Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 � .:�:.; , . �. � "1.4*. ' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ..�:*:* i Intelligence Information Cable i'e ) PAGE 10F/0 PAGES STATE/1R DIA NMCC/MC lat.MtIK X1424 AIIMY WAVY AMI, CIA/mmcc AnYOCXXXY4W MDO MIltaX %SIMS< jet:44 STATE/DIR MIC (HENDRICKSON ONLY) r Exo 0/NE 001 MC X KIM* XMOSIX XXXII XX11)XXFSPPX ::: ' � e� � � . ��.* ..:::. _ , = . _ THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. CI -- TE TOESDB-315/00518-68 .*:�.. - � � - - GM 12 FEBRUARY 1968 ..,.�, COUNTRY SOUTH V ,ETNAM .�� C.C., DOI 12 FEBRUARY 1968 . -' � 1 SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL: ANALYSIS OF VIET CONS TET OFFENSIVE ......% � I. � ::�:�.. ACQ SOURCE , I � INTIVARY: TEE OBJECYIVIa3 OF THE VIET COG (VC) OFFEITSIFE 103IC TO Dzsztox 71.as GvIVALL= fORCES, =Mit covER:acur or vreacke ;Gm) GovEsmeita, STRUCTURE, CREATE A C.M1ERAL IMILS711:14 ANDESTABL/SE REVOLUZIORARY GOVNRIRCHT DOMINATED BY TM NAT/0111. ussittrver YR= (rap). TEE ITO FAILED IN THESE OBJECTIVES IN NEAT APPEARS TO BE U ALIVOST DIMS= NESCALCAZATION CV TEEM OWN _ I _ _ 101.1UARY CAPABILITIES A= TEE. SUPPORT TREE ROMP GE! FROM TM PEOPLE. PERHAPS MORE TITAN RALF TM ire rosaas USED nr THE OFFEUE1VE RAVE DEMI KILLED. EsvErerazuss, 5 4 31C 'WAS .t.3 DeRESSIVZ DISPLAY Ce STRENGTH THAT 116'ITED A PSYCROLOGICAL rscroar 3 2 2 1 A ..roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 IN ' TDCS DB-315/00518-68 PAGE 2 OP-2-2 PAGES A2E00, DEALT THE PACIFICATIONPROGRJUW A SERIOUS BLAU,-AO CREATED PROBLEMS THAT WELL OCCUPY THE GOMITE/TFCE MAY /MONTHS. THE mixer SMATEGY ENVISIONED A TWO-PHASE ATTACK; LOCAL FORCES WERE USED LAW= IN THE FIRST-PHASE WITHITC/NZA. MAIN FORCES LARGELY REID FOR THE SECOND. THE PASSIVE RES.T.W2ANCE OF THE PEOPLE PLUS THE FIERCE REACTION FCECED CANCELLATION OF THE SECS/ PHASE WHICH IS smr,L AVAILABLE FOR NEW ATTACKS WEMCH ARE EXPECTED. ALTHOUGH WEAKENED BY HIS LOSSES, THE Lilt II IS NCT ON TEE VERGE CF OESPERATION A/D HE COULD COT EIS 'haVSES BY MORT TO THE MORE TRADITIONAL HARASSING ATTACKS, ALTHOUGH TH/S MGM LOWER MULE ILI HIS RANKS. PACIFICATION IS SET PACK ARD /T WILL BE MANY MONTHS nem THE 003FIDEl10E OF THEPEOPLE IN THE PREVIOUSLY SECURED MOMS CAN RE RESTORED. 121D SUMMARY. 1. THE YEAR OF THE MONKEY HAD AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING FOR THETEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS THE VC/NVA FORCES VIOLATED THE SACRED TET HOLIDAYS AND LAUNCHED VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS AGAINST 36 PROVINCE CAPITALS, FIVE OF THE SIXAUTONOMDUS CITIES, AND NUMEROUS OTHER POPULATION CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THEIR OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS -- TO DESTROY OR SUBVERT THE GVN/ALLIED FORCES, 5 5 4 ELIMINATE THE GVN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, CREATE A GENERAL UPRISING AMDNG THE 4 3 3 , 2 PEOPLE, AND ESTABLISH A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE NATIONAL . 2 1 1 � --;*711Atitrict.1�; ' \ LiStai ,stalas�-scamso* t4sit. At . _ A..roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 � � IN TDCS DB-315/0o8 -6B , PAGE 3 OF PAGES. r � oun,,teatictro eammeiropontirsiasmalmear. LIBERATION FRONT. IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ALMOST INCREDIBLE MISCALCULATION OF THEIRL , OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THEY COULD COMMAND FOOM TfiErPEOPLE, THE COMMUNISTS FAILED TO ACHIEVE THESE STATED OBJECTIVES. IT HAS COST THEM DEARLY IN. MANPOWER -- IN 12 DAYS SOME 31,000 KILLED, 5,700 DETAINED, PROBABLY ANOTHER 10,000 DEAD FROM WOUNDS, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER DEAD rRum AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES -- A TOTAL PROBABLY AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN HALF OF THE FORCES USED IN THIS ATTACK. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENEMY'S WELL-PLANNED, COORDINATED SERIES OF ATTACKS WAS AN IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF STRENGTH WHICH HAS GIVEN HIM A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ABROAD, DEALT A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, AND CREATED PROBLEMS THAT WILL TAX THE ENERGIES AND RESOURCES or THE GOVERNMENT FOR MANY MONTHS TO COME. 2. THE ENEMY'S MILITARY STRATEGY CONSISTED OF A Th-PHASE OFFENSIVE. WHEREVER POSSIBLE, THE FIRST PhASE ASSAULTS WERE CONDUCTED BY VC LOCAL FORCES. PSYCHOLOGICALLY, THIS WAS MDRE APPROPRIATE THAN USING NVA UNITS, GIVEN THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVE OF WINNING THE SUPPORT OF. THE PEOPLE. VNA FORCES WERE USED IN I AND It CORPS WHERE VC FORCES WERE INADEQUATE, BST THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY YOST VC/NVA MAIN FORCES WERE WITHHELD Fun THE SECOND PHASE WHEN THEY WOULD I4NE IN TO CAPITALIZE ON THE EXPECTED OHAOS AND GENERAL :UPRISING. � 3. THE PASSIVE REACTION OF THE POPULATION, THE FIERCENESS OF THE FREE WORLD AND ARVN COUNTEROFFENSIVES AFTER THE INITIAL SURPRISE AND CONFUSION, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 5 5 4 MASSIVE AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE OBVIOUSLY FORCED CANCELLATION OF THE COMMITMENT � 4 3 � 3 2 OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SLIGHTLY LESS THAN HALF OF THE 2 ea tl 100 11.1,1111.111.11111"11111111114"1111110111110481aidiss _ A roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 IN TDC-EDB-315/00518-68 'PAGE 4 .- PAGES mansmirmainniar letassfficarloo) I ,Lnem eon 131 � ENEMY'S MAIN FORCE MANEUVER UNITS OUTSIDE OF TuCiE IN THESMZ, WI' WELL OVER HALF OF HIS LOCAL FO Rr: UNITS, PARTICIPATE(' IN THE ATTACKS. THUS, HE STILL HAS SUBSTANTIAL UNCOMIITTED FORCES AVAILABLE FOR A NEW "SECOND PHASE" ATTACK, 4. IN SPITE OF THE ENEMY'S HEAVY LOSSES, HE APPARENTLY STILL PLANS A RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE ON A LARGE SCALE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE FAILURE OF COMMITTED FORCES TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY TO SAFEHAVENS AND CURRENT DISPOSITION OF PREVIOUSLY UNCOMMITTED UNITS LEND CREDENCE TO PRISONERS' STATEMENTS THAT THE SECOND PHASE OFFENSIVE WILL SOON BE INITIATED. ALTHOUGH THE VC/NVA MAIN FORCES WOULD SUPPOSEDLY OE BETTER EQUIPPED, TRAINED, AND DISCIPLINED THAN THE PRIMARILY LOW-LEVEL TROOPS (CANNON FODDER) WHICH LAUNCHED THE FIRST OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY HAS LOST THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, DOES NOT HAVE 111E COVER OF A TEl TRUCE, AND HAS ALREADY EXPENDED A GREAT DEAL IN THE WAY OF MEN AND MATERIEL. THE CONSEQUENCE OF A SECOND "ALL-OUT" SERIES OF ATTACKS MOULD.PROBABLY BE AS WISASTROUS MILITARILY AS THE FIRST PHASE. IF, INDEED, THE ENEMY IS PREPARING FOR LARGE- SCALE ATTACKS AT KHE SANK, WANG TRI, HUE, DANANG, OAK TO, PHY MY, TUY RDA, SAIGON, CAN THO, AND MY THO, THEN HE MJST STRIKE QUICKLY. THOUGH STRETCHED THIN, ALLIED FORCES HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR' GAINS, REGROUPED, AND INITIATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY'S MASSED MAIN FORCES WITH NOTABLE SUCCESS. AS TIME PASSES, HIS POSITION IS �BECOMING MORE TENUOUS AND THERE WILL BE LESS AND LESS OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE HIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES. 5 5 4 5: AtTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED, HE IS NOT ON THE VERGE 4 3 3 1 2 OF DESPERATION. HE HAS OVER HALF OF HIS MAIN FORCES-BATALLY'laNTAIITH MORE/T-72 1. H o ed for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 � IN TOCSD3-315/00518 -58 PAGE 5 CW .L PAGES relassittea famon centres/ I MEN AND MATERIEL ENROUTE OR AVAILABLE FROM NVN. HE HAS TAKEN SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES IN THE PAST AND SHOWN AN AMAZING DEGEE OF RESILIENCY. 04 THE OTHER HAND, HIS LOGISTICS AND RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS WILL BE GREATLY INCREASED WITH SUCH HEAVY LOSSES FROM THE LOCAL AND GUERRILLA FOPCES L.110 PROVIDE MANPOWER FOR SUPPORT AND COMBAT. 6. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A SECOND ASSAULT AGAINST THE CITIES, THE ENEMY COULD ELECT TO CUT HIS LOSSES BY REVERTING TO MORE TRADITIONAL HARASSING. ATTACKS WHILE ATTEMPT- ING TO IMPROVE HIS POSITION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE RECENT WELLCOORDINATEC ATTACKS OVER WIDESPREAD AREAS PROVED THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE THIS TACTIC. SUCH V:TACKS ON � A SMALLER SCALE WOULD STILL GAIN HEADLINES AND HAVE CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPEAL AND VALU.: TO THR ENEMY AS THEY RERAISE QUESTIONS IM SVN AND THE WORLD AS TO THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO THE PEOPLE. HOWEVER, AFTER SUCH EXTENSIVE INDOCTRIN- ATION ON THE INEVITABILITY OF IMMINENT VICTORY, A REVERSION TO ESSENTIALLY GUERRILLA � WARFARE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS OF MORALE AMONG THE CADRES AND A LOSS OF � IMPETUS FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY EFFORT,' 7. IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO MAKE A FIRM ASSESSMENT OF 1HE DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN CAUSED TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, an IT PROBABLY HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE. THE PACIFIED � AREAS DID NOT AT LEAST INITIALLY. APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A PRIORITY TARGET, PROBABLY BECAUSE VAST OF THE VC GUERRILLAS WERE DRAWN INTO LOCAL FORCE UNITS.FOR:THE CITY BATTLES OR WERE ENGAGED IN INTERDICTING LOCS. HOWEVER, GVN FORCES PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE PACIFIED .5 5 � 4 AREAS AND THE RD TEAMS WERE IN MANY CASES WITHDRAWN TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF 4 3 3 2 URBAN AREAS, LEAVING THE VC FREE TO PENETRATE PREVIOUSLY SECURED HAMLETS kyo 2 man.� oeanojallanaaIPIIIIIISIMIIIIIIIIIII."lilleaillihlf"MWIS oved for Release 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 IN . TDCsDB-315/0C618-68 PAGE 6 OF RAGES (elanOleatkm) (elnan centrals) CONDUCT PROPAGANDA, RECRUIT, ACQUIRE FOOD, ELIMINATE THE GVN ADMINISTRATION, AND OCCASIONALLY TERRORIZE THE POPULATION, THE IMPACT OF THE VC PRESENCE WAS ESPECIALLY SEVERE IN THE LARGER HAMLETS WHICH GENE .1 ARE LOCATED CLOSE TO THE POPULATION CENTERS AND WERE ON THE VC ROUTE OF ENTRY. THIS ACTIVITY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PART OF THE 'URGE REFUGEE FLOW INTO THE CITIES. 8. WITH MANY OF THE CITIES IN SHAMBLES AND REQUIRING PRIORITY REO3NSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION EFFORTS, THE DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM AL13ST INEVITABLY WI LL SUFFER. IN ANY EVENT, IT W iLL BE MANY MONTHS BEFORE THE PONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE PREVIOUSLY SECURED HAMLETS CAN BE RESTORED, SOME OF WrIrrl FELT THE VC PRESENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME. ONE POSSIBLY HOPEFUL SIGN IS THAT MANY OF THE VC EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE RELATIVE PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GVN AREAS, CONTRARY TO WHAT THEY;HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE MILITARY DEFEAT AND HEAVY LOSSES, SWUM CONTRIBUTE TO SOME FUTURE DEFECTIONS. 9. THERE HAS NATURALLY BEEN A MIXED REACTION From THE PEOPLE TO THE COM-311ST ONSLAUGHT INITIALLY, IT WAS ONE OF SHOCK AT THE STRENGTH OF THE ATTACK: AND ANGER AT ITS PERFIDY. HOWEVER, EVEN THOSE SKEPTICS WHO WOULD NOT PREVIOUSLY ACKNC9W1GE THAT THE LARGE ELECTORAL TURNOUTS, THE INAS! LITY OF THE VC TO GET A RESPONSE TO CALLS FOR A GENERAL STRIKE, AND THE AWDST TOTALLY CONSCRIPT NATURE OF 'THE VC FORCES WERE PROOF THAT THE VC LACKED POPULAR SUPPORT, CAN HARDLY DENY IT NOW DESPITE THE CREATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY 5 5 4 ADMINISTRATION, SUPPOSEDLY UNTAINTED BY ASSOCIATION WI-TH !TIETLFIN0 SIGMFICANT '4- I 3 3 2 ELEMENT OF THE POPULATION OR OF THE.AILMED FORCES DEFECTED,' WiliKVEPORESOntiM "TO 1 A ..roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 � felaselleatfat) (dOsem controls) � �� IN TDCSDB -315/00518 -66 PAGE 7 CW ;PAGES PEOPLE TO RESPOND TO THE VC CALL FOR AN UPRISING, AND IN FACT OFTEN' TO RENDER ASSISTANCE � TO THE GOVERNMENT FORCES, WAS THE KEY TO THE FAILURE or THE VC PLAN, AND IS ONE OF THE MOST ENCOURAGING ASPECTS OF THE WHOLE AFFAIR. 10. THERE ARE NEGATIVE FACTORS, OF COURSE " THE PEOPLE NOW HAVE A GREATER RESPECT FORME CAPABILITIES OF THE VC, AND THIS WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN SOME CASES iN A MORE CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD OPEN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. THERE IS CRITICISM OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF PREPAREDNESS, CHARGES OF EXCESSIVE PROPERTY DAMAGE AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND LOOTING BY THE COUNTERREACTION FORCES, AND A PERSISTENT BELIEF THAT SOMEHOW THE UNITED STATES WAS IN COLLUSION WITH THE VC. HOWEVER: THE POPULATION IS UNIVERSALLY ANGRY AT THE VC FOR VIOLATING EOTH A SACRED HOLIDAY AND THEIR.OWW TRUCE, AND THE BLAME FOR ALL OF THE ILLS. IS GENERALLY PLACED ON THE VC. !HERE WAS LEFT NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE AS TO THE SUPERIORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT FORCES An AS TO WHO WON THIS ENGAGEMENT. ON BALANCE, WE FEEL THAT IN THE CONTEST POR THE MINDS AND HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE, THE VC HAVE SO FAR SUFFERED A SEVER! LOSS. IN COWEN DANGER, THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO UNITE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT. WITH A RESIDUE OF la WILL TOWARD NE VC WHICH WILL NOT BE EASILY ERASED, THE TASK OF NATION-BUILDING, AT LEAST IN THOSE AREAS STILL UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, SHOULD BECOME A LITTLE EASIER. MUCH WILL:DEPEND, HDdEVER, ON THE SKILL AND ALACRITY WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HANDLES THE SEVERE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IT FACES. $ 5 4 11. THE DAYS AHEAD CONSTITUTE A SEVERE TEST FOR THE GVN. THERE IS NO 4 3 3 2 QUESTION BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT SUFFERED A SERIOUS LOSS OF PRESTIGE BY ITS 2 2 .spgeoparanumesiessolessisit sem contras) ' /11� 0 � A 'ati.....:C�0.4-1;.- A..roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 lh TDCS DB-315/00518-6B PAGE 8 Of PAGES (cleuslitcation) (Clanin cant.ots) INABILITY TO DEFEND ITS CITIES, NOTWITHSTANDING', THERE HAS,BEEN.ATFLEAST A TEMPORARY TENDENCY ON THE PART OF NATIONALIST LEMENTS TO SET ASIDE THEIR PAROCHIAL INTERESTS AND PALLY BEHIND THE_LEADERSHIP. THIS IS BY NO !CANS UNIVERSAL -- THE MILITANT BUDDHISTS, THE DAI ViETS, AND SOME OTHERS STILL HAVE REFUSED EITHER PUBLICLY TO CONDE*, THE VC OR TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY. ALTH3 IT WAS AN AMERICAN IDEA, CLEARLY THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT .SO FAR WAS THE CREATION OF THE :MINT VIETNAICSE/ AMERICAN TASK FORCE UNDER VICE PRESIDENT KY TO HANDLE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLDS OF REHABILIT- ATION. WHATEVER CLOSING OF RANKS BEHIND THE GOVEMMIT THAT HAS ACCRUED CAN BE CREDITED LARGELY TO KY, WHO HAS EMERGED AS THEHMAN 07 THE. HOUR." DESPITE AGSRAVATING AND BJREAU- : CRATIC PROBLOAS, SOME FoRdARD MDVDMENT HAS BEEN MADE IN RE-ESTABLISHIN3'ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES. KY MAY WELL HAVE SAVED THE GVN FROM PROJECTING ITS USUAL IMAGE .0F INACTIVITY. - 12. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT FUTURE POLITICAL PROULEMS. THE SCHISMS 14111CH DIVIDE THIS SOCIETY ARE DEEPLY ROOTED, MID WILL INEVITABLY ARISE AGAIN AS THE FIRST FLUSd OF . UNITY BEGINS TO FADE. DEMANDS WILL BE MADE FOR THE REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS: MTV NATIONAL AND LOCAL, WHO PROVED UNEQUAL TO THE TASK IN A CIRSIS, 4110 THIS WILL BE V.ERTAIN TO � RESTORE THE ENDEMtC FACTIONAL INTIMTING. THE MILITARY, SOI,E CF THE CATHOLICS, AND THOSE FAVORING A.ROUGH, OIRECTED SYSTEM WILL FAULT THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT BEING TOUGH ENOUGH, WHILE OTHERS WILL BE CONCERNED OVER EVEN THE TEMPORARY SACRIFICE OF DSHDCRATiC PROCESSES 5 5 � 4 AND THE CONTINUED PREEMINENT ROLE OF THE MILITARY. THE CRISIS HAS IGNITED A SPARK4 . 2 OF UNITY, BUT TO SUSTAIN IT WILL REQUIRE A SUCCESSFUL RELIEF AND RECOVERY_OPERAT1011.2 ftWASectem � A..roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 IN TDCSDB-315/00518-68 PACE 9 OF 10 PAGES (class(fication) (diners controts) AND A SUBLIMINATFON OF PERSONAL AND PARTISAN POLITICAL INTERSTS.WHIa4IMIS SOCIETY HAS NEVER BEFORE DEMONSTRATED. 13. THE COMMJNISTS CAN BE CREDITED WITH HAVING MAINTAINED EXCELENT SECJRITY FOR SL A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, BUT THEY ARE GUILTY: OF A MASSIVE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS AND INTERROGATIONS OF THE PRISONERS INVOLVED IN THE -RECENT ATTACKS INDICATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT THE VC DID INTEND TO TAKE AND HOLD THE CITIES, DID EXPECT A GENERAL UPRISING, AND DID PLAN TO INSTALL A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AS EVIDENCED BY THE PRESENCE OF A STANDBY VC ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN THE MAJOR CITIES. IT MAY SEEM INCREDIBLE THAT VC EXPECTATIONS SHOULD HAVE pEEN SO DIVORCED FROM REALITY, BIT THERE ARE THREE FACTORS WHICH PROBABLY EXPLAIN. THIS. FIRST, THE COMMUNISTS ARE ARC ALWAYS HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF THEIR DOCTRINE, AND IN THE PRESFR7 CASE THE ARTICLES OF FAITH WERE: "THE LONGER WE FIGHT, THE STRONGER WE BECOMES" AND, "THE YORE VICICUSLY THE ENEMY FIGHTS, THE CLOSER HE IS TO COLLAPSE;" AND, "THE PEOPLE SUPPORT US AND WHEN THE UR9AN PEOPLE HAVE THE CHANCE TO RISE UP, OUR VICTORY Will BE ASSuRED.� SECOND, THE LEADERS HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY AND GREATLY MISINFORMED. BY "OWER CADRES. GIVEN THE DOCTRINAL BIAS ALLUDED TO ABOVE AND THE ORIENTAL PENCHANT FOR TELLING-PEOPLE wHiT THEY WANT TO HEAR, THE REPORTS GOING UPdARD HAVE SO:MISINTERPRETED THE FACTS THAT THE LEADERS COULD NOT BASE THEIR DECISIOds'ON REALITY. THIRD, THE NEED FOR A 'SIGNIFICANT NelaoRy AFTER IWO YEARS OF DROUGHT MAY HAVE INTRODUCED A LACK OF PRUDENCE. BY ANY RATIONAL STAND i 5 5 ! 4- NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN LOSING TOO MUCH IN ORDER TO GAIN TOO LITTLE. FOR TOO LONG, 4 ; 3 3 2 VC STRDNIGTES AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN WINDLING. NC MIRE tiATURE.OF Tmc*Ar.>,;) .-Thr�nr2 relealtonlent A. 'roved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00009979 ; ' IN IDCS De.315/m518-68 PAGE 10 OF 10 PAGES amasinessimessmiseast (austficakm) (anem centre') ENTIRE ENVIRONMENT OF THE STRUGGLE, CHANGED WITH THE MASSIVE UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT. THE TET ASSAULT MUST HAVE BEEN PART OF AN EXPECTED VC PLAN TO INFLICT HEAVY PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE IN HOPE OF GAINING, IF NOT ALL THEIR OBJECTIVES, SOMETKING WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS A VICTORY. . IA. ME ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT WE HAVE PROBABLY SEEN ONLY THE FIRST"OF A TWO-ACT DRAMA. IF THE SECOND ACT REPEATS THE SCENARIO, WE WILL SERIOUSLY QUESTION THE ABILITY OF HANOI TO CONTINUE TO CARRY ON THIS KIND OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE FOR A PROTRACTED PERIOD. WHATEVER ELSE KAY FOLLOW, THE TEl OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, CONTRARY 10 MUCH FOREIGN OPINION, IS NOT POPULARLY REGARDED HERE EITHER AS A VC VICTORY OR EVEN AC AN INDICATION OF THEIR EVENTUAL SUCCESS. THERE IS A SOBERING THOUGHT FOR THE FUTURE, HOWEVER -- IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES, THE VC FLAY WOULD BE FtliNG OVER MUCH OF SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY. 15. it STATE USMACV 7TH AF DIR/JUSRAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC AkPAC PACAF PACFLT. ; 5 . 5 4 4 3. 3 2 2 felasr: !cat SOTO Min :t1 it4 roved for Release 2019/04/17 C00009979

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SITUATION APPRAISAL: ANALYSIS OF VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE