(EST PUB DATE) FIFTY YEARS OF SUPPORTING OPERATIONS A HISTORY OF CIA'S OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE 1951-2001

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0001225702
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June 24, 2015
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January 4, 2011
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January 1, 2001
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7,PA:5?Vf.29t'f.q CHAPTER Ii. Dirty Tricks and Deadly Devices (U) T, . he Office of Technical Service (OTS) marks 7 September 1951 as its founding date. On that day, its predecessor organization, the Technical Services Staff (TSS), was created. But the full heritage of OTS pre- dates the Central Intelligence Agency and can be traced to the Office of Strate- gic Services (OSS), America's first intelligence agency.I OTS is the lineal descendant of the OSS Research and Development Branch (OSS/R&D), which Colonel (later Major General) William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan (1883- 1959) created in October 1942 to devise dirty tricks and deadly weapons in subversive wars against Germany's Adolf Hitler and Japan's Emperor Hiro- hito. (U) Donovan appointed Stanley Platt Lovell (1800-1076), a sell-described "saucepan" chemist and successful New England entrepreneur, as chief of the Branch. Lov- ell was an orphan, who had put himself through Cornell University, where he earned a degree in chemistry. Plc served in research and management positions in pri- vate industry and was president of one chemical company and vice president of another in the Boston area when World War II broke out. His accomplishments included application of organic chemistry to shoemaking, clothing manufacturing, and orthopedic surgery. He held more than 70 US and foreign patents. (U) If Donovan was the forefather of CIA, I well was the foundling father of OTS. Lovell was typical of the executives, Stanley Platt Lovell (U) ' For a compact history of OSS, see Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: Ainericas First Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000). (U) ORN//X 1 SE Chapter 1 RN//X1 goat dung. This biological warfare project was canceled at the last minute, when German forces left Morocco for Stalingrad.40 (U) OSS and SOE Weapons and Devices (U) Method for attaching Limpets and explosive devices Barometric fuse triggered by altitude changes Method for sterilizing contaminated drinking water Chewable paper, resistant to humidity Baseball-shaped grenade Chemical used to sabotage automotive engines Delayed -action hand grenade used against fuel tanks Explosive used to sabotage train engines Electro magnetic transmitter homing device Method for attaching mines to steel or wooden ships Photo sensitive electronic switch for train sabotage Microwave transmitter for agent communications Switch used to trigger explosives on railroad tracks Incendiary used on land and water to ignite crude oil Chemical time delay Pocket -sized, celluloid case filled with gelled solvent Spin stabilizedrocket for use with rocket launcher Muzzle noise suppressor for light weapons British silent and flashless weapon Method for attacking wooden ships and bridges Method for silencing outboard motors This table is Unclassified. Abalone Anerorneter Aqua Vita Balsam Beano Caccolube Firefly Fountain IFT Limpetry The Mole MWT Odometer Paul Revere Pencil Incendiaries Rocket Silencer Spigot Mortar Teak Zephyr In 1944, Lovell approved an operation to use nerve gas in the assault on Iwo Jima. The invasion planners estimated that US Marines would suffer 23,000 casualties, and the JCS wanted to reduce that number if possible. Pres- ident Roosevelt vetoed the proposal, even though neither the United States nor Japan had signed the Geneva Convention prohibiting the use of nerve gas. (U) Lovell developed several plans for incapacitating or even killing Adolf Hit- ler. One scenario involved a capsule of liquid nitrogen-mustard gas, which is colorless, odorless, and floats on water. OSS recruited an agent scheduled to attend a war conference attended by Hitler and Italian dictator Benito Musso- lini. The agent was to crush the capsule in a flower vase, whereupon the gas 4" Lovell, Of Spies c.,C Stratagems; pp. 136-137. (U) TrtmR4444414.).RN//X1 Chapter 2 the time noted, the latter was "self-revealing," i.e., it involved actions that could not be concealed. The concept of "plausible deniability" was not yet in vogue. (U) US Clandestine Services and Technical Support (U) Office Created Abolished Office of Strategic Services June 1942 October 1945 Strategic Services Unit October 1945 October 1946 Central Intelligence Group January 1946 September 1947 Office of Special Operations July 1946 September 1952 Office of Policy Coordination September 1948 September 1952 Central Intelligence Agency September 1947 Directorate for Plans September 1952 March 1973 Directorate of Operations March 19'73 Technical Services Staff September 1951 May 1959 Technical Services Division May 1959 May 1973 Directorate of Science & Technology August 1963 Office of Technical Service May 1973 This table is Unclassified. OPC was dependent on CIA for rations and quarters, but it took direction from the State and the War (and later, Defense) Departments. its chief, Frank Wisner, was an OSS veteran with an office at State. Mainly because of a war scare in 1948 and the Korean War two years later, OPC grew rapidly. In 1949, Wisner had a staff of 302, a budget of $4.7 million, and no overseas stations. By 1952 he was overseeing a staff of 2,812, a budget of $82 million, and 47 stations. 4 OSO and OPC maintained separate stations and lines of com- mand. (U) The formation of OPC was unprecedented, since it was the first civilian peacetime special operations capability in American history. Its formation also The first major policy decision on covert action ("psychological warfare") aimed at encourag- ing armed resistance against Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was National Security Council (NSC) 4-A. it was adopted just before Christmas 1947 and was so sensitive that only three copies were made. The follow-on decision, NSC 10/2, created OPC and made across-the-board political, economic, paramilitary, and propaganda subversion against the USSR and its allies official US policy. See Grose, Operation Rollback, pp. 96-96, 104. (U) '3 The War Department was renamed Department of Defense in February 1949. (U) ti William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1983), pp. 43-44. (U) 17MfrrInifIlih14//X1 28 OTS Birth Certificate (U) Tirrr Postwar Bureaucratic Battles?OSS in Transition to CIA('" 4110 Ek-2- aAt 1951. noh-2 .01I :WI: A, I, Opt71,,,t1. On- 11; [..`pero_t.iorinJ. lads D i i 224nical re1ItC to ? - ; , ? ?-a (Arlin) id) ,100 pIr0ttur:C - SE FORN//X 'TTHr7ett4i44434LAJZL.....X1 Chapter 2 First TSS Organization (U) ; Septeg:bor 1951 Lautrailyal rot Executive Officer, Deputy Director (Plans) YAW Actin.; Mier, 3SO/D0/1' :Jew= Orzanik'zti -11?7.01ti _ _ PIM 9.LV COG'S = , Z9, NM ititY 1. 1E1 cozeplianco zth your wenorencler. (2-1027) re4uco-titas organi- :ational break,:oma of officou, be .aztriee41 that effective ? Septother 1951 tho [Vorettonal Aide Divizion (00/00/P) hoe been redeeignated. the ?actini- c:J. Sorvicco Staff (mit)/r) heaeleel by Col. Jur-R9 H. Druz., Actirz Chief, If4r.:D/r, klox.11 1513 "IP Building, Ex-Waster' 512. 2. The follomieg liatietze of Diyletoas, urat names aral titlea of Led: and personal effects, concealment devices, disguise, and escape and evasion aids). Two of the divisions were located in Central Building at the E Street complex, and the others were housed in temporary quarters, L Building and Quarters I on the Mall, just off Ohio Drive."' (V S77:CTI"171- 741"(44441441?1 38 Applying Technology to the Cold War ( Spinoffs to US Air Force Applications (U) TSS made major contributions to CIA aerial reconnaissance, but it remained on the sidelines as the Agency moved into the era of earth-orbiting satellites. Even though Dr. Gibbons attended the first major discussion of the use of satellites as intelligence-collection platforms a discussion that eventu- ally led to CIA's CORONA program?TSS's most important contribution to CORONA would be the unexpected use of SKYHOOK.29 The SKYHOOK project had not panned out as originally intended, but the Navy adapted the technology and used it to grab film canisters ("buckets") released by CORONA satellites as they parachuted to earth. (U) TSS Innovations in Aerial Reconnaissance (U) " Ibid., p. 115. (II) Joseph A. Frank, OR ISAR 1Office of Policy Coordination/Special Assistant for Research], "Discussion of the Feasibility and Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance Purposes," 25 July 1952. Cited in Miller, Office of Polley Coordination 1948-1952, Volume II, p. 370 n 222. The conference was held at the California Institute of Technology at CIA request. For a history of the CORONA project see Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., CORONA: America's First Satellite Program (Washington, I ).C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995). X) ritrlit41;4111N//X1 81 Illustrations Lib BY Y.P.V1___ "71 cSitP CPI ____ TYPE ruc ['Abbe P000 See C1.1,5S 4.1 NEWT see _ _1_40seas no el,. - billACHARDVY TO; ADSO 24. epril 1951 2I213201 a Transmittal of Staff Study of Problems of ObB 1. Transmitted herewith is a staff study ora the above sub- ject prepared at the request of Sr. Richard Helms, APO. 2. 1 sincere effort has been made to present the GAD prob- lem in terms of magnitude, responsibility, position with respect to OSO, ORC, and Cia, organization, personnel, procurement, and space. 3. Recommendations hove been presented for the solution of the immediate problems. However, the basic-problem of the rela- tionship of GAD to a similar unit within ORC remains to be re- oolved. On the resolution of this problem, many of the over-all far-reaching problems will depend. It is felt that this is beyond the scope of OaDts responsibility in such Natters and will of necessity have to be solved at a higher level. These problems, however, have been pointed out in the study presented. 4. It should be noted that since the initiation of this study the Table of Organization presented in TSB B has been ap- proved. For the purpose of fulfilling the mission and responsi- bility as outlined in this study, this T/D is inadequate. Attachmont Chief, CAD Cover memo for the "Bible, James Dium's Study of Problems in Technical Support (U) Mreitrit10/114,1?840094i4 I 42 stoturllyciv1I121V/X1 Illustrations 2430 E Street housed the CIA Headquarters until it moved to Langley, Virginia. Technical services remained behind. (U) SE 144 The Westout Building was among severa capital. (U) TSS and TSD occupied in the nation's SEC,Th"ir,?IlilaTIrelit!,44%.1 Illustrations "Temporary" Quarters 1, near West Potomac Park was used by the OSS, before TSS and TSI) used it during the 1.950s. (II) 71MITTr111,4*(44.12,141,41?.... 145 SITITrirttflIrt1104454(11... Illustrations The RT- t (Radio transmitter #1) was the first CIA audio transmitter. Large and in need of a regular electric power source, the RT- I was difficult to conceal. (U) 1!1.?1.144414114.114)11a.........., //XI 147 -"mrtrici Illustrations AMPLIT:NR CAS cRm VS1041r. 60 $-74 E OA'-OF,' SIT .117' SATTERY RAWER ORTTERIE-5 NO -2 REet/C/NG rucLy DisAssemaity, rofi cit-AN/N4 OR sArreor ReRhAcemerir The HD-2 (Hearing Device-2) was an early countersurveillance device. With a neck loop antenna and bodyworn receiver, the pipe would allow an officer to hear nearby hostile radio communications by biting down on the pipe stem. (U) The BOOKIE phone covert communcation device .(1958) was used to communicate safely with unveited assets in areas, such as Germany and Austria, occupied by hostile services. (U) - ,TrrIt110,61.51044.1444Iii. 148 :47r7M7/1 Illustrations The E Street Complex, which TSD and OTS occupied into Following a costly operational failure in the 1960s of audio equipment installed in an Asian site, TSD created an equipment testing group, located M SI'7(rrirrIf4KIWNARA.I.a. 234 rrxii Illustrations TSD was a key player in the U-2's development. The office also helped develop psychological screening for prospective pilots and supplied a concealed poison pin for pilots' use. N sEcitumilWinWORN/Ai 235 SI7TIMII*4414416W21 Illustrations During a covert action in Indonesia (1958-59), a Civil Air Transport pilot named Allen Pope was shot down delivering supplies to the insurgents. TSS 's Water Air Division worked on two plans to rescue Pope from a low-security jungle jail. One plan involved using the SKY HOOK device and the other a collapsible rubber aircraft (both pictured below). Neither plan proved practical, and eventually Pope was released. (S) "freitLoiiit6/44#F44444441 236 OW410,1 Illustrations Between 1953 and 1970, CIA managed a secret Vietnamese communist forces. (U) at in Laos against local and North Among many other things, work in Laos involved trips to locations like the one above or preparation of concealments, such as the wicker basket below, to transport spy gear. (U) S.17.rir r 1#164.1 238 Illustrations TSD played a key role in maritime sabotage operations. A Navy SEAL team near Da Nang used Chinese junks extensively modified by TSD 's Engineering Branch. The junks had con- cealed diesel engines that were used only when in hot pursuit of a target or for fast escapes. (sketches of one such design below). (1.3) HIGH-SPEED BOAT WITH SUPERIMPOSED JUNK liUll AND SUPERSTRUCTURE SUPERSTRUCTURE AND HULl SECTION BEING JETTISONED FOR GETAWAY Illustrations TSD contributed to propagan efforts aitned at the communist Chinese. Leaflets, like those shown, were dropped from bal- loons onto mainland China. With Chinese text on the flip side of the cartoons, the leaflets aimed to exploit the political turmoil Mao Zedong had sown in the mid- 1960s. Such projects involved many skills: graphic arts, linguis- tics, engineering, physics, and meteorology. (C) 243 Illustrations Nfi Spies, like the famous GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky?shown on trial (left)? depended on commercial miniaturized photographic equipment to copy docu- ments. In the 1960s TSD developed increasingly sophisticated, miniature devices for photocopying, SIlit.77,727"771 T 244 grrIt The "Second Cold War" (U) a press tour ()I- its classified spy museum, appropriately located in the Hall of Clickisti in Fultyankit, the KGB I leadquarters budding.37 The guide singled out a collection of items reportedly obtained from CIA and other western spy services. It included pocket computers, tiny satellite communications devices, a pen-photo camera, ampoules with poison, a light torch [flashlight] with a built-in gun, cryptographic equipment and other spy paraphernalia confiscated from foreign agents. al) Five years later the KGB successor organization, the Federal Security Ser- vice (I'S B), revealed another artifact, which it shared with the National Geo- graphic. It was a microscopic text message that had been etched into the black border of a 1983 issue of the esteemed publication--a new twist on an old spy craft, microdots, invented by the Germans before World War II. (U) From the KGB Museum to National Geographic (U) "Here is a unique copy of the February 1983 National Geographic. "Unbeknown to the [National Geographic] Society, someone etched a micro-message into the black borders around several ads and features. Under high-power magnification, the message specifies where and how to leave a package and to make contact. 'Wait ten minutes only,' it reads. 'Our representative will say...' (U) "According to a museum curator, the doctored magazine was given to a Soviet intelligence officer, Col. Vladimir Mikhailovich Vasilyev, by two US agents who recruited him in Budapest. Vasilyev delivered reports on weapons and military plans from 1983 until he was arrested by the KGB and executed ill 1986. Experts say he may have been fingered by CIA defector Itlwarcl Lee Howard or mole Aldrich Ames, arrested last year. (U) "The KGB concluded that the micro-message was etched by a com- puter-guided laser beam in a secret lab. Asked to comment, a CIA spokes- man said only: "It is not surprising that the technology exists." (U) ----Excerpt from National Geographic Tire lust Novict iiicenrity arid intelligence organization was known as the Cheka and its officers were called Cheikisli (('lick a inen). (t1) .STrith14464:6ULIEN......../fX1 361 The "Second Cold War" (U) Soviet Version of the CIA Cable Tap Operation (U) "The Mole was developed by intelligence services tor monitoring underground wire communications lines. This device, removed from a cable running to a military unit, used the principle of electromagnetic induction. It was installed on the cable line in a camouflaged depression. Information transmitted over the cable was recorded on the tape of a wideband recorder using a special sensor . . . surrounding the cable. The cassette would he replaced as it was filled. The Mole is supplied with a signaling radio to ensure the unit's security and for cassette removal. An agent riding or passing by near where the device is set up queries it by a coded signal whether "everything is normal." If the sensor has not been touched, the agent receives an affirmative signal. In this case, with condi- tions being favorable, the cassette is replaced in the tape recorder and recording continues. The apparatus can store information from 60- tele- phone channels. Recording time on the tape recorder is approximately 115 hours." I (U) lirtisnitsyn, "U.S. Cliobal Intelligence. Collection," pp. 33.-38. (U) Winds of Change (II) The winds of social and attitudinal change began sweeping through OTS even before the Cold War had ended. A 1989 Inspector General's report found significant problems with sexual and racial harassment, as well as a general lack of sensitivity to changes in the workplace and in American society as a whole. Irank Anderson, the director at the time, was offered?and seized an opportunity to put his house in order without outside interference.5' Anderson relied on jawboning the troops and training to solve the problem. Meanwhile, African-American officers in the 'formed a support group, the Black Officer Support system, and tue women Ad Minor- ity Advisory Panel followed. OTS established the Open Door Award, pre- sented to officers who made notable contributions to advancing women and minorities. Next came the Multicultural Management Staff, a peer panel pro- motion system, and cultural diversity training for OTS staff. ) Andcrson ink!! 367 ThrrI/1)604.1W4PUISE Illustrations tiFS771}t).1.1(4.11.111.16' 370 e*4Q4'=i4. Illustrations CIECIIET/PWIT'n11NUX 1 371 Illustra In 1999, Mc Soviets revealed a variety of C'IA-produced spy gear taken during this period from CIA agents or officers. the collection pictured in a Russian book below can be seen in a IMISCUM in MOSCOW. (I I) J-t!H ' 10?./I 05.111(1 I. I '11'1110,11 11111IIIII..u.; (14.411, IN) E111.1IIIIII31.11111III 1i1iii 1(55. gy,,K, golvt, a!my. II ugeprr..,[1,1, AppA,10(11151f1 lInoo,e4 oil, 110.110,110 1/011 Od1,10,,iobtiaax. aqqp.onw Il111010 Ui 0011611(0. 0 11/0.1111.1111III 11', 6615, flovrill1101.11 410106.11110507 101 Ok.110 4 04:111,41 Clockwise from the upper left are: a body-worn receiver and antenna used to detect KGB sur- veillance; eye glasses with poison concealed in one of the earpieces; satellite-based Communi- cation device taken from a CIA officer; camera concealed in a ball-point pen; Tessina camera, of Me type given C. (toward [(nut of the While Rouse "plumbers"; camera concealed in a key (U) )ECRETI/Noror rvivi 373 , 1; co "-?=1 - .S.P.i.CIL=aalLIN/r)C1 Illustrations The OTS [ Ratnines and documents foreign spy gear ana weapons ror. A staf expert mcognrzea i fragment of a circuit board (below left) found at the crash site of PanAm 103 near Lockerbie, Scotland, as identical to a part of a Libyan owned timing device the staff had examined some tune before (below right). His testimony and that of one other OTS officer helped convict a Libyan operative in the destruction of PanAm 103 and the deaths of its passengers and crew. (U) .'"grr4(4444111,1 380 ? 11( ^$',1 ? ,1" I ?