JOINT RESPONSE TO OIG REPORT - "ACCOUNTABILITY REGARDING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE & AFTER 9/11/2001."

• Keywords: CONCLUSIONS
• Keywords: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
• Keywords: JOINT
• Collection: DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATED TO 9/11 ATTACKS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001229684
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2015
• Publication Date: July 4, 2005

Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684.SEPGANE-frf-NUFVEN/ /MREO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs4 July 2005MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General, CIAFROM:SUBJECT:Former Deputy ChiefDCI Counterterrorist Center(U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings andConclusions of the Joint Inquiry intoIntelligence Community Activities Before& After 9/11/2001."I. Introduction1. (U) The following represents the joint response of17 of the officers cited in the OIG report on accountabilityprepared in response to the findings and conclusions of theJoint Inquiry into the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001.? For unexplained reasons the OIG decided at somepoint between an earlier draft of its report andthis final version that a number of us were nolonger to be recommended for accountabilityboards. We all decided, however, to sign thisjoint response because none of us had any insightinto the criteria used by the OIG to make itsfinal determination.2. (U) Although the OIG's evaluation of the JointInquiry's findings has improved when compared to theportions of the initial draft we were shown in the December2004-January 2005 timeframe, largely thanks to the inputfrom the individuals identified in that report, we stillfind this OIG document to be deeply flawed. Unfortunately,the OIG review has missed an historic opportunity to examinewhat worked and did not work well within the IC. Instead,it has chosen to take a very narrow approach to its mandatefrom the Joint Inquiry; an approach that does not attempt toproduce a realistic and comprehensive review of whathappened. In so doing, it abandoned any hope of producing a6BeRETHVOTORN1 /MRnvmnTmn CITTOOTV-rfITITITnAT nr77TVTOApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684aaiwelmwrrnuryna/fmnSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."document that would help CIA and the IC improve its abilityto work CT issues in the future.3. (U) For the sake of completeness and thehistorical record, we insist that this joint response, the13 January 2005 joint response to the earlier OIG draft, anyseparate responses designated by individual authors, theAugust 2001 OIG Inspection report on CTC, and the September2001 OIG Inspe,ction report on NE Division be made anofficial part of this OIG report on 9/11. We believe thatit is essential that these documents be included in order toprovide a complete picture, not just to those who will readthis record in the process of deciding if there will beaccountability boards, but also because it is clear thatthis OIG report may eventually?perhaps sooner rather thanlater?be released to the public.? The release of the Department of Justice IG reportsets a precedent for demands that the CIA alsorelease the OIG report that may be difficult toignore.? If these materials are not included as part of theofficial report, the only official record will bewhat we consider to be a flawed OIG report.Fairness and history demand that we be given someopportunity to respond.? The above named documents should also bereferenced in your report so it will be clear toany reader that they exist.4. (U) At the same time, the process for commentingon the OIG report ensures that our responses will beinadequate. We have never been allowed to retain a workingcopy of the report. We have been forced to read and takenotes on what is a lengthy document; a process that makesresponding in detail to the numerous charges difficult.And, we have not been given significant time or anyresources to try to research many of these accusations.This response is already significantly beyond the initialten days we were allocated to read and respond to a reportthat had been years in investigation and preparation.2SECRET4-1-NeFORMY /MR1)1..01\11A I nit ?i ?Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684APP-r-o-\7e-c-1-f-ork-el-e-a-s;:-2-0-1-570-671-0 -65-12-2-96.84.cmo.AraterrrwasynniIminSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."Almost without exception, whenever we have been able toresearch specific charges or facts raised in the initial andfinal OIG reports, we have found serious problems. Althoughthe OIG had complete access to all lotus notes and cablesfrom the period under review and draws on them?on aselective basis?to make its case, we have not had the sameaccess. We believe we would have been able to present amore complete picture of our actions/efforts/thinking if wehad equal access to notes, cable traffic, and administrativedocuments.5. (U) By concentrating its efforts on an attempt tofind individuals to blame, the OIG report has ignored thebigger issues that would have led to an in-depth examinationof our CT analysis and operations and, hopefully, would haveproduced recommendations that could have stood the test oftime. At a superficial level, the OIG reports tells us thatwe only need to worry about ensuring that our officers liveup to some ill-defined level of "professional standards" andsurprises will be avoided and the IC will run smoothly.? The IG in its introduction, for example,explicitly excludes from consideration anevaluation of successes?many of which wereachievements of the same officers criticized inits report. A comparison with what worked wellwould have given greater context to the supposedfailures of the CIA and might have led toimprovements in CT analysis and operations in thefuture.? As such, the IG has failed to produce acomprehensive "lessons learned" that could guideus in determining what still needs to be changed.6. (U) The OIG report also demonstrates a clear lackof understanding about the policy, resource, and practicalconstraints that governed CTC decisions and actions. Itcompounds this problem via the selective use of "facts" tomake points that are based on either misunderstanding or adeliberate attempt to create a case for individualaccountability rather than an unbiased examination ofevents.3BECRETHNOTONN7/MRApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684TTVTTTr-TApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684SUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."7. (U) Finally, the leadership team in place duringthe run-up to 9/11/2001 wants to restate the point raised inthe 1/13/2005 joint response: we were responsible for theCenter's actions, within the constraints placed upon us bypolicy and the resources we had under our control. It isour belief that to hold more junior officers responsible forthe work environment they found themselves in, and overwhich they had no control, would only encourage anenvironment of risk-aversion or discourage individuals fromtaking on the risky missions.II. Context  8. (U) We will not attempt to repeat the manycontextual problems we had with the earlier draft, althoughsome carry through to the final report. We again urge aclose read of our 1/13/2005 joint response, which contains adetailed response to many of the claims that are eitherexplicit or implicit in the OIG final report. There are anumber of issues that do require additional comment,however, now that we have seen the entire report andrevisions to the earlier OIG draft.9. (CI) Resources. This is a prime example of a topicthat demonstrates how the OIG report either lacks anunderstanding about the policy and resource constraints wefaced or how it tries to selectively use "facts" to paint anegative picture of CTC. The OIG report, for example,questions CTC's management of available resources. Inparticular it claims that we did not spend all the moneyavailable to us despite our repeated requests for additionalfunding. As proof  of this it cites the fact that there iscurrently about million of CTC FY00 base funds unspent.?In reality, on 30 September 2000 there was only(0.5 percent) in FY00 base funds that wasnot obligated. This represented only about 2 daysof spending in CTC.4AECREIP-i-MOTONEV /MR HWTTTW-7Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684SUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."? What is the discrepancy? We obligate fundsagainst activities such as field operations, PCSdeployments, contracts, etc. If all the chargesdo not come through, the unspent total climbs overthe years until the books are cleared. It isagainst provisions of the Anti-Deficiency Act toobligate or spend more money than we have beenbudgeted. Under these circumstances and with thelate arrival of Base funds in FY00 millien-arrivcd on 27 July 2 ), it is miraculous that wewere as close to spending our entire budget as wewere at the end of FY00.? OIG is well aware from its previous audits thatdeobligations of expired one-year tenured budgetsis a long-standing Agency problem and not systemicto just CTC. To resolve this problem, the Agencywas granted authority to fight the post-9/11 waron terrorism using two-year tenured budgets. TheAgency did not have two-year tenured budgets untilFY02 and CTC did the best it could within theconstraints of those fiscal realities in FY00.? Even the entire million represents onlyslightly more than one week of funding at ouraverage spend rate, and as a percent of our budget(less than 3 percent) is not significantlydifferent than the overall DO budget "excess" forFY00. Not something you can build new initiativesupon.? The OIG report seems to implicitly say we shouldhave obligated more money than we had on theassumption that not all the estimated bills wouldcome due over the next four years. Not somethingwe were allowed to do.10. (Q) Moreover, the OIG report selectively treatsthe fundamental issue of the Center's financial resources.One passage in the report asserts that the OIG did notattempt to reach a conclusion on what overall funding shouldhave been because of conflicting information on the adequacyof funding. Despite being unable to comment on resources,5-SZCIMPHNOFORNI /MRin.oni I A I RI/ r ? V1`.1 . !m TCT 101:7C 7717TApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684WISCUIEW/Iwaymyrum//MASUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."somehow they seem to be content to misuse budget informationto claim inefficient management of funds. Finally, we wouldnote FY00 was a very confused year: starting off with cuts,accelerated spending due to the Millennium Threat, and latein the year a reserve release and supplemental funding.? It is clear from the post-9/11 environment that wewere nowhere near the funding level required tocarry out an aggressive CT program. And that theoverall issue is how the USG allocates funds tocover priority issues. That topic cannot beadequately addressed without looking at the rolesof Congress and OMB.11. (Q) Staffing. Similarly, the OIG report says itdoes not assess the sufficiency of personnel in CTC, exceptto the extent that it concludes there were not enoughofficers with operations experience in UBL Station given theworkload the unit faced. This seems to be an attempt by OIGto ignore the workload issue that we discussed extensivelyin our 13 January 2005 joint response and the IG's ownAugust 2001 inspection report. The focus on operationsexperience also seems to be an attempt to divert attentionfrom the reality of the CTC environment pre-9/11.? The officers we had working these issues were thesame ones that were responsible for the successCTC had prior to 9/11 and, in many cases, are theones responsible for CTC's post-9/11 successesonce we had adequate resources, authorities, andpolicies. It also ignores the operationalexperience of the people in the field who, by-and-large, were responsible for implementation.? The OIG report also seriously downplays theimportance of our effort to homebase more analystsand operations officers to deepen our expertiseacross the board. This process continues throughtoday and began once CTC was given permission tohomebase officers rather than to rely exclusivelyon rotations.6SECRE-14-71-Nepepat/ /MRI1LRuI 1 ftApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684suis.ausw-f-trour-vsum I InnSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."12. (C//NF) Finally, we are puzzled by theinconsistency in OIG messages on training, especially withrespect to targeting officers in UBL Station. Severalquotes from the IG's December 2003 Inspection Report on "TheFuture of Target Analysis" will highlight the mixed messagebeing provided by the OIG. First, the OIG defines targetanalysis in a manner consistent with the approach of UBLStation:? "There are contending definitions of targetanalysis, but for the purposes of this inspectionreport, we define it as the application ofanalytic techniques to focus collection and covertaction." And, "These target officers can providebackground information, context, and insight aboutwhich targets should be sought, and how they canbest be pursued."13. (C//NF) The December 2003 report then quotes a"widely respected senior target officer" to describe thetradecraft of targeting, indicating that it involves:driving collection, target marketing, 'operationalizing'information, and operational planning. The detaileddiscussion included in the report of these last threecharacteristics accurately describes the main activities ofUBL Station, which served as a headquarters component thatwas driving, marketing, and coordinating field operations.Instead of highlighting that the UBL Station targetingeffort was doing exactly what its own target analysisinspection says they should be doing, the OIG 9/11 reportcriticizes them for not having the same operationalexperience and training that exists in the field.? There is no evidence in the OIG 9/11 report tosupport its assessment that officers highlytrained in the recruitment cycle and streettradecraft?necessary to run field operations?areby definition more qualified than targetingofficers to use all-source intelligence toidentify, validate, designate for pursuit, andcoordinate multi-station operations againsttargets of interest.7.SECREW-AlelPORN/ /MRr-rTCCTUTrATTnT1  Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684msNm/fLum.SUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."? If the OIG, nevertheless, believes that operationstraining is necessary, we question why they didnot include that recommendation as part of its9/11 target analysis recommendations in December2003, or for that matter, make a similarrecommendation in its August 2001 inspection ofCTC.? The OIG 9/11 report seems to indicate that officesand officers will be held accountable for havingor providing training that the OIG itself does notrecommend. In the current environment it will bedifficult to send many targeting officers throughthe  course whcn thcy arc in ouchdcmand ao part of thc buildup of thc cadreoperationo officcro.14. (E) Systemic Problems. The OIG 9/11 reportabdicates any responsibility for examining the role ofsystemic issues in the runup to the terrorist attacks.Without understanding the nature of these systemic issuesassociated with the Agency and the USG approach tocounterterrorism, we are uncertain how the IG's assertion oflapses on the part of individuals square with the 19systemic recommendations the OIG says it made to the DDCI inSeptember 2004 by the OIG. The memo the OIG drafted onsystemic issues within the CIA needs to be considered as apart of the overall OIG process. The OIG 9/11 reportclearly states that such a memo was prepared and forwardedto the DDCI. None of us have seen this report.15. (C//NF) August 2001 OIG Inspection of CTC. Thisis perhaps the most perplexing portion of the final OIGreport. The initial draft IG report completely ignored theOIG's own CTC inspection report, delivered just one monthprior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As highlighted in our1/13/2005 joint response, the August 2001 inspection reportspeaks of a well-run Center that is suffering from astressful work environment, and limited options for dealingwith continued shortfalls. Nowhere in this earlier reportdoes the OIG recommend the Agency take steps to change theenvironment in CTC.8-Srfreal9"107.01017 /MR rTTCC1-17-1-r-AMTnIkTApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684AVZ?MMWtTUVFVNA1//MKSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."? When this report was brought to the OIG'sattention in our January 2005 response, it mademajor changes to its initial findings in the 9/11report, but ultimately absolves itself of anyresponsibility for its earlier report byessentially claiming that its inspections processwas superficial, conducting a "lessons learned"exercise, and changing its methodology.Nevertheless, the OIG 9/11 report still cites theAugust 2001 report to make points when it suitsits purposes.? None of this can change the fact that leadershipthroughout the Agency has been told to rely on IGinspections as an aid in improving the managementof their units. We are now being told that was amistake and that OIG will do better in the future.That is all very convenient with the benefit ofhindsight, but it seems that no matter whatassertions are made now, these inspections weresupposed to identify problems and makerecommendations for corrections.? We, in fact, believe the August 2001 report is abetter representation of the environment in CTCand implicitly the environment inside the Agencywith respect to CT-related issues than is theflawed 9/11 IG report.16. (QI) The IG seems to be on the horns of a dilemma:either they have to admit that the problems they are nowciting are only evident with the benefit of hindsightbecause they could not detect them at the time, or they haveto admit that they have for years been producing uselessreports and that perhaps they should hold themselves up tothe same standard of accountability?that they did notperform their jobs with a reasonable level ofprofessionalism, skill, and diligence and consequently didnot discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactorymanner. At a minimum, if one accepts the current IGposition, the OIG inspection process should be shut downuntil the IG can explain its past practices and how itintends to improve in the future. There is no sense9-SEGRBT-HtgOTONEV /MR1.%Wlk7TTlar" c'TTCCTW'-^'"'Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 0012296840,ITTONeNTTT,NTTT,Wr TTYTTTr,Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684-wliwatemIrrnyr-vmmufmnSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."spending the resources currently devoted to the inspectionprocess if it is not providing management with a useful toolto improve itself that will not be repudiated whenconvenient.III. Key Issues  A. Watchlisting & Passing Intelligence to the FBI17. (C//1111 Despite our best efforts in our previousjoint response to inform the OIG of the proceduresassociated with watchlisting, including the fact that theinstructions to the field clearly indicated that it was afield and not a .Headquarters function, the final reportcontinues to accuse CTC officers of not performing up to theIG's standard. It also accuses the former Chief, CTC of notupgrading procedures for nominating individuals forwatchlisting. The system and procedures in place anddescribed in cables to the field did, in fact, produce morenominations by CIA than from any other government agency andthere is no indication that there was widespread confusionon responsibilities. With the resources and peopleavailable pre-9/11, it functioned as well as any systemcould have operated.? We have gone into some detail in our 13 January2005 joint response and will not repeat thatmaterial here, but urge a close read of ourearlier comments.? It is unclear why the OIG has selectively focusedaccountability on a few CTC officers when thefield has primary responsibility and FBI officershad the information about both men as soon as CTClearned of it. As the OIG report points out,dozens of officers opened and/or read the cable.? Here as in other places we also must object to theconnotation of some of the passages in the OIGreport. For example, the report asserts that ifal-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi had been placed on the No-Fly list there might have been a greater chance ofdisrupting the 9/11 plots. It is impossible to10_SZCIREWINOTORW/MRI-TINCCTVTI-*TM-"/VV"  Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684nrmnr,"-mrt-Imm-rnw7 1-1171T7-1-mr.T  Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684WiN111/ I 171.1%?SUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."know the consequences of placing these twoindividuals on the watch list earlier or on theNo-Fly list. Indeed, the plotters were successfulin dealing with the inability of one member of thegroup to get into the United States. Yet thereport seems to want to imply greater impact towarrant accountability boards.B. Strategic Analysis18. (U) The final draft of the OIG 9/11 report failsto address the key issue on strategic analysis that weraised in our 13 January joint response. Fundamentally,strategic analysis is designed to call policymaker attentionto an important issue. There are no credible indicationsthat the people that mattered inside the USG did not fullyunderstand the al-Qa'ida threat. Indeed, if anything, the9/11 Commission hearings and report clearly indicate thatsenior officials in both the Clinton and Bushadministrations understood the threat.? During the Clinton administration that awarenesswas embedded in the covert action authoritiesapproved by the White House. In public testimonythese officials even claim to have given us farmore authority than an exacting, legal reading ofthe Memoranda of Notification would justify.? The understanding of the threat did not end withthe Clinton administration. One of the officialswho spanned both administrations was Dick Clarke,the NSC's senior CT policy officer. Consequently,there was continuity in Bush administration onthis issue. Additional strategic pieces would nothave advanced the knowledge base of those chargedwith making or advocating policy in the NSC.19. (U) Strategic analysis does not exist in the realintelligence world for its own sake. Yet given thecertainty that the magnitude of the al-Qa'ida threat wasfully understood in the policy community, the IG still seemsto be telling us that we should have produced more, at thesame time telling us that we also did not produce enough11-SZGRIBTHNOTORN//MRInnw.rm ni,"ymmy  Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684SUBJECT:Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684(U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."current intelligence for the PDB and SEIB. The IG has takenthe usual bureaucratic approach, requiring that more be doneacross the board without any recommendation for additionalresources to accomplish this mission and then threatening tohold people accountable for not being able to be all thingsto all people. Unlike the IG's 9/11 report, at least itsAugust 2001 inspection report acknowledged that CTC had fewoptions to meet these conflicting demands and was doing agood job managing the environment that confronted theCenter.? That said, although we believe our record issolid, CTC was not satisfied with the amount ofstrategic analysis we were able to complete givenour staffing levels and competing demands foranalytic products. Unlike the OIG report, whichjust asserts we should have done more, we wereactively working to increase the resources devotedto strategic analysis. The former Chief of theAnalysis and Information Group was aggressivelypushing a program to increase staffing andexpertise within AIG. CTC could not control thespeed of the response from the bureaucracy.20. (U) The OIG criticism of our strategic analysisis carried to an extreme in the discussion of the productionof intelligence analysis on aircraft as weapons. On thistopic the IG faults CTC for not doing a specific assessmentof this threat. Yet the 9/11 Commission staff in its August2004 Staff Report on the FAA makes the following statements:"The FAA was the agency primarily responsible for assessingintelligence for its relevance specifically to US commercialaviation." And also: "Nevertheless, the FAA had indeedconsidered the possibility that terrorists would hijack aplane and use it as a weapon. In the spring of 2001, FAAintelligence distributed an unclassified CD-ROM presentationto air carriers and airports, including Logan, Newark, andDulles. The presentation cited the possibility thatterrorist might conduct suicide hijacking but stated:'fortunately, we have no indication that any group iscurrently thinking in that direction.'" The Staff Reportlater states: "However, the FAA's security briefings toairports in the spring of 2001 contained an important12IMX=449NOFORN//MR.TTCC1.777/"ATT(W.Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684-0Z6arcE02771117/7lAtta / / lviKSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."caveat. It stated that from the hijackers' perspective, 'Adomestic hijacking would likely result in a greater numberof American hostages but would be operationally moredifficult. We don't rule it out . . . If, however, theintent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages forprisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion,domestic hijacking would probably be preferable.'" Whatshould we make of this? A couple of obvious conclusions arewarranted:? The IG has not dealt with material surfaced byother inquiries, such as the 9/11 Commission. Insome cases, such as this one, this material shouldhave a fundamental impact on the IG's conclusions.? The IG is again asking that CTC do somethingadditional that would only duplicate work that hasalready been done by some other element of theUSG, and in this case an organization that hadprimacy over the issue. This is particularlystriking during a period of intelligence reformprompted by the 9/11 Commission report that iscalling for less duplication.? The possibility that aircraft would be used asweapons was not enough to generate a real worldresponse even when explicitly acknowledged becausethere was not specific threat information. As theOIG report notes, there was on average only aboutone report per year that dealt with the aircraftthreat out of the thousands of threat reportsreceived between the mid-1990s and 2001. One morereview by CTC would not have changed the responseby the aviation community. Although it is worthnoting that the former Chief of AIG was in theprocess of setting up a unit to look at possiblefuture terrorist tactics at the time of 9/11.21. (U) The OIG effort to assign accountability toCTC is also evident in the charge that not enough was doneby CTC on the domestic aspect of the threat. The 9/11Commission Report clearly indicates: "Taken together, thetwo directives (PDD 62 & 63) basically left the Justice13ReFANNERYIWDMW/0011111171.17-%710r" f"-TACCTTYTE"7 '"-nAT 1DIPT7TW'7  Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684/ /SUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."Department and the FBI in charge at home and left terrorismabroad to the CIA, the State Department, and other agencies,under Clarke's and Berger's coordinating hand." On severaloccasions the former Chief, CTC asked the FBI for acomprehensive briefing on the role and activities of al-Qa'ida in the United States. We never received such abriefing. Yet now, the IG would hold us responsible foractions that properly were a different organizations lead,just as in the case of analysis of aircraft as weapons.C. Kahlid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)22. (,6,1-14NP) There is not much more ground to coverthan what we highlighted in our 13 January joint response,and we urge a close read of our earlier comments. A few keypoints, however, are worth emphasizing here:? The IG claim that we should have come to closureon the role of KSM sooner than we did is, ofcourse, driven by hindsight, when everythingbecomes much clearer. On top of this, however,the IG report does not present a credible scenarioas to the implications of our limitedunderstanding of the role played by KSM. It isnot as if CTC did not capture and render KSMbecause we were not able to document his role inal-Qa'ida beginning in the late 1990s.? The idea that it was inappropriate to assign KSMto the Rendition? Branch rather than to UBLStation is also perplexing and driven byhindsight. The IG documents that the FBIconsidered KSM an FBI case, not even a joint FBI-CIA case. There was a warrant out for his arrest.Rendition? Branch was assigned the job ofproviding support in tracking down and capturingthose individuals wanted in the United States.The IG report even states that CTC issued hundredsof requirements cables in its effort to locate KSMand bring him to justice. These cables oftenemphasized the fact that KSM posed a threat andasked for information about what he was doing andwith whom he was meeting. CTC was working th--e-14SZ.CRE/P1-/-14R3FORMY /MRApproved for for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684TTPATTT1,,,,,Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684-araiverr7 LNIRJ r URN / /SUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."rcndition with the resources available to it underthe policies in place at the time.? And finally, the internal contradictions in the IGreport are nowhere more evident than whendiscussing KSM. The IG wants CTC to add to theworkload of UBL Station by leaving the KSM casethere, at the same time they are complaining thatunit was suffering from a heavy workload and didnot have the experience to carry out operations.D. Intra-DO Coordination and Cooperation/LiaisonRelationships23. (Cl/NF) We will not repeat our earlier commentsfrom our 13 January joint response, but would like to notethe 21 September 2001 IG Inspection of the Near EastDivision to emphasize the correctness of some of our earliercomments.O That report acknowledged theand baocd onthccommcntothcICto policy diffcrcnr.Middlc Eaot policy  ' h thc tlnitcda co ov? In its current report, the IG again ignores itscontemporary inspection of similar or relatedissues, and instead chooses  to assert that lack ofprogress with  was the result of poorrelations between CTC and24. (C//11F) Elsewhere in its NE inspection the IGimplicitly points out the excellent working ielationshipbetween NE and CTC by praising Stationsand -Base. All places that CTC was heavily involvedin funding and working with on the CT target. Given all ofthis it seems more likely  that the problem with working theCT target in had more to do with the1-1,7 than with tension between UBL Station 715-SEGREPP-/-MOTORN/ /MRrWTTI.t71.7/- I-TTCCTWTIApproved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684-04Meireirri-TIWL'IJKLNI / / ELKSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."?Indeed, the OIG inspection of NE was moreconcerned with looking backward to the lastcrisis. The only recommendation it made to NEmanagement was to review its work on  No recommendations or significant discussionaddressed any of the issues now raised in the OIG9/11 report.E. Intelligence Community25. (U) The overall discussion of the role of theIntelligence Community in the OIG's 9/11 report isconfusing. When non-CIA elements of the IC refuse to staffthe Community Counterterrorism Board in CTC, the IG assertsit is CTC or CIA's fault, not the fault of the organizationthat was supposed to fill the position. At the same time,when the IC does something good?the OIG report praises theADCl/Collection as the manager with the only effectivecollection strategy?it implicitly seems to imply that thiswas simultaneously a failing of the CIA and CTC. CTC wasworking very closely with the ADCl/Collection and saw thisas a successful part of the overall CT effort. There wascertainly no reason to divert scarce resources to duplicatewhat was already working.? Other parts of the OIG 9/11 report on CTC'sinteraction with the IC seem to ignore the 9/11Commission's Report and the entire debate overintelligence reform which highlighted the lack ofcontrol over the IC by the DCI or an entity likeCTC with community responsibilities. It seems oddto hold individuals accountable for issues thatseemingly required the largest organizationalrealignment of the entire IC in50 years to correct.IV. Unfinished Business  26. (U) A comprehensive and useful report on 9/11would have included a discussion of broader issues to helpthe CIA evolve in a time of intelligence reform. Among the16SZGROPI-MOTORBV/MR....CC7WVP-ATTnA 17217Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 201-5-/-0-6710 E0-12296844WIlowilm=7-7-mvxmnmilgymSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."difficult topics that have not yet been addressed is how todeal with surprise and, in particular, surprise attack. Thekey questions should have been:? How can CTC officers, who in the pre-9/11environment were clearly working the hardest andthe longest on this issue, do things differentlyin this period of intelligence reform to reducethe risk of surprise?? How do personnel and budgets get allocated whenthere are conflicting priorities?? How do you attract officers to work on highpriority topics such as counterterrorism, if whenthe inevitable intelligence surprise comes alongthey are going to be held personally accountable?Acknowledgement Block(U) Seventeen officers mentioned in the OIG 9/11report, including all 16 of the current or former CTCofficers cited by the IG, have signed the above response.Signatures have been retained separately by the formerDC/CTC in accordance with the approach used in the OIGreport, which utilizes only the titles of the officersinvolved.17SECREAL/-/-110FORM7 /MRWEI117MTWTr'  Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684-0,Mftit="7-7-LWIZ-VAM,(JAMSUBJECT: (U) Joint Response to OIG Report -"Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusionsof the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence ActivitiesBefore & After 9/11/2001."CTC Front Office Statement and Signature Blocks  (U) Finally, the former CTC front office wants to re-emphasize (as it did in the 1/13/2005 joint response) thatwe were responsible for the activities of the Center underour watch. We believe it is not appropriate for more juniorofficers to be held responsible for conditions over whichthey had no control. All of the undersigned believe thatthe Center admirably discharged its responsibilities giventhe constraints under which it was operating. If we werenot always successful, it was not for want of trying ordedication to the mission. We are proud to have served withour fellow officers on the front line in the war againstterrorism during this difficult and stressful period. Therewas no more expert and determined group of individualsanywhere than those who labored in anonymity within CTC toprotect our country and our fellow citizens. CTC'scapabilities are clearly demonstrated by the series ofoperations and analyses conducted by the Center that set thestage for the USG response to the 9/11 attacks, and perhapsmore dramatically by the success achieved when previousrestrictions and resource constraints were removed. Thecountry and we owe a debt of gratitude to those who gave ofthemselves before and after 9/11 to fight the terrorists whoplot attacks against America. It was an honor to serve withthem.18ISBeRVILHNO/PerRMI /MR".T7CCTWTP-AM70.1,..Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 001229684