(EST PUB DATE) FIFTY YEARS OF SUPPORTING OPERATIONS A HISTORY OF CIA'S OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE 1951-2001
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0001225702
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
27
Document Creation Date:
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date:
January 4, 2011
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2005-00724
Publication Date:
January 1, 2001
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
DOC_0001225702.pdf | 6.25 MB |
Body:
7,PA:5?Vf.29t'f.q
CHAPTER Ii.
Dirty Tricks and Deadly Devices (U)
T,
. he Office of Technical Service (OTS) marks 7 September 1951 as its
founding date. On that day, its predecessor organization, the Technical
Services Staff (TSS), was created. But the full heritage of OTS pre-
dates the Central Intelligence Agency and can be traced to the Office of Strate-
gic Services (OSS), America's first intelligence agency.I OTS is the lineal
descendant of the OSS Research and Development Branch (OSS/R&D),
which Colonel (later Major General) William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan (1883-
1959) created in October 1942 to devise dirty tricks and deadly weapons in
subversive wars against Germany's Adolf Hitler and Japan's Emperor Hiro-
hito. (U)
Donovan appointed Stanley Platt Lovell
(1800-1076), a sell-described "saucepan"
chemist and successful New England
entrepreneur, as chief of the Branch. Lov-
ell was an orphan, who had put himself
through Cornell University, where he
earned a degree in chemistry. Plc served in
research and management positions in pri-
vate industry and was president of one
chemical company and vice president of
another in the Boston area when World
War II broke out. His accomplishments
included application of organic chemistry
to shoemaking, clothing manufacturing,
and orthopedic surgery. He held more than
70 US and foreign patents. (U)
If Donovan was the forefather of CIA,
I well was the foundling father of OTS. Lovell was typical of the executives,
Stanley Platt Lovell (U)
' For a compact history of OSS, see Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: Ainericas
First Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000). (U)
ORN//X 1
SE
Chapter 1
RN//X1
goat dung. This biological warfare project was canceled at the last minute,
when German forces left Morocco for Stalingrad.40 (U)
OSS and SOE Weapons and Devices (U)
Method for attaching Limpets and explosive devices
Barometric fuse triggered by altitude changes
Method for sterilizing contaminated drinking water
Chewable paper, resistant to humidity
Baseball-shaped grenade
Chemical used to sabotage automotive engines
Delayed -action hand grenade used against fuel tanks
Explosive used to sabotage train engines
Electro magnetic transmitter homing device
Method for attaching mines to steel or wooden ships
Photo sensitive electronic switch for train sabotage
Microwave transmitter for agent communications
Switch used to trigger explosives on railroad tracks
Incendiary used on land and water to ignite crude oil
Chemical time delay
Pocket -sized, celluloid case filled with gelled solvent
Spin stabilizedrocket for use with rocket launcher
Muzzle noise suppressor for light weapons
British silent and flashless weapon
Method for attacking wooden ships and bridges
Method for silencing outboard motors
This table is Unclassified.
Abalone
Anerorneter
Aqua Vita
Balsam
Beano
Caccolube
Firefly
Fountain
IFT
Limpetry
The Mole
MWT
Odometer
Paul Revere
Pencil
Incendiaries
Rocket
Silencer
Spigot Mortar
Teak
Zephyr
In 1944, Lovell approved an operation to use nerve gas in the assault on
Iwo Jima. The invasion planners estimated that US Marines would suffer
23,000 casualties, and the JCS wanted to reduce that number if possible. Pres-
ident Roosevelt vetoed the proposal, even though neither the United States nor
Japan had signed the Geneva Convention prohibiting the use of nerve gas. (U)
Lovell developed several plans for incapacitating or even killing Adolf Hit-
ler. One scenario involved a capsule of liquid nitrogen-mustard gas, which is
colorless, odorless, and floats on water. OSS recruited an agent scheduled to
attend a war conference attended by Hitler and Italian dictator Benito Musso-
lini. The agent was to crush the capsule in a flower vase, whereupon the gas
4" Lovell, Of Spies c.,C Stratagems; pp. 136-137. (U)
TrtmR4444414.).RN//X1
Chapter 2
the time noted, the latter was "self-revealing," i.e., it involved actions that
could not be concealed. The concept of "plausible deniability" was not yet in
vogue. (U)
US Clandestine Services and Technical Support (U)
Office
Created
Abolished
Office of Strategic Services
June 1942
October 1945
Strategic Services Unit
October 1945
October 1946
Central Intelligence Group
January 1946
September 1947
Office of Special Operations
July 1946
September 1952
Office of Policy Coordination
September 1948
September 1952
Central Intelligence Agency
September 1947
Directorate for Plans
September 1952
March 1973
Directorate of Operations
March 19'73
Technical Services Staff
September 1951
May 1959
Technical Services Division
May 1959
May 1973
Directorate of Science &
Technology
August 1963
Office of Technical Service
May 1973
This table is Unclassified.
OPC was dependent on CIA for rations and quarters, but it took direction
from the State and the War (and later, Defense) Departments. its chief, Frank
Wisner, was an OSS veteran with an office at State. Mainly because of a war
scare in 1948 and the Korean War two years later, OPC grew rapidly. In 1949,
Wisner had a staff of 302, a budget of $4.7 million, and no overseas stations.
By 1952 he was overseeing a staff of 2,812, a budget of $82 million, and
47 stations. 4 OSO and OPC maintained separate stations and lines of com-
mand. (U)
The formation of OPC was unprecedented, since it was the first civilian
peacetime special operations capability in American history. Its formation also
The first major policy decision on covert action ("psychological warfare") aimed at encourag-
ing armed resistance against Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was National Security Council
(NSC) 4-A. it was adopted just before Christmas 1947 and was so sensitive that only three copies
were made. The follow-on decision, NSC 10/2, created OPC and made across-the-board political,
economic, paramilitary, and propaganda subversion against the USSR and its allies official US
policy. See Grose, Operation Rollback, pp. 96-96, 104. (U)
'3 The War Department was renamed Department of Defense in February 1949. (U)
ti William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa
and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1983), pp. 43-44. (U)
17MfrrInifIlih14//X1
28
OTS Birth Certificate (U)
Tirrr
Postwar Bureaucratic Battles?OSS in Transition to CIA('"
4110
Ek-2- aAt
1951.
noh-2
.01I :WI: A, I, Opt71,,,t1. On-
11;
[..`pero_t.iorinJ. lads D
i
i
224nical re1ItC to
? - ; ,
? ?-a
(Arlin)
id) ,100
pIr0ttur:C
-
SE
FORN//X
'TTHr7ett4i44434LAJZL.....X1
Chapter 2
First TSS Organization (U)
;
Septeg:bor 1951
Lautrailyal rot Executive Officer, Deputy Director (Plans)
YAW Actin.; Mier, 3SO/D0/1'
:Jew= Orzanik'zti
-11?7.01ti
_
_ PIM 9.LV COG'S = ,
Z9, NM ititY
1. 1E1 cozeplianco zth your wenorencler. (2-1027) re4uco-titas organi-
:ational break,:oma of officou, be .aztriee41 that effective ? Septother 1951
tho [Vorettonal Aide Divizion (00/00/P) hoe been redeeignated. the ?actini-
c:J. Sorvicco Staff (mit)/r) heaeleel by Col. Jur-R9 H. Druz., Actirz Chief,
If4r.:D/r, klox.11 1513 "IP Building, Ex-Waster' 512.
2. The follomieg liatietze of Diyletoas, urat names aral titlea of
Led:
and personal effects, concealment devices, disguise, and escape and evasion
aids). Two of the divisions were located in Central Building at the E Street
complex, and the others were housed in temporary quarters, L Building and
Quarters I on the Mall, just off Ohio Drive."' (V
S77:CTI"171- 741"(44441441?1
38
Applying Technology to the Cold War (
Spinoffs to US Air Force Applications (U)
TSS made major contributions to CIA aerial reconnaissance, but it
remained on the sidelines as the Agency moved into the era of earth-orbiting
satellites. Even though Dr. Gibbons attended the first major discussion of the
use of satellites as intelligence-collection platforms a discussion that eventu-
ally led to CIA's CORONA program?TSS's most important contribution to
CORONA would be the unexpected use of SKYHOOK.29 The SKYHOOK
project had not panned out as originally intended, but the Navy adapted the
technology and used it to grab film canisters ("buckets") released by
CORONA satellites as they parachuted to earth. (U)
TSS Innovations in Aerial Reconnaissance (U)
" Ibid., p. 115. (II)
Joseph A. Frank, OR ISAR 1Office of Policy Coordination/Special Assistant for Research],
"Discussion of the Feasibility and Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance Purposes,"
25 July 1952. Cited in Miller, Office of Polley Coordination 1948-1952, Volume II, p. 370 n 222.
The conference was held at the California Institute of Technology at CIA request. For a history of
the CORONA project see Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., CORONA: America's First Satellite Program
(Washington, I ).C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995). X)
ritrlit41;4111N//X1
81
Illustrations
Lib BY Y.P.V1___ "71
cSitP CPI ____ TYPE
ruc ['Abbe P000 See C1.1,5S
4.1 NEWT see _ _1_40seas no el,.
-
billACHARDVY TO; ADSO
24. epril 1951
2I213201 a Transmittal of Staff Study of Problems of ObB
1. Transmitted herewith is a staff study ora the above sub-
ject prepared at the request of Sr. Richard Helms, APO.
2. 1 sincere effort has been made to present the GAD prob-
lem in terms of magnitude, responsibility, position with respect
to OSO, ORC, and Cia, organization, personnel, procurement, and
space.
3. Recommendations hove been presented for the solution of
the immediate problems. However, the basic-problem of the rela-
tionship of GAD to a similar unit within ORC remains to be
re-
oolved. On the resolution of this problem, many of the over-all
far-reaching problems will depend. It is felt that this is beyond
the scope of OaDts responsibility in such Natters and will of
necessity have to be solved at a higher level. These problems,
however, have been pointed out in the study presented.
4. It should be noted that since the initiation of this
study the Table of Organization presented in TSB B has been ap-
proved. For the purpose of fulfilling the mission and responsi-
bility as outlined in this study, this T/D is inadequate.
Attachmont
Chief, CAD
Cover memo for the "Bible, James Dium's Study of Problems in Technical Support (U)
Mreitrit10/114,1?840094i4
I 42
stoturllyciv1I121V/X1
Illustrations
2430 E Street housed the CIA Headquarters until it moved to Langley, Virginia.
Technical services remained behind. (U)
SE
144
The Westout Building was among severa
capital. (U)
TSS and TSD occupied in the nation's
SEC,Th"ir,?IlilaTIrelit!,44%.1
Illustrations
"Temporary" Quarters 1, near West Potomac Park was used by the OSS, before TSS
and TSI) used it during the 1.950s. (II)
71MITTr111,4*(44.12,141,41?....
145
SITITrirttflIrt1104454(11...
Illustrations
The RT- t (Radio transmitter #1) was the first CIA audio transmitter. Large and in need of a
regular electric power source, the RT- I was difficult to conceal. (U)
1!1.?1.144414114.114)11a.........., //XI
147
-"mrtrici
Illustrations
AMPLIT:NR
CAS
cRm
VS1041r. 60 $-74 E
OA'-OF,'
SIT
.117' SATTERY RAWER ORTTERIE-5
NO -2 REet/C/NG rucLy DisAssemaity, rofi
cit-AN/N4 OR sArreor ReRhAcemerir
The HD-2 (Hearing Device-2) was an early countersurveillance device. With a neck loop
antenna and bodyworn receiver, the pipe would allow an officer to hear nearby hostile radio
communications by biting down on the pipe stem. (U)
The BOOKIE phone covert communcation device .(1958) was used to communicate safely
with unveited assets in areas, such as Germany and Austria, occupied by hostile services. (U) -
,TrrIt110,61.51044.1444Iii.
148
:47r7M7/1
Illustrations
The E Street Complex, which TSD and OTS occupied into
Following a costly operational failure in the 1960s of audio equipment installed in an Asian
site, TSD created an equipment testing group, located M
SI'7(rrirrIf4KIWNARA.I.a.
234
rrxii
Illustrations
TSD was a key player in the U-2's development. The office also helped develop psychological
screening for prospective pilots and supplied a concealed poison pin for pilots' use. N
sEcitumilWinWORN/Ai
235
SI7TIMII*4414416W21
Illustrations
During a covert action in Indonesia (1958-59), a Civil Air Transport pilot named Allen Pope
was shot down delivering supplies to the insurgents. TSS 's Water Air Division worked on
two plans to rescue Pope from a low-security jungle jail. One plan involved using the SKY
HOOK device and the other a collapsible rubber aircraft (both pictured below). Neither plan
proved practical, and eventually Pope was released. (S)
"freitLoiiit6/44#F44444441
236
OW410,1
Illustrations
Between 1953 and 1970, CIA managed a secret
Vietnamese communist forces. (U)
at in Laos against local and North
Among many other things, work in Laos involved trips to locations like the one above or
preparation of concealments, such as the wicker basket below, to transport spy gear. (U)
S.17.rir r 1#164.1
238
Illustrations
TSD played a key role in maritime sabotage operations. A Navy SEAL team near Da Nang
used Chinese junks extensively modified by TSD 's Engineering Branch. The junks had con-
cealed diesel engines that were used only when in hot pursuit of a target or for fast escapes.
(sketches of one such design below). (1.3)
HIGH-SPEED BOAT WITH
SUPERIMPOSED JUNK liUll
AND SUPERSTRUCTURE
SUPERSTRUCTURE AND HULl
SECTION BEING JETTISONED
FOR GETAWAY
Illustrations
TSD contributed to propagan
efforts aitned at the communist
Chinese. Leaflets, like those
shown, were dropped from bal-
loons onto mainland China. With
Chinese text on the flip side of the
cartoons, the leaflets aimed to
exploit the political turmoil Mao
Zedong had sown in the mid-
1960s. Such projects involved
many skills: graphic arts, linguis-
tics, engineering, physics, and
meteorology. (C)
243
Illustrations
Nfi
Spies, like the famous GRU Colonel
Oleg Penkovsky?shown on trial (left)?
depended on commercial miniaturized
photographic equipment to copy docu-
ments. In the 1960s TSD developed
increasingly sophisticated, miniature
devices for photocopying,
SIlit.77,727"771 T
244
grrIt
The "Second Cold War" (U)
a press tour ()I- its classified spy museum, appropriately located in the Hall of
Clickisti in Fultyankit, the KGB I leadquarters budding.37 The guide singled
out a collection of items reportedly obtained from CIA and other western spy
services. It included pocket computers, tiny satellite communications devices,
a pen-photo camera, ampoules with poison, a light torch [flashlight] with a
built-in gun, cryptographic equipment and other spy paraphernalia confiscated
from foreign agents. al)
Five years later the KGB successor organization, the Federal Security Ser-
vice (I'S B), revealed another artifact, which it shared with the National Geo-
graphic. It was a microscopic text message that had been etched into the black
border of a 1983 issue of the esteemed publication--a new twist on an old spy
craft, microdots, invented by the Germans before World War II. (U)
From the KGB Museum to National Geographic (U)
"Here is a unique copy of the February 1983 National Geographic.
"Unbeknown to the [National Geographic] Society, someone etched a
micro-message into the black borders around several ads and features.
Under high-power magnification, the message specifies where and how
to leave a package and to make contact. 'Wait ten minutes only,' it reads.
'Our representative will say...' (U)
"According to a museum curator, the doctored magazine was given to a
Soviet intelligence officer, Col. Vladimir Mikhailovich Vasilyev, by two
US agents who recruited him in Budapest. Vasilyev delivered reports on
weapons and military plans from 1983 until he was arrested by the KGB
and executed ill 1986. Experts say he may have been fingered by CIA
defector Itlwarcl Lee Howard or mole Aldrich Ames, arrested last year.
(U)
"The KGB concluded that the micro-message was etched by a com-
puter-guided laser beam in a secret lab. Asked to comment, a CIA spokes-
man said only: "It is not surprising that the technology exists." (U)
----Excerpt from National Geographic
Tire lust Novict iiicenrity arid intelligence organization was known as the Cheka and its
officers were called Cheikisli (('lick a inen). (t1)
.STrith14464:6ULIEN......../fX1
361
The "Second Cold War" (U)
Soviet Version of the CIA Cable Tap Operation (U)
"The Mole was developed by intelligence services tor monitoring
underground wire communications lines. This device, removed from a
cable running to a military unit, used the principle of electromagnetic
induction. It was installed on the cable line in a camouflaged depression.
Information transmitted over the cable was recorded on the tape of a
wideband recorder using a special sensor . . . surrounding the cable. The
cassette would he replaced as it was filled. The Mole is supplied with a
signaling radio to ensure the unit's security and for cassette removal. An
agent riding or passing by near where the device is set up queries it by a
coded signal whether "everything is normal." If the sensor has not been
touched, the agent receives an affirmative signal. In this case, with condi-
tions being favorable, the cassette is replaced in the tape recorder and
recording continues. The apparatus can store information from 60- tele-
phone channels. Recording time on the tape recorder is approximately
115 hours." I (U)
lirtisnitsyn, "U.S. Cliobal Intelligence. Collection," pp. 33.-38. (U)
Winds of Change (II)
The winds of social and attitudinal change began sweeping through OTS
even before the Cold War had ended. A 1989 Inspector General's report found
significant problems with sexual and racial harassment, as well as a general
lack of sensitivity to changes in the workplace and in American society as a
whole. Irank Anderson, the director at the time, was offered?and seized an
opportunity to put his house in order without outside interference.5' Anderson
relied on jawboning the troops and training to solve the problem. Meanwhile,
African-American officers in the 'formed a
support group, the Black Officer Support system, and tue women Ad Minor-
ity Advisory Panel followed. OTS established the Open Door Award, pre-
sented to officers who made notable contributions to advancing women and
minorities. Next came the Multicultural Management Staff, a peer panel pro-
motion system, and cultural diversity training for OTS staff. )
Andcrson ink!!
367
ThrrI/1)604.1W4PUISE
Illustrations
tiFS771}t).1.1(4.11.111.16'
370
e*4Q4'=i4.
Illustrations
CIECIIET/PWIT'n11NUX 1
371
Illustra
In 1999, Mc Soviets revealed a variety of C'IA-produced spy gear taken during this period
from CIA agents or officers. the collection pictured in a Russian book below can be seen in a
IMISCUM in MOSCOW. (I I)
J-t!H
'
10?./I 05.111(1
I. I '11'1110,11 11111IIIII..u.;
(14.411,
IN) E111.1IIIIII31.11111III
1i1iii 1(55.
gy,,K, golvt,
a!my.
II
ugeprr..,[1,1,
AppA,10(11151f1
lInoo,e4 oil,
110.110,110 1/011
Od1,10,,iobtiaax.
aqqp.onw
Il111010 Ui 0011611(0.
0 11/0.1111.1111III
11', 6615,
flovrill1101.11
410106.11110507 101
Ok.110 4 04:111,41
Clockwise from the upper left are: a body-worn receiver and antenna used to detect KGB sur-
veillance; eye glasses with poison concealed in one of the earpieces; satellite-based Communi-
cation device taken from a CIA officer; camera concealed in a ball-point pen; Tessina camera,
of Me type given C. (toward [(nut of the While Rouse "plumbers"; camera concealed in a key
(U)
)ECRETI/Noror rvivi
373
, 1; co
"-?=1
-
.S.P.i.CIL=aalLIN/r)C1
Illustrations
The OTS [ Ratnines and documents foreign spy gear ana weapons
ror. A staf expert mcognrzea i fragment of a circuit board (below left) found at the crash site
of PanAm 103 near Lockerbie, Scotland, as identical to a part of a Libyan owned timing
device the staff had examined some tune before (below right). His testimony and that of one
other OTS officer helped convict a Libyan operative in the destruction of PanAm 103 and the
deaths of its passengers and crew. (U)
.'"grr4(4444111,1
380
? 11( ^$',1 ? ,1" I ?