Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011750 TEXT OF CIA REPORT C Tuesday, February 2 , 1968 i.sc0C-4) SUBJECT: Viet-Cong General Offensive Plans for Dan.ang, .Hue, Quang Tri and Other Centers in Viet Cong Military Region 5 The following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong prisoner E 51\ 0.. N.0. D. 1 49 From briefings he received during November-Decernb-e-r- 1967,E \` learned that the Viet Cong planned to take the following steps in Dana.7.1-g City in connection with the projected general offensive: A. Besiege the city and prevent resources from entering it. B. Wage a war of nerves against the city. C. Attack the airfield by rockets to blockade Government of Vietnam and -allied troops within the city. D. Increase shelling of the airfield should allied troops provide only artillery and air support for Government of-Vietnam troops and try to protect their own bases. � E. Should allied troops be deployed to reirforce Government of Vietnam troops, retreat from the city and try to besiege the surrounding area while awaiting the outcome of the IQie Sanh and western highlands (Pleiku-Konturn) battlefields. The Viet Gong would then launch a general Offensive or ask for negotiations, depending on their position. 3 indications of a general offensive on Da.nang were to be: The shelling of Danang and.1N-hon. Nuoc airfields for two consecutive nights; the shelling of fuel storage fa.cilities, I Corps headquarters, and ordnance installations; and attacks by Sapper Battalion 2 on the Lien Chieu fuel storage area, the Nam 0 bridge, and ships moored in the Hoa Khan.h area. Viet Gong forces reserved for the offensive against Dan.an.g would be one regiment of the North Vietnamese army 2nd division (the other two regiments would be held for possible use in a very decisive battle), one mobile battalion of the Quan.g Nam Province main forces, one Sapper element, and newly infiltrated Regiment 31 of�North Vietnamese Army 341st division. 1.840C.4) Hue, Viet Cong forces were to overrun the city and to hold it by all means. I:E attacked by Government of Vietnam/allied forces, they were to move fro= one house to another but were not to-be allowed to retreat- from the city, even ii this meant-the sacrifice-of the entire regiment. Thus, the Viet Cong forces would have to hold Hue until the battle broke-out in the Ba.-_e San': area, the Pleiku-Konturn area or the Saigon area. 3 pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011750 Approved f r Rol a Date Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011750 _ 1:1 uang Tri Province, the Viet Cong/North. Vietnamese Army planned to-eliminate the Lang Vei post: as a means to lure the U.sS. into concentrating all of its power-- artillery, marines, aircraft�in the Khe Sanh area. When the plan had worked out properly, the Viet Cong planned to launch a decisive battle in either the Pleiku- Konturn area or the Saigon area. Once this was begun, the Viet-Cong would then shell the airfields. One regiment would attack Quang Tri City and try to hold it at all costs. 1. 3(0(4) in other areas of Viet Gong military region 5, specifically in the provincial capitals where the allies are weak and have no large military bases such as Hoi An, Tam Ky, Bong Son, Hue and Kontum, the Viet Cong planned to use military forces to liberate the people; in the strongly defended cities, the Viet Cong would employ political means as the main force, although they would also fight militarily if possible. 1.3(060 3 If Government of Vietnam/allied :troops wish to fight successfully against the Viet Cong attack on Da.nang, they must helilift their troops behind Viet Con:- lines and attack from the re-ar. They should outnumber the Viet Gong three to one and be prepared to fight not only the Viet Cong retreating from the city but also the Viet Cong reserve forces trying to penetrate the city. At the present time, Government of Vietnam regular forces should be used to conduct- operations to observe and discover the movement of Viet Cong units and front line laborers. At the same time, the Government of Vietnam troops should be allowed to rest and recuperate so as to be prepared for the � c o.naing decisive battle.) 3 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011750

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VIET CONG GENERAL OFFENSIVE PLANS FOR DANANG, HUE, QUANG TRI AND OTHER C ENTERS IN VIET CONG MILITARY REGION 5