(EST PUB DATE) GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES, 1997

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: JALALABAD AUG 1996
• Keywords: KABUL SEPT 1996
• Keywords: BATTLE AND CAPTURE BY TALIBAN
• Keywords: MAZAR-I-SHARIF MAY 1997
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000771909
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00550
• Publication Date: April 1, 1997

3 T'eR
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 12-02-2008
-svertt-
NIE 97-3
April 1997
Global Humanitarian
Emergencies, 1997 (U)
 Global Humanitarian
Emergencies, 1997 (U)
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. (u)
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
'Suitt
April 1997
 Scope Note
This Estimate focuses on complex humanitarian emergencies-situations
in which armed conflict, government repression, and/or natural disasters
cause at least 300,000 civilians to depend on international humanitarian
assistance. Our definition includes those situations in which people also
need protection to facilitate their access to humanitarian aid. The Estimate
does not address situations in which the need for food or other aid is the
result of chronic conditions. (u)
Complex humanitarian emergencies generated by conflict often last for
years, during which large numbers of civilians flee-either within the
country, as internally displaced persons, or across international borders, as
refugees. Emergencies frequently are accompanied by the disruption of tra-
ditional food supply networks; fragile or failing economic, political, and
social institutions; population pressures; and environmental degradation.
(U)
To address the resulting needs, nongovernmental organizations, UN agen-
cies, other international institutions, and donor governments provide
humanitarian assistance. Although the bulk of humanitarian aid is food,
such aid may also include water and sanitation, shelter, medical care, and
assistance with landmine clearing. In some emergencies, military forces
provide security to ensure the delivery of aid and provide lift and transport
of relief supplies. (u)
 Contents
Page
Scope Note
1
Key Judgments
5
11
Humanitarian Needs (u)
11
Global Survey
13
Potential Humanitarian Emergencies
19
The International Response: Meeting the Need? (u)
21
The UN, NGOs, and Other Humanitarian Organizations
21
Humanitarian Military Assistance
24
The Availability of International Funding
25
Implications (u)
31
Africa (u)
33
3 'Se ret-
NIE 97-?
 fit, 4
NIE 97-3
 Ivey Judgments
Humanitarian Aid Needs
Worldwide, the number of people in need of emergency humanitarian
assistance dropped 13 percent from roughly 41.5 million in January 1996
to an estimated 36.2 million in January 1997, according to the US Commit-
tee for Refugees (USCR).' We judge that the number of people in need of
emergency humanitarian assistance during 1997 will exceed the January
1997 level, but will remain below the January 1996 level. Conditions are
expected to improve in several countries, but worsening conditions else-
where-such as in North Korea and parts of the Horn of Africa-combined
with developing emergencies, will more than offset these gains (see
figure 1).F__1
Includes people in need because of humanitarian emergencies in all countries, not just the 20 major
emergencies highlighted in this Estimate. During 1996, humanitarian conditions improved in Arme-
nia, Cambodia, and Mozambique to the point where less than 300,000 persons were in need in each
country. Thus, the number of humanitarian emergencies meeting our threshold dropped from 23 in
1995 to 20 in 1996T-1
5 t-
NIE 97-3
 3Stret 6
NIE 97-3
 The International Response
Funding for humanitarian emergencies appears to be declining, a trend that
probably will continue:
? The average response to the UN 1996 appeals for all countries was
65 percent, with donors providing roughly $1.7 billion of the $2.6 billion
requested. This is down from 71 percent, or $1.8 billion of the $2.5 bil-
lion requested in 1995. (UN appeals account for about half of the total
funding for humanitarian emergencies.)
Donors are likely to be more selective in choosing when to contribute and
probably will fund emergencies in those countries and regions they con-
sider important, while ignoring other humanitarian emergencies.
The availability of food aid for ongoing and potential humanitarian emer-
gencies in 1997 is likely to be adequate. However, worldwide grain stocks
are expected to remain near current low levelsF_~
Global military forces available for humanitarian operations are expected
to remain at 1996 levels. A key factor that will continue to affect interven-
tion decisions is whether there is a clear, agreed-upon mandate with a set
timetable for withdrawal and a firm understanding with regard to funding
and other resources to be provided. Countries will be wary of any scenario
that risks involvement of their forces in a local conflict:
? Among countries willing to undertake humanitarian operations, many
lack the capacity to provide adequate logistic support for large, rapidly
developing humanitarian emergencies and will continue to look to the
United States for this type of support. In particular, the United States may
be called upon to provide heavy lift and security for a developing emer-
gency in Zaire. The United States may be called upon to provide more
limited logistics support for Kenya and possibly Albania.
Ongoing humanitarian operations during 1997 could impede the interna-
tional community's ability to respond to new emergencies, particularly
given the downward trend in funding. At the same time, if the international
community reallocates its resources to address new crises, it could pose a
threat to existing humanitarian operations. F__1
 Figure 1
Current Humanitarian Emergencies
,1 Worsened
SI X Worsened, then
improved
* 4 Worsened, then
leveled off
* Status quo
A V Improved, then
worsened
X Improved
Humanitarian People in
Situation in Needa
the Country (in millions)
During 1996
Armed
Conflicts
Under the revitalized peace process,
the fighting has died down, the
factions have partially demobilized,
and all major political forces are
planning to participate in elections on
30 May to establish a new national
government. Despite the disarma-
ment process, however, factions are
expected to retain the core of their
armed fighters, and fighting will
continue in some areas. Thus, the
situation will remain bleak in much
of the countryside, and many
refugees and IDPs will not be able to
return home.
Projected
Humanitarian
Conditions for
1997
 an
'or
 ~_ _-_` 357392PM54-97
 Discussion
Humanitarian Needs (U)
After peaking in the early 1990s, the number of
humanitarian emergencies and people requiring
-emergency humanitarian assistance declined dur-
ing 1996 (see figure 2). With improved situations
in Armenia, Cambodia, and Mozambique, and
the absence of major new humanitarian emergen-
cies in 1996, the number of emergencies meeting
the 300,000 person threshold dropped from 23 in
1995 to 20 in 1996. Conditions also improved
during 1996 in Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Haiti, and Rwanda-although each of these
emergencies still involves more than 300,000
persons in need. (u)
Worldwide, the number of people in need of
emergency humanitarian assistance dropped
13 percent from roughly 41.5 million in Janu-
ary 1996 to an estimated 36.2 million in Janu-
ary 1997, according to the US Committee for
Refugees (USCR).2 Nonetheless, the number of
people requiring emergency humanitarian
assistance remains triple that of the early
1980s. Moreover, in some areas, such as North
Korea and Liberia, the number of people
requiring aid increased significantly during
1996. Further, we do not expect the overall
downward trend to continue through 1997. (u)
Location and Character
The majority of humanitarian emergencies in
recent years often have occurred where two or
more ethnic groups have competed for territory,
resources, and power within a single country.
Nearly half of the people requiring emergency
2 Includes people in need of emergency humanitarian assis-
tance from all countries, not just the 20 major emergencies
highlighted in this Estimate. (u)
Figure 2
Estimated Number of the World's
People in Need of Emergency
Humanitarian Assistance, 1984-97 (u)
11i 1 I I I I I I I I I I
Refugees +
1984 85 86 87 88 89 90b 91 92 93 94 95 96 97`
a People who fear persecution or harm if returned to their home
countries but are not recognized by governments as refugees.
Some are given temporary refuge or allowed to remain
undocumented. Information on these groups is fragmentary
and estimates of their numbers often vary widely.
b No data available.
`Figures for January each year.
Source: US Committee for Refugees, "World Refugee
Survey" various issues.
 Defining and Estimating Populations
"In Need" (U)
Definitions of populations "in need" of
emergency humanitarian assistance used by
the international relief community often are
inconsistent. The Intelligence Community's
definition of persons in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance includes refugees,
people in refugee-like situations, internally
displaced persons, and others requiring
humanitarian aid in their home locations
due to conflict, government repression, and/
or natural or technological disasters. (u)
The figures used in this Estimate for the total
number of people in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance worldwide were
provided by the US Committee for Refugees
(USCR). Because this Estimate focuses only
on those emergencies in which 300,000 or
more people are in need, the totals listed for
individual countries will not add up to the
worldwide total cited in this paper. (u)
The numbers cited in this Estimate for peo-
ple in need in individual countries represent
the Intelligence Community's best estimate
based on a review of information available
from the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, diplomatic reporting, nongovernmental
organizations, and the media. They should
be treated as approximations, not precise
numbers of people affected by conflicts, gov-
ernment repression, and/or natural disasters.
A change in the reported population "in
need" does not necessarily reflect a change
in circumstances, but may be due to a
change in access to reliable information. (U)
A number of factors contribute to the prob-
lems surrounding the collection and analysis
of statistics on populations "in need" and
their requirements:
? The personal level of need varies markedly
among emergencies and even within coun-
tries. Some people who are "in need, "for
instance, live with friends or relatives and
require only supplementary help; others
are totally dependent on relief to survive.
? The quality and availability of data varies
markedly. Poor security, rapidly changing
circumstances on the ground, and often dif-
ficult geographic and political conditions
minimize access to those in need and limit
the effectiveness of remote sensing tech-
niques in determining displaced population
numbers.
Political and economic considerations play
a large role. Some governments provide
inflated statistics on the numbers of people in
need in order to obtain greater amounts of
aid and support. Other governments under-
estimate the number of people in need either
because a large number can symbolize the
failure of the regime to properly manage a
crisis or because they underreport on groups
that are out of favor. F__]
Sec 12
 humanitarian assistance today reside in
Sub-Saharan Africa and are at greatest risk of
malnutrition, starvation, and disease. With the
breakup of the former Soviet Union, ethnic
nationalism has fueled humanitarian emergen-
cies in Central Asia and the Caucasus (see
figure 3). (u)
As has been the case over the last decade, there
were more internally displaced persons (1DPs)
than refugees in 1996. This is significant
because IDPs often reside in contested areas
where they can be difficult for relief organiza-
tions to reach. In January 1997, there were
more than 19.2 million IDPs and 14 million ref-
ugees, according to the USCR. A year earlier,
in January 1996, there were roughly 22 to 24
million IDPs and 16 million refugees. (U)
Global Survey
We judge that the number of people in need of
emergency humanitarian assistance during
1997 will exceed the January 1997 level of 36.2
million, but will remain below the January 1996
level of 41.5 million. Conditions are expected
to improve in several countries-including
Angola, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Georgia.
However, worsening conditions elsewhere-
such as in North Korea and parts of the Horn of
Africa-combined with newly developing
emergencies, will more than offset these gains.
We categorize the 20 current major humanitar-
ian emergencies as described below:
Ongoing Armed Conflicts account for the
largest number of people in need due to human-
itarian emergencies-roughly 13 million.3
Over the last year, armed conflicts prolonged
humanitarian emergencies in Afghanistan,
Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
and Tajikistan.4
3 We arrived at this figure by adding our estimates of the num-
ber of people in need for the individual countries listed. (U)
Conflict in Zaire in 1996 primarily affected Rwandan
refugees. We discuss the developing emergency in Zaire
as it affects Zairians in the next section of this paper. (U)
? Fighting is expected to continue in Afghani-
stan, Liberia, and Tajikistan during 1997, and
we judge that overall humanitarian conditions
will remain about the same in these countries.
However, conditions in northern Afghanistan
may worsen due to Taliban's efforts to gain
control of the country.
 3'&ret_ 20
 The International Response: Meeting the
Need? (u)
The UN, NGOs, and Other Humanitarian
Organizations
The international humanitarian aid community
consists of loosely organized networks of
humanitarian organizations: UN agencies; the
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC); the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC);
other international organizations, such as the
International Organization for Migration
(IOM); and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). (For a more complete discussion and
listing of the major humanitarian organizations,
see Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996,
Volume I dated February 1996.) (u)
The UN is the major player in humanitarian
emergencies. In addition to the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main
UN agencies providing assistance in response
to humanitarian emergencies are the WFP and
the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). (u)
Successes and Failures During 1996. Human-
itarian organizations work to provide emer-
gency aid to people in need due to conflicts,
government repression, and/or natural disas-
ters. The success or failure of an international
response to complex humanitarian crises
depends not only on the level of assistance pro-
vided, but also on the mitigation and mediation
efforts made by humanitarian organizations in
conjunction with donor governments, host
countries, and neighboring states. Humanitar-
ian organizations experienced both successes
and failures in achieving these objectives dur-
ing 1996. (u)
 The. Humanitarian Impact o
Economic Sanctions (U)
The : provision of food, medicine, and other
materials required for public health.rnay be
permitted under certain sanctions. However,.
sun etionea regimes often: withhold humani
tarian aid from those segments:of thepopu:
lation that are the: most vulnerable. Such.
regimes often exploit the,>link.between sane-'
Lions and poor domestic economic condi
tions. condemning foreign powers for
targeting: innocent civilians. (u)
United Nations agencies and NGQs may
assist in tl e;distril ution of humanitarian aid
in a sanctioned countrti; but usually they-are:
. faced with the arduous task of operating in. a
hostile environment without::much power to
affect. actual distribution. Under such circum-
stances, these agencies have a: selfinterest in
highlighting, and sometimes overstating, the
severity of humanitarian: conditions feeding
into the regime's public condemnation of
sanctions.)
 Early Response. In humanitarian emergencies,
a rapid, coordinated response is critical. A slow
response often results in the loss of thousands
of lives even though a "successful" operation is
eventually mounted. During 1996, the UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)
worked to improve the UN's standby capacity
to respond to emergencies. For example, the
DHA's Military Civil Defense Unit (MCDU)-
designed as a focal point for UN agencies and
other humanitarian organizations requesting
military/defense assistance and services from
governments in complex emergencies-was
first tested during the 1996 crisis in Africa's
Great Lakes region. The MCDU responded to
and helped to coordinate a broad range of
requests, including arranging airlifts of relief
supplies to the region, providing civil engineers
for road/bridge assessments for the WFP, and
assisting in a World Health Organization
(WHO) epidemiological survey. (u)
Nevertheless, cooperative humanitarian inter-
ventions by national military and civil defense
units remain slow and difficult to implement
because they continue to be undertaken largely
on an ad hoc basis according to decisions made
by the UN Security Council and regional politi-
cal organizations. (u)
Large-scale Repatriations. A number of sig-
nificant large-scale repatriations constituted
some of the major humanitarian successes in
1996. For the first time this decade, there were
substantially more persons returned to their
homes than displaced, and a number of long-
term repatriation programs were either brought
to a close (Mozambicans) or were very near
completion (Burmese, Vietnamese, Guatema-
lans, Ethiopians):
Roadblocks. Humanitarian organizations fre-
quently operate in hostile environments. Con-
tinued fighting, threats to aid workers, and
repressive government policies largely have
prevented humanitarian organizations from
adequately responding to crises in West
Africa-principally Liberia-as well as in
Afghanistan, Chechnya, and northern Iraq.
? In Liberia, fighting in Monrovia in April and
May t996 led to the evacuation of most relief
workers; the relief infrastructure was devas-
tated by factional looting.
 In a number of cases in 1996, notably Angola
and Bosnia, peace agreements have resulted in
the cessation of hostilities, but a variety of
obstacles-political, economic, and security-
have prevented large-scale repatriation, reinte-
gration, or reconstruction. In the aftermath of
most humanitarian crises, the lack of subse-
quent funding for such activities also hampers
returnees from reestablishing their former lives
and livelihood. (u)
Key Challenges. Humanitarian organizations
will continue to face two key challenges:
Attacks on Relief Workers. Hostage-taking
and attacks on relief workers have increased;
incidents directed against humanitarian work-
ers resulted in the detention or deaths of relief
workers in Chechnya, Rwanda, Sudan, Afghan-
istan, and Tajikistan in the latter half of 1996.
Humanitarian organizations are likely to find
themselves increasingly in positions where
they will he asked to negotiate for the release of
their kidnapped workers. F-1
Pressure From Donor Countries. The insis-
tence of donors on time limitations and exit
strategies for humanitarian operations places
additional pressures on humanitarian organiza-
tions to muster a rapid and effective response,
and to place more of their resources into miti-
gation (and prevention). Further, there will be
increasing calls for humanitarian organizations
to be more involved in human rights monitor-
ing activities, particularly in postcrisis states
pursuing policies of reintegration and recon-
struction. (u)
Humanitarian Military Assistance
While humanitarian organizations deliver and
distribute the bulk of humanitarian aid, only the
military has the rapid lift capability necessary
to deliver relief in time to save a substantial
number of lives in large, rapidly developing
emergencies-such as natural disasters or the
1994 Rwanda crisis. Moreover, in some con-
flict situations, only the military can provide
the security necessary to deliver aid. (u)
The capabilities of global military forces to
participate in humanitarian operations have not
changed since our 1996 Estimate. Major indus-
trialized countries-particularly the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France-con-
tinue to maintain force structures capable of
participating in humanitarian operations. (For a
detailed discussion of the capabilities of global
military forces to participate in humanitarian
emergencies, see NIE 96-1/I, Global Humani-
tarian Emergencies, 1996.) The ability of
developing countries to participate in humani-
tarian operations continues to vary widely.
Moreover, the availability of funding and the
specialized logistics, transport, engineering,
military police, and medical personnel needed
to sustain those forces is limited. n
An African Crisis Response Force? During
1996, the United States began to pursue the for-
mation of a pan-African Crisis Response Force
(ACRF), designed primarily to engage in
peacekeeping missions. It is envisioned that
international aid and training will be provided
to enhance the capability of African units to
operate together in regions where humanitarian
assistance is required on short notice. This US
initiative has met with mixed reactions: some
 French IFOR checkpoint along "Sniper
Alley" (west side of city), Sarajevo. (U)
African countries have welcomed it and agreed
to contribute forces, but others have adopted a
wait-and-see attitude.)
The two countries with the most advanced mili-
tary forces, South Africa and Nigeria, are not
prospective contributors to the ACRF:
? South Africa's legacy of apartheid makes it
reluctant to deploy its largely white officer
corps in black Africa; moreover, it does not
wish to take responsibility for solving
Africa's problems while its own internal
structures are still fragile.
? Nigeria has marshaled the only all-African
peacekeeping force-the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG)-that is experiencing
some limited success in Liberia. However,
the United States did not approach Nigeria to
discuss the ACRF initiative; US-Nigerian
relations are strained due to Nigeria's human
rights violations and its poor counternarcotics
record.
The Availability of International Funding
We are unable to estimate with any precision
total worldwide spending on humanitarian
emergencies in 1996, because much of the data
required to do so still are not available.5 How-
ever, based on available data, funding for
humanitarian emergencies appears to be declin-
ing, a trend that we expect will continue (see
figure 4 and figure 5):
? The average response to the 1996 UN appeals
for all countries was 65 percent, with donors
providing roughly $1.7 billion of the $2.6 bil-
lion requested. This is down from 71 percent,
or $1.8 billion of the $2.5 billion requested
in 1995. UN appeal data constitutes about
half of overall funding for humanitarian
emergencies.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) has a one-year time lag in processing its data.
(U)
 Figure 4
United Nations Consolidated
Interagency Humanitarian
Assistance Appeals, 1992-96 (u)
Development Agency plans to cut its budget
by 11 percent between 1997 and 1999, which
will strain its ability to maintain funding for
humanitarian emergencies. (u)
International political support appears to be
waning for the majority of the emergency aid
programs that are operating in countries where
humanitarian problems have continued despite
an end to most fighting:
? Less than half of the amounts requested in the
1996 UN appeals for Sudan, the Caucasus,
and Iraq were funded.
? Budgets for refugee repatriation-for exam-
ple in the Horn of Africa-remain under-
funded. Donors reportedly believe that when
refugees decide to return, they usually are
able to do so without international assistance.
(U)
? Although the majority of OECD governments
that belong to the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) reported slight increases
in their spending for humanitarian purposes
in 1995-the last year for which data is avail-
able-the major OECD donors are indicating
they will reduce such expenditures in 1997.
? Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom
have announced plans to reduce their aid bud-
gets, which could affect funding for humani-
tarian operations. The Swedish International
Funding From National Government.
National governments continue to provide
roughly 70 percent of financial and in-kind
contributions for emergency humanitarian
relief. The OECD countries remain the princi-
pal donors (see tables 1 and 2):
? In 1995, European Union (EU) member
states collectively continued to be the world's
largest funder of humanitarian aid. Member
governments and the EU's European Com-
munity Humanitarian Office (ECHO) pro-
vided more than 40 percent of worldwide
funding for humanitarian operations. The
se~ 26
 Figure 5
Status of 1996 Consolidated Interagency
Humanitarian Assistance Appeals a (U)
Africa's Former Angola Afghan- Caucasus` Iraq Liberia Sudan Somalia Sierra North Tajikistand Chechnya
Great Lakes Yugoslavia istan Leone Korea
Regionb
a Requirements and contributions as of 31 December 1996, including carryover funds received in 1995.
b Includes a $259 million request by the UN for the crisis in eastern Zaire.
`For Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.
d Donor alert for November 1996-May 1997.
Source: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
Unclassified
United States provided roughly 24 percent of
the total, the largest commitment of any sin-
gle government.
? Other top donors, in order of their contribu-
tions, were Germany, Netherlands, Sweden,
Japan, Canada, the UK, Norway, France, and
Switzerland. Japan's contributions substan-
tially increased during 1996.
? Humanitarian aid contributions from other
countries including India, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, and South Korea remained small;
these countries tend to target their aid bilater-
ally to a narrow set of recipients in which
they have a special interest. (U)
 Table I
Estimated Funding of Global
Humanitarian Assistance, 1995 (U)
United States 1.2
European Union government 2.1
contributions"
UNHCR will finance the reconstruction of 247
private homes in Sarajevo Novi Grosl
municipality. The cost will amount to 15,000
German marks. The above picture shows one
of the buildings that will not he covered and
will have to await new donors. (U)
Funding From Private Sources. Private
sources provided roughly $2 billion-nearly 30
percent-of total global emergency humanitar-
ian aid in 1995. Most private aid is funneled
through NGOs, although some is contributed to
international agencies, particularly UNICEF.
(U)
Food Aid
Total food aid deliveries-which include devel-
opmental as well as emergency food aid-dur-
ing 1996 followed the downward trend that
A] I other OECD government 0.9
contributions
European Community Humanitarian
Offices
Private contributions" >2.0
Total >7.1
,includes bilateral expenditures for emergency and disaster
relief and contributions to multilateral organizations for
emergency purposes. Excludes military expenditures for
support of humanitarian operations, such as airlifts and the
delivery of relief supplies. DAC report for 1996.
hBilateral contributions for humanitarian purposes by
EU members except for Greece and Ireland.
k The ECHO budget is composed of monies from the EU budget
and from additional contributions by member states during
1995.
"Estimated.
G This table is Unclassified.
began in 1993-94 (see figure 6). According to
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), total food aid shipments in 1995-96
(July-June) amounted to 7.7 million metric tons
(mmt), down from 9.5 mmt in 1994-95, and
barely half the peak delivery of 14.7 mmt in
1992-93. Nearly half of total food aid for 1995-
96, or 3.1 mmt, was contributed by the United
States, followed by the European Union with
2.9 mmt. (u)
Total food aid deliveries during 1996 were con-
strained by the relatively small 1995 world
grain harvest-mainly caused by unfavorable
 Table 2: Billion US $
Annual Official Development Assistance (ODA)
and Humanitarian Emergency Aid Provided by
Development Assistance Committee Members
(U)
ODA
58.1
60.1
60.8
56.5
59.2
58.8
Humanitarian Aid
2.5
4.8
4.7
5.2
>6.0
>4.2
(percent of ODA)
(4.3)
(8.0)
(7.7)
(9.2)
(-10)
(-7)
Preliminary data from the DAC report for 1996.
weather-which resulted in record-high grain
prices and the lowest surplus stocks in 20 years
for donor countries:
? There was a nearly 36-percent drop in total
US food aid deliveries between 1994-95 and
1995-96.
? Growing concern over budget deficits in the
EU as well as in Canada, has caused those
countries, like the United States, to reduce
government-held stocks and total food aid.
(U)
Emergency food aid accounted for 2.4 mmt of
the 1995-96 total. The share of food aid for
emergencies has risen from an average of 20
percent between 1986 and 1990 to 29 percent
of the total in the 1991-95 time frame. We esti-
mate that 4.4 mmt 6 of emergency food aid will
be required to meet emergency humanitarian
needs for 1997 (see figure 7):
? Sub-Saharan Africa will require about 2 mmt
of emergency food aid due to drought-in
countries such as Eritrea, Kenya, and
Figure 6
Total Food Aid Deliveries
1987-96 a (u)
a Year begins July 1.
b Projected.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization
Developmental
Somalia-and civil strife in the Great Lakes
region and other African countries such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola.
 The availability of food aid for humanitarian
emergencies in 1997 is likely to be adequate.
Moreover, total food aid is expected to increase
somewhat over 1996:
? FAO estimates global cereal production in
1996/97 to be almost 7 percent higher than
1995/96, and grain prices have dropped
sharply from the peak reached in spring 1996.
(C NF)
However, government-held grain stocks-from
which most emergency aid is traditionally
drawn-are expected to remain near current
reduced levels because of the continuation of
agricultural policies that call for reduced pro-
duction subsidies.' Therefore, donors will have
to depend more on open market purchases of
food for humanitarian emergencies.n
The United States, Canada, and the European Community are
reducing subsidies to farmers consistent with the agreement
reached in the GATT Uruguay Round. (u)
Figure 7
Emergency Food Aid Requirements
For Humanitarian Needs, 1997 (u)
. o o b u ,o
ko~ J~'my
aAngola,Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.
bNorth Korea.
cAfghanistan and Sri Lanka.
dBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
eAzerbaijan, Russia (Chechnya), Georgia, and
Tajikistan.
tIraq.
5Haiti.
 Implications
We judge that the overall demand for emer-
gency humanitarian aid, which declined in
1996, will increase in 1997. This will occur at a
time when a declining trend in donor country
aid budgets is expected to continue. Thus, the
question of whether-and to what extent-an
international response is needed in particular
situations will continue to vex the international
community. In making decisions to provide
funding, food, and sometimes military forces to
respond to populations in need of emergency
humanitarian aid, the international community
will consider a number of factors on a case-by-
case basis.
Funding. The outlook for the international
response to ongoing and potential humanitarian
emergencies is clouded by the growing prob-
lem of obtaining adequate international fund-
ing. Funding reductions reflect, in part, donor
fatigue with long-term humanitarian emergen-
cies and growing uncertainty about the effec-
tiveness of humanitarian aid, particularly
compared to more long-term development
assistance. This trend is expected to continue
through 1997:
? Donors are likely to be more selective in
choosing when to provide aid and are more
likely to fund emergencies in those countries
and regions they consider important, while
ignoring other humanitarian emergencies.
Furtherr cline in the funding of
UNDH nay make DHA more cau-
tious about launching future appeals, thereby
complicating donor and relief agency efforts to
maintain a comprehensive means of soliciting
funds)
1996 World Food Summit (U)
Representatives from 137 countries in
November 1996 attended the World Food
Summit in Rome. Although the Summit did
not focus exclusively on emergency food
needs, its Declaration on World Food
Security and Plan -of Action reconfirmed
the world community's commitment to
eradicate hunger and contained a resolu-
tion to reduce the number of undernour-
ished people to half their present
estimated level of 840 million.no later
than 2015. (u)
The signatories. to the Summit Document
further agreed: on broad commitments
aimed at fighting world hunger by foster-
ing conditions :to eradicate poverty, pro-
moting sustainable agricultural
development, promoting trade policies
conducive to food securityfor all, and
providing for emergencyfood require-
ments. (U)
Food. Donor governments are expected to
maintain a policy of reducing agricultural sub-
sidies; thus grain stocks are expected to remain
near current low levels. However, with
increased global harvests, it is likely that donor
governments will make sufficient food aid
available in 1997 to meet ongoing emergency
humanitarian needs as well as potential emer-
eg ncy needs in Zaire, Kenya, and Albania.
 Military. Global military forces available for
humanitarian operations are expected to remain
roughly at 1996 levels. Most countries continue
to be reluctant to commit forces for humanitar-
ian operations in conflict situations:
? A key factor that will continue to affect inter-
vention decisions is whether there is a clear,
agreed-upon mandate with a set timetable for
withdrawal and a firm understanding with
regard to funding and other resources to be
provided. Countries will be wary of any sce-
nario that risks involvement of their forces in
a local conflict or otherwise holds the poten-
tial for escalation.
? The members of the UN Security Council ini-
tiated multilateral humanitarian operations in
such places as Somalia and Rwanda, partly in
response to the media-inspired public reac-
tion to humanitarian emergencies. This will
continue to be a significant factor as the inter-
national community considers whether to
become engaged in emergencies, particularly
in areas of little strategic importance.
? Among countries willing to undertake
humanitarian operations, many lack the
capacity to provide adequate logistics support
for large, rapidly developing humanitarian
emergencies and will continue to look to the
United States for this type of support. For
example, the United States may be called
upon to provide heavy lift and security for a
developing humanitarian emergency in Zaire.
Such involvement could also be sought in
connection with developments in Kenya, and
possibly Albania, although more limited
logistics support would be required for these
emergencies because Kenya and Albania
have more developed infrastructures and are
more geographically accessible.
Ongoing humanitarian operations during 1997
could impede the international community's
ability to respond adequately to new emergen-
cies, particularly given the downward trend in
funding. Conversely, if the international com-
munity reallocates resources to address new
crises, it could pose a threat to existing humani-
tarian operations.F_~
Sec 32
 Annex
Country Estimates (U)
Note: The total number of persons in need for
each country listed includes refugees from the
named country, internally displaced persons,
(IDPs) and others in need in their home locations
due to conflict, government repression, and/or
natural or technological disasters. The numbers
cited in this Estimate for people in need in indi-
vidual countries represent the Intelligence Com-
munity's best estimate based on a review of
information available from the UNHCR, diplo-
matic reporting, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and the media. They should be treated
as approximations, not precise numbers of peo-
ple affected by conflicts, government repression,
and/or natural disasters. (u)
Africa (U)
 Se
be 34
 35 eSc eta
 eria
The humanitarian situation in Liberia sharply
deteriorated in early 1996 due to an intensifica-
tion of the 7-year-old civil war. The situation
has stabilized in recent months as factional vio-
lence has temporarily subsided. Relief agencies
have been reluctant to resume extensive opera-
tions outside of the areas controlled by the
Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) until factions
demonstrate respect for humanitarian
principals. F__1
Roughly 2 million Liberians require humani-
tarian aid-500,000 more than in January
1996. Some 1.2 million Liberians are internally
displaced, although the majority do not depend
on regular international humanitarian relief. At
least 760,000 Liberians remain refugees in
neighboring states, including 410,000 in
Guinea, 330,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 15,000 in
Ghana, 5,000 in Sierra Leone, and 4,000 in
Nigeria. F_~
Continued fighting and harassment of relief
agencies have made many areas of the country-
side inaccessible to humanitarian assistance
Sec
The staging area for Liberian refugees in
Freetown. (U)
during much of 1996, resulting in an increased
incidence of disease and malnutrition:
? In September, critical food shortages were
reported in at least three counties, and a par-
tial survey revealed a malnutrition rate as
high as 47 percent in some areas.
? Also in September, relief workers reported at
least 10,000 severely malnourished people in
Tubmanburg. Subsequent attacks on civil-
ians there by factional fighters-in an attempt
to loot food rations-forced relief workers to
halt distribution of bulk rations and start pro-
viding cooked food.
? In November, the WFP reported a malnutrition
rate reaching as high as 40 percent in parts of
upper Margibi and Bong counties. F_~
Nevertheless, the fighting has died down and
all major political forces are planning to partic-
ipate in elections on 30 May to establish a new
national government. (u)
 e-er et-
Outlook. The humanitarian situation is unlikely
to improve during 1997. Although the
disarmament process and demobilization
are underway, the factions are expected to retain
the core of their armed fighters, and fighting will
continue in some areas. Thus, the situation will
remain bleak in much of the countryside, and
many refugees and IDPs will not be able to
return home.F--]
Funding. The primary aid donors to Liberia are
the United States and the EU. The United States
pledged more than $76 million in 1996 and the
EU made a $26 million contribution. (u)
Most Recent UN Consolidated Appeal.
$114.6 million for 1996, but in December, the
UN issued a $91.9 million appeal for Liberia to
cover the period from January to June 1997.
Percent met: 78.2 of the initial appeal, as of
31 December 1996; No information available
for newest appeal. (u)
 39 ~t
 43 Sec
 Se 44
 47 Jew
 Se
 U` ~ 52
 53