THE DI'S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000621388
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: June 1, 1990

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388TITLE:TheDI's OrganizationalCultureAUTHOR:(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:34ISSUE: SummerYEAR:1990Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Uproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388US ?IINTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388How to succeed and surviveThe Dl'sOrganizational Culture(b)(3)(c)0 rganizations, like societies, have cultures.These cultures reflect the organization'smission and how its employees carry itout. The culture of an organization also exerts apowerful influence on the job satisfaction of itsemployees. When we feel in harmony with thevalues and workstyle of our organization, we arelikely to be productive and satisfied. When ourwork preferences, personal values and attitudesconflict with those of our organization, our livesin the workplace can be miserable and extremelystressful.An organization's culture often manifests itself ina distinct professional personality?a set of com-mon work norms, attitudes and behaviors?found in a majority of its professionals. Thesepersonalities have their roots in early trainingand job experiences, and they are reinforcedthrough countless repetitions of routine activities.They are what distinguish us from our colleagueseven in closely related sister organizations. Jour-nalist Arthur Hadley describes a woman whooperates her own computer research firm whosays she can tell within minutes whether an inter-viewee was trained at IBM, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, or some other major computer firm.Hadley also describes the differences in outlook,behavior, and values that clearly distinguishArmy, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force offic-ers from each other.' Our own experience withinthe CIA's four directorates makes the same point.Ask a member of the Directorate of Intelligence(DI), the Directorate of Operations (DO), theDirectorate of Science and Technology (DS&T),or the Directorate of Administration (DA) whatArthur T. Hadley, "The Split Military Psyche," TheNew York Times Magazine, 13 July 1986, pp. 26-32.21errtr--Zare the three most important elements of theirmission. You will be lucky if there is any conver-gence.As an outsider, my sense of the culture in theDO, the DA, or the DS&T is highly impressionis-tic. But I have experienced the DI's culture first-hand, and I believe that the directorate and thepersonality it spawns have been shaped by anumber of features of our work.The Analysis BusinessAnalysis is what the DI does for a living. Weresearch, analyze and write about some of themost complex issues one can imagine, includingwars; the intentions and capabilities of foreignadversaries; political succession, turmoil, andchange; the world economy; technology transfer;and the international narcotics network. Thiswork invariably is done with incomplete informa-tion and a substantial degree of uncertainty. It isoften like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzlewithout the box-top picture as a guide, withoutall the straight-edge pieces to provide the pic-ture's exact width and depth, and without all theinternal pieces. There are always parts of the pic-ture that are unknown, and we can only speculateabout them.We also are paid to make judgments about thefuture and to predict what is likely to happen,not simply to describe what has occurred. We areexpected to know our history and to be familiarwith the current facts about our accounts; ouranalysis must address the meaning of those factsfor the future and for the US.This business of analysis dictates the combina-tion of education and intellectual skills we lookApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388for in the people we hire. It also shapes our dailyroutine?read, think, communicate verbally, andwrite a lot. More important, it shapes the way welook at ourselves and the mental habits thatmark us as analysts.In the DI, we take great pride in our ability tothink critically about issues, to ask the right ques-tions, to be objective, to see issues from a num-ber of perspectives, and to marshal evidence insupport of our conclusions. We also pride our-selves on being intellectually honest. We call theshots as we see them, regardless of any partisanpolitical considerations or pressures. As a group,we are a tough-minded and critical lot, alwaysready to do battle with words and ideas. We areas quick to challenge anyone else's conclusionsand arguments as we are to,defend our own.While we see ourselves as being open-mindedempiricists, at times we can also be defensive,intellectually arrogant, and overly cynical. Weoften find it easier to be neutral or negative thanto be upbeat and optimistic. To survive in thisculture, intellectual robustness, self-confidence,resiliency, and assertiveness are essential.The Communications BusinessThe communications business, which also preoc-cupies most DIers, forms the other importantcomponent of our mission. In a sense, we areonly paid half our salaries for doing our analysis.We earn the other half by communicating thepolicy-relevant portions of that analysis to thosewho need to know it.Our communications requirements are just asdemanding and difficult as our analytic mission.But the talents they require are quite differentfrom those that define a good analyst. The profes-sional education of a communications specialiststresses knowledge of the various media, audienceanalysis, and the art of packaging and delivering amessage. Effective communicators are often extra-verted and similar in personality type to their col-leagues in the business world. On the other hand,the college course work of the typical political orCultureeconomic analyst emphasizes concepts, theories,models and comparative analysis?magnets forthe introverted. Their natural colleagues are aca-demics, not entrepreneurs. The successful DIofficer has to find a way to merge both the ana-lytic and communications professions.In the communications business, we competewith other intelligence agencies for the policyma-ker's attention and time, and we are often com-peting with the policymaker's own views. Successrequires constant attention to our consumer:What is it he or she wants and needs to know?We also have to know something about how ourconsumer thinks and takes in information, if weare to succeed in getting our message across.While we are not in the business of telling thepolicymaker what he or she wants to hear, wewant to be sure that the consumer hears what wehave to say?like it or not.The "DI style" is the most conspicuous elementof our culture that derives from the communica-tions dimension of our work. It includes present-ing conclusions first; using tight, logical organiza-tion; emphasizing brevity and clarity ofexpression; describing the evidence; and provid-ing a precise analytic bottom line. These elementsare all designed to ensure the most effective andpersuasive communication of our message. Thesingularity of the DI product reflects the powerfulinfluence of this dimension of our culture.Few, however, come to the DI as polished com-municators. Our people are hired primarily fortheir area expertise and analytic skills, not fortheir ability to identify and assess an audience orto package and market an analytic product. Mostof us have to learn these skills on the job. Overtime, we master the formats?intelligence assess-ments, typescripts, current features and items,briefings?and the presentational tricks of thetrade. We also should grow more adept at antici-pating and responding to our consumers' needs.While the learning process can be painful, wehave discovered the same verity as our colleagues22Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Culture _--Gettficturrtral?in the newspaper, radio, and television worlds: hewho ignores what the customer wants and how hewants it will lose that customer.A Corporate ProductSome years ago, a colleague and I produced apaper that was handed directly to the Presidentby his National Security Adviser with the follow-ing advice: "Mr. President, you really must readthis nice piece that Bill's folk"?here he report-edly pointed to then Director William Casey?"out at the Agency prepared." From an analyst'spoint of view, that is high praise for therelevancy of a paper. It certainly represents get-ting to our most senior customer. But I havealways been more intrigued by the phrase "Bill'sfolk." It conjures up images of a band of Keeblerelves running around Langley producing cute lit-tle papers that our avuncular director takes to thePresident. Over the years, I have come to appre-ciate how that simple phrase effectively captureshow we are viewed downtown. To most of ourcustomers, we are "Bill's folk" or the "Judge'speople," with our product representing theAgency and the directorate as a whole. Goodpapers reflect favorably on all of us, and the badones make us all look just a little suspect. We are,in effect, a corporate enterprise.Think about how we do our work. Others collectand often control most of the data we use. Thereare always multiple sources of in-house expertiseon any subject with whom we should collaborate,and most of them will officially get involved incoordinating any finished piece of intelligenceconcerning their substantive area. Then there isthe review process at the branch, division, officeand directorate levels. At the lower levels, theproduct is primarily scrutinized for substantiveaccuracy and presentational clarity. At the upperlevels, the focus shifts slightly to policy relevancy,comprehensiveness, and message clarity. Once apaper leaves our building, it in theory representsthe best thinking the DI collectively can musteron that subject.And how does the individual analyst fare in thisprocess? A few get lost, most find a reasonably23comfortable niche, and many thrive. Muchhinges on each analyst's ability to comprehendthe corporate nature of our production processand to make it work for him or her. Pride ofindividual authorship and expertise, while impor-tant, is never an appropriate end in itself. Thename of the game is steering one's productthrough the process while ensuring that the basicthrust of one's analytic message remains intact. Itis a lot like a Congressman's challenge in steeringa bill through the legislative process; the effort iscomplex, lengthy, multilayered, and filled withpitfalls. Nevertheless, the effort is essential if weare to communicate analysis to our customers.To succeed in the DI environment, an analysthas to have or develop strong interpersonal skills.He or she also has to understand that the require-ments for working within a hierarchical powerstructure?the ability to give and take orders?are quite different from those needed to survivein situations where power and authority arestructured horizontally. We cannot order a co-equal colleague to agree with us, we have to con-vince him or her. This often requires a willing-ness to bargain, persuade, and compromise.It takes time, hard work, and determination todevelop the skills needed to master the ins andouts of a corporate production process. Althoughit is often stressful and frustrating, most surviveand learn. A great many regularly gripe and com-plain, a defining characteristic of the DI person-ality. To one such litany of complaints, a formerDeputy Director for Intelligence once providedthe following corporate response: "I'm not sure'we' should trust the analysis of a complex inter-national problem to someone who can't evenmaster his own production process."Publish or PerishDuring my years in the academic world, my col-leagues and I spent many hours discussing the"publish or perish" phenomena. We had all beenconditioned in graduate school to accept it asessential for survival. In truth, as most of usApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388---eariferrd?riGr Culturecame to realize, the phenomena was more fictionthan fact at most American institutions of higherlearning. Effective classroom performance andservice to the university community were equally,if not more, important.When I joined the DI, however, I quickly learnedthat I had entered a world where publicationreally was essential to survival. No analyst makesit in the DI without successfully putting pen topaper from time to time. In fact, analysts estab-lish their bona fides both with their managersand their colleagues primarily through the writtenword; to be taken seriously, you have to showyou can do what everybody else has to do.The production files maintained for each DI ana-lyst symbolize the importance of establishing a"paper trail" of one's analytic performance.Much like baseball players, we are judged in partby our statistics?not exact numbers but theranges. Over time, we all know our publicationnumbers have to be respectable across the vari-ous types of written production.Unfortunately, writing publishable analyticprose?like hitting or pitching a baseball?is noteasy. No matter how much some analysts want toor how hard they try, they never master the art.Moreover, there is something so final and intel-lectually threatening about putting your thoughtson paper and handing them to someone else forevaluation?if you avoid the batter's box youcannot strike out. But all DI analysts have towrite, and that is pressure. And the better youhit, the more times you will be sent to the plate.Although you may get used to the pressure, itnever goes away.Get It Right"Sadat will not recognize Israel.""The Shah will not fall.""The Soviets will not pull out of Afghanistan.""Nothing ever happens in Eastern Europe."Each of these statements is a judgment no DIanalyst ever wanted associated with his or hername. Still, making judgments is what we arepaid for, and the law of averages mandates thatsome will be wrong. In theory, of course, we canbe wrong for the right reasons or wrong becausewe lacked the right information. But wrong iswrong, and we all know about long memories andthe visual acuity of hindsight.Every DI analyst regularly experiences the pres-sure of not wanting to be wrong. Consequently,the good ones develop techniques for reducingthe risks through research habits, collaborativeanalysis, alternative hypothesis exploration,retesting assumptions, and challenging the con-ventional wisdom. They also master the watch-words of caution?might, could, possibly, how-ever, on the other hand. Yet, in the end, thereare no guarantees. Thus, is it any wonder that theDI analytic cadre is a conservative lot? Whoamong us would agree with the notion that a .500analytic batting average qualifies us for theanalyst's hall of fame?Importance of TimingIf we only wrote for ourselves, or if our analysiswas mainly for posterity, the issue of timelinesswould be irrelevant. But we write for busy policy-makers who "need it when they need it." This isespecially true of current intelligence, which isneeded at the opening of the day's business.Analysis that arrives too early?or worse, toolate?will usually have minimal impact. Conse-quently, the timeliness of our analytic efforts canmean everything.Most of us who have been around for a while canrelate a war story or two about a colleague whoseanalysis hit at just the right time and made a sig-nificant difference in the policy process. Weremember these times because praise and promo-tions often follow. Unfortunately, we probablycan also recall a few topnotch analytic efforts thatdisappeared into some black hole once they leftthe building. In many cases, the timing was notright.It often helps that our consumers' lives areheavily driven by their calendars. Heads of state24Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388Culturemeetings, summits, ministerials, policy reviewgatherings, foreign travel, international confer-ences, and negotiating rounds are usually sched-uled well in advance. When we are lucky, a cus-tomer will actually tell us what is on his or hermind so we can be both timely and relevant.Nevertheless, timeliness is not an exact science,and we often find ourselves rushing to meet adeadline imposed by unforeseen events. If wemiss the deadline, it almost certainly will meanmissing the intelligence boat and a chewing out.We also frequently find ourselves squeezedbetween two deadlines, neither of which hasmuch give. Where are those 36-hour days? Suchtime pressures shape our professional lives andworking style.Surviving in the DIThere are many strategies and techniques foradvancing and coping with the daily pressures ofprofessional life in the DL Each of us has to findand use those that are most "us." Some do's anddon'ts are conveyed via orientations, mentoringand training. Other things we have to experienceand figure out for ourselves?after all, we areanalysts. I have, however, also observed somespecial characteristics common to most peoplewho "make it" in any organization, the DI beingno exception. These simple rules are often easierto admire than to emulate.Learning From MistakesMy father often delighted in noting that experi-ence was one of life's cruelest teachers. "Whatother pedagogue", he would say, "gives you theexam before teaching you the lesson?" I haveoften reflected on those words after botchingsomething. The exam becomes a powerful lesson.Intelligence analysis demands a certain amount ofinitiative and risk taking. As a result, mistakes are25inevitable. Those who succeed often seem espe-cially adept at identifying the reasons for a foul-up, including their own, and at avoiding a repeti-tion. While to err may be human, consistentlymaking the same mistake smacks of stupidity.Imitate What WorksThe ability to observe what works and to imitateit is closely related to learning from mistakes.Examples of success are constantly around us andfree for the taking. Most successful analysts, forexample, learn to master the DI presentationalstyle through imitation. Practicing this rule, how-ever, requires that we not get hung up on thenotion of having to do it our way. A mentor ofmine once pointed out that "a good idea is agood idea, whether you had it or not." Successfulpeople intuitively seem to understand this wis-dom, and they constantly apply it to their ownwork.It would be ideal if our careers would move everupward, with brief and predictable plateaus. Butfor most of us a career more closely resembles aseries of peaks and valleys; there are times whenwe feel on top of things and times when we feelwe have fallen behind. Most of us are good athandling the peaks, but those valleys can be hell."Murphy" lives, and he regularly stalks the hallsat Langley. There are many Catch-22s in this orany business, and today's success is oftenfollowed by tomorrow's failure. Those who makeit ride out the tough times by keeping them inperspective and by finding some humor in theridiculousness of it all. Remember, we areexpected to take our work?not ourselves?seri-ously. Behavioral scientists call this maturity. Itcan also be thought of as basic survival when allthe intelligence, determination, and force of willwe can muster is to no avail.This article is classifiecApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621388