SNIE 4-1-74; PROSPECTS FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
• Keywords: NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001247371
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2010
• Case Number: F-2005-01250
• Publication Date: July 11, 1974

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OF
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 1. - x~)' 1 -1 RET
GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
11 July 1974
MEMORANDUM I'OR: Deputy to the DCI for National
Intelligence Officers
SUBJECT: SNIP 4-1-.74: PROSPECTS FOR THE PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
RUERENCE : D/DCI/NIO Memorandum, subject as above,
dated 18 June 1974
The Attachment is provided in response to the reference.
It represents the views of the OWI/DDSZxiT and th1s Cm e.
R. E. IIINT?A.N
Chairman .
Attachment:
As stated
Copy YD of 4 copies
 T& SECRET
ATTACHMENT
GUIDEI? MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE C0!- fv,(ITTEE
CONTRIBUTION TO
SNIE 4-1-74: PROSPECTS FOR TIRE, PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR.
CAPAHIL.ITII3S
PROBLEM
To estimate the capability and intent of those countries
which are deemed serious candidates for acquiring nuclear
weapons, to acquire a nuclear-capable ballistic missile
delivery system by 1980.
SUNDIARY
Of the 15 countries considered, only one-Is:ca.el-has
developed and probably deployed a nuclear-capable ballistic
missile. Several other countries, however, have acquired
ballistic missiles from foreign sources. One of these is
West Germany, which has acquired the Sergeant and. the ?Perstf,?"'I
systems (both SRI3Ms) from the US. It also is planning to
purchase the US Lance (also an SRBM) to replace both the
Honest John (a FROG) and the Sergeant. In addition to
West Germany, other NATO countries are planning to purchase
the Lance.
The USSR has provided the Mobile SCUD-B SRBM to Egypt,
and it appears.that they also may. ,have provided it to Iraq
as well.
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 ' rcl sErfr -
None of the other countries has as yet either a.cquiree
a missile system from a fox eign country or has an active
native program to develop one.
Pive countries are believed to have a good e.ncrn
technology and industrial base to develop a missile o
their own without major outside assistance. They are C.nad
Italy, Japan, Sweden and West Germany. Only Japan and West'
Germany are judged to have the capability to develop and
deploy an IRBM system by 1980. Sweden may have the capaa.bi_
to develop and deploy an SRBM by that time. None of the
five is expected to begin a native program within the pe
of this estimate. Like Germany, Sweden might consider 1-
.,ax-chasing an operational SRBM, either the Lance froui the US
or the Pluton from France.
Of the remaining countries that are not judged capable
of developing a system on their own without cons
outside assistance, India, Pakistan, and Taiwan are ju&-.=.gei:
to have a high desire to acquire ballistic missiles, All
probably would want IRBMso None of these countries could
develop their own missiles by 1980.
India is attempting to establish the technology and.
industrial base necessary for a native program and i s expe? ..r =.
to seek outside assistance, chiefly from the West but perhaps
 from the USSR also. Pakistan also could approach the West
but might be able to obtain assistance from China. it
seems unlikely that Taiwan could obtain any assistance from
any major Western country or the USSR but might be able to
acquire aid from Israel.
None.of the other countries are expected to acquire
ballistic missiles by 1980.
ARGENTINA and BRAZ I L
Both Argentina and Brazil
already
are attempting to purchase tactical missiles from both the
US and Western Europe. Neither country has the industrial.
capability to produce ballistic missiles on their own withcm
significant outside help. It appears likely that, for
prestige reasons, both eventually will want to acquire
ballistic missiles. It ' is doubtful, though, that they will
acquire any ballistic missile system before the end of the
period of this estimate.
CANADA
Canada clearly has an industrial and technology capa-
bility for developing a strategic missile system. However,.
recent Canadian governments have firmly renounced any intere's'.:
in acquiring either nuclear weapons or advanced delivery
 systems. In light of the special relationship between the
US and Canada in the area of continental defense, it is
unlikely that the Canadians would undertake the development
of a strategic miss le force.
EGYPT
Beginning in 1980, the UAR attempted to develop offensive
ballistic missiles
The;~ program, however, encountered considerahe 'difficult'
primarily due to an Inadequate technological and IndustriaJ.
base. 'research and development were conducted on two zniss.es:
the 75 nm Victor and the 170 mm Conqueror. Neither of the
missile programs was completed, and by.late 1967 all we re
cancelled.
The IJAR?s
entire missile program was abandoned a :ter,an expenditure of
over 50 million dol:l.ars. It is extremely unlikely that the
Egyptians will renew a native ballistic .missile development
program.
Turing the October 1973 war, the USSR supplied the
SCUD-D mobile SREM to the UAL The Soviets have developed
HE., chemical, and nuclear warheads for this missile.
 At least one SCUD with an HE warhead was fired during the,
recent conflict.
The SCUD-B has a range of about 160 nm with a payload
weight of 1,800 lbs. In order for this missile to have
strategic significance in the Middle East, this range would
have to be maintained. Any Egyptian-developed nuclear weapons,
if used on the SCUD, would have to be of this weight or :.e_ss.
INDIA
There is no direct evidence of an :active Indian program:
to develop a strategic ballistic missile system. It does
appear, however, that they intend to acquire such a systenni.
We believe that the Indians are strongly motivated to acquire
a missile force to act as a deterrent against the potential
'Chinese threat. For this purpose, they. would require an
IRBM capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a. range of
about 2,000 nm. Such a weapon system, if deployed in the
northern part of India, could provide coverage ,of a large
percentage of China's population and industrial centers,
including Peking. The Indians probably would not require
such a missile for, use against Pakistan.
The only way India could hope to attain a strategic
missile delivery capability by 108 would be through the
acquisition of a weapons system from. a foreign 'power
6
 Soviet SS-5 TRBMs satisfy the range
requirements.
we believe it highly unlikely
provide strategic missiles
would
which
are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Thus, the only likely way the-Indians can acquire such
a system Is for them to develop one on their own, with out-
side technical assistance. The experience gained from, the
planned Indian space program could be a very significant
factor in a strategic missile effort. Although this program
is still quite modest, the ind.lans have committed themselves
to s major expansion. over the next decade.
An important aspect of this expanded space program calls
for the development of a four' stage solid-propellant launch
vehicle designated SLV'-3, which is similar in performance
to the US Scout. This vehicle is to be about 64 feet lgng
and have a 39 inch maximum diameter. An ,adaptation of this
vehicle appears to be-India's best prospect for obtaining
a ballistic missile in the shortest possible time.
 - i lid SBC1 B.t+
The Indians have recognized and acknowledged publicly
that they cannot implement any maj or undertaking without a
substantial infusion of technical know-how from abroad as
well as the importation of critical hardware and components.
They already have started to develop the necessary technical
capability and industrial base for this satellite launch
vehicle program.
The principal space research facility is the Thumba,
Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) on India's
southwest tip. A science and technology center at VEILS
is the focal point for development of the satellite launch
vehicle, Facilities for making solid propellants and
fabricating rocket motors have supported the sounding rocket
programs and are being upgraded to produce prototype motors
for the satellite launcher.
A new test range is being constructed near Madras, the
Sri farikota island Rocket Launch Station (SH1RLS), which
not only will be the principal rangehead for future Indian
satellite launches but also will be the location or some
of the production facilities for both their satellite launch
.Vehicles and expected IRBM programs.
The Indains are planning to build a solid-propellant
rocket motor production plant at SHiRLS
8
 If a decision were made to go ahead-with such an effort
now, and if the program were given high priority, we estimate
that the Indians probably would require at least 10 years to
deploy an indigenously -designed IRBM. But significant imports
of technology and related hardware would be required from
abroad during at least the early phases of such an effort.
They also probably would require the services of qualified
foreig personnel, particularly for managing the program.
Prom a?propulsion standpoint, the'lower three stages
of the SLV 3 seem suitable for use as a nuclear weapons
dellvory system. Stage 1 is 3.3 feet, in diameter and
approximately 29 foot-long. Stages 2 and 3 are both 2.6
feet in diameter and approximately 19 and 7 feet long
respectively. All three stages are to' contain modern poly,
.butadiene and/or polyurethane and amnion .Scum pexchiorat6
propellants. The first two stages are to employ a metal
motor case and Stage 3 a fiberglass one. This vehicle should
be capable of ranges in excess of 1,500 nm
9
 So far, the most elaborate guidance the' Indians ha
devised is an autopilot. But eventually they intend to
intploy an inertial rn asuring un . an
rate gyros in the ;guidance system for the SLV- , w hhich are
most of the constituent ,parts of an inertial guidance system.
a : precision i acili;t.y has been set up to support the , develop-
riieht and prototype , prod action of gyros, acc eleronneters, and
hydraulic control comp! nents. Purtherm;are, the Indians have
acquired a sophisicated inertial guidance: test system and
We built a special. facility for accommodating this equip-
By the time an IB.BM could be ready,for flight testing,
the Indians might reasonably be expected to . develop their
own inertial guidance system
The missile's .accuracy could be improved
if they could obtain foreign technical assistance.
10
 There is no evidence of any Iranian interest in
obtaining a nuclear-capable missile delivery system. With
the exception of Israel, Iran probably has the b st industrial
potential in the Middle-East for developing and producing
their own ballistic missile systems. However, should they
decide to acquire such a system, they probably would attempt
to, purchase one from the us.
ISRAEL
Of the countries under consideration, Israel is the
only one that has developed a nuclear-capable bails. tic
missile of strategic importance. Development of the missile,
called the MD-620 and Jericho,
. probably was
completed about 1970.
The Jericho is a mobile, two-stage, solid-propellant,
shortwrange ballistic missile system that has both tactical
and strategic importance in the Middle Bast, The missile
is about 43 feet long, weighs almost 15,000 lbs,
Its
miaximum range is about 260 nm,
11
 "'HCRET,
Initially, the Israelis seeped to postpone deployment
of the Jericho deliberately, but the October .173 war
apparently forced them.to begin deployment prematurely.
Each Jericho firing unit may consist of four transporter'
erectors, each with a check-,out van, one, command-and.'cantroi
vehicle, and a small security force. For launching, the
firing units would move to presurveyed sites
12
 ? ?~~~1S:Li JL~
ITALY
Italy has a basic Industrial and scientific competence
which might enable It, with some outside. aid, to develop a
strategic missile system. From national and multilateral
military and space programs, Italy has acquired experience
in some advanced technology, which would be helpful in
missile development programs.- Italy has a good solid-
propellant technology and has produced motors of up to
about 2 feet in diameter for space applications < They
R
probably have a .good capability. far the development, of M.
Italy's overall competence in missilery probably will con-
tinue to Increase slowly. It is unlikely that they would
undertalte a major missile development program unless there
were a breakup of NATO
13
 TCPCRET
JAPAN
Japan has no strategic ballistic missile program, but
it has developed Its own satellite launch vehicle capability.
if a serious, commitment is made in the near future to start
development of a nuclear capable missile system, initial
deployment probably could take place within 3>S years.
Most areas. of strategic value are all within
about 1, S00 nza of. Japan, The Japanese could present a
~teasoanably credible threat to these areas with a force of
about 50.75 medium-range missiles (MIfMs). Japan possesses
most of the scientific, technical and industrial resources
to successfully develop such-a s'stem. Of particular
significant and direct applicability would be. the experience
gained during the past decade in the development, testing
and production of launch vehicles and hardware for the
Japanese space effort. if the largest Japanese satellite
launch vehicle-developed to date, the solid-propellant Mu-3C,
were used as the basis for a ballistic missile, it probably
could deliver a range of 1,375 nm. The
main problems in the conversion would be the development of
guidance and control systems. Improved and more powerful
versions of the Mu (Mup4S1f and Mu-4SS) are scheduled to be
tested over the next few years. If successful, these efforts
would increase the payload-and/or range capability of any
military version of the Mu.
TOPS BT
 "for 011%.n
The Japanese can probably convert the Mu-3C or improved
versions into a MRhMJ1RBM without any major input of foreign
technology. The most difficult and time.wconsuming?task
would be the development of a suitable guidance and control
system. The Mu-3C employs a radio-inertial, system for
placing satellites In orbit. Some further impro cement ' in
the control system is planned in the next year or two. The
Japanese probably could begin flight testing an inertially.-
guided SSM version of the Mu in about 1-2 years.
The US Thor booster is being produced under license
that wilx.. give the Japanese a capability for orbiting
synchronous satellites by the mid- to late 1970s. Although
this vehicle could be converted to a MRBM/IRiM, the use of
cryogenic liquid propellants in the boaster .stage makes it
unattractive from an operational point.:of view. But US
Japanese cooperation will lead to a substantial improvement
in the overall level of Japanese space technology and will
enhance their missile development capabilities.
Japan already.has the basic test facilities required
for missile. development and these are scheduled to be up-
graded ova the next few years. The Kagoshima Space Center-
on the southern tip of Kyushu, from which the Mu-3C has
been fired,, is a relatively modern launch facility. It
is
 would be well suited, with appropriate modifications and
expansion, for use in any missile development program the
Japanese might undartahe. A larger satellite launch complex
.Is also under construction some 50 urn to the south on
Tsuegas1ima Island which will support the Thor Program.
Either site would provide adequate firing-Tan ges to the
east or southeast for a MRHM/IM flight test program.
Downrange facilities would have to be established and
would probably involve the use of Instrumented ships.
PAKI3' A
The Pakistanis are be1ioved to have a very strong
motivation to acquire a ballistic missile system, primarily
for use against targets in India. Pakistan's technology
and industrial capability ate inadequate to develop a
missile system on Its own. Massive assistance or purchase
of a complete missile system from an Outside source would.
be required.. The only countries from which such assist*nce
appears possible are 0 and China, with China being the
more likely. Pakistan would probably prefer an IRS, but
they could have ,use or a .ghorter-range ta;.t1cal ballistic
missile.
16
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SOU L APR!CA
South Africa. does not have the capability to produce.a
ba llitic' missile on its own, if they should decide . to
acquire dike, they would have to either develop their own
Industrial base,. which appears unlikely, or purchase a system
from a foreign coantr
The South Afiricans, however, are known to be chiefly interested
in alr and coastal defense and do not appear to have a require-
ment for a surface"to-surface ballistic missile.
Should Sweden decide to develop and deploy a nuclear-
capable ballistic inissile force, they would need substantial.
outside aid. Although Swedish industry-is sophisticated and
is pxoducing small tactical missiles, no work has been done
on ballistic missiles. For such a program, the Swedes
probably would be "forced to import technology and components
on a fairly large scale. In view of their many failures
in 'trying to develop their own tactical missiles, a more
probable course would be for them to purchas :;a complete
missile system or to manufacture under license a system
developed and tested elsewhere,
In order not 'to provoke the USSR, any nuctear'capable
missile system that the Swedes might attempt to acquire
17
ToP 5 ,
 TOP "fit `1t3T
probably would,be restricted in range to less than 100 nm
and be designed for defensive use only. There are only two
candidate systems in the West: The US Lance and the French
piuton. They are more likel
y to acquire the Fluton since
the prench would probably be willing to sell it to them
much sooner than the US would make the Lance available.
TAIWAN
Taiwan has a strong motivation to acquire a ballistic
missile system and probably would require an IRM in order
to reach targets in China. It Is unlikely, though, that
they could acquire such a system from any outside source.
Taiwan has a very Inadequate technological and industrial
base to produce any type of ballistic missile. It does have
a small research and, development effort on small tactical
solid-propellant rockets, but. this effort could be expanded
significantly only with outside assistance. Such assistance
would be difficult to obtain
W HST GE 04M
Xf the West Germans were to develop a missile capability,
they probably would want IRBMs with ranges of 1, S00 to 2, 500 nm
They probably would require at least S years to deploy
a liquid propellant system without outside aid.
 The German industrial base is strong and divers :l.ed