religious holiday) and in defiance of government orders forbidding such demonstrations, a second on 7 September. These demonstrations led to the imposition of martial law in Tehran and 11 other cities on reach accommodation with religious leaders. Political of - fairs in Iran were given fuller treatment in "Iran: Prospects for.the Shah," (NID, 14 September 1978, which laid out the difficulties that the Shah and his associates would have in trying to cope with various opposition pressures. It made the point that given the limitations on how far the Shah was willing to liberalize, opposition leaders would need to show a greater'willingness to cooperate if a resolu- tion of Iran'.s problems were to be reached. It noted that such cooperation was alien to the society and would not come easily. This element was repeated in other intelligence publications in the next couple of months, carrying the implication that such cooperation will not, in fact, be forthcoming. They do not, however, go on and draw the con- clusion that efforts to effect a compromise acceptable to the Shah and his opponents would almost certainly fail. reported the new cabinet, stressing that it was trying to -n_Y _e ess important National Front which reject com- 24. The events of late August and early September, as we now know, constituted a major turning point. The pos- sibility of a compromise was probably lost then, although there was no way of knowing it at the time. Just prior to the imposition of martial law the Embassy, summing up the situation in Tehran 8485 (6 September 1978 noted the very strong anti-regime stands of the religious leadership a d th 1 - 50 TOP fir.C E1  Comments 25. The conventional wisdom concerning the staying power of the Shah's regime is mentioned easewhere in this report and need not be repeated here in detail. The reasons for holding it were his proven record of :survival, the loyalty of armed forces, weakness of political (secular) forces, belief that the Shah was ready and willing to use the force necessary to suppress opposition. The Shah in- tended, as part of his plan to secure a dynasty, to con- struct a political edifice that would function after his demise. He had not, however, let anyone know when and how he intended to do this, and his actions of loosening and tightening the political reins confused participants and observers and led some of them to conclude that he was losing his grip. 26. The demonstrations and deaths in January and February, were not in themselves cause for alarm. The con- tinuance of the cycle in late March and early May was, and concern was reflected in the NID article of 17 June, when 40th day violence was due to take place. But the commemora- tion was peaceful. When trouble began again in the latter part of July it happened piecemeal, and was not well reported according to the documents we have. During August, anti- regime momentum built up, coming to a head on 8 September with the imposition of martial law and the killing of some 300 protesters. 27. One can argue that those observing Iran should have taken a good, hard look at the way events were shaping up as of early September 1978 and reached a judgment that the Shah was in serious trouble, perhaps in danger of being overthrown. The NIE then in progress offered such an op- portunity, and State/INR did express a dissenting view even though it was fairly mild. Within NFAC, people did consider the situation and, no doubt influenced y their judgment of the army's loyalty and by the "he's down, he's up, but he'-s more up than down" tenor of field reports on the Shah's moods, considered that he would stay inpower. The relative peace that prevailed for a month after 8 September helped in maintaining this optimistic outlook.. And so did the rela- tive paucity of arguments to the contrary; W- 51 - ECRET  28. The language used in NFAC publications, however, is different than that of a few months earlier. Both the political and economic intelligence talk of problems and difficulties. There is no sense that the Shah will have everything his way. But the overall impression is still that he will probably be able to outmaneuver his opposition. Only with the definitive failure of the regime's efforts to publicly divide Khomeini from the less extreme ayatollahs at the end of October, and the subsequent establishment of a military government does NFAC conclude that "the Shah has delayed so long in taking decisive action that he has reduced substantially his earlier good chance of preserving the Pahlavi dynasty with powers like those of the past." - 52 -  ---TOP TADp1 SECRET WHITE REVOLUTION 1. In retrospect, the analysis of the difficulties of staging a "white revolution" was a bit superficial and over- optimistic. Perhaps the analysts, like many non-governmental observers, were misled by the Shah's many successes--real and apparent--and so lost sight of how hard it was to mod- ernize, liberalize, and yet maintain control. History pro-. vides few examples of leaders who have been able to do this over an extended period of time. That the Shah was able to do as much as he did is a testimony to his resourcefulness. Without suggesting that one could have predicted with cer- tainty, that he would eventually fail, we think. that the problem was serious enough to merit more careful and sus- tained analysis of the situation he was in and the problems he faced. Our conclusions and evaluation are on pp. 65-67. A Politico-Economic Problem 2. Three aspects of the issue are apparent, and we do not think that it is only hindsight that makes them stand out. One is the impact of the huge influx of oil money on the coun- try. On this point NFAC's product suffered badly from the separation of political from economic analysis (a subject to which we will return). The deficiency is a common one and exists outside of government as well as in it. Analysts are trained in either politics or economics, and institutional barriers inhibit joint work, with the result that topics that combine both subjects do not receive sufficient attention. Thus. it is disturbing but not surprising that NFAC papers gave the facts and figures on economic growth and change, talked about the rates of inflation and the bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the economy, but never explained what this was doing to the political system. More specifically, little was said about the changes in power that were occurring and the resulting grievances among those who were losing out economi- cally--at least in relative terms and losing political in- fluence--even in absolute terms. Brief mentions are sometimes made. Thus a short part of the economics section of the draft NIE of 6 September 1978 was headed "Basis for Popular Unrest," and began: T912 eEGR t; rr  "Most Iranians have gained little in terms of stan- dards of living from the oil and construction booms, and discontent with the Shah's economic and military, priorities could add to labor unrest in the years ahead. . . . The gap between rich and poor has wid- ened, and the poor have been particularly hard hit by inflation. . . . The small-scale artisans, re- tailers and providers of services and simple manu- factured products that constitute the private sector have languished for lack of credit and because of high taxes. . . . As in the past, programs to expand housing and social welfare will be carried out slowly. The Shah's development program seems likely to lead to growing discontent among the urban poor."* Some of this analysis also appears in the.NID for 18 Se tember 1978 and similar analyses are presented in CIA ER 4 SentemhAr 197A Although a bit bland, this analysis was better than tat found in the section of the NIE dealing with the "Power Structure": "The Shah has deliberately aimed his program at the common man, hoping to build mass support, make easier the building of Iran into a modern industrial state, and assure a peaceful transition and: reign for his son. At this point, however, it is.riot clear whether the Shah has achieved positive ma-ss.support or simply 3. Further analyses were needed, especially of the polit- ical implications of these economic changes. Not only did in- telligence need to try to find out whether the Shah's support was eroding among the working classes which were generally thought to have benefitted from his rule,`but there was a need for analysis of the changing position and attitudes of FeRE  TOT] UE R C~Tl~ r. E m .. 4. These economic changes produced several effects. First, the quality of life was actually lowered for some people, especially those who were hard hit by inflation. Second, many, important groups lost power and influence as new entrepreneurs made their fortunes, often through connections with the regime. Thus it is not surprising that the bazaaris strongly supported the opposition. Third, foreigners had a large role in the economic changes--and were probably seen as even more important than they actually were--thus increasing nationalism. Further- more, since the Shah was closely identified with foreign in- terests, he was the target of much of this feeling. Fourth, the dislocations and rapid changes led in Iran, as they usually fore they arise should be discouraged. bazaaris and other segments of the middle class. The political impact of the cooling off of the economy after mid-1977 should have been examined. The common belief, mentioned in many NFAC publications, that the greatest dangers would arise in the mid-1980s when oil revenues decreased, social problems accu- mulated, and the Shah tried to arrange the transition to his son's rule helped to distract attention from the present problems. Had this belief been borne out, NFAC would undoubt- edly have been congratulated on its foresight. That it was not does not mean that such attempts to see problems long be- should have known that they called for close attenticn. do, to a resurgence of traditional values, in this case reli- gious values. Hindsight makes these patterns clearer, but they are common ones in societies'undergoing rapid economic growth and we think that both analysts and management in 5. The second aspect was the peculiar nature of the oil boom, which posed special problems. Not only was the increase in government revenue both terribly rapid and terribly large, but the government did not have to develop efficient state machinery for mobilizing or extracting resources from the general public. This enabled the government to avoid un- popular measures, but it also had two unfortunate side-effects which were not treated in the NFAC papers. First, the govern- ment could avoid heavily taxing the rich. While this had some political benefits, it allowed the income disparities to in- crease markedly and fed resentment among the rest of the society. Second, it allowed the government to forgo ties to the grassroots--either repressive or mobilizing. It was thus easy for the government to :Lose touch with mass opinion. - 55 -  It lacked the organizations and cadres which could have channeled demands, transmitted information and coopted local leaders, and exerted control through means less intrusive than SAVAK. These efforts are difficult ;and often fail, but in most cases states that do not have some success along these lines simply cannot bring about great social change because they lack the instruments for doing so. In sum, the oil boom allowed the government to foster` large-scale social change, with the resulting disruption of riuch of society, without having to develop the instruments' that could help ameliorate some of the problems and chann :1 and control the dissent. The GOI apparently realized thi and tried to de- velop the official. political party and se`;eral auxiliary organs (Tehran Air rams A-124, 23 July 1977, ^ and A-157, 19 September 1977, PR AME 77-054, 14 September 1977, ile thaneitfseemRd_all ed. The government was then more- The Shah's Liberalization Program 6. The third aspect of the Shah's jeneral dilemma that received insufficient NFAC analysis was the problem of liber- alizing a repressive regime. This problet was mentioned with some frequency, but there was no detailedxand careful discus- sion of how great the problem was or how the Shah might cope with it. This question was of obvious importance after the fall of 1977 when the Shah started to liberalize and when the USG had to decide how much to push the Shah to liberalize, but at no time in the succeeding year was 'there an NFAC dis- cussion that was more than a few sentences long. In early August 1978 when the Shah pledged that the forthcoming Majles election would be completely free and whex Sharif-Emami in- troduced a number of wide-ranging reforms a month later, the question of the ability of the government.;: to carry out this policy, without losing control of the country should have been sharply raised. These measures and this pir-oblem were of course overtaken by events, but since this was not known at the time we do find it surprising that they did not; receive more atten- tion. By early September the new political parties were al- lowed to form, the government sponsored Repurgence Party was allowed to collapse, free debate was permitted in the Majles and the press was allowed to what it'wanted. These WRYLY T__L)"L1 n T~ ~ ` ' ~ r~  TAT,TRT T 7. Field reporting was skimpy on these questions. The Embassseportindid not express concern that the Shah was moving too fast or unleasing forces he could not control,* and it provided little information on which the opportunities and dangers of the program could be evaluated. It occasionally worried that the Shah's inexperience with this kind of endeavor would lead him to commit tactical errors and appear indecisive (Tehran 4836, 21 May 1978, and as the unrest and reforms picked up speed in mid-September it felt the "Critical question . . . is how fast GOI can move to implement [Sharif-Emami's] program and convince fence-sitters and oppositionists that GOI is serious about political free- dom and social justice." (Tehran 8659, 11 September 1978, also see Tehran 9157, 21 September 1978, Thus :the Embassy felt both that the way out of t he difficulties lay in the Shah's pushing ahead and that halting the liber- alization would incur high domestic and foreign costs. But partly because of its lack of contacts with non-elite groups, it could say little about how the program would be received. It seemed to assume that the Shah had broad support throughout the country and that many of those who had doubts about the regime would be won over by a degree of liberalization which would show them the Shah was moving in the right direction.** 8. In 1977 Embassy reporting had been skeptical about how much the Shah would liberalize because it thought "this could only be done if it is perceived that [greater] opposi- tion is safely manageable.in security terms, and that the system is stable enough to afford what the Shah calls the On 1 June t e Embassy noted that "There is ZittZe reason for us to doubt the Shah's commitment to liberalization. . It is obvious, however, that he is having trouble keeping Pan- dora's box only partly open." (Tehran A-80, 1 June. 1978, Similarly, in mid-August the Embassy pointed out that "The Shah is on a tight rope--trying to minimize violence while channeling political conflict into electoral realm." (Tehran 7882, 17 August 1978, While this set the general problem ll we , the rest of the ca e, which offered acute comments on a number of topics which are quoted in other sections of this report, did not add much information or analysis. - 57 - OP SECRET  'luxury of dissent.'" (Tehran Airgram A-124, 25 July 1977, C) As the Shah moved much further and much faster than anyone had expected, no one returned to this common- sense analysis. The Shah had previously felt that much milder reforms were incompatible with the security of his regime. Why would they not be tertibly dangerous now? How could the Shah reconcile a high degree of liberty with the maintenance of much of his power? The Embassy's reports did not address the question of whether the Shah could win out in a free political struggle, although the sections quoted above imply an affirmative answer. Similarly, the Embassy reported former Prime Minister Hoveyda's prediction that "nearly two-thirds of current Majles [of 268 members] could be re-elected in an honestly free election." (Tehran 9689, 5 October 1978) INR'S view seemed a bit ..less sanguine: i the,June 1979 elections are:substantially free.. . the opposition probably will do relatively: well. The Shah's power will be further eroded." (Footnote to Iran NIE submitted by State, 11 September 1978, could hand him a defeat no matter how they went. NFAC did not address the issue of the Shah's ability to with- stand free elections; the elections were scheduled for June 1979, and NFAC's analysis was directed at the immediate future. Thus elections 10. The Shah's basic dilemma was illustrated by one minor incident that the Embassy reported. In late Septem- ber Sharif-Emami's government proposed to grant to univer- sities a degree of autonomy, much more than they had enjoyed in the past and more than anyone would have dreamed possible six months earlier. But this did not bring calm to the campuses: "Initial reaction of some - 58 - rTz-vP SECRET  toward significant political and economic reform."* saftey valve. . . . Much of the sense of crisis built up over the past months has abated. There is a valid prospect for a stable but generally orderly society moving liberalization had been very effective in "shifting the. venue of dissent away from the streets" and into normal channels. The willingness of the government to permit dissent in the Majles and mass media "has done much to prove the government's sincerity, and acts as an important said that the co ination of martial law and political In one, 11. The Station provided only two reports on the liberalization issue, but they are quite informative nn S. was going to appear in many other contexts. faculty has been fairly stiff criticism . . . and a deter- mination to push for real autonomy. . . . Contrary to earlier-expressed GOI hope that if bill were being reviewed when school opens this would help quiet things down, it now appears that unless GOT is willing to make real concession on autonomy now, it will have left major issue on table which can be easily seized upon by those who wish to--provoke demonstrations." (Tehran 9366, 27 September 1978, A month later the government was forced to promise reforms so extensive that the Embassy noted that if they were carried out "Iranian universities will be more independent than American universities or those of most 9the democratic countries." (Tehran 10384, 24 October 1978, The obvious question was whether this process much more pessimistic. Whereas the first saw martial law and liberalization as working cogec-ner to curb violence and promote legitimate dissent, the second saw them as posing "an intricate dilemma" which would bring down the government. To proceed further with. the anti-corruption program, for example, would be to implicate many high officials. But to curb it would show that the reforms were report, 1978, 0 and Tehran 4583, 14 May 1978, C). *A milder version of this argument was voiced by the Embassy during an earlier period that tried to combine liberalization with a firm hand--see Tehran 4526. 12 May was  12. NFAC analysis was alert to the general problems posed by liberalization quite early and generally not only did a good job of summarizing the reports from the field but also adopted a slightly more pessimistic--and more accurate--view than the Embassy. But NFAC production was not thorough, penetrating, or sustained. It stayed too much on the surface of events, in part because of the pressure to report the latest developments, and did not come to grips with the basic problem of whether the Shah's dictatorial regime could safely permit a high level of political freedom. Part of the explanation is that the pace of liberalization was fastest after late August and by this time so many things were happening that the analysts had to carefully ration their attention. The demonstrations, strikes, and riots were more pressing and had to be reported. 13.. As early as 10 February 1978, noted an aspect of the problem when he analyze t e protests of the month before: Such demonstrations have been encouraged by the recent worldwide interest in human rights and by the somewhat more lenient policies the government has been attempting to follow as a result of foreign criticism. The government--and therefore the Shah--is in something of a dilemma. If it permits its most basic programs to be challenged, demonstrations will continue and probably intensify; if it meets suchdemonstra- tions with force, it can be accused of suppression of civil and religious liberties. Short of capitulation there is probably little that the government can do to mollify most of;its 0 onents. 10 February 1978, Also see ran: e a s 'Hundred Flowers' Campaign," 14 September 1977, 14. When the Shah continued the new policy of allow- ing public criticism of his regime and tried to cope with the winter and spring riots with as little bloodshed as possible, Oney noted that "The new line of tolerance of dissent adopted by the Shah presents the security forces with the problem of how to control public.,:disorder without. 60 -- --TOR SE-GRET  TOP e~nD E''f~ Z J resort to the harsh measures of suppression that hav been common--and effective--for the last 15 years." 7 April 1978 After the announcement that the Mai es elections would-be free, Oney pointed The Shah is taking a calculated risk. Just as his more liberal approach to dissent in the last two years has resulted in violent demonstra- tions by those hoping to force more concessions from him, so the promise of free elections is likely to produce new political ferment. . . . His success will ultimately depend on the willingness of a generally irresponsible opposition to forego violence in exchange for a legal political role. . The next year in Iran could, like 1906, 1941, and 1953, be a turning point in Iranian history. Sinbad, the Persian who let the genie out of the bottle, 9 August 1978) A shortened version of this memo which ran in the NID the next day omitted the last two sentences. 15. But after this, NFAC production said little about the consequences of liberalization. On 11 September 1978 the NID reported that the imposition of martial law had not weakened the Shah's commitment to liberaliza- tion and on 14 September the analysts made the important point that "The radicals are portraying both the Shah's liberalization program and his recent concessions to the religious community . as a reflection of his weakness.  They argue that they must now exploit this by demanding further and more extensive concessions." 15 September 1978) This paralleled the observation in the NID two weeks earlier that "The Shah's appointment of a new cabinet [headed by Sharif-Emami] could be interpreted by some Muslim clergymen as a capitulation to their de- mands. This could encourage Muslim. leaders to push for further political concessions, such as the right of the Muslim clergy to veto Parliamentary legislation--some- thing the Shah is certain to reject." (NID,, 28 August 1978, These articles pointed to a dynamic process which the Shah would not be able to control and indicated why limited liberalization was not likely to succeed. But this was never stressed or treated in more detail and depth. The strength of these forces was not compared with those that were conducive to a peaceful solution and the potential clash between the Shah's desire to liberalize and his willingness to use force if the protests got out of hand (see below, pp. 72-74) was not noted.* 16. On 16 September the NID argued that the com- bination of martial law and political liberalization might be effective when it presented a cautious version of the first of the two station reports?,discussed above, and included the important reservation that the clergy still showed no willingness to negotiate 16 September 1978) *In this same period, INR's proposed footnote to the draft NIE put the problem more sharply:: "The conflict between the liberalization program and the need to limit violent opposition raises serious questions about the Shah's ability to share power and to maintain a steady course in his drive to modernize;. Iran." (11 Septem- ber 1978, 62 - TOP GRET  TOP SECRE - 63 - TOP SE T  +0_P BEC-R-FT- 18. Little attention was paid to the ability of the radical opposition to create sufficient unrest to make it difficult for the Shah to avoid haltirfq liberalization and establishing a military government, as he eventually did in early November. The desire to prevent this out- come was mentioned in a field report as One reason why the moderates opposed large demonstrations during Muharram (the especially important religious month beginning in early December), and an massy cable in UctoDer no.e e danger that even if the religious groups; preached an agreement with the government, other elements might continue the unrest. "The government would [then] have to face up to continuing disturbances whose forceful repression might involve bloodshed--and thus force the religious leaders back on the warpath toypreserve their position ulation." (Tehran 10061, 16 October 1978, 19. When NFAC analysts returned to the dilemmas of liberalization in late October, they sounded the same themes they had a month earlier: "The political liberaliza- tion [the Shah] once thought would mark the final stage of his labor now se instead to si nal''the beginning 20FOctober= "The of a greater task."7-S-1 Shah believes he must demonstrate to moderate opponents and politically aware Iranians that he has abandoned one-man rule and intends to build a libetalized government based on consent. At the same time, hiscritics must be persuaded that the Shah has no intention of stepping down and that further civil disturbances: would serve no useful purpose." (NID 23 October 1978 The problem with these statements is not tha ey are wrong, but that they should have been made earlier and formed the beginning of the analysis, not its end. The question of whether the Shah could survive, let alone prevail, in a relatively free political climate was never addressed. Indeed it was never even posed sharply enough to alert - 64 - 1\ir. 1  -TOP Q~nrs r. rr J not noted. others to its importance.* Similarly, the possibility that the Shah's commitment to continued liberalization might either make it harder for him to crack down or indicate a frame of mind which would not turn to repression was Conclusions and Evaluation 20. It seems in retrospect that had the situation not developed into a crisis in October and November, the attempts to carry out the announced liberalization would have led to-the development of greater domestic opposition. For the Shah to have cracked down would have become in- creasingly difficult and costly; for him to have allowed the process to continue would have undermined his power to rule and even to reign. Even without hindsight the problem was great enough to have called for much more attention and analysis. The 1961 NIE, "Prospects for Iran is not likely to be derailed by the protestors . . . as for its Zack of sustained argument. (6 September The proposed NIE did not help much. One of the princi- pal judgments of the final draft of the Long version was that "Popular reaction to the Shah's liberalization policies . . will provoke greater dissident activity and attacks on him." Its five-page section on "The Shah's Liberalization" can be faulted less for its optimistic conclusion ("His program of liberalization it Shah must expand "public participation in the political process" and "exercise sufficient authority to discourage those who . . . attempt to challenge the regime" and noted that "The dilemma facing the Shah is that these two courses of action conflict to a gr xtent," but drew no conclusions. (29 September 78 The thrust of the draft of a shorter NIE was simi ar. (22 October 19,78 greater authority is manifested. Thus,.lenience by the government can be more destabilizing in Iran than a show of force,." F_ I have a generally negative attitude toward government and tend to yield to the political will of others only when - 65 - TOP Q r O-4 T% T-1111  21. Five factors seem to account for the deficiency. First, information from the field was not particularly good. The analysts had little to go on... Second, there was great pressure to report the latest events and, especially in the fall, many things were happening that had nothing to do with this issue. From.m.id-year on the analysts had to deal with a steadily: growing volume of traffic and increasing demands for articles for the NID for memoranda, and for briefings. Further- more, e a lysts felt that it would serve no purpose to discuss a problem that would not demand the consumers' immediate attention for several months. ; In their view, a month or two before the elections woul..d: have been the time to treat the issues. Third, many of the dilemmas of liberalization were not unique to Iran but could have been well approached by an appreciation of the process as it was attempted in other autocratic states. The analysts, however, were not experts in such general problems. Their expertise was on Iran and similar countries. Yet there was little in the detailed facts of what was happening to provide adequate guidance. Analysts or-,scholars who were familiar with other countries' attempts to liberalize might have been able to help identify the crucial issues and note indicators that would show whether the Shah was succeeding, but they were not called in because this was seen as an Iranian problem and because such consulta- tions were not customary. (See further-discussion in Process, p. 27) 22. Those working on Iran may have shared the broadly held American view of liberalization as desirable. It is possible that this had an influence on analysis. If there was such an influence it was a subtle and unconscious one. 23. The final, and probably most important, factor is highlighted by the reception of the optimistic station report of mid-September. This led not only to a report in the NID, but also and was reflected in D/NFAC's testimony De fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 September 1978 in which he argued that 66 -  much of the explanation for the apparent abatement of the crisis was the combination o martial law and new freedom of press and parliament. This argument was not only plausible, it was also consistent with the belief that most politically relevant Iranians wanted to modify the system, not overthrow it. It made sense against the back- ground belief that the differences within the country were not so great as to preclude compromise. Part of the reason for the expectation that the opposition would split, discussed on pp. 79ff, was the belief that important actors wanted to preserve the shah as a bulwark against radicalism. A similar consideration seems to have been at work here. The Shah, most Western observers felt, had done a lot of good for his country, and many of his countrymen recognised this. Thus, as late as 25 October, the Embassy was referring to the "silent majority" that favored his retention, albeit p ps with reduced powers. (Tehran 10421, 25 October 1978, Since it was clear that the Shah was willing to grant many of the protestors' demands, it made eminent sense for a compromise to be struck on a major program of liberalization. This was, we think, a typically American view. (The authors differ on the extent to which such ethnocentrism may have than by the ultimate noncompromiser, Ayatollah Khomeini. by submitting to superior power. Given the belief that the Shah was strong and that he retained the support of the military and security services, analysts may have reasoned that enough opposition figures feared that the Shah's superior power would be loosed on them so that they would opt to accept what they had already won. With hindsight, it is fairly clear that many Iranians saw power flowing away from the once aZZ-powerful Shah and that they were more heavily influenced than observers knew 24. There is another possible explanation, and it hinges on the premise that Iranians do not compromise in the give-and-take sense, but rather that they compromise affected intelligence production.) - 67 T012 ir~T  TOP nTen r, m THE ISSUE OF THE SHAH'S WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE 1. One of the crucial beliefs that underpinned the optimistic analysis of developments in Iran was the view--from which there were few dissents*--that the Shah would be able to exercise control of the situation. In 1977, Oney noted that opponents of the regime placed undue faith in student and religious protest because they looked back to relatively successful protests in the early 1960s without realizing that the Shah was now .in a much stronger position. 27 July 1977, C) The events of most of the next year i not shake this confidence. The Embassy and the analysts thought that if there were a real and immediate danger to the Shah's regime he would clamp down effectively, even though doing so would have been costly. This view was shared by many newsmen--"Most diplomatic observers and dissidents agree that the Shah has more than enough resources to crush any serious challenge to his regime" (William Branigan in the Washington Post, 7 April 1978); "even [.the Shah's] political foes agree that he still has the power to crush any major threat to his rule," (An-Nahar Arab Report, 17 April 1978). Even a Marxist opponent of the regime agreed; he argued in a recent book that the Iranian terrorists "underestimate the degree to which the repression and post-1963 boom have placed new weapons in the hands.of the regime." (Fred Halliday Iran: Dictatorship and Development, p. 243).** 2. As the final draft of the proposed NIE put it: "The government has the ability to use as much force as it needs to control violence, and the chances that the Henry Precht, the State Department Country Director for Iran, apparently disagreed. But his views reached the NIO/NESA only in September and were not directly expressed to the other analysts. **The inherent plausibz z y o this view was reinforced in the minds of at least some of the analysts by the analogy .to 1963 when the Shah put down protest demonstrations by force. 68 -  recently widespread urban riots will grow out of control is [sic] relatively small. The limiting factors are the Shah's expressed desire to permit some liberalization and the possible fallout abroad from harsh measures. These limitations may encourage further demonstrations, but the threat of the force that the Shah has available if he is pushed too far will deter all but the most virulent opposition." (6 September 1978 pp I--14--I-15) This merely formalized and restated what ad been said often over the past year. As early as December 1977 the Embassy said that if student protests continued "we have no doubt the authorities are prepared to reimpose order forcefully." (Tehran 10777, 6 December 1977E After. the Tabriz riots, the Embassy explained that it di not share the gloomy views of the US Consul because GOI has until now refrained from using full range of social controls.:" (Tehran 1879 23 Feb,On 8 August 1978 the Embassy argued that the Shah "is thus far unwilling to wield a heavy hand unless there is no other way to proceed. This does not mean that he will not or cannot put the lid on again, because he can do so, although he would be faced-with even greater problems than in 1963." en ay , that "At some point, e a may be forced to repress an outbreak with the iron fist and not the velvet glove if Iran is to'retain any order at all. We have no doubt that he will do so if that becomes essential... . . He is mindful of what vacillation brought Ayub Khan and Bhutto in Pakistan."* (Tehran 7882, 17 August 1978, Even the relatively pessimistic draft Interagency n el- ligence Memorandum drafted by INR in late September declared: "Possessing a monopoly of coercive force in the country, [the armed and security] forces have the ultimate say about whether the Shah stays in power." (29 Sept., p. 9, 3. NFAC analysts took a similar position. On 11 May 1978 the NID concluded that "The Shah is gambling that his program of modernization has enough political support to allow him to take stern measures, if necessary, against the conservative Muslims." also repeated *See section, The Shah's Position, pp. 1:ir8-114. 10 69 - TOP SECRET  TOiii ^R T (Los Angeles Times, 17 March 1979) 4. Those further removed from day-to-day events shared this assumption. The NIO/NESA and his assistant reported that until well into the crisis they expected the Shah to be willing and able to use as much force as was necessary to re-establish his control. The DCI noted in retrospect: "I persisted, personally, in believing . . . well into October, that the Shah had the horsepower to take care of [the opposition]. At the right time, before it got out of control, [I thought] he would step in with enough power to handle it. . . . on the levers of power." (NID, in the NID for 17 June 1978, On 14 September 1978, NFAC reported that "The za is not minimizing the current challenge to his rule in Iran, but he seems determined to weather the storm and to keep a firm hand 6. Just because a belief is impervious to a great deal of evidence does not mean that it is wrong. This belief, furthermore, was not only inherently plausible, but had been supported both by the Shah's general history of behavior and his use of force to break up a dissident meeting in November 1977. But if an analyst does hold such a belief, strengthen, rather than weaken, the regime.) 5. The problem with this line of argument is not that it turned out to be incorrect, but that almost no evidence, short of the most massive and disruptive of protests, could have disconfirmed it. And by the time such protests occurred, they might signal the end of the Shah's regime. The Shah's failure to crack down at one point did not show that he would not use force in the near future. Thus the first nine months of 1978 did not show that the Shah could be forced out, and indeed it is hard to see what events could have shown this, given the basic belief in the Shah's as-yet unused power. Furthermore, this view fed an underestimate of the significance of the protests of the spring and summer, since the corollary to the belief that if matters were really serious the Shah would clamp down was the inference that if the Shah had not clamped down, matters could not be that serious. (Indeed this inference may have supported the belief that liberalization would - 70 - TOP 8r. Gn r. +  TOP SECRET vatar special precautions should be taken. Not only should especially strenuous efforts be made to probe whatever evidence is available, but consumers should be alerted to the danger that information that could disprove the belief is not likely to become available until the situation has gravely deteriorated. Furthermore, analysts and consumers who are aware of these- problems might reduce the confidence with which they held their. belief. No matter how plausible it seemed, the fact that the belief could not be readily disconfirmed provided an inherent limit to confidence that should have been' placed in it. cities in September. Missed Warning Signs 7. There were at least a few signs that the Shah was extremely hesitant to crack down that could have been noted. They stand out only in retrospect and even had the analysts singled them out for attention at the time it would have been impossible to have said exactly how significant they were. But we think that they could have been noted if the analysts had been fully aware that their important belief that the Shah. would use force when he needed to was not amenable to much direct evidence. Throughout the crisis, the Shah vacillated and used less force than most people expected. In early November 1977 the Emba-ssy noted that peaceful protests had not incurred the "crackdown expected by many." (Tehran 9692, 4 November 1977 At the end of the month the Shah signaled the lima s of dissent by seh.ding a goon squad to break up a large, but peaceful, protest meeting. But restrictions were soon put on SAVAK again. Similarly, in the spring the Shah first exercised restraint, then launched "private" violence against the dissident leaders (much to the dismay of US officials), and then halted the campaign even though the unrest did not diminish. Again later in the summer the Shah showed. that he was very hesitant to use force. He had to be persuaded by his generals to institute martial law in a dozen TOP SECRET  TOP cEnRrm None of this proved that he would not . crack own at a later stage, but it could have been seen as a warning sign.* 8. Vacillation not only cast some doubt on the expectation that the Shah would crack down,-but may have been an important cause of the growing unrest. On the one hand, the repressive incidents further alienated large segments of Iranian society and probably made people even more skeptical of the Shah's professed desires to liberalize. On the other hand the concessions to the protestors and the restraints on SAVAK weakened one of the main pillars supporting the regime and, more importantly, led people to see the.Shah as vulnerable. Finished intel- ligence noted the Shah's swings from repression to conces- sions, but did not point out that they might have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of the opposition. Here, as on other subjects discussed elsewhere in this report, NFAC did a better job of reporting events than of analyzing their probable causes and effects. 9. Similarly, tension between the Shah's sustained commitment to liberalization and his ability and will to crack down could have been noted. The two are not completely contradictory since the Shah could have planned on liberalization as his first line of defense and repression as his instrument of last resort, but in many ways the two policies did not sit well together. The Shah's willing- ness to continue liberalization and indeed speed. up its pace in the face of increasing unrest might have thrown doubt on his willingness to use massive force. 10. Another kind of evidence might have disturbed the belief that the Shah would crack down. The analysts knew that it was the policy of the US Government to - 72 - l.+R E 1  strongly urge the Shah not to resort to,repression. This theme appeared at the beginning of the unrest in the fall of 1977 and remained, and indeed was strongest, in late October 1978 even as NFAC analysts were concluding that the Shah's survival was problematical. Throughout the period of this study, the United States had believed it possible and necessary for the Shah to liberalize. In late 1977 and early 1978 this meant a curbing of abuses by the security forces; in the middle of 1978 it meant a continua- tion of the trend toward more political freedom which it was expected would culminate in free elections; in the fall this meant urging the Shah to view martial law as only a temporary set-back on the road to a more open regime and strongly opposing the imposition of a military government. Although a firm hand with the violent demonstrators might have been compatible with aspects of the liberalization program (and this was often the Embassy's analysis; e.g., Tehran 4526, 14 May 1978~ 7and Tehran 45.83, 15 May 1978, there was always tension etween these two policies (recognized in Tehran 7882, 17 August 1978, a tension that increased with the size of`the unres . By the late summer it is hard to see how a :crack down widespread enough to have been effective could have co-existed with liberalization. This view was not universally shared, as can be seen by the reports discussed in white Revolution, 11. In the earlier periods it could be argued that while the United States was urging restraint, this did not contradict the belief that the Shah would crack down if he needed to because the situation was not that serious and the main danger was that the Shah would overreact. But this was not true in September and October. Although it was still believed that the Shah could survive, his margin was seen as quite thin. If he were ever to crack down, 12. Of course it was not the job of the analysts to second-guess the policy-makers. But the knowledge of the policy should have led them to question whether the Shah would crack down. He might not take the American advice. Indeed, analysts may have come :to believe over the years that the Shah was not greatly moved by what American ambassadors told him about Iranian domestic affairs, and US representations did not.see:n to have much impact in the late winter and early spring. But - 73 - TOP- SECRET  TOP o r. e'n r. rr. Mi w given the vehemence of the American position the antes snouia nave notea two ings. First, there was strong pressure on the Shah to avoid repression even when the situation became extremly tense. Of course the Shah might crack down anyway. But everyone agreed that the Shah shared the Iranian view that nothing of signif- icance happened in his country that the US was not involved with. The Embassy noted his frequent claims that "some people" thought the United States was behind the protests. The analysts presumably understood that much of the American role in the 1953 coup was to give the Shah courage by stressing how much we supported him. The obvious danger, then, was that the strong American representations would interact with the Shah's distorted outlook and lead him to entertain real doubts as to whether the United States was still wholeheartedly on his side and fear that he would be deserted if he used force.* Second, the Ambassador and the State Department seemed to have a very different view than that held by the NFAC analysts--the former seem to have thought that a crack down would be neither effective nor necessary. The belief that it would not be effective contradicted the basic assumption of NFAC. The belief that is wasn't necessary indicated that NFAC's assumption was irrelevant, because the contingency it assumed would not arise. NFAC analysts could have tried to find out why the State Department disagreed with them and weighed the evidence and arguments that led to a contrary Events That Changed Minds 13. Two streams of events finally undermined the belief that the Shah would reassert control if and when he had to. First, the unrest grew to such proportions that reaction to American pressure. *The ORPA analysts have explained to us that although they did not pay much attention to this aspect of US policy, they would mention this factor in finished intelligence only in the context of reports concerning the Shah's - 74 -- OP CR T  the analysts came to doubt whether repression would be possible. This did not appear in finishes intelligence until November, but it seems to have been developing in people's minds from mid-October, with different people coming to this conclusion at slightly different dates.* For some, the strikes which started in early October and soon spread to the oil workers were most important. Force might be used to scatter demonstrators, but it could not produce oil. For others, the continued un- rest throughout the country was at least as important, for it indicated that people would go into the streets in larger numbers, and over a longer period of time, than had been true before and sharply raised the question of whether the amount of force needed might be more than the Army could supply. 14. The second stream of events contradicted the belief that the Shah would crack down. We have dis- cussed this at greater length in our treatment of NFAC's analysis of the Shah's changing moods, but here should note that for some analysts, events were taken as show- ing that the Shah lacked the will to use what power he had. In early October the Shah was givinq in to almost all the economic demands of the various striking groups and later martial law was being widely disregarded. For these analysts the crucial evidence came in a bit before that which showed. that they could not reassert control even if he tried, but this still was relatively late. On 11 Septmber 1978 INR submitted a footnote to the draft NIE which said in part: "We are duhous that the Shah, in the near term, can suppress urba' violence without substantial use of force. That, -'n turn, would further aggravate his difficulties by enZxrrging the circle of opposition against him and possibly ca:--'.ling into question the loyalty of the armed forces and secur-"ty services.". But this position does not seem ti; have been stressed or developed, at least not in md_erial which - 75 - TvrSEG T  TOP SECR T the Shah which told them tht he would not crack down. For unless something in the Shah's past behavior told them that he would not be firm and decisive, they had to await direct evidence of a failure of will in his handling of the current crisis. Field reports had paid attention to the Shah's moods from the late spring on, and many of them appeared in the finished intel- ligence, but they were read against the background of the basic belief in the Shah's strength of character and decisiveness. Although these reports indicated that the Shah was frequently depressed (but not wildly beyond reason, given the situation he was facing), they did not unambiguously point to the conclusion that he would not ask decisively if he had to. Analysts who started with the view that the Shah was weak, on the other hand, did not need the direct evidence of his unwillingness to move against the strikes and pro- tests of October to conclude that he would not meet the test. The NIO remembers a meeting at which the State Department desk officer said: "you've got to remember, the Shah is a coward. He ran away in 1953."* This, the NIO reports, was an unusual perception, and once he was convinced of its validity he no longer expected the Shah to survive. But if one started from the more common perception of the Shah as all the CIA analysts,did, one could not be expects change came to the surface again. *This statement is pithy but probably not accurate. In retrospect it appears more likely that the Shah's fundamental tack of self-confidence, noted in several NFAC papers, - 76 - TOPQECRET  TOP SECRET Conclusions and Evaluation 17. In'conclusion.,, white the belief that the Shah would reassert control if he had to was certainly plausible, at least until. the fall of 1978, NFAC dig' not,do as good a job as it could have in carefully analyzing the evidence' or in alerting consumers to the fact that clearly dis- confirming information would not arrive in time to give them warning that the Shah was in deep trouble. NFAC produced no papers which dealt with thi.s question. While TOP SECRET  TOP SECRET J 18. We think the primary explanation for these failings was two-fold. First, the belief was shared by all NFAC analysts (at least until the early faZZ), was very plausible, fitted with the pre-existing view of the Shah, and so became an article of faith. Most observers outside the government also shared this view and even in-retrospect it is hard to say why he did not crack down. The incentives to challenge this belief were slight. Second, it did not need to figure in the report- ing or analysis of most day-to-day events. When the Shah cracked down it would be news; until then the possibility still remained open. Only when the unrest grew to enormous proportions did his restraint seem important in explaining what was happening. So the analysts' main task of dealing with the latest events did not make them k more carefully at"this crucial belief. F_ 7 and Embassy. the Shah's moods were commented on, the possible im- plications for his deciding to use force were not drawn. The Shah's swings from leniency to repression and back again were not probed for patterns and clues to the future. Although much attention was given to whether the Shah could use force (e.g., the analyses of the army's morale), little was said about his willingness to do so. NFAC did not explore either the impact of US policy, which may have been magnified by the Shah's exaggera- tion of American power, or the apparent discrepancy between NFAC's anal sis and that of the State Department Trite i 6E .- i- r  TOP spettE SPLITS IN THE OPPOSITION 1. Another crucial belief was that the opposition would split. Before examining the evidence that was available and the inferences that were drawn, we should note that this be- lief was subject to the same problem as the expectation that the Shah would exercise control if things got really serious-- i.e., definitive negative evidence could not appear until the Shah was on his last legs. At any previous point all that could be known was that the split had not yet occurred. Given the obvious tensions within the opposition, one could never be sure that it would continue to hold together. Indeed, expec- tations of such a bargain were very high in the last days of October. The point is not that these beliefs were silly or automatically wrong. Even in retrospect, we cannot tell how close the oppositon came to splitting. But NFAC should have realized that the belief that a split was possible was not eas- ily'disconfirmable and alerted the consumers to the problem. 2. Furthermore, the belief that the opposition would split did not sit too well with the companion belief that the Shah could clamp down when,he needed to. Granted that one reason the moderates might split from the more extreme opposi- tion was fear that if they did not strike a bargain with the Shah, he would resort to force (this was noted in several of October's cables), but in other ways the two beliefs pulled in different directions. Repression would presumably unite the opposition and the longer the Shah waited for the opposi- tion to split, the harder it would be for him to repress be- cause the unrest was growing stronger. If the Shah were torn between these two possible solutions, he might well end up with the worst of both worlds. While one could believe that the Shah would first try to split the opposition and then crack down if he could not do so, this assumes that the failure would become obvious before the Shah lost too much power or 3. The belief that the opposition would split was wide- spread throughout the period under consideration. As the pro- posed NIE put it: The Iranian Freedom Seekers Liberation Move- ment would-like to become the spokesman for all oppositionists, but the disparity in basic views and personalities among the several groups makes this difficult and unlikely. Any cooperation TOP SECRET  TOP SECRET probably will be limited to paper pronounce- ments and minimal joint activity. There is virtually no chance that the opposition can develop a joint program that is meaningful and capable of.attracting popular support. (p. 1-15, 23 August 1978, The IIM drafted by the State Department on 29 September on "The Near Term Political Prospects for Iran (S/NF), which generally had a more pessimistic tone than the draft NIE, took a slightly different view: "Far from a disciplined coalition, [IFSLM] nevertheless provides a modicum of co- ordination among the opponents of the regime. There is a perceived need on the part of each faction in t e ali- tion to cooperate with the others." (p. 7) 4. Thi b the Embassy eels of NFAC. the common neiier in NFAC was a e opposition would split, D/NFAC stressed the heterogeneous nature df the opposition in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 September 1978 (Briefing Notes, Situation in Iran and the DCI has said that he did not think the oppositi could remain united. (,LA Times, 18 March 1979; Director's Notes No. 39, 7 February 5. There were several ways in which the opposition might have split--e.g., among factions in IFSLM"(an umbrella group for all 'political' opposition), between political and religious opposition, between moderates and extremists in the religious establishment. While the first two are ndt unimportant--one major opposition political figure became PM in December 1978-- the 'political' opposition did not have th'i numbers or the strength to affect the Shah's position on`.ts own. The fol- lowing discussion concentrates on what became the key issue, i.e., the split that the Shah wanted to br.ng about in the religious leadership and, consequently, it its following. Such splits were, as we understand it, not uncommon in modern Iranian history. 6. The Embassy's basic rationale for the expectation of a split was put in a cable of late May: - 80 - 9pop SECRET  The majority of religious leaders . have found it useful, or necessary, to join the ex- tremists managed . . . by Ayatollah Khomeini, but their motivation is different from his. Unlike Khomeini, who makes no secret that his intention is to overthrow the Shah . . ., these leaders have more limited aims in mind. Chiefly, they wish to call attention to their grievances. As long as the government was paying little attention to them, they had no reason to withhold support for Khomeini. Now there are indications that the government is beginning to listen. . . . Since many of these religious leaders see the monarchy as a necessary institution which helps protect Islam against communist challenges, and no alter- native to the Shah is apparent to anyone, they probably are prepared to be reasonable and settle for a rational, responsible attitude on the part of the government without any major changes in institutions. Rather, they hope for a more under- standing application of laws and regulations and a greater, more public recognition of the continuing importance of religion in Iranian life. (Tehran 5131, 20 May 1978, An airgram of 1 June made a similar point: The Embassy's soundings among religious leaders suggest an underlying basis of loyalty to the Monarchy and to the independence of Iran as the Shah envisions it, but increasing unhappiness at the breakdown of communications between the religious leadership and the Shah . He is attempt- ing, therefore, to open better channels to the re- ligious leadership and will doubtless act on.some of their complaints. If done deftly, this should go a long way to assuage them and lead to a break- down of opposition unity. (Tehran A-80, 1 June 1978 Slight variants of this analysis were to be central to the Embassy's views until the end of October. This view was certainly plausible and probably contained a large measure of truth, but because of the scarcity of contacts with the religious-based opposition, it had to strongly rest on indirect inferences and second--hand reports and so should have limited the confidence that was placed in the con- clusions. - - 81 -  7. NFAC's basic analysis of the religious community, conducted before the current crisis, is'compatible with the Embassy's perception but put much more emphasis on their opposition, stressing that "the Moslem clergy are among some of the Shah's fiercest critics." (Elites, February 1976, p.. 43) Probably no more than 10 percent of the clergy . can be counted as outright supporters of the Shah. They are probably the: least in- fluential of the clergy. . . . Probably 50 percent are in outright opposition of the government and are wholly dependent on their popular following for support; this includes nearly every religious leader of any stature. The .remainihig 40 percent qualify as fence-sitters, maintaining a popular following but avoiding overt attacks on the government. The religious leaders have "their roots . . . in traditional Islam, and their constituency and support are found in the lower classes, the traditional middle classes, and portions of the modern middle class. They represent the din-e-mellat, the religion of the people as contrasted with the din-e-dowlat, the religion of the government." (Iran in the 1980s, August 8. For the sake of convenience, field reports and fin- ished intelligence on the question of whether the opposition would split can be divided into four periods:. spring and summer; late August to mid-September (the Sharif-Emami re- forms and the reactions to. the imposition of martial law); late September; October (the final attempt to split the op- position). Readers who wish to skip the'detailed treatment of these materials can turn to page 93, for our conclusions.. Field Reporting and NFAC Analysis Spring and Summer 9. In the spring and summer of 1978 some'evidence ap- peared that supported the view that the opposition coalition was fragile. It seemed generally agreed that Sharia-t-Marlari personally opposed violence and at times he and his followers - 82 -  opposed demonstrations that were likely to become violent (for 7890, 17 August Tehran i 1978, e, n an example, seethe report was T also see a so a report that "Shariat-Madari and his supporters have r Khomeini until it borders on hate f o increased their dislike because pro-Khomeini groups are blackmailing Shariat-Madari supporters by threatening to shut down or burn their shops in 1 August 1978, A-105 , the Bazaar." (Tehran Airgram Furthermore, a confidant of the moderates said that "The IFSL ecent liberalizin h e r has been 'reluctant) ' im ressed b t nf the Shah." 10. But in the period there were even more discouraging Et7mn i-hough. Shariat-Madari had "a reputation for hav- rotesting t om killin s that started the cycle ofguuVrest, intervi.ew to foreign correspondents in which he made an "open a (and unprecedented) public refutation of governientostate ents," -A -As ave (.Tehran 961, 26 January 1978 , or rejected the government proposal at he "cease supporting Khomeini, in return for which the government would be prepared to go to considerable lengths to.meet the demands of anu u.LU jiw 6 vrr~---~- 21 12th Imam's birthday on u h On 4 e cized" celebration of t M rch (Tehran Airgram A-10.5, 1 August 1978, the Economist noted that because Shariat-Ma arl was "thought olitical that he was counted nd a t p e a by many to aTe so modera as a tacit government supporter," and everyone was surprised al of the government. i i c t when he took a stance highly cr 11. Perhaps what should have been more disturbing were the references not to Shariat-Madari's immoderate actions, but to his lack of power. One report noted that while he not have a rsonal opposed violent demonstrations, While this is clearly an overstatement, said that "Khomeini retains an almost mystic respect o mass of illiterate population and Shariat- differ to a significant degree Madari feels that he cannot with Khomeini in public." (.Tehran Airgram A-10.5, 1 August 1978,  -ivP 8%cicn i At this point the Embassy commented: "We are not sure just how independent Shariat-Madari actually is." In the same vein, on 14 August 1978 the Embassy reported that the Shah said "extremists were able by their threats.and harassment to create a sense,of fear and uncertainty among the majority of religious leaders who then remain silent or at worst go along with extremists -f-protection." (Tehran 7700, 14 August 1978, 12. As early as 25 May, the Embassy noted that Shariat- Madari had disputed a BBC report that he and his followers had entered into talks with the government arid "issued letter denying that he has met with governmentrepresentatives,. stressing the complete sympathy of the Iranian people with their clergy, and noting that there are.no policy differences among the Moslem ulema." The Embassy cahcluded that "sensi- tivity with which both sides have viewed BBC leak . . . sug- gests that both are approaching subject ;seriously." (Tehran 4988, 25 May 1978, E -1 It also cold have suggested that Shariat-Madari was fully aware of hbw unpopular the Shah was and how dangerous it would be for him to appear to be less adamant than Khomeini. We do not want to argue that the evidence at the time proved that the latter interpretation was correct, but that it represented an alternative view, which was most accessible if one started from the ' er tive outlined on pp. 94-95 that should have been aired. sn_ 13. The occasional warnings culminated in an Embassy cable of mid-August which deserves to be` quoted at length: Moderates such as Ayatollah Shariatmadari do not at this time feel capable of?opposing Khomeini openly, though they reportedly still work for moderation within the religious move- ment and would doubtlessly welcome a chance to participate in an electoral process which might not leave them wholly subservient to Khomeini, who remains outside the country. In Shia Islam there is no institutionalized hierarchy: A re- ligious leader attains his prominence by con- sensus within his parish. Some of the violence we are witnessing here results froma fervid competition for eminence by the ayatollahs, moderation apparently does not beget followers - 84 - POP sFeRJET  TOP SEGRE-T- from the workers, small shop keepers and artisans at this time. A tradition of throne/ opposition dialogue does not exist in Iran, and neither temperment nor tradition favor western concepts of political conciliation and brokerage. The earlier efforts to establish a dialogue with the more moderate leaders were not pursued with much vigor and the objective of splitting the religious leadership has simply not worked so far. Part of the reason for this latter failure has been the threats and harassment of the moderates by the well-organized Khomeini fanatics; also, as noted earlier, no ayatollah wishes to lose his followers by appearing soft. Furthermore, the Amouzegar government (as op- posed to the Shah and the court) has proved sur- prisingly inept at dealing with religious elements on anything other than a take it or leave it basis. w If our general assessment is valid, the Shah has to find a way to open serious give and take with the so-called religious (and some political) moderates (.this will be hard to swallow because of his utter disdain for "the priests"). We should realize at the outset that this may ulti- mately prove impossible because of their ultimate demands.(as opposed to what they might accept as a part of an on-going process) would mean religious control of the government and reduction of the Shah to a constitutional monarch. The Shah would never accept the first and would. see the latter emerging only in the context of rule p ina to hi- son. (Tehran 7882, 17 August 1978, These comments, both on the moderates' goals and on their power, were never refuted by later Embassy reporting. The evidence provided was not conclusive, of course, and later events might lead the moderates to be willing or able to play a more independent role. But by mid-August they had- not done so,'and there appeared to be good reasons wh the would be very cautious about breaking with Khomeini. - 85 - mef, nr~r  min n 1 e,..-. 11131 14. Throughout this period, NFAC analysis made few comments on these questions. Although paper on the religious-based opposition on 10 Febru ed of the dif- ferences within the religious community, the government at that time was not working to divide the religious leaders and so it did not address th ibility later envisaged by the Embassy. In early June, ~7briefly returned to this subject, implying that a split was possible: "Too little is known of factionalism among the clergy to be certain, but it is likely that a considerable number of them, while unenthusiastic about the regime, would prefer not to confront it and risk greater loss sition and power than has already been the case." 2 June 1978 The Embassy and station reports summarize in the last p raphs were not covered in finished intelligence and there was no discus-sion.of whether the oppo- sition could be split, what the moderates' goal were, and how independent they could afford to be. With the exceptions cited above, NFAC products in the spring and summer referred to the religious community as though it were united. In some cases this may have been done in the need to keep the analysis brief (e.g. NID, 10 Aug. although even a longer NID re- port on 17 June, "Iran: Increase in Religious Dissidence," does not mention any split between Shariat-Madari and Khomeini. Late August - mid-September 15. When Sharif-Emami took office as the Prime Minister in late August, he made a number of concessions to the reli- gious groups (e.g., returning to the Moslem calendar, closing gambling casinos, removing Bahais from positions of power). But instead of being conciliated, the religious leaders ''Ironically, part of the closing paragraph of this report proved more accurate than later analyses. "Emissaries of the Shah are in contact with religious leaders, and they may reach some understanding on the need to curb further violence. There are, however, many obstacles in the way of a durable political compromise between the Shah and his conservative Muslim opponents, who believe that reforms instituted by the ""M ^'"d h1_0 father threaten the future a, Islam in Iran." appears and his neither Similarly, on 10 May the NID said that "There to be little room for compromise between the Shah conservative Muslim opponents." But on these occassions nor later was tt c tear whether the bulk of the onDosition was seen as fa;ling into that TOP C`L`GD 'CT  -~8ECRE P issued a string of demands. The Embassy's comment was.the "clergy have been slow to react positively, but historical background of their ties with GOI would not encourage opti- mism under best of circumstances. . . . Competition among local religious leaders . . . is not conducive to cooperative posture with GOI." (Tehran 8351, 31 August 1978,Other lists of religious demands are in Tehran 8548 7 September 1978 and Tehran 8485, 6 September 1978, 7this, how- ever, did not really address the question of whether the earlier expectation that the opposition would eventually split still held. 16. Events in early September, before the imposition of martial law, continued to provide both encouraging and discouraging signs although, at least in retrospect, the latter predominated. The report that the moderates could not exercise restraint, partly because the Shah had made so many concessions "as the result of mob terrorist activity" I I was con- sistent with the refusal of Shariat-Madari to negotiate with the new Sharif-Emami government. (Tehran 8485, 6 September 1978 But both these reports also carried some optimistic news. Tehran 8485 noted that while Shariat-Madari publicly said he and Khomeini were in complete agreement, "in other contacts Shariat-Madari is much more cautious and leaves room for eventual differences of opinion." And the source which said that the moderates could not. now exercise restraint also noted that "Moderate opposition leaders are afraid that the temper of the country is such that further violence . . . threatens the entire course of the movement toward representa- tive government." 17. At this point finished intelligence began referring. to the religious moderates and implied that the Shah's strat- egy was to separate them from the extremists by makin reason- able concessions. (See the NID for 28 August 1978 and 30 August and the Weekly Summary of 1 Septem er But it also pointed out that previous attempts to do so had failed (NID 30 Aug., nd concluded that while "some moderates may be satin the Shah's recognition of their importance, the more militant of his religious critics will be mollified by nothing short of his abdication." (Weekly Summary, 1 Sept. A few days later Oney argued that although "the new prime minister is optimistic about his main task--to try to find a modus vivendi with the clergy . . .--the only clerical reaction has been to demand more  concessions." 7 September 1978 The implications o is perceptive remark were not noted and the moderates ability to break with Khomeini'if they wanted to was not discussed, a serious omission in view of the fact that the purpose of the Shah's appointing Sharif-Emami's re- form cabinet was to strike a bargain with them. 18. The imposition of martial law and the killings of 8 September turned attention away from relations within the opposition, although when Sharif-Emami announced his program to the Majles, the Embassy implied that, while the moderates had not yet been won over, this remained a real possibility if the GOI carried out an effective liberalization program. (Tehran 8659, 11 September 1978 This seemed to be the view at every stage. As we note earlier, almost no evidence could disconfirm it. Furthermore, neither the Embassy nor the analysts noted that the government concessions, although not sufficient to win over any of the opposition, were massive by standards of only a few months earlier. In the spring, no one would have thought that the Shah would have gone as far as he did and, more importantly, most observers probably would have predicted that the sort of concessions which were made in August and September would have satisfied a large segment of the opposition and brought about the split which observers were anticipating. Thus the relatively lake-warm response to the concessions should have suggested either that the moder- ates would not be won over by anything the Shah could be ex- pected to do or that they had little power and could not afford to be seen as. opposed to Khomeini,`a conclusion sug- gested by the reports quoted earlier. In'either case, doubt would cast on the belief that the oposition would split. 19. In this period the finished intelligence had more to say on the issue than it had previously. But the analysis was a bit thin in both quantity and quality. On 14 September the NID discussed the issue more fully than it had in the past, and for that reason we shall quote all the relevant sections: Responsible opposition leaders, religious and political, will have to show a greater willingness than they have thus far if they are to accommodate the Shah's efforts to reconcile critics who want a greater voice in setting the pace and direction of p TOP 8EC ET  -TOP L. r. GRr. m J national policies. The bloody events in Tehran on Friday will make it more difficult for moderate op- position figures to rein in demonstrators and fore- stall radicals who call for the Shah's ouster. The divisions within the religious and politi- cal factions of the opposition will hamper the ef- forts of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami to begin nego- tiations with more responsible critics of the gov- ernment. Moderate opponents who may be inclined to open a dialogue with the Prime Minister will be .anxious not to be outflanked by radicals who will denounce their "capitulation" to the Shah. the moderates have refused to provide." (15 September 1978, The Weekly Review added that cooperation from the moderates would be extremely important--"cooperation that, thus far, Similarly the NID of 16 September pointed out Emami, who he said is 'unfit to govern."' that mus im clergymen ?. . still show no sign of interest. in negotiating a political compromise that would give the Muslim leadership a greater voice in government policy af- fecting religion but would leave the Shah's ultimate authority intact." Two days later the NID noted that "A leading religious figure, who has been urging the people to avoid violence, vowed that he will not cooperate with Sharif- 20. In iate'September the relations between the moder- ates and the extremists received more attention from the field. In a relatively pessimistic cable, the Embassy reiterated that in the past months "the Shariatmadari clergy did not dare to let itself be outflanked on the left and lose mass supporters to the extremists," but also stressed that "the nature of the opposition is not as unified as it might appear." (.Tehran 9158 21 Sept. 78, The Embassy did not, however, explain why the same pressures which forced the moderates to keep up with the extremists would cease operating. But a week later station reports came in which indicated that the Embassy might have been correct: Shariatmadari and other moderates: - 89 - T!1 !ten r. rY  9=OPsFexFT Have privately stated that they are very con- cerned by the increasingly radical nature of oppo- sition to the Shah and his government. These re- ligious leaders fear that this might result in 'political chaos and complete disorder,' which could prompt a Communist takeover or a military dictatorship. As a result of these concerns, these Ayatollahs are urging moderation on their followers and are actively seeking to enter into effective negotiations with the Ahnb L_ Another report L ran parallel But both these reports also struc pessi- mistic notes. The first said that "Negotiations have so far been hampered by the religious leaders' lack of confidence in emissaries who have already come to them from the Shah." A field comment in the second underscored the moderates' mis- trust not only of the emissaries, but also of the Shah him- self, noted the power of Khomeini over the moderates, and concluded that "Some of the moderate religious leaders' de- mands are in all probability unacceptable to the Shah . [I)t is unce tt i ~ a n what actions by the government would con- stitute an acceptable program for the religious leadership." 21. These reports were summarized f n NID of 29 September, which, partly because of the order in which the para ra hs g p were placed, emphasized the optimism. The bold-faced lead paragraph in the NID stated: "Important religious leaders in Iran are anxious for an accommodation with the government in order to solve the political crisis." Later nn namo apart." Of course it had appeared,'although wit ou emp asis e temb -- p er quoted above, but since these reports, if true, would remove many of the grounds for optimism, they deserved more thorough analysis. At minimum, the consumers should have been warned that the mod- erates' desires for a settlement might be irrelevant. Given the paucity of the information avail le,: perhaps this was i t,. all that cou] I---- . ve - 90 - TOP SMEGRET1  +r~n SECRET settlement and offered to try to bring religious leaders, in- cluding Khomeini,, along if the Shah made suitable concessions. 22. In mid-October hope for reconciliation between the government and-the moderates increased.. It rested on three not entirely consistent considerations. First, National Front leaders were reported to be increasingly anxious for a Paris does not lead us to fully share [National Front] source's optimism that Khomeini may be willing to go with local leaders.". (Tehran 10281, 22 October 1978, Third, shortly after'the Embassy reported that "Source close to moderates had told us,there would probably be public evidence tempts to deal with the government (although the Embassy noted that "our reading of the Khomeini published interviews out of indications that Khomeini m- g t sanction the moderates at- of break between Shariat-Madari and Khomeini within next week," (Tehran 9990, 15 October 1978, (Tehran 10059, 16 October 1978, complex talks between Khomeini and'the moderates and tftajmoderates and the govern- ment seemed to be starting. On 22 October the Embassy made the important point that the moderates "have begun to lower their apparent ambitious. While two or three weeks ago, many of these politicians were openly calling for the dismissal of the Shah., most of them now quietly state that they accept the need for the Shah's continued leadership, albeit within the framework of a democratic, constitutional society. These same figures have also begun discreetly to disassociate them- selves from Khomeini and to urge restraint upon the mullahs." The reasons were the growing fear that a military government would take power if the unrest continued and the "greater sense of self-confidence" on the part of the religious moder- ates, who "are in the process of negotiating an understanding with the government, which would entail their allegiance to the Shah." Furthermore, the moderates had more room to ma- neuver because "the Khomeini star seems to be waning." (Tehran 10267, 22 October 1978, This report was consistent with the earlier conversation with a representative of Shariat-Madari in which he "confirmed what we had been told previously by others: moderate religious leadership respects Sharif-Emami and appears ready to work with him despite prob- lems engendered.by martial law. . . . We have somewhat more. doubts about moderate leaders' ability to bring Khomeini aboard, but suspect merely muted opposition which would give moderates a breathing space would be satisfactory." (Tehran 9904, 11 October 1978, This seemed also to be Sharif- Emami'sl view, since he said he was close to a deal with the moderates and that Khomeini was going to "remain quiet." Second, there were some - 91 - mep nr.r.RttT  m~r~ Cr T.`/ti T1 'L`T' 1 V 23. The one discouraging note was supplied by a SAVAK official who stressed that the negotiations "cannot reach a successful conclusion as long as religious leaders fear the adverse reaction of Ayatollah Khomeini to any agreement which permits the retention of the Pahlevi dynasty. . . SAVAK is convinced that moderate Ayatollahs desire an accommodation with the government which will defuse the present tense situ- ation. However, these Ayatollahs know that they will be deserted by their followers, if after an,.agreement is reached Ayatollah Khomeini co s it." also see Washington Post, 2-9 October.) 24. The NID generally mirrored these reports. On 14 October aid that Sharif-Emami was "making some progress in his negotiations with moderate religious leaders-." The "moderate opponents now realize that the radical actions to which they had contributed mi ht tri er a comple a collanse of governmental authori-y." also see 20 October) A week later the NID re- por a -rime Minister seems confident that he can reach a modus vivendi with moderate clerg,,.men that will isolate extremists led by Ayatollah Khomeini," an expectation it neither endorsed nor contradicted. (23 October, A few days later the NID told of a tentatiV agreement between Sharif-Emami and the moderates, although: it pointed.out that "a number of.pitfails . could wreck chances for restoring stability." The report concluded cautiously: "Emissaries of the moderate opposition are trying to persuade extremist re- ligious leader Khomeini . . . to drop his demand for the Shah's overthrow and accede to the accord. The::chances seem bleak in view of Khomeini's implacable opposition to any compromise with the Shah. The moderate opponents therefore will prob- ably be forced either to formalize a split:: with the extrem- ists or to repudiate the fragile accord w:th the overnment.". (26 October, On 31 October, the NID reported inn cEGni^~n'  i IN Conclusions and Evaluation 25. We do not think this issue was treated well in the finished intelligence. At best it summarized the reports from the field and did so--to its credit--often with a slightly pessimistic tone. But until mid-September it did not even do this very well. As early as May the belief that the Shah could split the opposition was one of the main pillars supporting the conclusion that he could weather the storm. Yet NFAC finished intelligence said almost nothing about this until September. The Embassy cable of 17 August which questions the ability of the moderates to break with Khomeini did not make its way into finished intelligence. 26. In the spring this subject received little atten- tion because the analysts concentrated on explaining the general causes of the unrest, reporting the disturbances as they occurred, and discussing the danger that the Shah might use excessive brutality in an "overreaction." Furthermore, no finished political intelligence was produced in July, al- though work continued on the proposed NIE. To the extent that relations among'opposition groups seemed important, analysts drew attention to the improbable "alliance of con- venience" between the moderate left (National Front) and the religious right. (NID, 17 June 1978, The ques- tion of whether the latter community itself wou split took on most significance only after it became clear, first of all, that it was supplying the bulk of the support for the pro- tests, and, second, that the Shah felt the situation serious enough to require concessions to the religious moderates. Nevertheless, NFAC was a bit stow to see the importance of this question. The analysts have explained to us that they wrote the items as they did because the moderates and Khomeini were in fact working together during this period. This strikes us as an example of the unfortunate tendency (noted in the Process section) for NFAC product to reportion specific events at the expense of in-depth and analytical treatment of the questions which are believed likely to strongly infZu- ence future developments. 27. After Late August finished intelligence not only sum- marized the Latest reports, but was more pessimistic and more accurate than most other observers. Nevertheless, problems remained. The articles left important parts of their mes-. sages implicit. They did not point out that much of their - 93 - TOP SE(3RET  --TOP cin RE reasoning undercut the common optimistic assessments, con- etude that an agreement between the government and the clergy was unlikely, or point out that the Shah 'right soon face the choice of repression or abdication. This was, perhaps, a matter of style and norms--analysts have, .seen conditioned over the years to keep as close as.possib/e to the facts rather than draw out the implications whi:yh consumers can do for themselves. Furthermore, the analysis were aware of the relatively optimistic reports from the field and understand- ably felt restrained by the possibility that the field was correct. NFAC products can be faulted for not clarifying the lines of argument, noting any inconsistencies, or pulling together the ex.isting evidence (which her as. on so many other points, was not extensive). The issues were not posed sharply enough or treated in sufficient depth. It did not take hindsight to see that what was crucial was both the de- sires and the independence of the modera.t?s. Neither point was singled out for special attention. P:7r example, the re- ports that the moderates had responded to the Shah's conces- sions by making greater demands were notai, but their sig- nificance was not probed. The validity of the reports that the moderates felt that they could not agree to anything that Khomeini opposed were never denied, but neither did the analysts explain how, if they were true, conciliation was Similar reports had been received since mz -Augua!-` and even, in muted tones, in the spring. This is not to say that the evidence was so overwhelming that the analysts should have automati- cally accepted it. But there should have been a probing of the reports that the moderates could not hove on their own and a discussion of why and under what conditions the moder- ates might break with Khomeini and whethe- they could main- tain their power if they did. 28. Furthermore, there was no analy,,is to support the implicit assumption that if the moderates did break with the extremists, the latter would not be wiZZi_)ig and able to con- tinue violent protests, thus probably makk,'ng the government ossible. These reports seem to have had little impact. p  Tnv SEnnEfi J ~ - between the expectation that the opposition would split nd 29. It was also unfortunate that finished intelligence. did not address the question of whether the Shah could sur- vive if the opposition remained united. If the answer had been that he could not have, more attention might have been. focused on the relations within the opposition. An addi- tional benefit would have been to illuminate the relationship the actions of the moderates could be decszve. respond with force and putting the moderates in an untenable position. (A variant of this danger is noted in Tehran 10,061, 16 October 1978, Indeed tittle was said to substantiate the belief that t e moderates were numerous enough to be an important. force on their own. In the spring and early summer this view seemed quite plausible, but by Late summer and early fall as the protest grew in size and intensity a good deal more evidence should have been required before the analysts accepted the conclusion that an agreement with the.moderates even if possible, could have saved the situation. D/NFAC implictiy questioned this belief in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of 27 September when he noted that the religious moderates were much Less n~umeroue than the extremists. But the NID item of 29 Sept. and much of the discussion of the negotiations between ne moderates and the Shah in mid and late October implied at the belief that the Shah would crack down if he had to. NFAC from analyzing the fundamental problems. 30. No definitive answers were possible, but a more thorough weighing of the evidence and a more penetrating analysis of the problems were. Here as at other points the felt need to report daily events seems to have distracted - 95 --  1. It is ironic that a misreading of the appeal of the religious opposition was one of the major prob- lems with NFAC's analysis. The person who placed the greatest stress on the importance of the religious groups was NFAC's senior Iranian political analyst. He had an extensive knowledge of Islam, had included analysis of the influence of religion and religious leaders in his writings, and consistently called for more informa- tion. His efforts over the years to stimulate the collection of more data were strenuous and his awareness of the information deficiencies is recorded most recently in Elites in Iran, p. 75 Without this background of concern, he could not have produced the paper, "Iran: So s on the Bases of Religious Opposition" 7 10 Feb- ruary 1978, C) which set forth the importance o the religious movement, which we shall draw on later. .Information Available 2. Despite these efforts, the amounts of informa- tion available to NFAC on the religious establishment was slight. Non-governmental experts who may have had information were not sought out by NFAC (and it is not certain that these people would have responded). More importantly, until late summer 1978, the field paid little attention to this subject; nor had it for many years. Thus, although it was known that Khomeini was one of the most important opposition religious leaders until February 1978 the US di not know that his son had d h r vious October and not until May a ' e ame a regime or a death (Manchester Guardian, 21 May 1978), and that he had decides-to make si opposition more strident and urgent. Only after the Shah fell was it reported (in public sources) that the Shah had heavily cut the subsidies to the religious groups. Similarly, it was 2 1/2 weeks before field TOP nEr.r. Err+ r  reporting attributed'the Qom riots toa newspaper att on Khomeini, published at the. instance of the GOI.* 3. NFAC had a pretty clear idea of what it knew and where data was lacking--specifically information on the relative influence of the religion:; leaders. (See Elites, 1976, pp. 43-47, 75) Little i;.~ anything was add-in the succeeding two years. NFyC knew that Khomeini, and other ayatollahs, received financial support from bazaaris, and that he supported one ter- rorist group financially. But his pouter and influence relative to other religious leaders--made progressively apparent from late summer 1978 and abundantly clear in January 1979--was not well understoodhe had a lot of domestic support. 6. Even if analysis was not directly influenced by policy, these three inter-locking beliefs supported each other and made .the analysts especially glow to give full credit to information indicating that the Shah was in very. serious trouble. It is probably impossible to say which of the three beliefs came first either in time or in impor- tance. As the Shah survived over perilous years, people became more convinced both that the United States should support him and that he was helping lots of Iranians and earning their support (or else he would not have survived).. And as they came to believe that he was a good ruler they i "~~~~~  7. A related problem was that the observers' appa- rent lack of sympathy with the protestors was reflected in their choice of words. They talked of "mobs" which the product of wishful thinking. increasingly expected him to be able to survive.* Further- more, the fact that those outside the government who thought in the early autumn that the Shah might fall were people who opposed his rule gave the analysts an easy way to downgrade these warnings, for they could seem Lobe--and perhaps were-- that this indicated or created a subtle bias. i-~u~~yCU ~.a~.~,. ay 1 78 February 1978, "vandalism" .(Tehran mullahs "agi a ing" (.Tehran 8353, 31 August 1978, an "irresponsible".opposition. (NID, 10 August 1978, Field reporting used more highly colored terms than did finished intelligence, but we think it is fair to say that a reader of the latter could also tell what outcomes the writers wanted and which they feared. :tt is~.o~ible 8. The unprecedented nature of the revolution and the Shah`s record of survival made it hard enough to see that past might not~be a good guide to the future, To believe that the unrest would succeed was to expect the kind of sudden and dramatic change in affairs that strains our imaginations. The analytic task would have been ex- tremely difficult if the United States had been neutral or even anti-Shah. But we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the subtle influence of US policy may have made it a bit harder for the analysts to realize that the Shah's position was becoming precarious. -rr~v e L r n r. -r i  In Conclusion It will be clear to readers who have stayed with us this far that there is no one :reason for NFAC's failure to assess the deterioration of the Shah's position during 1978. Zife is never that simple. We Ycave cited a number of reason--inadequate information, pre-existing beliefs, mind sets, a amaZZ and isolated community of Iranian analysts, and a production system that emphasizes reporting events rather than underlying causes. We conclude with a dual appeal: analysts, re-examine your assumptions and - beliefs; managers, create an environment conducive t anaZyzing foreign affairs, not dust reporting them. mr~> e~r~n >~~  ~,.r r ~_< - 135 - rrn~~r~ ~~~ ~  Tl17'] [~T/'rT TT ~ ~ nn c~r~rs r. T ?- -- ?- -  min ~*'^_._~T_ T UJJ \J1~.LJ ~- ?rr~n ~~cnr~~~ vs~~+ ~ ~  min nr. i-.n.r.~m mgr ~r n-r~~  ri,Rrz nrr.r? r.m -~~v.a~v.a~.u .. rY'`/'1~T~ ^:~ -~ v1.~ va~i ~.  1 J - 140 - /'T 1171 [~ T`` /"~ 7'1 ri T ~n ~S~r  Perception and Evidence Robert Jervis, Perce tion and Misperception in International~Po itics (.Princeton University Press 1976 pp. 1 6-181.. ~ - 141 -  176-Processes of Perception Scholars often have been unsympathetic with pt