DIVICTORATE OP PLANS Thus material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 11I, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the sronsrniuion or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised person is prohibited by law. Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 �"'ot Mandatory Review Ca.se # Nki 9 I-Li 5B � ocument IntelPgence in orrnation Cable � ROUTINE � , IN 39528 PAGE 1 OF 11PAGES STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDET JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA $DO ONE CRS OER MDEXISGS ZZ .E>i itkARVift.6: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY -EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE 1.3(a)K 11111111 6i-011111111111.11.11 DMT 2 DECEMBER 68 COUNTRY DOI SUBJECT ACQ LAOS/CHINA JANUARY - NOVEMBER 1968 AilAS ggiBED TAAr' 'SITUATION APPRAISAL or POSSIBLE MOTIVES BEHIND THE CONSTRUCTIa OF ROADS IN NORTHERN LAOS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS SOURCE THIS APPRAISAL 1.3(0(4 1111111.1.11111111MMIMIIIIMMIII.IS AN INTERPRETATION � BASED ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INFORMATION. PREPARED PRIMARILY FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE, IT IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS IN THEIR OWN ASSESS;., OF THE SITUATION. SUMMARY: BY EARLY OCTOBER 1968 A MILITARY FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 3,000 ARMED CHINESE WAS ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION OF A MAJOR NEW ROAD ARTERY FROM THE SINO-LAO BORDER TO A POINT CONNECTING WITH A ROADBED LEADING TO THE MEKONG RIVER THIRTY KILOMETERS FROM THAILAND. THE cHoicr OF A MILITARY OVER A CIVILIAN CONSTRUCTION FORCE, THE LOGISTICS OF THE EFFORT, ITS TIMING IN RELATION TO THE PARIS TALKS, AND THE CHINESE MOTIT BEHIND IT POSE QUESTIONS REACHING BEYOND THOSE OF IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE. OMNI Assommummammeamm (classification) (elision% controls) 1.3(04) APPROVED FOR RELEASE 17 AUG 19'92 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 -��,�1,11F (dassification) sem con ro to...ay... � � � Iliwn rum..mi Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 IN 30528 ItAGE 2 ci . 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4) ON ITS OUTCOME MAY REST THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE THAI SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT AND THE CONTROL OVER THE PATHET LAO 'ELEMENTS CLOSEST TO THE CHINESE BORDER. , END OF SUMMARY 1. PERHAPS THE MOST SURPRISING THING ABOUT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ROAD PROJECT IN NORTHWEST LAOS IS THAT ANYONE SHOULD BE SURPRISED BY � IT. THERE ARE REPORTS OF CHINESE ROAD BUILDING PROJECTS WHICH DATE FRol 1962. MORE RECENTLY THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE Of CHINESE INTENTIONS DATING BACK TO JANUARY 1968 AND EVEN INDICATIONS THAT, BUT FOR 'INTERNAL DISRUPTIONS PRESUMABLY CAUSED BY THE CULTURAL REVOLTUION, THEY WOULD B: MUCH FARTHER ALONG NOW. 2. CLASSICALLY, THE CHINESE FIRST PREPARED THEIR LOGISTICS BASE OFFICIALS FROM 1.3(a)(4) SHANG-YUNG /QD 8148/, CHINA, INSTRUCTED VILLAGERS IN NAM HOO /QD 8259/. CHINA IN JANUARY 1968 TO INCREASE THEIR RICE PRODUCTION GOALS IN ORDER TO SUPPORT CONSTRUCTION WORKERS WHO WOULD BUILD A MOTORABLE ROAD FROM THE SINO-LAO BORDER AT QD 7846 TO BAN BATENE /QD 7744/, LAOS, AND THEr SOUTHWEST TO NAM TUA /QD 5018/. THIS ENTERPRISE WAS DESCRIBED AT THAT TIME AS A SUPPLY ROUTE TO SUPPORT THE PATHET LAO. 3. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS FIVE MONTHS LATER BEFORE CHINESE SOLDIERS APPEARED IN LAOS PERMANENTLY /EXCURSIONS OF ONE OR TWO DAYS HAVE BEEN COMMON FOR SOME TIME/ WITH SURVEYING INSTRUMENTS, CONSTRUCTION TOOLS, (elassillection) (dissern controls) 1.3(a)(4) �� Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 (c/asslitcat(on) Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 IN J9528 , 1.3(a) (4 PAGE 3 01:11 ?AGS MIMIIMNMMMMMNMNNMM .3(a)( ftt(stent controls) 5 4 2 1 � MIK (classification) fdioem controls) AND ANTIAIRCRAFT /AA/ WEAPONS. THE SIZE AND MAKEUP OF THE FORCE, ONE ENGINEERING COMPANY AND FIVE INFANTRY COMPANIES, DID NOT AT THIS TIME FLAG IT AS A PRECURSOR OF THE LARGER ELEMENTS TO FOLLOW, ALTHOUGH THE PRESENCE OF .A 105MM HOWITZER AND TWO 57MM AA GUNS HINTED THAT =EY NOT EXPECT THEIR EFFORTS TO GO UNCHALLENGED. INDEED BY OCTOBER TY 11;.1) SWOLLEN TO A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 3,000 MEN, ONE�THIRD OF THEM COMBAT TROOPS, WITH A MOTORIZED SURFACE ROLLER, PNEUMATIC DRILLS AND COMPRESSi�a: NINE OR TEN BULLDOZERS, AND HAND TOOLS. THEIR ANNOUNCED INTENTION WAS T( CUT A ROAD SIX METERS WIDE FROM THE YUNNAN SALIENT TO MUONG SAI /RC 12..:), THE EFFECT OF THIS WOULD BE CONNECT WITH OLD ROUTE 46 LEADING 70 THE METh AT PAK BENG /QC 2301/. ROUTE 46 IS NOT A MOTORAALE ROUTE BUT IT COULD - AND MAY WELL BE USED AS A TRAIL BY COMMUNISTS INFILTRATING AND EXFILTR. THAILAND VIA LAOS. 4. THIS INCURSION FORCE pomp NOT, OF COURSE, GO UNNOTICED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT THE CHINESE INTENDED IT TO. BY OPTING FOR DIRECT PARTICIPATION AT EVEN THE COOLIE LEVEL, THEY APPEARED TO TURN THEIR BACK ON ALL CHANCE� FOR PLAUSIBLE DENIAL. WORKING THROUGH LOCAL LAO ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS USING CONSCRIPTED LAO LABOR WOULD HA": PRESERVED A FIG LEAF OF RESPECTABILITY, BUT WOULD ALSO HAVE TIED THE CHINESE TO A MUCH SLOWER PACE. THAT THEY NEVERTHELESS ARE LOOKING ;7 TOWARDS A PROLONGED PERIOD OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL � 1.3(a)(4) Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 IN 39528 � 1111111111 MiassmUmO fd(ssem controls) 1.3(a) PAGE4 Wilt PAGES 1.3(a)(4) OR AT LEAST AN ABSENCE OF ANIMOSITY, IS EVIDENCED BY THE CHINESE DECISION TO SUPPLY THEIR FORCE ENTIRELY FROM YUNNAN , FOREGOING ANY EFFORT TO LIVE OFF THE LAND. ON 16 JUNE, FOR EXAMPLE, CONSTRUCTION STOPPED FOR TWO MONTHS BECAUSE THE TURMOIL IN CHINA HAD DISRUPTED TRANSPORTATION, AND SUPPLIES WERE NOT REACHING BAN BATENE . VILLAGERS WERE TOLD THAT CONSTRUCT ION WOULD BE POSTPONED AND SOLDIERS WOULD AGAIN TAKE UP THEIR TOILS WHEN THE SITUATION RETURNED TO NORMAL. IT DID SO, AND THEY DID. IN MID-AUGUST A CONVOY OF 208 TRUCKS APPEARED AT THE BORDER BEARING MAO SLOGANS.) AND THE PACE HAS NOT CLACKENED SINCE. 5. THE CHINESE PAY TWO WAYS FOR THE LUXURY OF USING THEIR OWN LABOR �FORCE:. ON ONE COPNT THEY RISK BEING CRITICIZED FOR INVADING A TERRIRORy OF AN OSTENSIBLY FRIENDLY AND NEUTRAL LAOS. HOWEVER, SINCE THEIR ROAD- BUILDING ACTIVITY IS CURRENTLY RESTRICTED TO AN .OUT-OF-THE- . WAY AREA CONTROLLED BY PATHET LAO AND NORTH VIETN MESE FORCES AND THUS IS NOT OPEN TO INSPECTION BY OFFICIALS OF THE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT iRLGi AND OR THE WORLD PRESS, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THIS VIOLATION OF,LA0 SOVEREIGNTY WILL 5 CAUSE MORE THAN A SLIGHT TREMOR ON THE WORLD'S PUBLIC 4 3 OPINION SEISMOGRAPH. ANOTHER PROBLEM THE CHINESE MUST 2 HAVE CONSIDERED AND � Mir (C U� � ation) dissem controls $ IDENTIFIED AS -AN ACCEPTABLE RISK IS THE �:. a. �� Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 5 1-3404) reit M nt�V II � SIB ww". 01140LETE "Zs'. COITI 101 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 39523 fAGZ :5 oFU PAGES 1111111111 iummummuummommor controls FACT THAT THEY ARE EXPOSING tHEIR. TROOPS TO AIR. ATTACK. THE PR:LSENCE OF ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS INDICATES THIS, AS DOES THE INDOCTRINATION OF VILLAGERS TO DIG SHELTERS AND TO. EXPECT AIR .ATTACXS.. HOWEVER , THIS, rqo !MAY FACTOR OT. TO A BAkG.AIWRATE PRICE.' WHILE THE CHINESE ARE VELL- AWARE THAT THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. IS BOMBING PATHET *LAO AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN LAOS, THEY PROBABLY ASSUME THAT THE VIITED STATES WOULD CONSIDER BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST T.HE CHINESE COMMUNIST PEOPLES LIBERATIONS ARMY /PLA/ IN THE CATEGORY OF A NEW BALL GAME. THUS, THE CHINESE MAY WELL BE .GOING UNDER T*HE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY HAVE ONLY TO DEAL. WITH THE FEW SCORE 11A0 AND THAI-PILOTED -T-2S' S. 6. OVERALL, THERE IS ONE OTHER SLIGHT RISK TI-E CHINESE RUN IN. 'BUILDING THIS ARTERY. 'OBVIOUSLY, ANY ROAD THAT LEADS OUT AN ALSO LEAD IN. IN JUD.GING THIS THREAT; HOWEVER A CURSORY LOOK AT THE POTENTIAL OF EVEN A MILITARILY- HOMOGENEOUS SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD RENDER ANY DOUBTS THE CHINESE HAD ON THIS SCORE SHORT-LIVED. 7. WHILE THE TOTAL OF THESE FACTORS MAY BE SMALL BY CHINESE COST-INDEXING STANDARDS. THE. ROAD-BUILDING PROGRAM 11111111111111111MEN111111111111111.11111111111111111 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 ii:*4171 JUur � � --7737+1,--.:' Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 Mal .amm...1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 felessification) Nissen controls) e' 173(a)( me 6 a .11 PACES z 1.3(a)A - NEVERTHELESS REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT OF MANPOWER AND CAPITAL AND MUST, THEREFORE, HAVE SOME MORE SPECIFIC GOAL .THAN SIMPLY OPENING NEW TRADE ROUTES, ANALYSTS WILL FIND tionyEs APLENTY, ONE NO DOUBT MORE FAR REACHING THAN HE NEXT9 TO EXPLAIN HOW THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS ROUTE IN NORTH.LAOS FITS INTO .THE CHINESE GRAND DESIGN. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT .THE CHINESE OBjECTIVE IS MULTI-PURPOSED.. SOME OF -THE MORE. VALID PROBABILITIES W0111.:D -SEEM .TO'BE AS FOLLOWS: A. THE CHINESE MUST .BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATE.S WITH A MORE-THAN-CASUAL EYE. 'THUS IT nun ALSO BE AssumED, THAT THEY FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY�OF AMERICAN/ VIETNAMESE PEACE � NEGOTIATIONS' WELL BEFORE THE -BEGINNING. OF Tea. PARIS TALKS. IF ONE ACCEPTS THESE POSSIBILITIES, IT IS 'LIKELY THAT THE CHINESE LOOKED UPON THE ROAD-BUILDING PROJECT-AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THEIR INFLUENCE OVER THE PAIHET LAO INSURGENCY. -A:ROAD LEADING ..TO !WONG- SAI AND VERY POSSIBLY BEYOND, WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH GOOD� LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND A .LOSIEZICS ARTERY TO SUPPLY THE 1111111111111111111111.. Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 1.3(04) 11:".: 3007 � c� OilioLLTE Approved for Release: 2619/04/04 C00012514 � IM1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111M (etesstfleatton) NOWA _t�nirOitj 1.3(a)(4 PAGE7 OF 11 PAGES 1.3(a)(4) PATHET LAO FORCES AND THUS .STRENGTHEN: T-HEIR .POLITICAL HAND IN DEALING WITH THE LAD SUBVERSIVE � MOVEMENT, WHICH HAS COn TO RELY PRIMANILY ON THE NORTH:VIETNAMESE... THIS- .0.0:1IvE HAS NO DOUBT BEEN GIVEN. IMPETUS BY 112 NORTH vrETNAmEsE DECISION TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED STATES. rE�AIRING TEAT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN- .PARIS i pF WHIc T.HEY..� PI.St-iPPROVE, WILL CAST THE. FUTURE OF THE AREA BY GRANTING A F.EGEMONY TO THE* PAT.HET LAO/READ...NORTH VIETNAMESE/1 � . 1:HE. ;HINES:F.. mAY WELL. .HAVE DECIDED upog THIS COURSE IN. ORDER � TO INCREASE THEIR,. .OPTIONS. IN '.111�1-1.ARE OF- TRADITIONAL SIGNIFI- cANCE TO CHINA. B. IF. THE CHINESE �ARE ABLE. TO REORIENT THE PATHET LAO MOVEMENT LOGISTICALLY, � AND � THUS POLITICALLY IT COULD GIVE Ti-1'M ANOMER SMALL LEVER .WITH *WHICH' TO PRESSURE THE � NORTH :VIETNAMESE: IF THEY OE Vli:LING TO USE FLA TROOPS IN � NORTH LAPS, IT COULD MEAN THAT CHINESE TROOPS AND INSTALLA- . TICNS COULD BE PLACED ALONG THE NORTHERN. SECTOR OF THE CuRRENT LAC/NORTH VIETNAM BORDER. THIS, IN�TuRN, wOuLD' PROVIDE THE CHINESEyWITH YET ANOTHER POLITICAL LEVER TO BE USED AGAINS.T. NORTH �VIETNAM, AS WELL AS BASES FROM WHICH TO ._11011.1111111111111.11.1111111111111101111111. Aooroved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 1.3(a)(4) � IltORM� InG7 �� OOSOLCTE � - COM. Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 111111111 (classification) IN 39328 P.f.GE� 50F 11 PAGES /dissent controls) _1.3(04 � 1.3(a)(4, OUT CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS INTO THE. EORDER AREA OF NORTH VIETNAM IF AND WHEN. SUCH OPERATIOUS APPEAR TO tE IN THE INTEREST OF THE CHINESE. C. ANOTHER RELATED AND POSSIBLY MAJOR CHINESE OBJECTIVE �COULD WELL BE TO ESTABLISH A .BUFFER ZONE IN NORTHWEST LAOS TO. INSURE THEIR -HOME .TERR1:ORY AGAINST . UNWANTED 'INFLUENCE: D. WITH THE VIETNAMESE _PEACE TALKS,THE �POSSIBILIT Y1. OF ANOTHER TRIAL MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE CONTENDING .FORCES IN _LAOS BECOMES MORE .THAN .A POSSIBILITY. A C..-.INESE MILIT=RY -.PRESENCE IN LAOS WILL NO DOUBT .INFLUENCE.. THOSE INVOLVED. IN DECIDING �1..r.HAT THE, TERMS OF �THAT MARRIAGE SHALL ,BE.: THE � ARGO:Z:4.7MT A . . COMMUNIST� Ofil,ENTED MOVEMENT IN Y TEI"TrIANE WILL BE INA BETTER 'PGSITION TO NEGOTIATE THE .CHINESE.REMOVAZ WILL .BE .DIFFICULT :.TO _REFUTE.. THE ,PRICE CAN BE liMADAY itsiAGINED�LEGITIMATION OF THE ROAD CONSTRUCTION AS :AN ATD� PROJECT, TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF CHINESE BASES IN SAYABCURY PROVINCE ON THE THAI BORDER ,�AND INCREASED CHINESE INFLItEriCE- IN Vlit:NTIANE. E. YET ANOTHER OBJECTIVE OF THE CHINESE ROAD 'LW( 111111111111111.111 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 1.3(a)4) 2fl.: 3007 Olit&OLETE Ft. ..40� COATIOM, � Approved for Release: 2019/04./04 C00012514 � .111111111111110111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 relassi cation dtsson controls IN 39528 PAGE 9 OF 11 PAGES 3E TO TRADE ON THE FIRST FAINT CRACKS. TO APPEAR IN ra LAST � TEN YEARS IN THE MONOLITH OF THAI POLITICS. WITH A ROAD TO MUONG SAI, THE CHINESE WOULD HAVE. ESTABLISHED' A MOTORABLE LINK TO OLD ROUTE �46 WHICH LEADS 'TO THE MEKONG AT PAK BENG A ROUTE WHICH HAS BEEN USED BY THAI COMMUNIST TERRORIRTS: � INFILTRATING AND EXFILTRATING THAILAND. THIS OBVIOUSLY WOULD FACILITATE CHINESE SUPPORT FOR THE THAI COMMUNIST TERRORIST MOVEMENT. AT THE OPTIMUM,. THE CHINESE MAY HOPE TO CONVERT TEE CURRENT LIMITED THAI INSURGENCY MOVEMENT TO A FULL-3LOWN REVOLUTION BEARING 'THE *STAMP OF QUOTE 1ihDE N CHINA UNQUOTE. AT THE VERY LEAST THE CHINESE HT HOPE TO PRESSURE THAILAND TO A RETURN TO ITS CZNTURIES�OLD POLICY OF MAINTAINING A COVERT FOOT IN THE OPPOSITE .CAMP TO SOFTEN ANY SUDDEN REVERSALS OF FORTUNES. 8. IT IS NOT PROBABLE. THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT WILL. INITATE GROUND OR AIR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINESE ROAD PROJECT. LAOS DOES NOT W.ISH TO PROVOKE THE COLOSSUS TO THE NORTH. ALSO, THE LAO GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE UNSUR�E OF ITS LEGAL POSITION. ON 13 JANUARY 1,P62 SISOUMA NG "SISALEUMSAK SIGNED AN-AGREEMENT FADR_THE 1.111Mli Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 413(04) Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 IN 39528 MOINIMIlliiIIIIIiii_ PAGE10 OF 11 PAGES � MEM (classification) o n 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4) CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD BETWEEWMENG�LA, CHINA, AND PHONG SALY, LAOS. ACCORDING TO A RADIO PEKING BROADCAST BASED ON A NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY REPORT, THE THEN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, PHOUMI NOSAVAN, ASKED THAT THE ROAD LINKING THE FRONTIERS OF CHINA IN YUNNAN PROVINCE. WITH PHONG SALY BE EXTENDED AFTER ITS.COMPLETION TO NAM THA IN HOUEI SAI. AT THE TIME, SOUVANNA PHOUMA TOLD THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENT IN FORCE WAS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF.A ROAD FROM MENG LA TO PHONG SALY, AND THAT THE NAM THA QUOTE EXTENSION UNQUOTE WAS MERELY PHOUMI'S PROPOSAL WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN APPROVED. BY THE- LAO GOVERNMENT. ON 21 NOVEMBER 1968 SOUVANNA CONFIRMED HIS 1962 STATEMENT TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR BUT AMPLIFIED IT BY EXPRESSING'THE'VIEW THAT PHOUMI HAD REQUESTED THE CHINESE TO BUILD A ROAD FROM NAM THA TO BAN HOUEI SAI. IF THIS PROVES 'CORRECT THE CHINESE MAY WELL PLAN T0 USE OLD ROUTE 46 TO BAN HOUEI SAI 5 4 3 2 AS WELL AS OLD ROUTE 46 TO PAK BENG. THE LAO FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO LOCATE THE APPROPRIATE FILES ON THIS CASE. THUS, THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT. THE LAO GOVERNMENT ACTUALLY AGREED IN 1962 TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROAD CURRENTLY BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, OR AT LEAST AGREED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD IN THE GENERAL AREA IN WHICH THE _CHINESE ARE NOW WORKING. . � �11111�111 111111111111111111111111111111111111�1111111111111111111111111111111111 (classification) (dissern controls) Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 5 1;3(a)(4 felitart/testton)' Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514 fdissens controls) 1N 39528 ?AM' 11 .OF 1.1 PACES 9. WHATEVER THE CHINESE MOTIVE-AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF ONE DOES NOT RULE OUT THE OTHERS. AS .PLAYING A ROLE IN THE DECISION�THE POLITICAL AND NILITAY IMPACT OF: THF. ITSELF IS CERTAIN TO CLAIM THE AT:TENT:TO yOt 'POLICY MAKERS WELL AFTER, IF NOT BEFORE, A SETTLEMENT: IN :VIETNAM., 7.0. THE AMBASSADOR HAS READ THIS .REPOAT AND OFFERED NO OBJECTIONS. 11. MOW DISSEM. STATE 'ARMY AIR' AID.USIS. upirAcv. 7TH AIR FORCE .CINCPAC PAGF.L1 ARPAD" PACAF Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00012514

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SITUATION APPRAISAL OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES BEHIND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS IN NORTHERN LAOS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS