THE SVERDLOVSK DECEPTION

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000621357
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: December 1, 1988

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357TITLE:TheSverdlovsk DeceptionAUTHOR:(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:32ISSUE: WinterYEAR:1988Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357proved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357STUDIES 1INTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357-eccnETHA biological warfare capability(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)THE SVERDLOVSK DECEPTION(b)(3)(c)In late 1979 and early 1980, the US and other Western countries began tohear rumors from Soviet ernigrees that an outbreak of some kind of unusuallyvirulent infectious disease had occurred in the spring of 1979 in the closed cityof Sverdlovsk in the north-central Urals. The US Intelligence Communityviewed these reports as especially significant because a suspect biologicalwarfare (BW) research, production, and storage facility was located in Sverd-lovsk. The identification of this facility was based on informationas of 1972, the US(b)(3)(n)considered the facility fully operational.Arms control compliance was a key issue in 1972, when the USSR andmany other nations signed a global treaty prohibiting the use, stockpiling, andtransfer of biological and toxin weapons. This treaty, the Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention (BWC), went into force in 1975. Although the BWClacked provisions for verification, there were provisions for consultation amongsignatories in case of compliance Questions. There was also a provision forreview of the effectiveness of the BWC every five years, with the first reviewconference scheduled for mid-March 1980.Based on intelligence information, the US Government officially requestedinformation from the Soviets on the outbreak in Sverdlovsk in a demarchewhich cited the BWC as justification. A Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairsrepresentative responded verbally, and angrily, that the outbreak was due tomeat infected with anthrax and that there was no relation to the BWC. Hestated that the dates of the outbreak were March-April 1979 and that noquarantine of any kind was established. The US responded by suggesting thatqualified experts from each country hold confidential discussions. The Soviets,however, continued to maintain that no BWC issue was involved.Intelligence Assessmentmblished an assessment of the epidemic (b)(3)(n)  The assess-ment judged that the most likely cause of the anthrax outbreak was theaccidental release of airborne anthrax spores from Cantonment 19, thelong-suspect BW facility in southern Sverdlovsk. According to some reports,there was an explosion which disseminated the anthrax spores into the air.Credible reporting of autopsy findings indicated there were many cases ofinhalation (pulmonary) anthrax. Despite treatment, death resulted within a fewhours.Gastrointestinal anthrax would have resulted from eating infected meat,provided the meat was undercooked. The distinction between these two routes(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006213571Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Deception(b)(3)(n)of anthrax infection by autopsy findings is usually possible, if death occursearly. Because fatal anthrax eventually becomes a blood stream invasion withseeding of infection into multiple vital organs, a case which has survived longenough for wide organ involvement may be less clear. In the reports onSverdlovsk, however, the medical professionals were convinced that inhalationanthrax was the correct diaiznasis.(b)(3)(n) the earliest cases of anthraxoccurred in members of the military staff and in dependents from Cantonment19, adjacent Cantonment 32, and a nearby ceramics factory. All cases weretreated after all non-anthrax cases had been transferred and the civilian  physician staff had been replaced by military nhvsicians(b)(1)[here were rumors that the Defense Minister and the Health Minister visitedSverdlovsk two weeks after the epidemic began, while it was continuing. (b)(3)(n)  the implementation ofunusual medical control measures at Sverdlovsk, including a quarantine andextensive environmental cleanup. In addition, the population was providedwith vaccine, prophylactic drugs, and anti-serum. These measures would havebeen appropriate for an airborne dissemination of spores whose extent was not2 sccno-,(b)(3)(d)  (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357DeceptionApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357C'(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)well defined, but they seemed inappropriate for control of a meat-borneoutbreak. A public health problem caused by infected meat would not haveprompted military involvement. More important, such a problem would haveno implications for compliance with the BWC.The US believed that the weight of the intelligence evidence indicatedthat the Soviets had experienced a considerable number of human cases ofinhalation anthrax, following an accidential release of virulent anthrax spores.Because virulent anthrax spores are not used for producing either human oranimal vaccines (which are allowable peaceful activities under the BWC) andbecause a fairly large quantity must have been spilled to cause cases over alarge area, the worst-case implication was that the USSR had maintained a BWprogram in violation of the BWC. In addition to the Sverdlovsk episode,considerable evidence had been obtained over many years that pointed to theexistence of such a program.During 1980, several unofficial Soviet statements dealing with the out-break in 1979 seemed to be aimed at supporting the infected meat explanation.All of the statements, however, were intended to play down the importance ofthe anthrax outbreak. The sketchy riptailc nrovided were so inconsistent withthe information available  (b)(3)(n) that the US remainedskeptical of Soviet explanations and continued to request full informationunder the provisions of the BWC. This skepticism was not confined to theIntelligence Community; the view was widespread in the US press and theCongress that the USSR was not complying with the BWC.Soviet Accounts in 1986(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)Quite similar verbal accounts were presented on 16 and 25 September1986, during the Second BWC Review Conference. These accounts werestartling, because of their level of detail, their differences from previousversions, and the degree with which they were consistent with some facets ofthe Western perception of the outbreak. It seemed that the Soviets might have(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006213573Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357 (b)(3)(c)  3CCRET (b)(3)(n) Deceptiontailored a story which was as consistent as possible with the unclassifiedinformation published widely in the US and European press.The story, however, was still not cons(b)(3)(n)Release of thes ory o vious y was timed to influence global public opinion and to offset thedamage of Soviet trustworthiness in arms control treaty compliance issues.During the BWC Review of 1986, the US continued to request an officialSoviet response and made it clear that the verbal briefings on 16 and 25September 1986 did not constitute an adequate reply. The Soviets were accusedof maintaining an offensive BW program in violation of the BWC.New InformationIn April 1988, the Soviets unexpectedly dispatched to the US a briefingteam of three scientists whom they said were personally involved with theanalysis and control of an anthrax epidemic in 1979 in the city of Sverdlovsk.The Soviets were picking up the pace on chemical warfare treaty negotiations,and the briefing team probably wag e_nt_taini_tiLIPIp resolve the Sverdlovskissue. The 'team, (b)(3)(n)  gave talks to academicaudiences in Washington, Baltimore, and Boston, and it presented a somewhatembellished version of the contaminated meat story first advanced in 1980 andthen extensively detailed in 1986. The four pieces of new informationpresented by the team, however, did not significantly strengthen the contam-inated meat scenario.First, the Soviets reported that Major General V.I. Agafonov had visitedSverdlovsk, presumably during the epidemic. Later, they admitted that he wasa member of the Ministry of Health team fromepidemic. (b)(1)Agafonov is a senior mi itary anMinistry of Defe1(b)(3)(n)Agafonov 'spresence at Sverdlovsk is consistent with intelligence reporting that militarypersonnel were involved in managing the outbreak. (Expertise on anthrax restswith military medical officers in both the Soviet Union and the US.) TheSoviets' primary purpose, however, probably was to protect military BWactivity.Second, the Soviets claimed that the carcass of a cow which died ofanthrax was found in an abandoned mineshaft near Sverdlovsk. This bit ofinformation was not included in the Soviets' presentations in 1986, but themineshaft disposal had been mentioned in August 1980 in an article in a Sovietlegal review that discussed actions relating to the epidemic. The Sovietsevidently took pains to ensure that their account in 1988 was in line as muchas possible with all previous accounts, in order to strengthen plausibility.Third, the Soviets argued that, if the anthrax spores had been spread byairborne dissemination, many children would have been infected. In 1988, theyreported that only one child was infected. They explained that, becausechildren ate their meals in schools or nurseries, where only inspected meat wasserved, they were not exposed to any of the contaminated black-market meat.SECRET(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357Deception SECRET(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)  The Soviet description in 1986 of the outbreak listed one infected six-year-oldchild, but the rationalization for cases being seen mainly in adults was notadvanced at that time. This explanation is weak, because one would expect thechildren to eat at home in the evenings and on weekends. Therefore, cases ofinfected children should have occurred in homes with both children and  infected meat.(b)(3)(n)Fourth, the Soviets presented more clinical and autopsy slides in 1988 thanthey did previously. The slides showed characteristic lesions of only cutaneousand gastrointestinal anthrax. On a few slides, however, it would not even bepossible to determine if they were of human or animal origin. In fact, from theinformation presented in the slides, almost nothing could be independentlytraced to its origin.The paucity of systematic descriptions and full identification of the tissueslides reduced the credibility of the presentation for the audience of medicaland academic professionals. It was also surprising that no cultures of the germsfrom this recordbreaking outbreak were preserved for additional study byinterested scientists.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)Familiar Fabrication(b)(3)(n)Reporting of gastrointestinal cases only also provides plausible explana-tions of some previously unexplained quirks of the Soviet story. For instance,when questioned about the predominance of single male victims, one to ahousehold, the Soviets provided the following explanation at the NationalAcademy of Sciences:ECRET(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006213575Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)-S EC RETDeception-Families sometime purchase black-market meat. In this instance,the meat was contaminated with anthrax. The male head-of-household always receives the largest portion of meat served at ameal."(b)(3)(n)This plausibility is offset if the 1988 explanation is compared with the 1986version, as presented by Dr. Meselson during a briefing at the Department ofState. In that version, there was an elaborate discussion of the Russian customof cooking meat slowly by simmering, which would only partially sterilize theanthrax spores. The claim was made, without citing supporting evidence, thatmen were more vulnerable to anthrax, because of ulcers or gastritis resultingfrom alcohol intake.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)A Poor PerformanceThe Soviets have badly botched their handling of this story. If, in 1979 or1980, they had conformed to the generally accepted practice of voluntarilyreporting unusual infectious disease outbreaks to the World Health Organiza-tion, their credibility would have been much better. By releasing their story inincremental fragments over a nine-year period, while simultaneously refusingofficial confidential expert review or visits of Sverdlovsk, they have intensifiedWestern suspicions. The obvious selfserving timing of their efforts, first inconjunction with the 1986 BWC Review Conference, and then again justbefore critical treaty negotiations in 1988, has been quite damaging. TheSoviets apparently fear the questions which might result from any visit toSverdlovsk by international investigators.OutlookBarring any new radical disclosures by the Soviets, it is increasinglyunlikely that any persuasive new evidence will emerge to resolve the conflictover what actually happened at Sverdlovsk. The US cannot reveal its sensitiveintelligence information. If it did, the Soviets would promptly revise theirexplanation and concoct a plausible story to explain away the damaging details.By not providing an official response to the US, they have kept open theirability to revise their explanation when required for propaganda purposes. The6-SEGPrE-T (b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621357Deception SECRET (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)  Soviets probably remain confident that, in terms of influencing worldwidepublic opinion, they can plausibly deny what really happened at Sverdlovsk.Whatever the case, this experience underscores the shortcomings of armslimitations agreements which do not include effective provisions for verifica-tion.(b)(3)(c)  (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006213577