TRANSMITTAL OF STAFF STUDY OF PROBLEMS OF OAD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: STAFF STUDY
• Keywords: OSO
• Keywords: OAD
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001255568
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2011
• Case Number: F-2005-00724
• Publication Date: April 24, 1951

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2,41
MEMORANDLM1 TO: ADSO
24 April 1951
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Staff Study of Problems of OAD
1. Transmitted herewith is a staff study on the above sub-
ject prepared at the request of Tir. Richard Helms, APO.
2. A sincere effort has been made to present the OAD prob-
lem in terms of magnitude, responsibility., position with respect
to OSO, OPC, and CIA, organization, personnel, procurement, and
space.
3. Recommendations have been presented for the solution of
the immediate problems. However, the basic problem of the rela-
tionship of OAD to a similar unit wittin OPC remains to be re-
solved. On the resolution of this problem, many of the over-all
far-reaching problems will depend. It is felt that this is beyond
the scope of OAD's responsibility in such matters and will of
necessity have to be solved at a higher level. These problems,
however, have been pointed out in the study presented.
[,. It should be noted that since the initiation of this
study the Table of Organization presented in TAB B has been ap-
proved. For the purpose of fulfilling the mission and responsi-
bility.as outlined in this study, this T/0 is inadequate.
Chief, OAD
~
 A. STAFF STUDY OF THE OPERATIONAL AIDS DIVISION,
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
1. a. The Operational Aids Division (GAD) is presently-responsible
for the support of the clandestine operations of OSO by all material
means except electronic communications and logistical support. There
is a similar obligation to OPC which exists but is not clearly de-
fined. To fulfill these responsibilities means that OAD must collect
and process information, documents, equipment, etc. OAD must also
have the capability of rapidly producing or reproducing those "tailor-
made, hand-wrought" items by the appropriate art or craft necessary
to answer the requirements as established by the foreign divisions.
OAD also furnishes the equipment, technical skill, and technical train
im t wing fields: S/Yd, propaganda printing, photography,
and observation and audio-surveillance. Finally, OAD
as a researc and development responsibility to CIA, and the Army,
Navy, and Air Force for all specialized equipment (except electrical
communications) peculiar to clandestine intelligence operations. The
procurement responsibility, however, is vested in the Procurement
Office/CIA over which OAD has no controle
b. To accomplish this myriad of diversified tasks, GAD has a cur-
rently authorized strength of slots (see Tab A- for present T/0)
and a proposed authorized streh ofIslots * Since 1947, the
authorized strength of GAD has increased from in 1951 or ap-
proximately two and one-half times while the authorized
strength of OSO/OPC has increased over ten times in a similar period.
The volume of requirements resulting from this increase in operational
capability is not possible to calculate since the foreign divisions,
being aware of the static condition of the OAD capabilities, have not
always made known their total requirements,
c. As a result of these increases, not only in requirements but
also in responsibilities, it is obvious that a complete reexamination
of OAD is essential. The object of this reexamination should be the
delineation of those responsibilities which should be assigned to GAD
and the establishment of an organization designed to fulfill those
responsibilities.
4 See Tab B for organization under proposed /0.
II. THE PROBIEh2
2. Confronting O.AD/OSO at the present time are the following problems
a. The lack of appreciation for the need, magnitude, and important
of the OAD program is such that the command and staff echelons are
neither knowledgeable nor sympathetic to a point where adequate assist
ance is' forthcoming.
b. The present definition of the GAD responsibilities is neither
clear nor within thecaua}b Jje:s of the Division.
 c. The location of OAD within the ammand structure of CIA for
command and staff guidance is not in the best interest of OSO, OPC,
or C I&..
d. The present organizational structure of OAD does not permit it
to fulfill its responsibilities as required by the foreign divisions
of OSO and OPC.
e. The present personnel policy does not take cognizance of un-
usual talents required by OAD.
f. The present procurement policy does not permit GAD to meet the
security and deadline limitations set by the foreign divisions.
III. DISCUSSION
3. Importance and magnitude of the OAD operation,
a. The magnitude and importance of the 00 operation must be
clearly understood or QAD will always want for support. As differen-
tiated from a foreign division, it must be appreciated that OAD is not
bound by geographical limitations. The collection of documents and
document intelligence must be on a world-wide basis, backed up by an
indexing, filing, and analyzing activity which is the equivalent of a
good-sized reference library. The chart under Tab C shows the multi-
tude of steps necessary in fulfilling a cover and authentication
request. Note this collection process is a continuing program.,
be In the field of reproduction the Plant, Branch/OAD is capable
of performing or imitating most of the processes found in large re-
production plants throughout the world. The versatility essential in
OAD technicians to accomplish this is evidenced by the chart under
Tab Q which shows the steps in reproducing a document.
c. Heretofore, OAD, due to lack of personnel and space, has been
able to complete only part of its reproduction requests. It has not
been possible to engage in reproduction against anticipated needs.
The service rendered by OAD will never be adequate until a document
may be reproduced 'just in caset' and without creating a backlog.
d. The importance of OAD to OSO/OPC is irrefutable :and can only
be emphasized by the fact that notwithstanding the acquisition of the
TAD shop and POTBOIIER, the backlog of documents for reproduction con-
tinues to grow so that only top priority jobs have a chance.of being
done.
e. An apparent lack of understanding of the close cooperation es-
sential between all branches of CAD and its customers finds 00 in
seven (7) different locations in five (5) different buildings of CIA.
In spite of objections to the contrary, thinking still continues that
OAD can render effective support physically removed in toto from
0SO/0PC .
 Responsibilities.
a. The responsibilities of OAD are unnamed and unnumbered. Many
things now considered as part of the OAD mission have been acquired
from units which were closed down at the end of World War II. The
most obviously misplaced of these is the responsibility for research
and development for the Armed Forces in the field of "special intelli-
gence equipment". OAD does not presently have the capability to do
research except in the field of Sfiv. It is undesirable from a security
standpoint to bring the Armed Forces into such close proximity to this
sensitive operation, OAD stands ready to advise divisions in. any of
its fields of competence; it may even indulge in a modicum of develop-
mental modification, but true research is not practicable.
be Included in this pyramid of responsibilities has been elec-
tronics surveillance. Much of this Branch's equipment is stocked,by
Communications Division. The part of its work that requires a machine
shop is done in Communications' shop. While not strictly a comYnuni-
cations activity, the similarity of technical knowledge and equipment
makes these two units functionally alike. Surveillance personnel
within QAD have no further outlet for their talents, a-situation which
is not true were they in the Communications Division,or a new Division.
c. Between OAD and TRD there is some overlap in responsibilities.
This exists in hot. ra electronics surveil-
lance s for division appears'
to be o re am n ose subjects which are purely technical
training and pass those that involve operations in addition to tech-
nical training to TRD except that electronics surveillance training
should pass to Communications Division. This would leave all photo-
graphic training with OAD. Since TRD has never
entered the SJ`ir ocumen s training field,, these should remain in
GAD. Study will be given at a later date to strengthening the instruc-
tion given by OAD in these subjects utilizing the TRD courses. The
annual training load under normal conditions has been about
persons in each category; however, increases are anticipate see
para. 7b).
d, Other areas of conflicting responsibilities exist between O.AD
and some foreign divisions, but it is believed that these would solve
themselves if OAD was granted an appropriate authorized strength and
assisted in coming somewhere near this strength. Due to OADts limited
potential,. the divisions have adopted other means to obtain aid to
the extent of using operational people to do document intelligence
work.without the knowledge or coordination of GAD.
e. An effort has been made to spell out those items for which 00
should be responsible. Those items which fall within other functional
zones have been eliminated and will be recommended for assignment
elsewhere. (See Tab E ),
5. Location,
a. The location of CAD within the organizational structure of CIS
is unsound. This position under OSO was established at a time when
 there was only one unit engaged in clandestine operations. Since the
creation of OPC, OAD has had unwritten obligations to OPC and yet
there has never been any joint control or assistance. The situation
now exists where OAD is trying to run an overseas shop with people on
T/Ots of both OSO and OPC,
b. The present organizational position is impossible in the terms
of personnel., finance, and space arrangements. CAD operates under two
different sets of regulations, a situation which is not conducive to
efficiency.
a. The present organization of OAD (see Tab fi') is the result of
the deactivation of the wartime Research and Development Office of
OSS. OAD is now trying to keep alive all the functions which fell
to R&D during World War II. This attempt has forced OAD to spread
itself so thin that it now finds itself hopelessly backlogged because
of being compelled to accept an overload of responsibilities.
be After settling on an adequate organization at Headquarters,
OAD must plan overseas organizations which are located strategically
to serve the geographical areas concerned. Where there is a large
CAD unit 't is desirable that the organization of the
unit par e e quarters organa''zation. This would simplify
the entire administrative problem between O.A.D/Headquarters and
OeD/Field.
a. It must be borne in mind that OAD has a group of highly skilled
technicians in addition to the usual group of-intelligence officers
such as found in a foreign division. While it is not impossible for
a technician to become an intelligence officer, it is not very probable
due to differences in the years spent in acquiring their technical
skill, and in temperament, motivation, and job-satisfaction. The
technicians who work for CAD must shroud themselves in anonymity.
W% ereas this is the stock and trade of the normal intelligence officer,
it is difficult for the technician. Therefore, the job must be doubly
attractive to draw competent personnel from well-paying commercial
enterprise. Many of these employees stand to lose seniority rights
in unions and trade organizations by employment with OAD. This con-
sideration must be faced squarely and met by a realistic personnel
policy.
b. As has already been discussed the present allotment of person-
nel is inadequate to meet the demands of OAD. Firm estimates
OPC thru June 1952 call for documenting persons, training in
and trainingL___]in )hotography. In alone our staff is in-
adequate to train-the- F students per year we are receiving.
c. While the technicians will usually remain in OAD, the document
intelligence personnel are potential intelligence officers. By the
same token there is no reason why case officers should not be rotated
in to Document Intelligence either at Headquarters or overseas. Only
then will a well-rounded team be built. in this CAD field to support
 OSO/OPC operations. The impetus for such a program must come from
the Staffs of OSO and OPC.
B. Procurement.
a. The elimination of OAD from the procurement field has seriously
handicapped its operations. For procurement purposes OLD is a tech-
nical service; common practice in the armed forces has always been for
the technical services to do their own procurement, yet OAD is depend-
ent on a procurement office that is not technically qualified to pro-
duce the required results. These current procurement processes are
time-consuming and insecure.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
a. That since there is little sympathetic understanding of OD's
From the above discussions it may be briefly concluded:
mission and limited thinking as to the magnitude of its mission, OAD
suffers from a lack of administrative support. Space and personnel
are the priority needs of OAD, and. the lack of these illustrates the
absence of real support,
b.. That a satisfactory outlinelof assigned responsibilities has
never been furnished to OAD on which it may base its daily operations
and under which it may intelligently plan for the future requirements
and commitments.
c, That OAD's manifold responsibilities are so diversified that
satisfactory performance in all fields is well-nigh impossible under
the existing organization.
d. That the responsibility of research and development of special
intelligence equipment for the Armed Forces is not only beyond the
capability of OAD but is undesirable from a security standpoint.
e. That there is overlap between O and 'IM in several types of
technical training,
f. That there is justifiable usurping of 014D responsibilities
by certain foreign divisions due to lack of personnel in OAD.
g. That for 010 to be a division of OSO is organizationally and
functionally unsound.
h. That an inadequate effort has been made to establish a personnel
policy to satisfy the unusual problems of OAD.
i. That procurement has been centralized unrealistically to the
detriment of efficiency and security.
 10, The following recommendations
RECOI NDATIONS
are offered by OAD/OSO to the
a. That the Branches of OAD be relocated in suitable space adjacent
to the Office of the Chief and to each other and close enough to the
operating divisions of OSO/OPC to permit the frequent personal contact
that is necessary.
b. That a group of consultants be immediately employed to make
a survey of the reproduction problems peculiar to clandestine intelli-
gence operations and to make recommendations concerning the utiliza-
tion of private enterprise or of liberalized government procedures
to solve production, personnel, and procurement problems.
c. That a disinterested survey be made of those OSO/OiUI) functions
now exercised by OSO foreign divisions and those arrogated functions
be returned and the personnel involved be transferred to OAD.
d. That the existing procurement policy be revised to enable OJD
to accomplish its mission within the time and limits set by the
foreign divisions.
e. That OAD assume responsibility for all photographic., S,,
and document intelligence training and relinguish all others. Elec-
tronics surveillance training to remain in 0AD until the entire
surveillance problem is resolved.
11. In the remaining recommendations necessary to complete this study..
OAD/OSO finds itself in the difficult position of making recommendations
involving both OSO and OPC, as well as CIA. It is therefore necessary for
OAD to make the subsequent recommendations as a responsible staff whose
obligations are divided between OSO and OPC and who in specificcases ex-
ercises responsibility for the Agency to outside sourcesa
a. That the mission and responsibilities expressed in paras. 1
and 2 of Tab e, which are based on those functions which OLD logically
feels it should perform for OSO, OPC, and CIA, be adopted and assigned
to OAD.
b. That OAD be relieved of those real or implied responsibilities
listed in para. 3 of Tab F,
c. That if recommendation lla is approved, OLD be directed to
submit a new T/O of organization to accomplish this mission as assigned.
d. That OLD be transferred from the administrative control of
OSO and placed under control of the office or staff responsible for
the operations of OSO and OPC and be directed to render support to
OSO and OPC as outlined in its mission and responsibilities.
e. That an appropriate committee be designated to make recommenda-
tions on the following points:
 (1) The disposition of those responsibilities relin%uished
by C1D in para. 3 of Tab , including:
(a) The assignment of the research and development
responsibility for CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force for special
intelligence equipment.
(b) The advisability of either establishing a Surveil-
lance and Investigations Division to include the Electronics
Surveillance Branch/OAD or its transfer to Communications
Division.
(2) The advisability of establishing an Office to embrace
all these functions including those of CAD.
 THE MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OAD.
Stated in paragraphs is what is bet eved to constitute the log
mission of OAD:
ica,l
1. The Operational Aids Division provides cover and authentication
for agents; research, training, and operations in SW; and research, train-
ing, and service in photography.
2. Particular responsibilities include:
 r. Advice to authorized persons on any subject within the
OAD field of competence.
Described in paragraph 3 are another group of responsibilities which
discontinued as OAD responsibilities except as specifics.lly assigned.
must be provided for since they are requirements of operations, but-should be
3. a. Development and procurement
b. Research and development of special equipment for intelligen
purposes&
c. Research, development, and procurement
physical surveillance (except where an
f assistance).
e. Training and development of techniques and equipment for
electronics surveillance.
. Training and development of techniques and equipment for
f. Research development, and procurement of