MEMORANDUM FROM DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HELMS TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (KISSINGER)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001175765
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-01229
• Publication Date: March 23, 1970

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Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger) n
Washington, March 23, 1970.
3ox5o6,
`. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files 'ACountry Files,
Far East, Cambodia, Vol. II, September 1969-9 April 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.
See footnote 1, Document ~~ (memo-;-HAKK-to RN, V-1-9/70,re Cambodia)
14
V There is a check next to this paragraph.
There is a check next to this paragraph.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
APPROVED
FOR
RELEASE^
DATE:
17-Mar-2010
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Proposals to Sustain the Present
Regime in Cambodia
1. On 22 March 1970, General Haig forwarded your request
for a plan to sustain the present regime in Cambodia.. We have
2
outlined below a series of recommendations which we believe would
assist in this objective. These are necessarily somewhat tentative
in nature as our intelligence on the internal situation in Cambodia
is not solid enough as yet to permit us firm judgments. We also
make several suestions for action by th . "Departmnt of State
since we understand your query hasnotbeen addressed to any
other . a ency.
2. In essence we believe the core of any strategy devised
to maintain the present government in power should consist of two
elements:
a. Overtly, to the greatest extent possible,
the present Cambodian Government should attempt to
maintain a stance of neutrality. This is a course
along which the present leadership is already embarked
and is one to gain the maximum of international sympathy.
b. Covertly, we should work to support and
sustain the present Cambodian Government by supporting
its military effort against the Viet Cong in Cambodia and
shoring up its position by the provision of coverts economic
and political support.
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This course, if it could be successfully pursued, seems to us the
most likely to preserve the present regime against- what will
almost surely be a determined effort by the North Vietnamese
backed by Communist China and the USSR to unseat it.
3. We have some covert channels to the present government
which could be used to develo detailed plans
for clandestine assistance.
2
[Here follows discussion of CIA's intelligence sources in Cambodia.]
4. Our current information on the exact balance of forces
in Cambodia -- information which would be essential to formulating
realistic plans -- is thin. We have in the past concentrated on
attempting to detail North Vietnamese use of Cambodia as a channel
for shipment of arms and other supplies to the Viet Cong. Considerable
progress has been made in this collection effort particularly over the
past year, but as a result we have not tasked our agents with reporting
in depth on the Cambodian political scene.
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5. As initial steps. in determining the best way to support
the current regime, we believe we should send a senior CIA official
on a discreet trip to Cambodia to make clandestine contact with our
better placed agents. This would yield not only immediate intelligence
on the situation there but would also reassure the leaders of the
present government that the U. S. intends to provide them with
discreet assistance.. We think at the same time, we should move
forward with all speed to re-establish a CIA Station in Phnom Penh
with reliable communications by means of which on a timely fashion,
we can report intelli en d
c
soon as possible to Phnom Penh on a trip to make
contact with
g
e an convey messages to our agents and
the Cambodian Government.
6. The most immediate pressing need of the Cambodian
Government will almost certainly be military assistance. We
assume that the Chinese and Soviets will suspend military aid
until the present government makes drastic concessions or is
overthrown by one more friendly to the Communists. In these
circumstances the Cambodian leadership will need desperately
an alternative supply of military weapons. There are Cambodian
airfields to which deliveries could be ,made clandestinely by
aircraft flying out of Thailand and South Vietnam. They will
also almost certainly need some sort of economic assistance
and some quiet political help. All three of these aspects could
be explored with our contacts.
7. In summary, we recommend the following steps:
a. We send an experienced Agency officer as
controlled agents
within the Cambodian Government. This officer
would collect information on the current situation
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and could convey such assurances as you wish to the
new leadership.
b. Establish a CIA Station in Phnom Penh with
rapid and secure radio communications to replace the
present commercial channels used by the Embassy.
? c. Issue a United States Government statement
supporting independence and neutrality of Cambodia and
expressing sympathy with the Cambodian efforts to
remove North Vietnamese intruding troops from their
soil.
d. Develop a worldwide clandestine propaganda
effort to support the present government and call
attention to the flagrant violation of Cambodian territory
by the North Vietnamese. Also seek to discredit
Sihanouk's effort to create a government in exile. .-
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8. Providing Cambodia's response to our effort is positive,
we recommend the following additional steps:
a. Develop a clandestine airlift to supply the
Cambodian Army with necessary weapons.
b. Develop a clandestine combat control center
to coordinate Cambodian military activities with the
allied military effort.
c. Provide financial assistance to the new govern-
d. Through diplomatic means stimulate inter-
national support for the new regime. Encourage Thailand
 0
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to re-establish diplomatic relations With Cam.
Pursuade South Vietnam to issue a declaration breco
Cambodia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Pursuade gnizing
governments which have not yet recognized
the nev regime to do so.
9. The above is a quick response to you'rre ues
believe these suggestions have merit we can flesh the
q t? If you
detail.
m out in mor e
Richard Helms
Director