THE TANGLED WEB

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000624332
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: April 1, 1987

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332TITLE:TheTangled WebAUTHOR:(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:31ISSUE:SpringYEAR:1987Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332UDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.0All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Allied deception operations in HungaryTHE TANGLED WEB(b)(3)(c)Though fraud in other activities be detestable, in the manage-ment of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomesthe enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does soby force.?Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527The role of intelligence is vital to every aspect of deception operationsfrom preliminary planning through each phase of execution. As intelligence isusually the principal target for hostile deceptions, an intelligence planner oranalyst must be particularly aware that the intelligence with which he workscan result from deception schemes initiated by his adversaries. Intelligenceprofessionals can become knowledgeable concerning deception operations fromstudy and afialysis of past operations as well as from experience gained in theirwork.A strategic deception may be said to have occurred whenever a nation,alliance, or coalition of powers, has deliberately misled its adversaries oversome extended period of time concerning its strategic objectives or itscapabilities to achieve those objectives. Deceptions which involve intentions arealways more difficult to detect because the intent of a nation's leaders toachieve some particular objective may appear to be obvious at one time, onlyto have the nation later do something completely different. It is possible thatdeception has occurred, but it is also possible the change resulted from a shiftin policy or a new leadership.In deception operations two basic, almost self-evident principles arefundamental to success. One such principle came to be known during theSecond World War as the Magruder Principle, after the staff officer who firstdescribed it as -telling the enemy what he already wants to believe.- Magruderdid not confine this precept only to things the target wanted to believe butincluded also what the target was inclined, or predisposed to believe. Anotherbasic principle, the rational core, requires that in any successful deception,there must always exist a central core of accurate, verifiable information.Post-war Czechoslovakian defector (and one-time head of the Czech Disinfor-mation Section) Ladislaw Bittman discussed this important point as follows:For disinformation campaigns to be successful, they must at leastpartially correspond to reality or generally accepted views. A rationalcore is especially important when the recipient enemy or victim is aseasoned veteran in such matters because without a considerabledegree of plausible verifiable information and facts, it is impossible togain his confidence. Not until this rational skeleton has been estab-lished is it fleshed out with the relevant disinformation.25Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332DeceptionStrategic deceptions can serve more than one purpose, depending upon thecontext in which the deception is employed.' During World War II, the Alliesfighting Hitler and his Axis partners employed a comprehensive deceptionplan, originally codenamed PLAN JAEL. Following the 1943 Tehran Confer-ence, the codename was changed to BODYGUARD after Winston Churchillremarked, -In wartime, truth is so precious she must always be attended by abodyguard of lies."In the summer of 1943, another one of the early BODYGUARD plans, HUSKY,was employed successfully in support of the invasion of Sicily. A deception,codenamed OPERATION MINCEMEAT, used a corpse equipped with false butconvincing battle plans and identified as Major William Martin, 09650, RoyalMarines. The body of -Major Martin- was washed ashore in Spain whereBritish Intelligence knew German agents would receive the plans quickly.MINCEMEAT helped to persuade the German staff that the Allies plannedoperations elsewhere rather than Sicily. The planning and execution ofMINCEMEAT gave needed experience and encouragement to the Allied plannersand intelligence staffs.In advance of the June 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy, another of theBODYGUARD plans, FORTITUDE, proved successful in convincing Nazi leadershipnot only of a false debarkation area in France, but also that major tactical andstrategic threats existed in Scandanavia (FORTITUDE NORTH) and in the Balkans(PLAN ZEPPELIN). Success of FORTITUDE plans caused Hitler to deny his generalspermission to reinforce defenses in the main attack areas in Normandy andforced them to deploy their forces far from the battlefield. It became clear, asevents unfolded in response to deception operations, that Hitler, von Rund-stedt, Rommel and other German leaders were prepared to accept thedeception myths as reality because each, for different reasons and purposes,was predisposed to believe the myths.The discussion that follows will focus on Allied and German operations inHungary. It will show the development and execution of Allied strategicdeceptions under PLAN ZEPPELIN, German responses to the Allied deceptions,and illustrate how these activities affected the outcome of the war.Historical BackgroundIn preparing a deception plan which would cause Nazi leaders to divertresources into the Balkan-Carpathian areas, particularly Hungary, plannershad to consider the regional history and background of events leading up to theSecond World War.The Hungarian nation had always been isolated from neighboring statesby its exotic language and culture. Because of her geo-strategic location,' Planners engaged in deceptions must exercise great care to ensure that an operation that canbe successful on a short-term basis does not provoke some response which would adversely affectlong-term goals. For example, in the 1930s Adolf Hitler sought to convince European powers thathis military strength had increased significantly so that they might be intimidated and not opposehis short-term goals. His actions in support of this, however, provoked them into rearmamentprograms, which was the last thing he desired to happen. Hitler was then forced into costlypropaganda campaigns in order to quiet their fears.26Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332DeceptionHungary was successively invaded and occupied by the Huns, Mongols, Turksand Austrians. An Apostolic Kingdom with close ties to the Roman CatholicChurch, Hungary also contained large Protestant and Jewish minorities. Afteran Ottoman Turkish occupation of 150 years ended in 1686, Hungarians cameunder Austrian Hapsburg domination. The Hungarians proved to be increas-ingly troublesome subjects for the Hapsburgs and, during the Dual Monarchy(1857-1918), they were equally troublesome allies.Following the World War I defeat of the Central Powers, Germany andAustria-Hungary, there occurred a series of events that would determineHungary's future role. After the 1918 Armistice, the Austrian King-Emperor,Charles IV, proclaimed a Social Democratic Republic in Hungary headed byCount Karolyi. This republic survived for less than a year before beingoverthrown by a communist revolt led by Bela Ken. Kun's communistgovernment collapsed after 133 days. In the turmoil and confusion attendingcollapse of the communist revolution, an interim government was formed inMarch 1920, and Admiral Miklos Horthy was elected as regent and provisionalhead of state.The vidtors in World War I relocated most of the European nationalboundaries. All of the nations allied with Germany were affected to somedegree, but none more than Hungary. Prior to the Treaty of Trianon whichHorthy was forced to sign in June 1920, Hungary consisted of a territory ofsome 125,641 square miles. The Trianon Treaty reduced Hungary's territory tosome 35,863 square miles. The largest portion of the lost territory went toRomania and the new nations of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Poland andItaly received smaller portions of Hungarian territory. Thus, Hungary declinedfrom a pre-war population of more than 20 million to 9.5 million and lost morethan 3 million ethnic Hungarian citizens.During 1927, Hungary signed a Treaty of Friendship with Italy. This actinitiated a drift in her international relations which would later carry her intothe Berlin-Rome Axis. The drift accelerated after 1938 when the Western Alliesrejected Hungarian claims against Czechoslovakia.Admiral Horthy tried to keep his country out of World War II. In 1938,while attending a naval review in Kiel, he bluntly told Hitler if Germany gotinto a war, she was bound to lose. When the war began, Horthy refused Hitlerpermission to cross Hungarian territory with his forces. In 1940, Hungaryjoined in the Tripartite Pact and signed a Treaty of Eternal Friendship withYugoslavia. When Hitler launched his attack against Yugoslavia, Horthyinitially refused permission for German forces to transit Hungary but thenyielded, a grave decision which moved his Prime Minister, Count Teleki, tocommit suicide. The following June, Hungarians were also forced to provide atoken force when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in what was expected to beanother quick German victory.By early 1942, however, Soviet resistance was sufficiently strong thatHitler forced Horthy to commit his entire military force to the Russiancampaign. With both Great Britain and the United States now allied with theSoviets and at war with Hungary, Horthy and his close associates wereconvinced the Western Allies would emerge victorious and were anxious to27Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Deceptionhave an open line to Western leaders. The Hungarians also had very seriousreservations concerning the Soviets.2In 1942, Admiral Horthy persuaded Miklos Kallay to become his newPrime Minister. Kallay immediately made overtures to the West for a separatepeace. His approach was founded on the erroneous supposition that British andAmerican forces would reach the Hungarian frontier by the beginning of 1944,or possibly earlier. The situation would then make it possible for Hungary tojoin the alliance against Germany as the Italians had been able to do.Some contacts were made with the West in 1942, but official talks did notbegin until 1943, when the Hungarian journalist, Andrew Frey, was sent byKallay to contact British and American diplomats in Istanbul. Later, LaszloVeress, a diplomat, was also dispatched to Istanbul with a message to bedelivered through the British Ambassador which stated that Hungary wouldnot resist the allies if their forces reached the Hungarian frontier, and thatinstead, Hungarian soldiers would then turn against the Germans.Early in 1943, Western Allies received overtures from Hungarians inCanada, Sweden, Turkey, Portugal, Switzerland and the Vatican. Alliedintelligence staffs concluded that most of the overtures were independent anduncoordinated. It was also known that one of the Hungarian emissaries, ColonelOtto von Hatz, the Military Attache in Istanbul, was under control of theGerman Security Service. All of the Allied intelligence assessments agreed thatif Hitler became convinced that Hungarians were about to defect, he wouldtake immediate steps to occupy the country with German troops.At this time, the Senior Deception Staff possessed the basic elementsneeded to implement PLAN ZEPPELIN in Hungary. The Hungarians as reluctantallies of the Germans were searching for a way out of their worsening situation.Hitler, who never trusted the Hungarians, was well aware of their desires anddetails of their negotiations, and was predisposed to overestimate the strategicimportance of Hungary. The Germans were also aware that the -Balkan routeto Vienna,- an alternative operations plan advocated by Winston Churchill,called for Allied landings along the Adriatic Coast. (The -Balkan Route- hadbeen rejected by the Allies in 1943 when the ANVIL/DRAGOON operation to landin Southern France was adopted.) Thus, the deception planners could employthe Magruder Principle and tell Hitler what he was inclined to believe alreadyand continue to reinforce a -rational core- of intelligence indicating both apotential Hungarian revolt, or defection, as well as Allied operations in theBalkan-Carpathian region.After 1938, from territories that had come under Nazi control, all Germanrequirements for strategic materials could be met. Because the Germans hadsuffered military reverses in 1942 and 1943, however, Hitler and his staff wereincreasingly concerned about the availability of strategic resources such ascopper, chrome, bauxite and especially petroleum produced in the Balkan-Carpathian region. (In 1943, German synthetic oil production had peaked to2 Hungarians disliked and feared the Russians. The Tsar had dispatched troops in 1848 tocrush the abortive Hungarian revolt against the Hapsburgs and Hungarian troops had foughtagainst the Russians in the 1914-1918 war.28Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Deceptionsome 6.3 million tons per year, Romanian oil production provided an additional2.4 million tons, and Hungarian deliveries had increased to about 0.8 milliontons.)Petroleum supplies for Germany were drastically reduced in early April1943 when US bombers based in the Mediterranean began attacks on thePloestl oilfields in Romania as well as on water traffic on the Danube River. Bythe end of May, Romanian production was reduced by one-half, and therelatively small Hungarian petroleum production became increasingly impor-tant. Hitler's concerns for the Balkan-Carpathian region were intensified.During the same period, Western deception operations under PLAN ZEPPELINencouraged belief in Berlin that the Allies intended to advance into Germany,not only across the English Channel, but also through the Ljubljana Gap inYugoslavia. German intelligence had reports that General George Patton waspreparing to lead the Seventh US Army ashore near Trieste.3Hungary Increasingly DesperateOn 17 August 1943, Deszo Ovary, Hungarian Consul General in Istanbul,told Sterndale Bennett, the British Minister, that Hungary had decided that itcould accept the so-called Casablanca Formula for unconditional surrenderand requested that Bennett so inform the other Allies. Ovary emphasized thatsurrender was practicable only if the military situation made it possible.(Ovary made it clear that Hungary would surrender only when Allied troopsreached the Hungarian frontier.) On 9 September, the British Ministerresponded on behalf of the Allied governments and informed the Hungariansthat in order for any terms to be considered for acceptance, the following mustbe included:? Allied aircraft were to be facilitated in their operations over Hungaryand not attacked or intercepted in any way;? Secret radio communications were to be established immediately;? All further discussions were to be conducted through Gyorgy Bakack-Bessenyey, the Hungarian Ambassador in Berne.Kallay's efforts to negotiate some understanding with the West wereencouraged by the Allies. Late in 1943, arrangements were made for BritishArmy Colonel Charles Telfer Howie to escape from a POW camp in Silesia.Howie walked south to the Danube and was joined on his travels by a BritishArmy Sergeant, Tibor Weinstein, a skilled radio operator who spoke fluentGerman and Hungarian (and who had been living in Budapest until 1937).Howie and Weinstein arrived in Budapest and were installed by Kallay in theRoyal Palace and equipped with a radio. They were directed to contact theRoyal Navy in Malta and arrange for reception of Kallay's representatives withnew proposals for Hungarian peace terms. The British staff, which wascoordinating with the other Western Allies in prosecuting PLAN ZEPPELIN,3 Actually, the Seventh Army was not then an effective force. Patton would assume commandof the Third US Army in France, and Seventh Army would be activated under command ofGeneral Alexander M. Patch, for landings on the French Mediterranean coast.29Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Deceptionknew the German leadership was aware of many of the Hungarian overturesand believed Allied forces were preparing for a Balkan invasion. The Britishcontinued their contacts with Kallay knowing that the German counterintelli-gence was monitoring his activities.Operation SparrowDuring the period between June 1943 and August 1944, several BritishSpecial Operations teams and one combined British-American team had beenparachuted into Hungary on various covert and clandestine missions. Theseand other assets from OSS, SOE and SAS were co-opted by the ZEPPELINplanners to ensure that their operations in Hungary were compatible with theconcurrent deception operations.During the autumn of 1943, the OSS staff in Cairo developed a plan thathad the objectives of producing either an anti-Nazi revolt in Hungary or aHungarian defection from the war. The plan, later codenamed OPERATIONSPARROW, required an OSS team to be parachuted into Hungary to deal withhigh-level Hungarian authorities in pursuit of those objectives. The idea forSPARROW originated from a proposal made by the Hungarian Military Attachein Istanbul, Colonel Otto von Hatz. Hatz had infiltrated an OSS intelligence netrun out of Istanbul and through this net (codenamed CEREUS) suggested a planthat would bring about Hungary's withdrawal from the Axis. While there wassome suspicion regarding Hatz in the Istanbul Station, neither OSS Istanbul norCairo staffs became aware that Hatz was a German agent until the Cereus netand its principal agent, Dogwood, were compromised. (Hatz' duplicity wasknown in Berne and OSS Headquarters in Washington. Although IstanbulStation was warned about dealing with Hatz, the warning was apparentlydisregarded due to enthusiasm in Istanbul Station for OPERATION SPARROW).After the compromise of CEREus/Dogwood was revealed, SIS insisted thatsince Hatz had been a German agent when he proposed what becameOPERATION SPARROW, then SPARROW was also compromised?in fact, that itwas a German idea, designed to result in the exposure of Allied agents. Thedeception operators countered that:1. SPARROW might work anyway, i.e., there was a possibility that aHungarian revolt or defection could occur.2. The Americans doubted that the Germans had initiated the SPARROWplan.43. The fact that the Germans knew (through Hatz) about SPARROWenhanced deception being promoted by PLAN ZEPPELIN.The decision was made to continue with OPERATION SPARROW. As ofFebruary 1944, General Donovan had ordered the control and direction of4 In the aftermath of the debacle in which the Istanbul Station had lost most of its credibilityas well as its agents in Europe, Frank Wisner, well-known for his work in counterespionage (X-2),was sent to Istanbul as Station Chief to straighten things out. Wisner's investigation revealed thatwhen the curtain fell on CEREus/Dogwood Hatz had disappeared and counterintelligence turnedup evidence indicating that he had been working for the Russians all along.30Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332DeceptionSPARROW to be transferred to Allen Dulles in Berne. Dulles was in contact witha number of individuals and groups in Germany and German-occupied areasseeking to negotiate with the Allies for surrender. (This was one of the reasonswhy the earlier Allied response to the Hungarians had directed them to channeltheir efforts through their emissary in Berne).The importance of adequate counterintelligence cannot be overem-phasized. More effective counterintelligence would have limited thedamage done by the Hungarian Colonel von Hatz in the course of theseoperations. Hatz' actions, despite his somewhat peripheral role, are none-theless interesting. He was able to present the Germans, by whom he waspaid and with whom he was allied, a plan that he could represent woulddeliver Allied agents into their hands and also expose Hungarians collab-orating with the West. To the Russians, with whom he was working for along time, he could offer the possibility of eliminating agents from the Westand using the Germans to accomplish this. Since one of the objectives ofWestern Allied planning was to provide credible Social Democratic andanti-communist leadership for the postwar era, the elimination of intelli-gence networks in operational areas, such as Hungary, left the communistresistance to operate without significant competition. The price for decep-tion of Nazi leaders and diversion of German military resources in this casewould have to be paid by the Western Allies in the future. What Hatz wasreally up to is more difficult to judge. He was in a position to conclude thatthe possibility of the Western Allies moving into Hungary was remote, atbest. He was certainly well aware that his Hungarian superiors believed theGerman cause was lost and probably believed this too. While Hatz mayhave been a long-time Soviet agent, either out of political conviction, orbecause he believed that the Soviets would be the principal power in hishomeland in the future, it is also possible that he just wanted to be on thewinning side and was feathering his own nest. Von Hatz was closelyassociated with General Kuthy, the Hungarian officer responsible for SignalIntelligence, and the German Intelligence Chief, Hoettl, was inclined to besuspicious of both Kuthy and Hatz. According to an official report made byHoettl, after 15 October 1944, both Kuthy and von Hatz (who was nowcalling himself "Hatzeghy" without the "von") were unmasked as Sovietagents. A later report by Hoettl indicated that Hatzeghy became deputychief of staff in the Bolshevik-Hungarian army,"but for all his cleverness helost the confidence of the Russians even more quickly than Kuthy, andvanished forever in a Russian prison." (The Romanians have an old saying,"If you have a Hungarian for a friend, you don't need any enemies." Hatz'behavior lends credence to this view.)On Monday, 13 March 1944, OSS Team Sparrow dropped from an RAFHalifax into Hungary, near the town of Nagykanizsa, close to the Yugoslavborder. The team members had not been told that the Germans probably knewof their mission, but were instructed to establish contact with General Ujszaszy,Chief of Hungarian Military Intelligence and Security, to negotiate for theHungarians to break their alliance with the Germans and join the WesternAllies.31Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332DeceptionOn the Friday following their arrival in Hungary, the SPARROW team,commanded by Army Colonel Florimond Duke, assisted by Major AlfredSuarez and Captain Guy Nunn, met with General Ujszaszy who informed themthey would be negotiating with two Cabinet Ministers who were away from thecapital over the weekend and would return in two days. On Sunday, Ujszaszysummoned the team and informed them that the Germans had invadedHungary; Budapest was surrounded and they must now consider themselves tobe prisoners of war.Hitler Had Swallowed the BaitHitler had learned of the dispatch of the SPARROW mission to Hungaryfrom his Intelligence Service. Wilhelm Hoettl had been in Budapest as Chief ofthe German Security Service for Southern Europe. In his postwar memoirs,Hoettl said, -I was well-informed by Hungarian intelligence officers about allthese negotiations (between the British SOE, the American OSS and Hungariandissidents) and, in particular, the liaison between General Ujszaszy and theAmerican Colonel.- Hoettl had reported these events to Berlin, and persuadedHitler that Hungarian defection was imminent. According to Hoettl, theFuhrer told his staff, -the intention of Hungary to conclude a separate peacemust be thwarted if the southern section of the Eastern Front were not to beplaced in the greatest danger."The German occupation of Hungary ended the mission of the SPARROWteam, whose members narrowly escaped execution. With some assistance froma German officer, they obtained treatment as prisoners of war and weretransferred to Colditz Castle, near Leipzig, where they spent the remainder ofthe war. Ujszaszy and an associate, Janos Kadar, were jailed for their part inSPARROW. Shortly thereafter, Ujszaszy began working with Hungarian commu-nists seeking to activate the Popular Front (a loose agglomeration of parties andindividuals, temporarily united in anti-Nazi resistance) into liaison with theSoviets. Ujszaszy, through his mistress, Katalin Karady, a famous actress, wasput in touch with Imre Kovacs, a Popular Front activist. Kovacs then putUjszaszy into contact with Laszlo Rail, leader of the underground communistmovement who enlisted Ujszaszy in the cause. This started Ujszaszy down aroad that led him ultimately to Moscow. He was later heard broadcastingover Moscow radio and affadavits bearing his name were submitted in theNuremberg war crimes trials. Ujszaszy was never seen or heard from againafter the war and his Hungarian friends assumed he had been executed.The German invasion in March 1944 was timed to coincide with aconference in Berchtesgaden to which Admiral Horthy had been summoned.5When Horthy returned to Budapest, he was greeted by a German militaryhonor guard and informed that his Minister of Interior, along with manyprominent citizens and members of Parliament, had been arrested, and thecountry was under occupation rule. Horthy was then forced to accept theappointment of a Hungarian Nazi as Prime Minister, the banning of the SocialDemocratic and Smallholder Parties, and the roundup and liquidation ofIt was because of this conference that the two ministers Colonel Duke was supposed to meetwere -out of town.-32Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332DeceptionHungarian Jews. To ensure Horthy's compliance, Hitler ordered Colonel OttoSkorzeny to kidnap Horthy's son and hold him as a hostage.At the time the orders were issued in Berlin to execute MARGARETHE I (asthe plan for the invasion and occupation of Hungary was called), insufficientGerman troops were available. The forces in the West were depleted. Troopsthat were supposed to have been sent to reinforce defenses in France againstthe anticipated invasion had been diverted to the Anzio battle in Italy. OtherGerman forces were greatly overextended in Russia and the Balkans (the latter,in anticipation of the Allied landings along the Adriatic.) Nevertheless, toexecute MARGARETHE, further forces were withdrawn from these areas. Twodivisions, for example, were removed from France and were not returned intime to be employed against the Normandy landings. German High CommandOperations Chief, General Walther Warlimont, recalled after the war that-During the Hungarian operation, the Western front was left without a singlebattle-worthy, fully operational armored division at a moment when theinvasion might come any day.- Thus, OPERATION SPARROW triggered anunnecessary German invasion of Hungary with over 100,000 troops, includingseveral armored divisions, that were desperately needed elsewhere.6The successes achieved by the deception campaigns in World War II wererealized in large measure because they could be directed against a highlycentralized and concentrated totalitarian state. It was only necessary toinfluence Hitler and his immediate staff in order to achieve the desired results.The Magruder Principle was validated by PLAN ZEPPELIN. Hitler's lifelongobsession with the Balkans, the old underside of his native Austro-HungarianEmpire, his maniacal concern for petroleum his forces could no longer use,caused him to ignore the obvious indicators that there were to be no Alliedattacks through the Balkans.The Allied strategic deception campaign also offers lessons to those whowould avoid falling victim to hostile deception campaigns. The intelligenceestablishment and its masters must deploy effective intelligence resourcesacross a broad spectrum. They must also avoid being misled by selectiveconsideration of information which reinforces a preconception or preferredconclusion. It is always wise and prudent to consider the capabilities of one'sadversaries. The most reliable and precise intelligence concerning enemyintentions may be of great interest, but distinctly less relevant, if the capabil-ities to carry out the intentions are lacking. (The Allies could not have invadedthe Balkans in 1944, for example, particularly after the landings in SouthernFrance, simply because they lacked any capability to do so).6 Hitler would repeat the diversion of forces into Hungary. In October 1944 a Hungariandelegation signed an armistice in Moscow and Horthy announced on the radio that Hungary wasout of the war. The Germans arrested Horthy and Hitler gave orders to launch a counterattackin Hungary to secure the oilfields because he still expected an Allied counterattack through theBalkans. With Soviet forces poised to cross the Oder into Germany and the Western Allies aboutto cross the Rhine, the Fuhrer pulled troops from both fronts for his campaign in Hungary. Theseforces also included Sepp Dietrich's 6 Panzer Army, hastily withdrawn from the Ardennescampaign.33Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332DeceptionSELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYKratkaya Istoriya Velikaya Otechestvennaya V oina Sovetskovo Soyusa; Mos-cow, 1964Kriegestagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht; Bernard und GraefeVerlag fur Wehrwesen, Frankfurt a/M, 1960.Verratene Schlachten, Holsten, Hamburg, 1956.Panzer Leader, H. Guderian, Michael Joseph, London, 1952German Military Intelligence, Paul Leverkuehn, Weidenfeld & Nicholson,London, 1954Inside Hitler's Headquarters, W. Warlimont, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, Lon-don, 1964.Hitler's Lagebesprechungen, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1962.The Secret Surrender, Allen Dulles, Harper & Row, New York, 1966.The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage, Wilhelm Hoettl,Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1954.-Our Man of Destiny in 1944,- Charles T. Howie, The Hungarian Digest,April-June, 1966.Hungarian Premier; A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the SecondWorld War, Nicholas Kallay, Oxford University Press, London, 1954.Name, Rank and Serial Number, Florimond Duke, Meredith Press, New York,1969.Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, Stephen Kertesz, Indiana University Press, 1953.Effi Leben far Ungarn, Miklos Horthy, Bonn, 1953.Adalekok a magyar Nephadsereg Thrtenetthez, 1944 December-1945 majus,Sandor Mucs, Hadtortenelmi Kozlemenyek, Budapest, 1958.Az elso lepesek, Istvan Balogh, Katolikus SzO, Budapest, 1960.Bodyguard of Lies, Anthony Cave Brown, London, 1981.M16: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945, Nigel West,Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1983.MI9: Escape and Evasion 1939-1945, M.R.D. Foot & J.M. Langley, The BodleyHead, Ltd. London, 1979The Summer That Bled, Anthony Masters, Michael Joseph, London, 1972.34Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624332