INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF POPULAR REACTIONS IN THE PROVINCES TO THE VIET CON G TET OFFENSIVE

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00011917
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January 28, 2019
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ::: Intelligence Information Cable 4, / a � PRIORITY n IN 454.39. PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES STATE/INR DIA NM CC/MC ( SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIAMMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA fin T- FY0 This material contairui information affectin the National Defense of the United States within the meaning gproofhittzZatiyonleate. Laws, Title le, U.8.0 Secs. 793 and 794, the transmiason or r ye on o which In any manner to an unauthorized pe ( I a) 4 111111111111111111111. I Eidwidodi he. gs ow1eNro 01104.. I atdrovenwilog 4.41 I d�cknakkatiow THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. -OTE 1.3(1)(4) COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM DOI SUBJECT INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF POPULAR REACTIONS IN THE PROVINCES TO THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE 5 FEBRUARY 19 68 0.70131 Z DIST J ,FP?4UARY. 155.8 ACQ VIETNAM SAIGO (6 FEBRUARY 1968) SOURCE THIS IS A COMPILATION OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION AftekEI A�fN �Cm.L R47- I ; THE SUBJECT PREPARED BY CAS RESEARCH UNIT IN T SUMMARY: MORE CONDITIONED TO VIOLENCE THAN THE. P FIELD. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. SAIGON� , THE RESIDENTS OF SOME PROVINCIAL CITES KNEW THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD ATTACK, BUT NOT HOLD ,I. THEIR CITIES. THERE WAS SOME CONDEMNATION OF "OVERREACTION" B.Y. THE ALLIED FORCE, .AND THE , VC ARE MOR: RESPECTED AND FEARED BY THE POPULACE FOR THE NATION- WIDE STRENGTH OF .THE RECENT HTTACKS. - BUT ALL OF. THIS:WAS. 'OVER- SHADOWED BY A POLARIZATION OF VIEWS THAT-MAKE' TNE ."M IDDLE � OF THE ROAD" UNTENABLE HND STRONG SUPPORV:NECESSARY FOR EITHER THE VC ..OR_ THE GOVER NM ENT-OF -VIETNAM- - (GVN-) At. POPULAR�FEELING imvroved tor Release � Date .4 pproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 (a) (4 1.3t0t4) Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 � 11111=111111 (cZazafl) (dissent controls) 1N 4543 43 PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES IS ANTI-VC AND PRO-GVN. END -SUMMARY. 1. AN INITIAL ASSESSMENTOF POPULAR REACTION IN 'PROVINCIAL CITIES (LITTLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AS YET ON REACTIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE) INDICATES THAT IT PARALLELS THAT IN SAIGON. (AN ASSESSMENT OF SAIGON ATTITUDES IS AVAILABLE ��...� 1.111111111111r= 13()0) THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO EXCEPTIONS. FIRST, THE PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL CITIES HAVE SEEN THE WAR CLOSE UP FOR A LONG TIME AND WERE PERHAPS LESS AWED BY HOSTILITIES IN THEIR OWN AREA. THEY KNEW THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD ATTACK THEIR CITIES BUT WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE VC COULD NOT HOLD THE CITIES. HOWEVER, THEY WERE IMPRESSED BY THE COUNTRY- WIDE NATURE OF THE ACTION. SECOND, THERE WAS GREAT DESTRUCTION IN SOME PROVINCIAL CITIES; AND WHILE THIS GENERALLY RESULTED IN INCREASED CONDEMNATION OF THE VIEPoONG IT ALSO RESULTED IN � CONDEMNATION OF "OVER REACTION" BY ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) AND U.S. MILITARY. THIS.FEELING- tiJAS ESPECIALLY BITTER WHEN THE REACTION WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LOOTING BY ARVN TROOPS, AS WAS REPORTED IN SEVERAL IV CORPS CITLES. 2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUTHORITIES IN DEALING WITH SUBSEQUENT PROBLEMS, REFUGEES AND FOOD PRIMARILY, MAY WELL BE CRUCIAL IN FUTURE POPULAR REACTION TO THE GVN. HOWEVER, 13(8)(4) Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 IN 454.39 1.3(a)(4) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES � ammo 1 (classification) (dissent controls) .3(3)(4) INITIALLY AT LEAST, ANY RECRIMINATIONS SEEM OVER- SHADOWED 3Y THE POLARIZATION WHICH MADE THE "MIDDLE OF THE ROAD" UNTENABLE IN DALAT THE POPULATION IS NOW REPORTED:- "100 PERCENT" BEHIND THE GVM IN DANANG *IT IS FELT � THAT THE. ATTACK LESSENED THE REDINESS OF THE POPULACE TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE GVN., AND BUDDHIST MONKS -THERE ACTUALLY COMPLAINED THAT THE POLICEYERE NOT GETTING OUT TO THEIR PAGODAS FAST ENOUGH WHEN THEY CALLED.' IN MDC HOA KIEN TUAONG PROVINCE, IT IS FELT THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES NOW ARE TO BE SOLIDLY AGAINST THE VC OR AGAINST THE GVN.' UNIVERSALLY, T HROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE PEOPLE DID NOV SUPPORT THE VC. 3. INFORMATION COVERING THE PERIOD' UP TO 2400 HOURS 5 - FEBRUARY INDICATES THAT THE MORALE SITU4TION IS IMPROVING IN.-SOME AREAS. SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS, AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS, BOTH BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC, HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SOME -AREAS AND -REFUGEES :IRE BEING CARED FOR. � AN- - EXCPT ION IS QUANG TRI, WHERE THE MORALE IN THE CITY IS' DESCRIBED AS "NOT GOOD", WITH SOME PROMINENT OFFICIALS AtTtiIPTING TO GET THEIR FAMILIES OUT POLICE ARE STILL NOT'. FUNCTIONIN.G IN -PHAN THIET ALTHOUGH SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS. ARE. IN PHAN 'RANG. THE POLICE ARE REPORTED TO BE DOING AN OUTSTANDING- JOB. - IN QUI' N-HON, 13(3)(4) pproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 EDITIONS IN 45439 PAGE( OF 5 PAGES all11111111 (cZassificaHon) (dissent controls) 1;1 134RP �1.30mi .; .WHEREtrhj NEM'Y PLAN WAS: TO CAPTURE THE PROVINCE 'oHiEF TANI) MAKE � HIM fik6A0'6AT AN %APPEAL fT '� SUP PORT TH COALITION - GOVERNMENT, - . THERE WAS NO Co6PRATIO14- -WITH THE VC BY GVN AUTHORITIES' OR BY THE PEOPLE`, � AND TH ENEMY PLAN FAILED. ANTI-VCFEEUNGt� IN -.MA .NHON HAS �' INCREASED CONSIDERABLY." IN VINH 1:0iIG, WHERE - . .50 'PERCENT ' OF THE' CITY WAS DESTROYED, THERE- HAS:7BEEti A': SHIFT IN Pk3PULAR :cATTITUDE TOWARD INCREASED BLAME FOR THE VC AND AN� - UNDERSTANDING OF THE GVN. AND U.S. ACTION. IN CAN T HO THE ADVENT OF U.S., ,TROOPS INTO PROVINCE CITIES IS REPORTED TO. a-SPARKING- T HE MORALE OF THE GUN.. FORCES AND IMPROVING THEIR EFF'ECTIVENSS. 4. T H VC 'KAY .HAVE WON A POLITICAL VICTORY. .THEY ARE MORE RESPECTED AND MORE FEARED BY THE VERY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW: SO INCENSED AGAINST AND DISGUSTED WITH THEM. IN CHAU DOC IT IS THE ."GENERAL OPINION" THAT THE VC HURT THE GVN MORE THAN THE GVN � HURT THC. � PEOPLE IN �T OUNTRYSIDE AROUND CA MAU BELIE .HE � VC PROPAGANDA . THAT THE VC HAVE WON A GREAT VICTORY. IN DeilobliGitT � IS THE "GENERAL CONSENSUS" THAT THE VC WON A POLITICO: VICTORY IN PROVING THAT' THEY HAD. SUFFICIENT FORCES FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACK EVEN THOUGH IT IS ADMITTED THAT THE ATTACK ENDED WITH A- MILITA14Y VICTORY FOR THE U.S. AND GVN. 1.3(a)(4) pproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 T V vv.....VvvW Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917 11.111111111111 11111111111111^11111111 IN 45439 11111111111.1.11 � PAGE 5C*5 PAGES 1.3(3)(4) 5. AS IN SAIGON, THE GRATEST SUCCESS MAY HAVE BEEN IN FANNING THE FLAMES OF THE PARANOIA WHICH ALWAYS UNDERLINES VIETNAMESE POLITICAL THINKING. �THERE ARE APPARENTLY WIDE-SPREAD AND ELABORATE RUMORS IN DANANG TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS ATTACK WAS "PERMITTED". ACCORDING TO THESE RUMORS, THE U.S. PERMITTED, EVEil IF IT DID NOT COLLUDE WITH, THE VC TO BRING THIS PRESSURE ON THE GVN IN PREPARATION FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE CEDING OF THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES CA PERENNIAL RUMOR). (COMMENT: THE VC MAY FEEL THAT THEY CAN FAN THESE FLAMES FURTHER IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS TO COME. NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TEl OFFENSIVE MIGHT BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS AN ADMISSION OF A VC VICTORY, AND THERgiEEMS TO BE, IN SOME PROVINCIAL CITIES, AN INCREASED DESIRE TO SEE EVEN MORE VIGOROUS - ACTION AGAINST THE VC AT THIS TIME. THE PRESSURES FOR PEACE, NOT NOW EVIDENT, MAY EMERGE LATER. THE ABOVE POPULAR *REACTION IS BASED UPON A VERY LIMITED SAMPLING.) 5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF it.3(00) TRANSMITTED TO: WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI. Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917