MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): INCREASING SOVIET CAPABILITY TO OPERATE AGAINST MISSILE SUBMARINES
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0001189204
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
June 19, 2017
Document Release Date:
June 19, 2017
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Case Number:
SC-2007-00006
Publication Date:
February 25, 1974
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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AR 70-14
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
25 February 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Increasing
Soviet Capability to Operate Against
Missile Submarines
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles
of the Journal "Military Thought". This article generally
characterizes Soviet forces capable of assisting in
operations against enemy missile submarines and makes
recommendations for improving these capabilities. The
a t or ules outthe Loasi..Epp Air For Q2 as. a si9nI1T-Cnt
n antisubmarine warfare, but builds a case for
upgra ing ointIs?bnarine warfare aircraft forces and
equipment. He observes that Soviet forces must carry out
preemptive destruction of missile submarines or destroy them
after only a few of their missiles have been launched. This
article appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-
to-know basis within recipient agencies.
Wi lam E. Ne son
Deputy Director for cperations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO.
Late 1966
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THIS DOCUMENT 'Y NOT BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
SUBJECT
DATE 25 February 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Problems of Combat
Against the Submarine Missile/Nuclear Danger
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article
which appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 19f6 of the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal
"Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor of
Aviation P. Nevzorov. This article generally characterizes Soviet
forces capable of assisting in operations against enemy missile
submarines and makes recommendations for improving these capabilities.
The author rules out the Long Range Air Force as a significant element
in antisubmarine warfare, but builds a case for upgrading other
antisubmarine warfare aircraft forces and equipment. He observes that
Soviet forces must carry out preemptive destruction of missile
submarines or destroy them after only a few of their missiles have
been launched.
Fnd of Summary
Comment:
Gen.-Mayor of (Naval) Aviation Peter Pavlovich Nevzorov died in
February 1967. Military Thought has been published by the USSR
Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET,
SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not
the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version
is published three times annually and is distributed down to the le
of division commander.
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The Problems of Combat Against the Submarine
Missile/Nucrear Danger
by
General-Mayor of Aviation P. Nevzorov
Interesting articles have been published recently
concerning the thwarting of an enemy missile/nuclear attack
during various stages of a war and the activities of various
branches and arms of branches of the armed forces during
these stages. These articles have analyzed the most impor-
tant aspects of combat against the submarine enemy and, for
the most part, correctly bring to light the roles of the
various branches of armed forces and arms of the branches.
At the same time, there is a lack of adequate clarity
concerning a number of questions, both on the theoretical
level and on the practical level. Thus, in our opinion,
Colonel G. Lebedev's article* does not assess quite
correctly the possible degree to which the various forces,
and first of all, long-range aviation, can participate in
combatting missile-carrying submarines. Furthermore, the
author identifies thwarting the submarine missile/nuclear
threat with the general mission of our Armed Forces to
destroy the enemy navy, and, in doing so, he again
attributes to long-range aviation those capabilities for
combatting missile submarines which, unfortunately, it does
not possess.
Since many theoretical propositions, and practical
recommendations as well, have, in esdbnce, only begun to be
formulated and consequently require further deepening and
refinement, I would like to express my views also concerning
the significance and characteristics of combat against
modern submarines, to throw light on the principles of the
organization and conduct of combat actions against them and,
in so doing, devote attention to the fundamentals of the use
of aviation and its combat capabilities.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought",
No. 1 (74), 1965.
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We fully share the opinion of those admirals, generals,
and officers who consider that in its importance and scale,
combatting missile submarines today has nothing in common
with the antisubmarine defense of the World War II period.
The unceasing increase in the missile/nuclear might of
the probable enemies' atomic submarines, which moreover are
at a constant high state of combat readiness, will
constitute from the very first minutes of a war a very
serious threat to our state and to other countries of the
socialist commonwealth.*
Hence, combatting the submarine missile/nuclear danger
is developing into a problem of nationwide importance and
has become one of the most important tasks of our Armed
Forces.
The protection of the country from the missile/nuclear
strikes of enemy submarines cannot limit itself to passive
defensive measures alone. It is impossible to create any
sort of stationary all-round impregnable defense along the
sea frontiers of the Soviet Union and member countries of
the Warsaw Pact. In the same vein, it is impossible, before
the initiation of military operations, to bar enemy
submarines from penetrating into the areas of their
launching positions (for all practical purposes they already
occupy these areas at present). The initial nuclear strikes
of our strategic rocket forces, augmented by the strikes of
missile submarines, long-range aviation, and naval missile-
__
* At present the USA has built 37 missile submarines, of
1
which 29 are in service in the Navy and are constantly on
\ duty in the northwest portion of the Atlantic, in the
\Mediterranean, and in the Pacific Ocean. Attempts are also
being made to expand the patrol zones of the submarines by
k establishing bases for them in the Indian Ocean. After
completion of the shipbuilding program, i.e., by the end of
A.9 Polaris missiles will, in relative proportion, equal
percent of all of the shore-based intercontinental
\ballistic missiles that the USA plans to produce. We must
also keep in mind that currently the work of further
increasing the launching range, yield of warheads, and
target-hitting accuracy of the missiles is being continued
irigorously.
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carrying aviation, against important installations
(acluding submarine babes and the plants where submarines
are built) cannot also bring success in combatting enemy
submarines at sea, although undoubtedly these strikes will
drastically weaken the enemy's potential capabilities.
The question is quite reasonable: in general, is it
possible in the initial period of a war to conduct
successful combat against the submarine missile/nuclear
danger? We must keep the following in mind in order to
answer this question more or less convincingly.
According to the views of the probable enemy, his
atomic missile submarines are part of the first strategic
echelon. They, carry ...out.. underwater missile launchings
from the very first minutes of a war, from direct' -
tiftellie-deed-BYM-Vand-s h?iTn as to make it difficult for
us to combat both the submarines themselves and the missiles
launched_argl_thpm.
Furthermore, by possessing almost unlimited cruising
range, atomic missile submarines are capable of relatively
rapidly changing their launching positions and of going to
areas difficult of access for antisubmarine forces. The
execution of extensive maneuvering by the submarines has
almost no impact on their effectiveness in delivering
strikes against selected installations because, by using
existing radionavigation systems and artificial earth
satellites, they can determine their coordinates with
sufficient accuracy.
Now we can formulate an answer to the question posed
above: the successful thwarting or weakening of the nuclear
strikes of enemy missile submarines in the initial period of
a war is not achieved by strikes against enemy bases and
1 other shore installations. This task can only be fulfilled
as a result of successfully combatting the missile-carrying
'submarines directly at sea or on the ocean, and successfully
Lcombatting the missiles launched by them in the air.
This combat must be conducted by the antisubmarine
forces of our Navy and by the antimissile defense troops,
both specially designated and trained for this.
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Without touching on questions related to antimissile
defense, we will dwell briefly on the specific features and
requirements of organizing combat against missile submarines
at sea by the antisubmarine forces of the Navy.
First of all, it is appropriate here to emphasize that
combat against modern atomic, and particularly missile,
submarines is a very difficult task. In doing it, the most
difficult of all to accomplish, is the search for submarines
on the vast expanses of the seas and oceans, at distances of
up to 4000 kilometers from our bases and, in the future,
considerably farther.
7.
Because of the imperfection of modern detection means,
it is impossible to distinguish atomic submarines from
missile submarines or conventional torpedo submarines.
Therefore the actions of our forces have developed into
combat against all submarines,* which has naturally given
rise to grave additional difficulties.
Changing conditions in the employment of modern
submarines have placed completely new requirements on the
organization of combat against them. In our opinion, these
requirements boil down to the following.
First of all, both on a strategic scale and on an
operational scale, and all the more on a tactical scale,
combat against missile-carrying submarines must be active
and aggressive in nature to the utmost degree.
Secondly, timely discovery and detection of the sub-
marine enemy has to be accomplished before the initiation of
.
combat actions, i.e., still under peacetime conditions.
Therefore the reconnaissance currently being conducted for
the purpose of discovering the intentions and actions of the
naval enemy must be supplemented by a systematic search for
submarines in the entire theater and by the continuous
tracking of detected submarines.
* At present there are in the navies of the USA and NATO
countries 367 various submarines, of which 172 belong to the
US Navy. The USA has 21 multipurpose atomic submarines;
according to future plans, by 1970 the number of these
submarines is to be increased to 70 units.
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Filling in the missing data during the period of threat
will scarcely succeed, because for this there may not be
either forces or time and, consequently, actions to thwart
the enemy's nuclear attack will be doomed to failure.
And finally, it is only possible to thwart or not allow
the strikes of enemy missile-carrying submarines by
immediately destroying the submarines, because otherwise a
submarine is now capable of iaunching all 16 Polaris
missiles in 15 minutes, and in an even shorter period of
time in the near future.
Concerning the requirements which should serve as the
basis for the organization of combat against submarines, it
is also appropriate to talk about possible variants in the
actions of our antisubmarine forces. In our opinion there
will be two such variants. The first is to destroy the
detected missile-carrying submarines before the enemy
launches his missiles, by the procedure of preemptive
actions taken on orders of the Supreme High Command. In
this case, the thwarting of the missile/nuclear strike is
ensured to the greatest degree. The second is for our
antisubmarine forces to take retaliatory actions after it
has been established that the enemy has initiated the
unleashing of war or after the launching of missiles by the
submarines has become a proven fact. Of course, in this
case too, it will be necessary to get the permission of the
Supreme High Command. However, in doing this, we can
obviously count, not on thwarting, but on weakening the
submarine enemy's initial nuclear strike, since a certain
portion of the missiles may be launched before our forces
initiate offensive actions.
The experience of past wars and postwar operational and
combat training of the fleets indicates that success in
searching for and destroying submarines at sea depends
directly on the combat capabilities of antisubmarine
submarines, antisubmarine aviation, and antisubmarine
surface ships, using various means of detection and
destruction and exerting their combined efforts under
various conditions, for as yet there exist no other forces
to which one might give preference.
Antisubmarine submarines, especially those with atomic
propulsion, will become one of the most effective
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antisubmarine forces, as they are equipped with the latest
means of submarine detection and long-range means of
destruction. Possessing a vast radius of action and great
autonomy, they are capable of conducting a prolonged search
in all areas of the seas and oceans and under any .
hydrometeorological conditions.
surface also have means of
detecEIE'Y7iiirdii-EFEYITIT-iamarines. The allegations of
some comrades (primarily submariners) about the ineffective-
ness of employing surface ships against submarine missile-
carriers in the areas of their launching positions,
supposedly because of their inadequate combat reliability,
are too categorical, in our opinion. Any antisubmarine
forces have characteristic deficiencies. However, in a
great many cases, surface ships can make a significant
contribution to the detection and tracking of submarines,
sometimes even in remote areas (Particularly in peacetime
conditions and during a period of threat). Thanks to their
great autonomy and the presence of communications means,
surface ships can be used in close cooperation with aviation
participating in search and strike groups. The combat
capabilities of antisubmarine ships increase with the
presence of helicopter carriers.
Aviation has considerable combat capabilities for
combariNFiamarines. However, this statement cannot be
applied to all arms of the air forces and all types of
aviation. Colonel G. Lebedev is mistgkep when he asserts in
the aforementioned article that long-range aviation is
capable of independently searching for and destroying mobile
and small-size targets, among which, without any basis
whatsoever, he also includes submarines, ranking them with
surface ships and immobile shore installations. We must not
forget that submarines are concealed from visual and radar
observation by a layer of water and that, as yet, long-range
aviation aircraft do not have any technical means of under-
water detection.
However, in general, it would be erroneous to ignore
this arm of the air forces in the context of solving the
problem being discussed.
As has already been mentioned, long-range aviation,
jointly with naval missile-carrying aviation, can, with a
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portion of its forces, be enlisted in the delivery of
initial nuclear strikes against installations which support
the actions of enemy missile submarines, but, in our
opinion, it is in no position to provide support in
thwarting the submarine enemy's nuclear attack during the
initial period of a war.
When the topic is combat by aviation forces against
submarines at sea or on the ocean, what is meant is
specially trained antisubmarine aviation, armed with
special-purpose aircraft equipped with various means of
detecting and destroying submarines.*
In the past we had such aviation within the composition
of the Navy, and we still have it. Despite this, however,
we are faced, in essence, with the necessity of setting it
up with completely new quality and in the required numbers,
since the obsolescent types of antisubmarine aircraft on
hand with imperfect search equipment cannot reliably fulfil
the requirements of combat against the submarine missile/
nuclear danger. /n so doing, we are far from the thought of
setting aviation off against the other arms of the
antisubmarine forces, though there is every ground for
considering that antisubmarine aviation is reliable
* Radar (and also visual) observation, still the primary
means of detecting targets in the air and on the surface of
the water, is unacceptable when searching for submarines
underwater. Therefore, antisubmarine aircraft are equipped
with search devices based on various principles of physics
(radiohydroacoustic, magnetometric, thermal direction-
finding, optical, and for detection of the initial missile
launchings, etc.). Special antisubmarine homing torpedoes,
bombs, and rockets are used as means to destroy submarines.
For this reason, existing missile-carrying and bomber
aircraft are not suitable for combat against submerged
submarines.
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and the Most mobile and economically advantageous force for
combatting submarines.*
Estimates show that even a partial thwarting of the
launching of nuclear missiles from enemy submarines fully
justifies the material expenditures on the production and
maintenance of antisubmarine aircraft, not to even mention
that tens and hundreds of cities and important installations
on our territory will be saved from nuclear attack.
Besides searching for and detecting submarines,
aircraft are also capable, independently or jointly with
other antisubmarine forces of a fleet, of tracking and
destroying the detected enemy submarines. Further
improvements of technical means for the search and detection
of submarines will considerably increase the operational and
combat capabilities of aircraft (For example, just by using
a thermal direction-finding device under certain conditions,
antisubmarine aircraft will increase their combat
capabilities eight to ten or more times in comparison with
the use of radiohydroacoustic means.).
Comparing all of the positive and negative features of
all mobile antisubmarine forces (submarines, ships,
aviation), we can conclude that the hest results in
combatting the submarine missile/nuclear danger can be
achieved with the joint employment of all three forces, in
which the shortcomings of one of the forces are compensated
for by the positive qualities of the others. Thus, we
consider that, in general, combat against submarines should
be carried out during their transit from their bases, and
\
also in the areas of the seas and oceans where there is the
)greatest probability of their showing up and operating.
* It will suffice to point out that a single antisubmarine
submarine, using a hydroacoustic set, can examine in a day a
sea or ocean area of up to 40 thousand square kilometers,
but, along with this, depending on the remoteness of the
search areas, transit to these areas may take several days.
Antisubmarine aviation, armed with long-range aircraft, is
able to conduct a search at distances of over 4,000
kilometers; a total of two aircraft can accomplish the same
task in a single sortie with the help of radiohydroacoustic
means.
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Calculations show that the overall scope of those areas
from which Polaris missiles will most likely be launched
against our territory and where our antisubmarine forces
should carry out uninterrupted observation, amounts to
approximately 46 million square kilometers.
Of course, it is exceedingly difficult to control such
a maritime expanse. At the same time, allowing for the
gonditions required to ensure successful missile launchings
by the enemy's iiibMarine missile-carriers on patrol, we ca,p
consider that not all of the indicated area has to be
covered by observation in the first instance, but only a
portion of it, covering approximately 20 million square y
kilometers. And this is a fully realistic task for our
antisubmarine forces.
We share the opinions of those comrades who assert that
it is difficult for us to establish antisubmarine lines in
open sea theaters such as the Atlantic and the Pacific. At
the same time, the military-geographic conditions of several
sea theaters (primarily in island areas, narrows, straits,
etc.) permit us to achieve a monitoring capability against
the actions of enemy submarines by the use of cable-
hydrophone lines and to destroy these submarines by the use
of minefields. However, this, of course, requires great
efforts and material expenditures, but nevertheless, we
obviously should not refrain from setting up antisubmarine
lines.
Thus, the principal elements of a system designated to
combat submarines at sea should be mobile all-arms forces
(antisubmarine submarines, aircraft, and surface ships), and
to a certain degree also, stationary means of detection,
with reliable control of them, of course. This entire
system, established in peacetime, should be closely
coordinated with the antiaircraft and antimissile defenses
and the system of early warning against enemy missile/
nuclear attack on the appropriate operational axes of the
theaters of military operations. Otherwise, the antimissile
defense troops will be powerless in combatting missiles
launched from submarines.
In our opinion, the principles for the organization of
combat against missile submarines at sea should greatly
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resemble the principles for the organization of antiaircraft
defense.
The information obtained by various means on enemy
submarines has to be supplemented by search for and
observation of the submarines. Upon receiving information
of the initial detection of submarines, mobile antisubmarine
forces of the fleets carry out continuous tracking and
mutual guidance and, when military actions are initiated,
they proceed to resolutely destroy them. In doing so, the
preparation and implementation of an initial strike which is
as crushing as possible against the enemy by all of the
antisubmarine forces which are maintaining contact with the
submarines will be of particularly critical importance.
These conditions can be achieved by skilfully using the
threat period to prepare and deploy antisubmarine forces,
; including aircraft too. To allocate a large reserve of
i antisubmarine forces for subsequent operations is
/ impermissible during this period, since this may lead to a
I weakening of the initial strikes.
The actions of antisubmarine forces and means must be
delimited by zones or areas and distributed over the entire
possible expanse of open sea theaters.
The subdividing or delimiting of specific zones or
areas is determined by the need to increase responsibility
for the fulfilment of assigned tasks, by the need to improve
the conditions which ensure the mutual security of
antisubmarine forces from damage by our own atomic means,
and also by the desire to control these forces as reliably
as possible 'on the broad expanse of open ocean and sea
theaters.
It is not without interest to note that such a division
of sea and ocean expanses for the actions of the various
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antisubmarine forces is also practiced at present by our
probable enemies.*
Of course, we are far from thinking of copying the
American organization. At the same time, we must not fail
to take into consideration those specific conditions of
combat against submarines which manifest themselves to the
same extent both for us and for our probable enemies.
Obviously, in conformity with our organization, we also
should not refrain from allocation of sea and ocean areas
for the operations of antisubmarine forces. For these
purposes, it is most advantageous to allot the remote ocean
areas to antisubmarine submarines and long-range aircraft.
It is advisable to assign surface ships, helicopters,
and short-range antisubmarine aircraft to the areas within
the boundaries of the seas adjoining our territory and also
to the closed sea theaters (the Baltic and Black Seas, where
for the most part there may be enemy multi-purpose sub-
marines). In addition, these forces will also accomplish
the tasks of supporting the deployment of our strike
submarines and their return to their bases.
In our opinion, in accordance with the indicated
principles, preparation of the theaters in respect to
antisubmarine warfare with means of detection, obstruction,
communications, and control should be carried out.
* Thus, to combat our submarines, the northern portion of
the Atlantic Ocean, from the coast .of North America to the
Norwegian Sea and the western portion of the Barents Sea
inclusive, has been divided up by the American military
command into zones for the operations of specific large
units of antisubmarine forces, including land-based
antisubmarine aviation, surface ships, and submarines.
Aircraft of land-based antisubmarine aviation carry out
systematic patrols in these zones, observing large areas.
According to available data, just to search for our
submarines in the Atlantic, antisubmarine aircraft of the
NATO member-countries conduct up to 200 aircraft sorties
daily. In wartime they plan to increase the number of
aircraft sorties flown to 500 sorties per day.
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Discussing problem questions of combat against the
submarine missile/nuclear danger, I also wish to express my
opinion concerning the possible (advisable) forms of
conducting combat actions with various antisBEFOTB-6 forces,
since these questions have not yet received sufficiently
concrete definition.
In our opinion, it is advisable to look upon combat
against missile submarines as a very important component
part of naval combat actions in ocean theaters. It is, in
essence, an independent special naval operation carried out
most often at the same time as the delivery of initial
nuclear strikes by strategic means, since, in this case, the
most advantageous conditions are created for the further
conduct and development of a strategic operation by a fleet.
Having expressed this point of, view, we do not forget that,
according to existing official views, the destruction of
submarines is considered to be within the overall task of
combat against enemy naval forces. However, the inherent
characteristics of combat against submarines, and the
considerable volume of tasks accomplished and supporting
measures carried out, in doing this, are evidence of the
impossibility of uniting them within the framework of a
single operation which pursues the purpose of destroying
carrier strike forces, or groupings, of other surface ships
and amphibious landing detachments, and of destroying enemy
naval forces in their bases.
In combat against submarines, there are appearing a new
spatial factor--the underwater environment--and quali-
tatively new forces and means of combat. Therefore, the
concept, organization, and plan for the use of antisubmarine
forces, including aviation, in combat against submarines
will be isolated from the plan for the use of forces to
destroy enemy surface forces. Proceeding from these
considerations, the time has come to consider combat against
missile-carrying submarines as a form of special naval
operation.
In our opinion, the purposes of such an operation might
be, first of all, to thwart a surprise missile/nuclear
attack by the enemy from the direction of the sea (by
destroying the submarine missile-carriers in the theater or
its separate operational axes), and also to safeguard our
strike submarines and surface ships from strikes by enemy
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multi-purpose submarines. In this matter, the indicated
purposes can only be achieved as a consequence of resolute
actions by antisubmarine forces from the beginning of the
war, with the indispensable condition of having established
contact beforehand with the submarine enemy.
The component elements of an independent operation
combatting submarines, united by a common concept and plan,
might be: the joint and independent actions of
antisubmarine forces of the Navy to destroy all enemy
submarines discovered and being pursued; the delivery of
nuclear strikes by missile submarines, naval missile-
carrying aviation, and long-range aviation (exploiting the
results of the actions of strategic rocket forces) against
installations for the basing, construction, support, and
control of the enemy submarine forces in the theater; the
actions of antimissile defense forces to destroy
submarine-launched missiles; and the combat actions of
forces of the Navy, and, in part, of forces of Air Defense
and of the maritime front, in support of the operation.
The scope of the operation will be determined by its
scale and purposes. Depending on the scope, the operation
may be conducted by missile and antisubmarine atomic
submarines throughout the entire expanse of the theater, and
by large units and units of antisubmarine, naval missile-
carrying, and long-range aviation at the maximum radius of
operation of the aircraft.
An operation to combat submarines will obviously be the
fastest moving of all operations naval forces of a fleet
have to carry out.
Thwarting the initial nuclear strike of enemy
submarines, when they are being tracked, is possible during
the first tens of minutes of the war. The subsequent
destruction of all submarine groupings discovered will most
likely require not more than two or three days (since, as is
known, the enemy plans to carry out his strikes by strategic
means within a period of three days).
At the same time, it would be incorrect to fit the
entire combat against submarines into the form of an
operation alone. Even after its successful accomplishment,
there can be no guarantee that individual surviving enemy
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submarine missile-carriers will not deliver strikes against
our installations.
Therefore, the second form of use of the antisubmarine
forces of the Navy might be in systematic (day-to-day)
combat actions, in accordance with a previously outlined
plan, providing also for the achievement of resolute
purposes. We should assume that, in contrast with an
operation, such actions by antisubmarine forces will most
often be independent in nature in the zones or areas
allotted to them.
Upon examining the actions of aviation in combat
against missile submarines, it is necessary to emphasize
aviation's special, if one may speak in that way, role in
this combat.
First of all, these actions are characterized by great
spatial scope, since the search for submarines will take
place at great distances from base airfields, on several
axes and in many areas at the same time. And this will
require from aviation a state of high combat readiness and
the carrying out of the maneuvering of its forces between
theaters, will call for a great number of daily combat
sorties, will make it necessary for bases to be organized
near the areas of forthcoming actions, and will require that
new airfields be equipped and that the appropriate aviation-
engineer support and material-technical support be organized
at them.
Apart from this, in providing for immediate and
resolute actions of antisubmarine aviation at the beginning
of the war, it will be necessary while still in peacetime to
enlist a considerable portion of the forces of this aviation
in combat duty, jointly with antisubmarine submarines and
surface ships. Only in this .case will continuous and direct
contact with every enemy missile submarine be possible.
The inherent characteristics of searching and tracking
submarines at sea require the use of aircraft operating at
medium and low altitudes. In connection with this, the
ground control of aircraft becomes considerably complicated,
especially at great distances. The accuracy of air
navigation is decreased and piloting technique becomes more
complicated. That being the case, the greatest difficulties .
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arise when supporting the actions of antisubmarine aviation
in Arctic areas.*
The features enumerated give rise to specific demands
for the creation of antisubmarine aircraft equipment, for
weapons, and for flight personnel training, etc. The
present condition of antisubmarine aviation permits it to
merely participate in an operation to destroy
missile-carrying submarines which is carried out by the
joint efforts of all antisubmarine forces.
In our opinion, we can consider as an independent form
of use of antisubmarine aviation both its conduct of
systematic combat actions and, in peacetime, its
participation in the carrying out of combat duty. In so
doing, aviation can act jointly with other antisubmarine
forces. /n the latter case, its cooperation with the
antisubmarine submarines will most frequently be of an
operational nature (because of the lack of reliable means of
mutual identification and of communications with each
other). As regards the cooperation of aviation with
antisubmarine surface ships, it will, in most instances, be
of a tactical nature, consisting of mutual guidance and the
maintenance of contact with the underwater target until it
is destroyed.
Regarding the conduct by antisubmarine aviation of an
independent operation for combatting enemy submarines, such
an operation will obviously be possible in the event that
antisubmarine aviation receives long-range aircraft.
From what has been set forth above, it is evident that
upon antisubmarine aviation will fall the responsibility for
accomplishing most of the tasks pertaining to combat against
missile submarines at sea. This creates the need for a
quantitative increase of this aviation, for its qualitative
improvement, and for research and development in suitable
methods of using it.
* For example, complex hydrometeoroloqical and ice
conditions frequently hamper, and sometimes even prevent,
the use of some technical means for air navigation and
searching for submarines.
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The basic principle, laid down as the basis for not
only the operational but also for the tactical use of
antisubmarine aviation, is to achieve a monitoring
capability in all the areas where enemy submarines are
searched for, detected, tracked, and destroyed. For this
purpose it is most advisable that in the areas adjoining our
coasts (including also the internal seas of closed theaters)
short-range antisubmarine aviation operate, and that in
remote zones of open ocean and sea theaters such a task will
be within the capability of long-range antisubmarine
aviation.
The operational structure of aviation forces should
allow for their most effective use, taking into
consideration the concept and plan of the operation.
Here, several variants are possible, depending on the
composition of our own forces and the scale of the
operation. Thus, the composition of forces which is to
accomplish the primary tasks and the operation may include
these groupings: for the searching, tracking, and
destroying of enemy missile submarines in remote areas; for
the accomplishment of the same tasks, but primarily against
multi-purpose submarines near our coasts; for actions
against missile submarines located in areas of oceans beyond
the limits of countries bordering our own, by high-speed and
low-altitude, long-range antisubmarine aircraft, capable of
crossing continental air defenses with the least losses; and
finally, for support of the actions of our submarines, for
destroying enemy submarines in their bases and also the
shore means supporting them, and for laying minefields.
While still in peacetime, all of the required groupings
of aviation forces should be established, should work out
their intrinsic tasks, and should be in constant readiness.
In the course of systematic combat actions,
antisubmarine aviation may fulfil all of the tasks
enumerated above or only apart of them, depending on the
situation. When searching for submarines, this aviation
operates in combat formations which include groups or single
aircraft (helicopters) for support, search groups, search
and strike groups, or strike groups. Search and strike
groups are the most effective since they are capable of
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destroying submarines immediately upon detecting them or
upon receiving the order to do so.
The intense dynamism of the operations and combat
actions of aviation against submarines, their great spatial
scope, and the need for concentrating efforts on the main
axes and for organizing cooperation with the other arms of
the forces assisting in the accomplishment of the main task,
require centralized control. Such control also ensures
maintenance of the aviation in a high state of combat
readiness, more correct planning of its use, and continuity
of the control of large units and units of aviation.
We believe that on the scale of a single fleet, the
commander of aviation of the fleet should exercise direct
control over antisubmarine aviation in an operation and
during systematic combat actions, on the basis of tasks
received from the fleet commander.
When the forces of the aviation of two or more fleets
are engaged in simultaneous actions, and also when the
composition of the aviation includes aircraft capable of
conducting sorties over all of the principal remote ocean
areas,'it is advisable that direct control be assigned to
the Commander of Aviation of the Navy, on the basis of the
tasks and plan of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
A certain amount of decentralized control over the
forces of aviation, for example, when they are operating on
isolated operational axes of very extensive sea theaters is
not excluded.
In conclusion, we will note that the contents of this
article far from exhaust all of the questions pertaining to
the problem of combat against the submarine missile/nuclear
danger. This subject requires further theoretical research
and the verification of a number of propositions in the
course of operational and combat training. Therefore,
discussion of it in our military press will facilitate the
development of correct views on the use of the various
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branches and arms of branches of the armed forces in
accomplishing this important task.
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