INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF POPULAR REACTIONS IN THE PROVINCES TO THE VIET CON G TET OFFENSIVE
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00011917
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January 28, 2019
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
::: Intelligence Information Cable
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IN 454.39.
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA NM CC/MC ( SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIAMMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
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This material contairui information affectin the National Defense of the United States within the meaning gproofhittzZatiyonleate. Laws, Title le, U.8.0
Secs. 793 and 794, the transmiason or r ye on o which In any manner to an unauthorized pe
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
-OTE 1.3(1)(4)
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI
SUBJECT INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF POPULAR REACTIONS IN THE
PROVINCES TO THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE
5 FEBRUARY 19 68
0.70131 Z
DIST J ,FP?4UARY. 155.8
ACQ VIETNAM SAIGO (6 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE
THIS IS A COMPILATION OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION
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THE SUBJECT PREPARED BY CAS RESEARCH UNIT IN T
SUMMARY: MORE CONDITIONED TO VIOLENCE THAN THE. P
FIELD. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
SAIGON� , THE RESIDENTS OF SOME PROVINCIAL CITES KNEW THAT THE
VIET CONG (VC) COULD ATTACK, BUT NOT HOLD ,I. THEIR CITIES. THERE WAS
SOME CONDEMNATION OF "OVERREACTION" B.Y. THE ALLIED FORCE, .AND THE ,
VC ARE MOR: RESPECTED AND FEARED BY THE POPULACE FOR THE NATION-
WIDE STRENGTH OF .THE RECENT HTTACKS. - BUT ALL OF. THIS:WAS. 'OVER-
SHADOWED BY A POLARIZATION OF VIEWS THAT-MAKE' TNE ."M IDDLE � OF THE
ROAD" UNTENABLE HND STRONG SUPPORV:NECESSARY FOR EITHER THE VC
..OR_ THE GOVER NM ENT-OF -VIETNAM- - (GVN-) At. POPULAR�FEELING
imvroved tor Release �
Date .4
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IS ANTI-VC AND PRO-GVN. END -SUMMARY.
1. AN INITIAL ASSESSMENTOF POPULAR REACTION IN 'PROVINCIAL
CITIES (LITTLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AS YET ON REACTIONS IN
THE COUNTRYSIDE) INDICATES THAT IT PARALLELS THAT IN SAIGON.
(AN ASSESSMENT OF SAIGON ATTITUDES IS AVAILABLE
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THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO EXCEPTIONS. FIRST, THE PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL
CITIES HAVE SEEN THE WAR CLOSE UP FOR A LONG TIME AND WERE PERHAPS LESS
AWED BY HOSTILITIES IN THEIR OWN AREA. THEY KNEW THE VIET CONG
(VC) COULD ATTACK THEIR CITIES BUT WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE VC COULD
NOT HOLD THE CITIES. HOWEVER, THEY WERE IMPRESSED BY THE COUNTRY-
WIDE NATURE OF THE ACTION. SECOND, THERE WAS GREAT DESTRUCTION
IN SOME PROVINCIAL CITIES; AND WHILE THIS GENERALLY RESULTED IN
INCREASED CONDEMNATION OF THE VIEPoONG IT ALSO RESULTED IN �
CONDEMNATION OF "OVER REACTION" BY ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(ARVN) AND U.S. MILITARY. THIS.FEELING- tiJAS ESPECIALLY BITTER
WHEN THE REACTION WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LOOTING BY ARVN TROOPS, AS
WAS REPORTED IN SEVERAL IV CORPS CITLES.
2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUTHORITIES IN
DEALING WITH SUBSEQUENT PROBLEMS, REFUGEES AND FOOD PRIMARILY, MAY WELL
BE CRUCIAL IN FUTURE POPULAR REACTION TO THE GVN. HOWEVER,
13(8)(4)
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IN 454.39
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INITIALLY AT LEAST, ANY RECRIMINATIONS SEEM OVER-
SHADOWED 3Y THE POLARIZATION WHICH MADE THE "MIDDLE OF THE
ROAD" UNTENABLE IN DALAT THE POPULATION IS NOW REPORTED:-
"100 PERCENT" BEHIND THE GVM IN DANANG *IT IS FELT � THAT THE. ATTACK
LESSENED THE REDINESS OF THE POPULACE TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE GVN.,
AND BUDDHIST MONKS -THERE ACTUALLY COMPLAINED THAT THE POLICEYERE
NOT GETTING OUT TO THEIR PAGODAS FAST ENOUGH WHEN THEY CALLED.'
IN MDC HOA KIEN TUAONG PROVINCE, IT IS FELT THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES
NOW ARE TO BE SOLIDLY AGAINST THE VC OR AGAINST THE GVN.' UNIVERSALLY,
T HROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE PEOPLE DID NOV SUPPORT THE VC.
3. INFORMATION COVERING THE PERIOD' UP TO 2400 HOURS 5 -
FEBRUARY INDICATES THAT THE MORALE SITU4TION IS IMPROVING IN.-SOME
AREAS. SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS, AND
RELIGIOUS GROUPS, BOTH BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC, HAVE TAKEN THE
INITIATIVE IN SOME -AREAS AND -REFUGEES :IRE BEING CARED FOR. � AN- -
EXCPT ION IS QUANG TRI, WHERE THE MORALE IN THE CITY IS' DESCRIBED
AS "NOT GOOD", WITH SOME PROMINENT OFFICIALS AtTtiIPTING TO GET
THEIR FAMILIES OUT POLICE ARE STILL NOT'. FUNCTIONIN.G IN -PHAN THIET
ALTHOUGH SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS. ARE. IN PHAN 'RANG. THE
POLICE ARE REPORTED TO BE DOING AN OUTSTANDING- JOB. - IN QUI' N-HON,
13(3)(4)
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.WHEREtrhj NEM'Y PLAN WAS: TO CAPTURE THE PROVINCE 'oHiEF TANI) MAKE
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HIM fik6A0'6AT AN %APPEAL fT '� SUP PORT TH COALITION - GOVERNMENT,
- .
THERE WAS NO
Co6PRATIO14- -WITH THE VC BY GVN AUTHORITIES' OR BY
THE PEOPLE`, � AND TH ENEMY PLAN FAILED. ANTI-VCFEEUNGt�
IN -.MA .NHON HAS �' INCREASED CONSIDERABLY." IN VINH 1:0iIG, WHERE
- .
.50 'PERCENT ' OF THE' CITY WAS DESTROYED, THERE- HAS:7BEEti A': SHIFT IN
Pk3PULAR :cATTITUDE TOWARD INCREASED BLAME FOR THE VC AND AN� -
UNDERSTANDING OF THE GVN. AND U.S. ACTION. IN CAN T HO THE ADVENT
OF U.S., ,TROOPS INTO PROVINCE CITIES IS REPORTED TO. a-SPARKING-
T HE MORALE OF THE GUN.. FORCES AND IMPROVING THEIR EFF'ECTIVENSS.
4. T H VC 'KAY .HAVE WON A POLITICAL VICTORY. .THEY ARE
MORE RESPECTED AND MORE FEARED BY THE VERY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW:
SO INCENSED AGAINST AND DISGUSTED WITH THEM. IN CHAU DOC IT IS
THE ."GENERAL OPINION" THAT THE VC HURT THE GVN MORE THAN THE GVN
�
HURT THC. � PEOPLE IN �T OUNTRYSIDE AROUND CA MAU BELIE .HE �
VC PROPAGANDA . THAT THE VC HAVE WON A GREAT VICTORY. IN DeilobliGitT
� IS THE "GENERAL CONSENSUS" THAT THE VC WON A POLITICO: VICTORY
IN PROVING THAT' THEY HAD. SUFFICIENT FORCES FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE
ATTACK EVEN THOUGH IT IS ADMITTED THAT THE ATTACK ENDED WITH A-
MILITA14Y VICTORY FOR THE U.S. AND GVN.
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1.3(3)(4)
5. AS IN SAIGON, THE GRATEST SUCCESS MAY HAVE BEEN IN
FANNING THE FLAMES OF THE PARANOIA WHICH ALWAYS UNDERLINES
VIETNAMESE POLITICAL THINKING. �THERE ARE APPARENTLY WIDE-SPREAD
AND ELABORATE RUMORS IN DANANG TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS ATTACK WAS
"PERMITTED". ACCORDING TO THESE RUMORS, THE U.S. PERMITTED, EVEil
IF IT DID NOT COLLUDE WITH, THE VC TO BRING THIS PRESSURE ON THE
GVN IN PREPARATION FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE CEDING OF
THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES CA PERENNIAL RUMOR). (COMMENT:
THE VC MAY FEEL THAT THEY CAN FAN THESE FLAMES FURTHER IN THE
WEEKS AND MONTHS TO COME. NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE TEl OFFENSIVE MIGHT BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS AN ADMISSION
OF A VC VICTORY, AND THERgiEEMS TO BE, IN SOME PROVINCIAL
CITIES, AN INCREASED DESIRE TO SEE EVEN MORE VIGOROUS
- ACTION AGAINST THE VC AT THIS TIME. THE PRESSURES FOR PEACE,
NOT NOW EVIDENT, MAY EMERGE LATER. THE ABOVE POPULAR *REACTION
IS BASED UPON A VERY LIMITED SAMPLING.)
5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR.
ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF
it.3(00)
TRANSMITTED TO: WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917