SPA DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE: 16-Sep-2009 Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report Proliferation of Missile Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons FMSAC-STIR/67-5 30 November 1967 copy N! . 16 Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOREIGN MISSILE AND SPACE ANALYSIS CENTER PREFACE The proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems poses many problems for the United States. This paper discusses the capa- bilities, incentives, and likelihood of various countries to acquire nuclear- capable ballistic missile systems over the next ten years. e judgments presen e herein represent the views of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center and have not been coordinated with other components of CIA. cEC R T iii CONTENTS Page PREFACE PROBLEM .................................................. 1 CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 1 SUMMARY .................................................. 2 DISCUSSION ............................................... 4 Introduction ............................................... 4 Belgium ................................................... 151 Italy ...................................................... 32 Netherlands ................................................ 32 Switzerland ................................................ 32 Argentina ................................................. 32 Brazil ..................................................... 33 Denmark .................................................. 33 Indonesia ................................................. 33 Nationalist China .......................................... 34 Norway .................................................. 34 Spain ..................................................... 35 Cooperative space programs ................................. 35 205/36 v PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM To assess the prospects for the proliferation of strategic nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems over the next ten years.* CONCLUSIONS 1. France, the UK, are expected to acquire nuclear-capable a istic missile systems in the near future. France is the only country which thus far has clearly demonstrated both the inten- tion and capability to develop a native system. * A strategic ballistic missile system is arbitrarily defined as one that can carry a nuclear warhead to a distance of at least 200 nautical miles. cc~ SUMMARY During the next 10 years a number of additional nations may become involved in the proliferation of strategic ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Some may be motivated to ac- quire such systems more by a desire for national prestige than by realistic military considerations. Others may decide that the possession of such weapons will guarantee their safety in the face of some similar regional threat. In all cases, the na- tion involved will first have to choose whether to attempt to develop such systems domestically or to purchase them abroad. The costs and resources involved in developing, testing, producing, and deploying even a small bal- listic missile force are great, and a major national commitment is required. Although basic missile technology and some of the necessary hardware are readily available, even relatively advanced nations encounter difficult, costly and time-consuming prob- lems when attempting to develop and produce stra- tegic missile systems in quantities. The degree of difficulty of producing such mis- sile systems clearly depends on the circumstances of the particular nation involved, especially on its scientific and industrial base, and the kinds and numbers of missiles it desires. Nations already producing small sounding rockets, tactical missiles, or advanced aircraft would be better able to under- take a ballistic missile program than nations not having these kinds of capabilities. However, only an advanced space rocket technical capability would significantly reduce the time and effort necessary for a successful indigenous ballistic mis- sile program. On the other hand, external assist- ance from major powers in the form of needed com- ponents and equipment and in establishing and operating production and test facilities could sub- stantially reduce the burden. Similarly, acquir- ing the services of foreign missile experts would be extremely helpful to an otherwise indigenous pro- gram. Several other nations could, over the ten years, achieve some capability to develop such systems, but have no presently foreseeable incentive to have them. They include Belgium East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Italy, the iAetner- lands, and Switzerland. Of the remaining na- tions-those which, regardless of their desires, ap- pear to lack the capability to acquire strategic mis- siles during the ten-year period by any means-we have discussed Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Indo- nesia, Nationalist China, Norway, the Republic of South Africa, and Spain. nrr DISCUSSION INTRODUCTION It is sometimes assumed that any nation with a moderate scientific and technical base can develop ballistic missile weapons systems* without great difficulty. The only nations that have developed ballistic missile systems using essentially native re- sources have been World War II Germany, the USSR, and the United States, and both of the latter initially made extensive use of German equipment, personnel, and experience in their programs. Since World War II, five other nations have established serious programs to acquire missile delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear payloads. These are Communist China, France, and the UK. Despite a great inves and effort, together with a considerable amount of foreign as- sistance, none of these countries has yet successfully deployed a military missile system. The Chinese program, although now apparently self-sufficient, originally was primarily dependent on Soviet as- The US Government has not provided major components or subsystems of actual missiles to any of these native development programs. However, US industry has been supplying considerable assist- ance. One form of this assistance has been general end-use items such as umbilical connectors, accel- erometers, gyroscopes, tracking equipment, teleme- try equipment, and computers, which play an im- portant but secondary role in missile development. * For the purposes of this paper, surface-to-surface bal- listic missile systems have been defined in terms of their ranges as follows (in nautical miles) : SRBM (short-range ballistic missile)-up to 600; MRBM (medium-range bal- listic missile)-600 to 1,500; IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile)-1,500 to 3,000; and ICBM (intercon- tinental ballistic missile)-over 3,000. A second form of assistance have been component and subsystem production by foreign subsidiaries or licensees in the country concerned. These agree- ments usually provide for US technical personnel to assist in this production by means of training programs, both design and production assistance, and on-the-spot trouble shooting. A third category of assistance is the US export of equipment for use in fabricating and testing missile components. Many times these machines are general purpose; sometimes they are unique items. There have been few if any instances in which the items or assistance provided by the US, if with- held, would be critical to the foreign missile devel- opment program. In each case, it is likely that the country concerned could acquire a substitute or develop a replacement for any US-supplied item by paying a penalty in time, money, and possibly a degradation in performance. However, when this assistance is taken in total it is clear that the cost of these foreign missile development programs and the time required for their fulfillment would in- crease markedly if access to US markets were denied. This denial would certainly cause a major policy review of the programs and might prompt cancellation altogether in certain cases. The time periods estimated in the following text assume that access to the US aerospace market remains un- changed. In addition, the multi-national cooper- ative space research programs have been considered briefly as potential sources of missiles, components, or missile-related equipment or technology. iECnCT 5CrTRT~ 9 -UCREL SE:D T 13 15 17 EERET 19 ate- 20 ~7lTr --- 21 CCr 23 25 C ~-/^ nrs ~CG7CC 1 27 CCF~ TT^ 30 BELGIUM Belgium has the technical ability and industrial base to develop a short-range ballistic missile sys- tem, and it is gaining some experience from its participation in the pro- gram and from its membership in ELDO and ESRO. However, because of its limited resources, there is little likelihood that Belgium will attempt to acquire a ballistic missile system in the coming decade. EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES No bloc country now has the capability to develop a nuclear-capable ballistic missile delivery system. East Germany and Czechoslovakia might eventu- ally be capable of developing such a program; 31 however, under present and foreseeable circum- stances, the USSR will not permit them to engage in such a program. ITALY Italy now has a limited capability in the missile and aerospace fields and probably could develop a satisfactory short-range ballistic missile within the period of this estimate without significant outside help. An IRBM or ICBM system, on the other hand, probably would require considerable foreign technology. A limited research and development effort on ad- vanced weapons commenced in Italy after World War II, but the lack of well-defined objectives and centralized control of the missile effort during these early years resulted in a series of disappointments and failures. A few native short-range missile sys- tems are under development but none are in pro- duction. The most significant effort has been the production of some components, including the motor, for the surface-to-air missile sys- tem. NETHERLANDS The Netherlands has a small but good scientific, engineering and industrial base and is engaged the production of some components for the missiles. They also are invoo1vect in o and ELDO programs. SWITZERLAND Switzerland has the capability to produce a short- range ballistic missile system, although flight tests would have to be made outside the country. How- ever, it is believed that the Swiss have no require- ment for missiles with ranges in excess of about 75 nautical miles, and there is no known develop- ment program in this category. ARGENTINA Argentina has had modest space research and sounding rocket development programs underway since 1960. Activities in these areas of rocket re- search, development and production are carried out by a number of governmental agencies and departments, with a number of universities con- tributing some basic scientific support. The mili- tary, provides supervision over the program, u us far no serious work appears to have been accomplished on purely mili- tary missile systems. A series of small sounding rockets has been under development in Argentina for several years. CGS 32 In addition to purely indigenous efforts, the Ar- gentine National Space Research Commission (CNIE), which is also under the direction of the Secretary for Aeronautics, has concluded agree- ments with the US for cooperative research rocket operations using Argentine facili- ties. Sounding rockets have been supplied by these two countries, and Argentine technicians have been trained in the use and maintenance of these ve- hicles. A number of these vehicles have been suc- cessfully fired by Argentine crews at Chamical. BRAZIL Brazil, the largest and most populous country in Latin America, established a modest rocket pro- gram in 1964. The decision to initiate such an effort was strongly influenced by Argentina's rela- tively successful entry into the field in the early 1960's. Rapid strides have been made during the past year, and Brazil's program is now generally comparable to that of Argentina in terms of ac- complishment. razil"s space efforts to date have toward cooperation with the US in an upper at- mosphere research program. A rocket launch fa- cility capable of handling vehicles in the US Nike- Apache class was completed during the spring of The provided much of the range equip- intin has trained Brazilian technicians in the maintenance and firing of US vehicles. In addition to its cooperative program with the US, Brazil is also attempting to develop its own small sounding rockets. A few such vehicles have been produced and test fired, Although Brazil has the most advanced scientific and industrial base in Latin America, its capabili- ties in these areas are far from sufficient to permit the indigenous development of a nuclear-capable missile delivery system DENMARK Denmark does not possess the technical capa- bility needed to develop a ballistic missile delivery system and is not expected to acquire one. Denmark has a very limited native missile and rocket development and production capability. Al- though she is not engaged in an independent de- velopment program, she is participating in ESRO INDONESIA Prior to President Sukarno's fall from power in the latter part of 1965, Indonesian officials were often prone to make highly exaggerated claims con- cerning their country's ability to develop strategic missile and space launch systems. In view of the recent developments in Indonesia, particularly the moderation of its formerly aggressive foreign policy, it is presumed that any incentive to acquire such a capability has been eliminated. At any rate, the backward condition of Indonesia's scientific, tech- nical and industrial resources precludes the native development of nuclear-capable missile delivery systems Indonesia has been supplied with a fairly exten- sive and modern array of missiles by the Soviet Union, all of which have been basically defensive 33 n onesia has no capability to coy and must rely on the Soviet Union for replacement parts. None of the Soviet-supplied missile systems are capable of being modified by the Indonesians for use as a nuclear-capable strategic missile delivery system. Indonesia has been engaged in a rather limited native tactical rocket R&D program for several years. ese roc ets ave no potential for use in a strategic missile role. Indonesia also had, until recently, a fairly active, although relatively modest, research rocket pro- gram. The most sophisticated aspect of this effort involved the purchase of sounding rocket technol- ogy from the level ot Indonesian competence in rocketry was advanced considerably by the acquisition of this technology. In addition to this program, Indonesia has been attempting to develop native-designed sounding rockets. Several small, solid-propellant vehicles ut none have been de- veloped o e porn o ecoming a useful launch vehicle. These rockets have no potential military applications. NATIONALIST CHINA Despite Nationalist China's obvious concern with Communist China's burgeoning progress in the nu- clear and missile fields, it has neither the scientific, technological, or industrial resources to develop ballistic missile delivery systems and would prob- ably be unable to obtain assistance in this area from foreign sources. NORWAY Norway does not now have and is not expected to attain the capability to develop a ballistic mis- sile system in the next ten years. It is not antici- pated that it would attempt to acquire such a sys- tem by purchase. Norway has a very modest missile industry which is centered at the government-owned Kongsberg Armament and Guided Missile Plant in Kongsberg. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA The Republic of South Africa has virtually no capability for the native development of even a short-range ballistic missile system. The only pos- sible method of obtaining such a system would be by purchase. SPAIN Spain does not now have and is not expected to attain the capability to produce a native ballistic missile delivery system Such a system would have to be obtained through pur- chase from another country. COOPERATIVE SPACE PROGRAMS There are two principal multinational space ef- forts, ESRO (European Space Research Organiza- tion) and ELDO (European Launcher Develop- ment Organization), and several lesser joint efforts such as COSPAR (Committee on Space Research) and Eurospace. There also are a number of bi- lateral cooperative programs with NASA, and the are those, such as Soviets recently signed a space cooperation agree- ment with the French. One of the inducements for joining cooperative space programs is the belief that such membership will advance aerospace tech- nology. However, none of these international pro- grams are believed to be supplying technology hav- ing significant application to the development of ballistic missiles. It is believed that ESRO, for example, can only be of marginal assistance to any of the member countries* in the development of a ballistic missile system. The countries which will benefit the most that have private or government-controlled rms o which ESRO has awarded contracts for satellite development and production. The type of technology involved, however, is only of sec- ondary importance to missile development, such as the development of tracking and telemetry sys- tems and the design and packaging of highly re- liable electronic systems. Some member countries of ELDO** are in a good position to benefit from the Europa-I (or ELDO-A) satellite launch vehicle development program. As in the case of ESRO, the more advanced coun- tries are gaining the most from this program because t ey are developing the liquid stages for the launch vehicle, although such liquid technology may not be optimum for ballistic missiles. In addition, these countries are obtaining valuable experience in program management, personnel training and experience, missile staging technology, guidance and control system development, and flight testing. For the most part, the NASA programs involve the supplying of satellite launch vehicles and sound- ing rockets for foreign payloads. In the case of Italy's San Marco program, Italian technicians were trained in the launching of US Scout satellite launch vehicles. NASA also assists some foreign countries in the design, construction and testing of their own satellites. * The members of ESRO are: The United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain and Denmark. ** The members of ELDO are: The United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Australia. 35

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT