SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: SOVIET CAPABILITIES
• Keywords: STRATEGIC ATTACK
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001183878
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2011
• Case Number: F-2004-01080
• Publication Date: March 13, 1967

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
ET
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
NATIONAL: INTELLIGENCE -ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-8-66
NIE 11 8 fib
1`3 March 1967
Soviet Capabilities For =3~trategic -~td,
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
The sensitivity of this document requires t e handled ximum security precautions on a
need-to-know basis.. Recipients sure that only personnel -having all pro ..gearances and a need
to-know will have to this document.
Submitted, by
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 05-11-2011
Authenticated:
DIRECTOR OF-, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred, in by the,
,UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE "BOARD
As indicated overleaf
13 March" 1967 ~`
ING CUTIVE S~Cf#TIARY, USIB<
mffi
Pages 5
Copy No, ;.
 RET
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation' of this estimates
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart=
ments of State, Defense, and the; NSA.,
Concurring:
Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Deputy' Director" of Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of, Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence" Agency
Dr. Charles H Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, 'Atomic Energy?
Commission
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency
Abstaining:
Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
current contains information
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 SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR
STRATEGIC ATTACK
NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders is prompted by a recent review of
Soviet submarine order-of-battle which requires us to change the
judgments made in NIE 11-8-66, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic
Attack," dated 20 October 1966, TOP SECRET, ALL SOURCE,
RESTRICTED DATA, LIMITED DISTRIBUTION, on the size and
composition of the Soviet missile submarine force.
DISCUSSION
1. In NIE 11-8-66, we estimated that as of 1 October 1966 the
Soviet missile submarine force had some 45 ballistic missile submarines
(8-10 nuclear-powered) with a total of about 130 launchers, and an
equal number of cruise missile units (21-23 nuclear-powered) with
about 250 launchers.
2. A recent review of Soviet submarine order-of-battle indicates
that as of 1 October 1966 there were 36 ballistic missile submarines
in the Soviet Navy (7 of them nuclear-powered) with a total of about
100 launchers. The cruise missile submarine force-whose primary
mission is to counter naval task forces-was found to have a slightly
greater number of units than previously estimated, and a greater pro-
portion of nuclear-powered units. Since the latter are equipped with
more missile launchers than the diesel-powered boats, approximately
265 launchers (rather than 250) were found to be in the cruise missile
submarine force.
3. We continue to believe that a new type of ballistic missile sub-
marine will enter service by mid-1968. Since fewer ballistic missile
submarines are now operational than previously estimated, however,
our projection of the number of such units which will be operational
in 1976 has been reduced from some 60-70 to about 55-65. There
is no change in our estimate of the total number of cruise missile sub-
TO-P-S?C RJET
 2 TO RET
marines for 1976 (i.e., 55-65 units) but we believe the proportion of
nuclear submarines in. the cruise missile force will be somewhat higher
at that time (i.e., about 45 out of 60, rather than 40 or so out of 60).
4. A new table listing the estimated Soviet missile submarine
strength for 1966 through 1968 follows. The new table supersedes that
in Section IV of NIE 11-8-66.
ESTIMATE]) SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINE STRENGTH, 1966-1968
1 OCT 1966
MID-1967
MID-1968
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Nuclear
II-I (3 tubes)
3
2-1
1-0
11-I1 (3 tubes) ........................
4
5-6
6-7
New class (8 or more tubes) ............
0
0
1
Subtotal ............................
7
7
8
Diesel
Z-Conversion (2 tubes) ................
6
6
6
G-I (3 tubes) .........................
22
22
22-20
G-II (2 tubes) ........................
1
1
1-3
Subtotal ............................
29
29
29
TOTAL Ballistic Missile Submarines .........
36
36
37
Cruise Missile Submarines
Nuclear
E-I (6 tubes) ......................... 5
5
5
E-II (8 tubes) 20-21
24-25
28-29
Subtotal ............................ 25-26
29-30
33-34
Diesel
W-Conversion (1 to 4 tubes) ............ 13
13
13
J-Class (4 tubes) ...................... 7-10
9-12
11-15
Subtotal ............................ 20-23
22-25
24-28
TOTAI. Cruise Missile Submarines .......... 45-49
51-55
57-62
5. In addition, the final sentence of the last paragraph of Section
VII A of NIE 11-8-66 should be deleted and replaced by the following:
In any case, we believe we could identify a MOBS sometime
during its test program which would probably extend over a year
or two. If the Soviets follow established test procedures, identi-
fication is likely to occur about a year prior to attainment of an '
accurate, reliable system.
(NOTE: Paragraphs 1-4 approved by USIB-13 March 1967
Paragraph 5 approved by USIB-2 March 1967)
TO RET
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
,1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient" and of persons under his jurisdiction 6na
need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the
following officials within their respective departments:-
d.
f.
g.
h.
i.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients inay'
arrangement with the Office of National Estimates, CIA.
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of -'the Army, for the
Defense and the organization,of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary
Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (intelligence), for the Department of the
Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the A
Force
Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
Director of National Estimates, CIA,-- for any other Department or" A
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security 'regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence -Agency by
retain it for a period not: in excess of one year. At the end of this? period, the
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be cla.ssi-
IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
mission should be requested of the forwarding - agency to retain it in accordance with
document should either be destroyed, , returned to the forwarding agency,' or;. per
fled: T
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security' Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation