MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL ROCKETS AGAINST NAVAL TARGETS
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0001190034
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Case Number:
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Publication Date:
May 7, 1974
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
7 May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Employment of Tactical
Rockets Against Naval Targets
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article by the Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Soviet
Ground Forces examines possibilities for using tactical rockets against
naval targets. Four rockets with ranges of 65 to 500 kilometers and yields
of 10 to 500 kilotons are associated with the Ground Forces. The
appropriate naval targets are identified as enemy nuclear attack
capabilities, especially carrier strike groups, and amphibious landing
forces. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (84) for 1968.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies.
David H. Blee
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE CW
INFO. Mid-1968
SOURCE
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Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
,o11?1k,
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DATE
7 May 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Rocket Troops of the Ground Forces
in Combat with Naval Targets
Documentary
JLISuTg:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (84) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal tTMilitary
Thought ". The author or this article is Marshal of Artillery X% Kazakov.
This article by the Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Soviet
Ground Forces examines possibilities for using tactical rockets against
naval targets. Four rockets with ranges of 65 to 500 kilometers and yields
of 10 to 500 kilotons are associated with the Ground Forces. The
appropriate naval targets are identified as enemy nuclear attack
capabilities, especially carrier strike groups, and amphibious landing
forces.
End of Summary
Comment:
Marshal Yazakov was replaced as Commander of Rocket Troops and
Artillery and became an Inspector-General of the USSR Ministry of Defense
in 1969. He has contributed many articles to military periodicals, the
most recent being "Fiery Shield of the Motherland", Gudok, 19 November
1971. He also wrote Always with the Infantry, Always irah the Tank,
(Soviet Military Review, No. 6, 1973). The SECRET version of Military
Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the
level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end
of 1970.
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The Rocket Troops of the Ground Forces in Combat with
Naval Targets
by
Marshal of Artillery K. Kazakov
In conducting military operations in the main continental theaters,
our probable enemy, as is known, assigns a major role to his naval forces.
This is explained by the fact that the enemy navy is capable of mounting
nuclear strikes against targets deep in the continent as well as against
our ground forces groupings operating on a maritime axis; and that he can
transport large troop contingents by sea in order to reinforce his grouping
in a theater of military operations. This in turn exerts a decisive
influence on the course and outcome of operations. Along with the transfer
of troops, equipment, and materiel to reinforce groupings created in Europe
and the Far East during peacetime, the American command may, during
military operations, resort to large amphibious landings, within the NATO
framework or independently. Amphibious landing operations will have
various goals, including the capture of forward naval bases, shore
installations, or coastal (island) areas, and the support of troop
offensives on maritime axes.
Under these conditions, the success achieved by fronts in offensive
operations will depend to a great extent on the devel6WiTsituation, not
only on land but also at sea. Therefore, a front cannot avoid carrying out
certain tasks in the battle with various enemy forces which could hinder
the fulfilment of operational tasks, the more so since front capabilities
for combat with naval targets have grown considerably.
If, in the past, combat with the enemy at sea was almost entirely the
responsibility of the navy and aviation, with the role of ground forces
limited essentially to preventing landings or destroying them in their
landing areas, the situation today has undergone a fundamental change. The
fact that our ground forces have modern rocket systems, including the
latest models with long ranges and powerful charges, makes it possible for
fronts to maintain direct fire coordination with fleets during operations
airrea- provide considerable assistance in defeating the enemy at sea.
There has also been an increase in the capabilities of front aviation
to strike an enemy at sea. Its strikes will be especially effective
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against important individual objectives on the open sea, for example
against submarines, missile-carrying ships, and other targets which are
highly mobile and small. Aviation plays a particularly large role in
carrying out reconnaissance and final reconnaissance missions against naval
targets.
? At the same time, it may be appreciably more difficult to carry out
air strikes against large groupings of naval forces and their carrier large
units because of strong enemy air defense.
To hit such groupings, it is obviously more advisable to carry out
strikes by rocket troops along with strikes by naval forces. This is the
question to which this article devotes its main attention.
The rocket systems of the ground forces have quite considerable
capabilities for striking naval targets (see table).
Type of Depth of strike, in kilometers Time of strike prepara-
missile 50 150 250 300 450 800 tion, in minutes
from readiness
No.1 No.2 No.3
Yield of
nuclear
charge, in
kilotons
R-65
3
10
12-15
10
R-170
4
25
35
100
4
14/20
25
100
R-300 .
10
46
53
500
KR-500.
Note. The indicated strike preparation time is the average for a battery.
The time from readiness No. 2a is given as the numerator for the R-300.
As may be seen, ground forces rocket troops are capable of striking
enemy naval objectives and targets at sea while they are still a long
distance away, and in many cases even before they embark. And as more
advanced rockets become part of the armament of the ground forces, their
rocket troops will be able to mount effective nuclear strikes against enemy
naval groupings in virtually any theater of military operations.
What are the more typical tasks which may be assigned to ground forces
rocket troops in combat with the enemy at sea?
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One of the most important tasks is undoubtedly to destroy those means
which are capable of using nuclear weapons, means such as large units of
nuclear submarines, missile-carrying ships, and aircraft carriers. The
fulfilment of this task acquires special importance as combat operations
begin with the delivery of the initial nuclear strike designed to weaken
enemy nuclear strength and to reduce to the utmost the effectiveness of his
retaliatory strikes against our troops.
The second important task will be to destroy amphibious landing
forces, as well as troops, military equipment, and materiel being
transported by sea to reinforce groupings opposing our ground forces. It
will be particularly urgent to fulfil this task during the war, since NATO
troop exercises have shown that the transfer of reserves to the European
Theater is usually planned between the fifth to the eighth day of the war.
In a number of cases rocket troops can also be called upon to strike
enemy gun vessels which are providing fire support for ground force
actions.
The use of ground forces rocket troops to strike enemy naval targets
is difficult but completely feasible if very close coordination is
organized and maintained between front troops and naval forces.
In organizing coordination, it is necessary to determine the time
limits and scope of the tasks for front rocket troops to strike naval
targets; to agree on questions concerning the organization of joint
reconnaissance and the transmission of intelligence data from naval
reconnaissance means to the front headquarters, the headquarters of the
rocket troops and artillery,-Mahe headquarters of rocket large units and
units assigned to mount strikes; to establish signals for mounting and
terminating strikes, and to transmit these signals to the coordinating
levels and to the direct executors.
In organizing coordination, special attention must also be given to
establishing reliable and high-speed communications between naval
headquarters and the front headquarters in order to provide for the fastest
possible transmission-Reconnaissance data and to order the launch of
missiles. For this purpose it is advantageous to have an operations group
from naval headquarters (with its communications means) attached to the
headquarters of the coordinating front. An operations group from the front
headquarters and the headquarters-a-ihe rocket troops and artillery may
also be dispatched to naval headquarters. Such a group, having communica-
tions means and data for conducting discussions, is in a position, for
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example, to give immediate orders directly to rocket units to prepare for
strikes and to report this simultaneously to the front headquarters. In
this case, the command to the rocket troops to acirlany, mount the strikes
must, unquestionably, be given by the front troop commander or, at his
orders, by the chief of the rocket troops and artillery in coordination
with the naval command.
At some training exercises, representatives from rocket units were
detailed to reconnaissance ships and shore reconnaissance posts, but we
consider this inadvisable. Direct communications set up with ships
and naval aerial reconnaissance aircraft in order to speed up the receipt
of intelligence data.
The preparation and mounting of strikes by rocket troops against naval
targets must obviously be carried out through the joint efforts of the
commands and staffs of the front and the navy. Their main responsibility
is to organize reconnaissance OT naval targets, to determine the objectives
and timing of the strikes, to notify our own ships, and to monitor the
results of the strikes.
In individual cases, the decision to mount nuclear strikes may be made
by the front troop commander independently if he has precise intelligence
data and information on the position of our submarines and surface ships.
However, the naval command must be informed in advance as to the area of
the planned strikes, their yield, and the time at which they are to be
mounted.
In using rocket troops for combat with naval targets, the fundamental
questions are selecting the strike objectives, selecting the times for the
strikes, and determining the order in which nuclear strikes are to be
mounted. In our opinion, rocket troops using nuclear weapons of enormous
destructive power must, as a rule, be assigned large objectives such as
submarines and ships at their bases; naval bases and ports for the loading
and unloading of troops and equipment; carrier strike large units and
trogo and ships provlangfire support for amphibious landings.
There are no particular difficulties in striking submarines and ships
at their bases Or naval bases and ports for loading and unloading troops
and combat equipment. Mbunting nuclear strikes against them will be
accomplished with the same methods as are used by rocket troops in striking
objectives during ground forces operations.
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A, basic requirement in nuclear strikes against the naval objectives
indicated above is that they take place at the moment when the largest
possible number of ships, troops, and military equipment are in a given
area. If we consider that in the view of the American command up to five
days are required for one division, using several ports, to load its
troops, combat equipment, and materiel, then it will obviously be advisable
to strike these ports on the third or fourth day after the troop loading
begins. Before the strikes are mounted, it is absolutely necessary to
conduct final reconnaissance of targets.
The nuclear strikes may be either air or ground surface bursts (or on
the surface of the water, which is advantageous when the main strike
objectives are enemy ships).
The most advisable method for front rocket troops to use in attacking
carrier strike large units is to strike themdirectly in their combat
disposition while they are in transit (a typical combat disposition of a
carrier strike large unit is shown in Sketch 1).
The first priority strike objectives must be aircraft carriers and
heavy cruisers armed with guided missiles. It is desirable to strike
carriers when their assault aircraft are on board.
Depending on how far away .the'carrier\striIce large units are located,
rocket large units armed withtl_ d R-300 missiles may be used to mount
nuclear strikes against them. Cause of the strong air defenses of combat
dispositions of carrier strike large units, it is not very effective to use
units of cruise missiles. If it becomes necessary to do this, however, a
simultaneous group launch of three or four cruise missiles will, as a rule,
have to be made within a limited zone in order to increase the reliability
of the strike.
Rocket troops can strike an amphibious landing force as soon as it
comes into the range of their rockets and can continue the attack after
they have landed. It is advisable to give priority to the forward landing
detachments which comprise the assault echelon of a large unit, and to the
ships transporting nuclear attack means, tanks, and artillery, which
usually follow as part of the detachments of the main landing forces.
Very favorable conditions are created for mounting nuclear strikes
against an amphibious landing force when it reaches the landing area.
Sketch 2 shows the fundamental plan for the structuring of forces in
landing an expeditionary division of US Marines.
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The strike objectives of rocket troops during the preparation and
landing of an amphibious landing force will be the following:
- helicopter carriers, on each of which there may be up to one
reinforced battalion of marines with combat equipment and materiel;
- landing ships and transports, especially while they are standing in
place for the transfer of assault subunits onto landing craft;
- groups of ships providing fire support for the landing, usually
including cruisers, frigates, and destroyers;
- waves of landing craft transporting the landing force from its
formation area to the departure line.
It is less effective to mount nuclear strikes while the waves of
landing craft are in transit from the departure line to the shore, since in
most cases they proceed to the landing area along a wide front and at
maximum speed. It is advantageous to attack them during this period with
air strikes and with artillery and tank fire, preferably direct fire.
Since the forming-up of a landing force takes place at a distance of
up to 35 to SS kilometers from the landing area and requires a fairly long
period of time (up to 4 to 6 hours), nuclear strikes can be prepared in
good time and mounted with virtually all types of rockets available to the
ground forces. However, considering that the rocket troops will have to
carry out other no less important tasks at this time, it is advisable to
use units of tactical rockets in the main strike against the landing force
during the preparation and execution of the landing, the strikes to be
mounted by decisions of the army commander and division commanders. The
strikes can be prepared on the basis of intelligence data received from
both naval reconnaissance means and their own.
In conclusion, I would like to dwell on some questions which are
directly connected with the preparation of nuclear strikes mounted by
rocket troops against naval targets.
The preparation of a nuclear strike against any objective, including
naval targets, involves a number of measures to be taken by the command,
staffs, and rocket large units, units, and subunits. Among the most
important of these measures are: reconnaissance of the enemy; analysis of
the reconnaissance data obtained, and the selection of strike targets;
decision on using nuclear strikes against the objectives; allocation of
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tasks to rocket large units (units) for preparing strikes; transmittal of
tasks to rocket subunits and, finally, preparation of the strike by the
subunits.
The experience of training exercises shows that a delay in carrying
out any of these measures will inevitably lead to an increase in the total
preparation time for a nuclear strike and, consequently, to a reduction in
its effectiveness. In striking naval targets, the time factor acquires
even more decisive importance, since the strikes cannot be prepared
directly according to where the target is but must be prepared according to
the projected position of the target. Even the most insignificant errors
in determining the projected position, or a delay in mounting the strikes,
can lead to failure in carrying out the combat task.
Therefore, high reliability and accuracy of intelligence data
constitute one of the most important conditions for the effective use of
rocket troops against naval targets. Reconnaissance must provide exact
target coordinates and data on their speed and course. Changes in target
speed or course must be reported to the rocket troops without delay so that
the strike preparation data can be corrected in time.
Another no less important condition is the speed with which strikes
can be prepared and mounted against detected targets. According to
training exercises, it may take up to one hour .to_prepare a nuclear strike
from the moment_a_naval_target has been discovered by naval reconnaissance,
--Tsift.h?about 60 percent of this time spent on the receipt and analysis of
intelligence data the selection of strike targets, and the transmittal of
tasks to rocket data,
and 40 percent on the preparation of the strike
by the' subunits. It goes without saying that we cannot be satisfied with
this time, the more so since naval targets are highly mobile.
Is there any real possibility of shortening this preparation time for
nuclear strikes? In our opinion there is. In particular, there is no
doubt of the necessity to continue to shorten the technical preparation
time for rocket launchings as much as possible and, consequently, the
launch preparation time of rocket subunits, to improve the rockets, and to
automate the processes of technical preparation and aiming. But even all
of this will not fully resolve the problem of mounting timely strikes on
naval targets.
Prior4y should,bkliNen_to_shortening_the time needed for making the
decision to prepare nuclear strikes and for transmitting tasks to the
direct executors. This will become entirely possible when the means for
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automating control processes are introduced into the rocket troops,
aThouglr-scae-mabilities are available to us even now if a number of the
measures for preparing strikes are carried out beforehand.
If conditions are favorable for reconnaissance of naval targets,
starting while they are still a long distance away, it will be possible in
a number of cases to decide on a strike even before the targets have
entered the zone where they can be reached by rockets. During this period
rocket units can be assigned tasks to prepare for strikes, and strikes can
even be prepared against the projected positions of the targets. Under
these conditions, all that is required to mount the strike is an updated
fix of the target's position, speed, and course, which will unquestionably
bring a significant reduction in the total time needed to mount the strike.
The amount of work to be done by rocket large units and units will also be
reduced, it will not be necessary to reprocess the input data for rocket
launches, and it will be possible to transfer strikes depending on the
latest intelligence data on the position, speed, and course of targets.
In preparing and mounting nuclear strikes against naval targets within
short time limits it is important that the work of the front headquarters
and the headquarterstroops_ancLartillery-be-eee-rdinated with
the' naVal headquarters_amd that there be continuous high-,speedunica-
tion_among them.
These are the main questions and recommendations which this article
has intended to set forth concerning the use of ground forces rocket troops
to strike naval targets. Naturally it is impossible in one article to
examine all of the questions and provide exhaustive recommendations. Its
main purpose is to draw the attention of generals and officers to the study
and development of effective methods of using all means, particularly
ground forces rocket troops, to strike naval targets.
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Sketch 1. Typical combat disposition of a carrier strike large unit
Itir-SKRZ.
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Sketch 2. Fundamental plan for structuring of forces in
landing expeditionary division of US marines
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Sketch 2. Key
Uslovnyye oboznacheniya - key
Yadernyye udary RV - Nuclear strikes by rocket troops
Sosr. ogon art - Concentrated artillery fire
rAk Zagrad. ogon art - Barrier artillery fire
- Polosa dvizheniya desantno - vysadochnykh sredstv-
Zone of activity of landing craft
Posadochnaya zona dlya vertoletov - Helicopter landing zone
Punkty vysadk; desantnoy batalonnoy gruppy -
Landing points of a battalion assault group
Uthastki vysadki desantnoy polkovoy gruppy - Landing
sectors of a regimental assault group
Uchastok vysadki divizii - Landing sector of a division
do 30 km - Up to 30 km,
Korabl upravleniya - Control ship
DES - Landing craft
DBGRA,B,V,G - Battalion landing group A, B, C, D
1 eshelon - First echelon
Volny desanta - Assault wave
Iskhodnaya liniya - Departure line
Polosa podkhoda desantno - vysadochnykh sredstv - Approach
zone of assault landing craft
Rayon formirovaniya voln desantno - vysadochnyky sredstv -
Forming-up area for landing craft
Pervyy eshelon desanta (chetyra desantnyye batalonnyye gruppy) -
First echelon of landing (four battalion landing groups)
Vhutrenniy rayon stoyanki i manevrirovaniya desantnykh transportov -
Inner halt and maneuvering area of landing transports
DESO - Landing detachment
Desantnykh Korabley - 12 - 15 - Landing ships 12-15
Rayony ozhidaniya desantno - vysadochnykh sredstv -
Waiting areas of landing craft
Desantnykh transportov - 12 - 14 - Landing transports 12-14
Vspomogatelnyy korabl upravleniya - Auxiliary control ship
Desantnykh transportov 12 - 14 - Landing transports 12-14
Vtoroy eshelon desanta (tri desantnyye batalonnyye gruppy i
podrazdeleniye - Second echelon of landing (three battalion
landing groups and subunits)
Vneshniy rayon stoyanki i manevrirovaniya desantnykh
transportov - Outer halt and maneuvering area of landing transports
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^ Vertoletnyy desant (dye desantnykh bata1onnyye gruppy 1 eshelona) -
Helicopter landing (two battalion landing groups of the first
echelon)
Rayon deystviya vertOletnykh korabley - Area of activity of
helicopter ships
Blizhniy protivolodochnyy rubeih - Inner antisubmarine line
AUG - Carrier strike group
Blizhneye prikrytiye 130 - 300 km - Inner cover 130 - 300 km
^ Dalneye protivolodochnoye patrulirovaniye - do 370 km -
Long-range antisubmarine patrolling - up to 370 km
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