FORECASTING THE SINO -VIETNAMESE SPLIT

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000620600
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600TITLE:Forecasting theSino-VietnameseSplitAUTHOR:(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:30 ISSUE: WinterYEAR:1986Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600TUDIES 1INTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence. -CAll statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Out of the closetETFORECASTING THE SINO-VIETNAMESE SPLIT(b)(3)(c)Following the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975, the intelligence com-munity drastically reduced its resources and analytical efforts on Indochina, assucceeding administrations sought to distance themselves from that episode inAmerican history. As the Ford and Carter administrations moved to capitalizeon the China initiative begun under Nixon, the US retreated from a clear-cutpolicy in Southeast Asia; little attention was paid to the storm brewing inside PolPot's Cambodia, to the gulf that was developing between Vietnam and Chinaas a result of it, or to the Soviet drive to exploit the rift at the expense of theChinese in hopes of gaining a much stronger foothold in the newly reunifiedSocialist Republic of Vietnam. This article examines the efforts of the intelli-gence community to warn policymakers of the growing tensions between Chinaand Vietnam, and notes how these intelligence assessments lacked sufficientimpact, due to the political environment of the time.From 1975 through 1977, the volume of finished intelligence reports onIndochina fell dramatically. This drop in assessments reflected both a sharpreduction in analytical resources on the region as well as a waning interest byintelligence consumers in a part of the world where the United States wasperceived to have suffered a humiliating military defeat. After the end of USinvolvement in Vietnam in 1975, the Ford and Carter administrations soughtto purge Vietnam from our memory?it was acknowledged as a dark episodewhich succeeding administrations hoped to distance themselves from. When, in1976, our Thai allies asked us to close our air bases there and depart, the UScomplied, but failed to develop an alternative policy in Southeast Asia, prefer-ring instead to view developments there in terms of an acceptable equilibriumbetween the Chinese and Vietnamese communist regimes on the one hand, andthe free governments of ASEAN on the other hand. The reports filtering out ofCambodia (then Kampuchea) about the brutality and genocide of the Pol Potregime were indeed disturbing, but there was little official recognition at the timethat developments there would lead ultimately to a major new realignment ofalliances in the region. Cambodia, after all, had been, and remained?in thewords of William Shawcross--a sideshow.- The Ford administration focusedits attention on Cambodia only long enough to recapture the hijacked UScontainership SS Mayaguez from the Khmer Rouge government in June 1975.During the succeeding Carter administration, the pursuit of better relations withChina became the principal policy goal in Washington.This political environment had, in my view, a direct bearing on intelligenceanalysis. The number of US intelligence analysts working on Indochina droppeddramatically after 1975. In the words of a former colleague?an army captainApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Splitwith a professional military intelligence background assigned to work on Indo-china at DIA in the early 1980s?to have been an army officer assigned to workthe Vietnam account in 1976, 1977, or 1978 would have been the career "kissof death." The stigma associated with Indochina following the disaster of April1975 prompted some professional analysts to consider switching from Vietnamto more interesting accounts, and reportedly, more than a few bailed out to workon China, Thailand, and even Brunei. In such an atmosphere, it is certain thata few military professionals pined for an end to their intelligence assignments;after all, the inherent danger associated with driving tanks was far less risky thanthe career danger associated with being the army captain assigned to producethe Vietnamese ground order of battle in 1977.This combination of political environment and a sudden drop in analyticalresources had a corresponding impact on intelligence production. The numberof finished long- and short-term intelligence assessments prbduced on Indochinaby the US intelligence community?principally CIA, DIA, and State?fell from58 in 1975, the final year of the Vietnam War, to 17 in 1976. In 1977 the numberfell to 7. In 1978 the number of finished assessments rose slightly, to 10.While the quantity of reports on Indochina fell off sharply, the quality ofassessments produced remained high. The professionalism and dedication ofthose few analysts who stuck with the Indochina problem was reflected in theaccuracy of their work. Their reporting on political and military developmentsin the region in the mid-1970s, and ultimately their prediction of the Sino-Vietnamese split and resulting Soviet-Vietnamese alliance stands as an intelli-gence success. That their assessments lacked the impact that they should havehad was due more to the political environment than anything else. An exam-ination of the critical events in the region from 1975 through early 1979, andthe judgments which analysts forwarded to policymakers as tensions escalatedin 1978, shows intelligence on the target.EventsVietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978. In February 1979, Chinalaunched an attack into Vietnam's six northern border provinces. Relationsbetween Vietnam and China had been steadily declining since 1975:? In September 1975, China refused to grant Vietnam the amount of aidit had requested.? In October 1975, Vietnam's Party Secretary Le Duan traveled to Moscowwhere he obtained considerable Soviet aid and where he endorsed Sovietforeign policy positions.? By December 1975, the Soviets were involved in assisting Vietnam withsome 40 economic projects.? Throughout 1977 and much of 1978, border clashes took place betweenVietnamese troops and the troops of the Beijing-backed Khmer Rougegovernment of Democratic Kampuchea?the Pol Pot government.? In March 1978, the Vietnamese government decided to "nationalize"private trade throughout the country. This action most affected theApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600SplitApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Chinese merchant class, resulting in a mass exodus from the country ofoverseas Chinese.? In June 1978, Vietnam joined CEMA, the Soviet-bloc economic and tradeassociation.? In November 1978, Vietnam and the USSR signed a treaty of friendshipand cooperation.? In December 1978, Hanoi announced the formation of a -NationalFront- in Cambodia, signalling an intention to invade that country.What took place between 1975 and 1978 was a steady withdrawal ofVietnam from China's sphere of influence. To the Chinese, who had firmlysupported North Vietnam during its war with the US, this behavior was an insult,resulting in loss of face and loss of prestige in the region. Also influencing thistense situation was the thawing of relations between the United States and Chinaduring the Carter administration. Beijing's new posture was that the SovietUnion?and not the US?was the principal threat to world security. As relationsbetween Hanoi and Beijing worsened, the Chinese could not prevent the Viet-namese from mpving into the Soviet sphere, and this was a direct affront toChina's foreign policy objectives.There is reason to believe that both parties would have preferred a reso-lution of differences to an outright break in relations. This view is supported byChinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiao Peng's statements to the press in June 1978,when he portrayed Vietnam's actions as a series of "10 steps- against China.According to Deng, only when Hanoi took the -11th step--the expulsion ofoverseas Chinese?had the situation reached a turning point. It was at this timethat the Chinese leaders began to warn that Hanoi must be, in their words,-punished.- Deng further stated that unless Hanoi moderated its policy onethnic Chinese, Beijing would retaliate. China subsequently ordered three Viet-namese consulates located in South China closed, and began small-scale militarymaneuvers near the Vietnamese border.AnalysisCIA's Office of Regional and Political Analysis produced an IntelligenceAssessment in June 1978. Among the key judgments were two perceptive oneswhich, while not directly forecasting a Chinese military response to Vietnam,did note that relations between Hanoi and Beijing were likely to deterioratefurther, and that outright military confrontation was highly possible:Although both sides realize that neither is likely to benefit from anall-out confrontation, bitterness is so deep that the situation coulddeteriorate further, especially if the Vietnam-Cambodian fightingintensifies.The relationship between Peking and Hanoi already has moved intoa new and probably protracted stage of open political warfare andheightened military tensions that could threaten the new equilibriumthat has developed in Southeast Asia since the end of the Indochinawar . . .Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)SplitAdditionally, the assessment predicted that "Peking can and probably willresort to a number of other measures to remind Hanoi of China's influence and?capabilities in the region. They are likely to include further reductions ineconomic assistance and trade, military posturing along the border, increasingdiplomatic attempts to convince other countries?especially in Southeast Asia?to reduce dealings with Vietnam, and perhaps a more aggressive assertion of itsclaims to islands in the South China Sea, which are disputed by Vietnam as wellas other countries."Tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border  increased throughout the fallof 1978. In September and October revealed that the Vietnamesewere increasing their physical defenses along the border with the addition ofantiaircraft artillery batteries and SA-3 surface-to-air missile batteries. A reportreceived in early October stated that there had been intensified Vietnamesemilitary movements along the border, including troop reinforcements and SAMdeployments.By mid-October, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and Pacificreleased an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) on Sino-Soviet com-petition in Indochina. The IIM pointed clearly to the possibility of a Chinesemilitary action against Vietnam. The memorandum stated that should theVietnam-Cambodian situation worsen to a point which seemed to threaten theindependence and stability of the Phnom Penh government, China would be leftwith three options:China could greatly increase aid to Phnom Penh. . . This. . . poses therisk. . . of emboldening the Cambodian leadership to provoke Hanoieven further. It could also lead to greater Vietnamese dependence onthe USSR for political and military support and therefore to greaterSoviet involvement in Vietnam.China could try to distract Vietnamese attention from Cambodia bya show of force along the border with Vietnam. While this wouldcertainly affect the pace of fighting along the Vietnamese-Cambodianborder, it would also pose the kind of security threat to Vietnam thatcould lead Hanoi to permit a marked increase of the Soviet militarypresence in Vietnam and might also lead to a Soviet show of force alongthe Sino-Soviet border. China nonetheless might consider such a moveif it was assumed that Vietnam was already past the point of no returnin forging a close military relationship with the USSR.China's third option would be to do nothing more for Phnom Penh,letting the chips fall where they might and hoping to capitalize polit-ically and diplomatically in the long run . . .As we now know, the second of the three options put forth in this estimateaccurately predicted the future course of events in the region. What remainedfor analysts was to monitor the Cambodian situation, measure the Chineseresponse, and affix a timetable for any possible Chinese military reaction. Asnoted, Vietnam proceeded with its full-scale invasion of Cambodia in December1978. The fact that the Vietnamese employed several infantry divisions?including some belonging to three strategic army corps?and that some wereApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Splitairlifted into combat from northern Vietnam, showed that this was no short-termpunitive military operation. Although it was not until early January that analystsfinally reported the Vietnamese SAM emplacements along the Chinese borderand Hanoi's increased readiness posture, they had reported six months earlierthat the potential for open hostilities between the two countries was very high. (b)(1 )By mid-January 1979, had provided strong evidence of (b)(3)(n)a large Chinese military buildup along the Vietnamese border  (b)( 1 )(b)(3)(n) On17 February- ?theChinese Army attacked across the Vietnamese frontier at 25 locations. In theensuing 30-day incursion, the Chinese managed to capture at least five Viet-namese provincial capitals and inflict some punishing blows on their formerallies. Subsequent analysis, however, and statements by the Chinese themselves,indicated that the Vietnamese more than held their own and probably inflictedserious casualties on the People's Liberation Army, thus causing more perceptiveanalysts to question whether China really taught Vietnam a lesson after all.Despite the timely assessments and warning of war provided to policy-mak-ers by the intelligence community months before the fact, some US officialsreacted with incredulity when Deng Xiao Peng?on a visit here?informedthem of China's intentions in January 1979. Although analysts clearly recognizedthat confrontation between China and Vietnam was imminent, some officialscould not?or would not?believe that Beijing would make a total break withHanoi. Their refusal to accept this possibility was probably due to several factors,though two seem clear. First, the deterioration of relations between the twocountries took place over such a long period that policymakers may have beenlulled into a belief that China was bluffing; this was compounded by a generallack of interest in Indochinese affairs by Washington during the preceding threeyears. Second, Deng's visit here in early 1979 made it difficult, if not impossible,for policymakers to believe that China would act against Vietnam anytime soon.The intelligence community's forecast of a break in relations betweenChina and Vietnam and the subsequent tactical warning of war were accurateand timely. But the effect was dampened significantly by Washington's lack ofinterest in Indochina, and by a zealous pursuit of better political and economicrelations with Beijing, at the expense of a new and decisive foreign policy towardSoutheast Asia.PostscriptThe Sino-Vietnamese split and accompanying border war which had beenso accurately predicted by US intelligence analysts throughout 1978 resulted inApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600---SECTE-r Splitrenewed interest in Southeast Asian affairs after February 1979. The intelligencecommunity launched a major new effort to study Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos,and work on the Chinese Army was intensified. New analysts were hired, andthe old interagency Vietnam Ground Forces Working Group?dormant sincethe end of US involvement in Vietnam in 1975?was reconstituted. Analystswere assigned to assess the outcome of the China-Vietnam border war, andpredict whether or not China would follow through with threats to teachVietnam a -second lesson.- Others were assigned the task of analyzing the orderof battle and capabilities of the Vietnamese Army; they soon found that mostof the files had been packed away in boxes, and that they had to start fromscratch. For the next three and one-half years, a team of abalysts from CIA, DIA,NSA, State, and Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) met regularly to hammer outa variety of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, and order of battle documents. By late 1982, mostof the Vietnamese order of battle disagreements had been ironed out, ? allowinganalysts to tackle questions relating to ground forces capabilities, command andcontrol, and the future of Cambodia. Throughout this period analysts also kepta close watch on Soviet involvement in Indochina, and in doing so, they wit-nessed the prophecy of October 1978 come to pass. During 1979 the US intel-ligence community produced a total of 35 finished assessments on Indochina, 30of them in the last ten months of the year?after the February 1979 Chineseinvasion of Vietnam. Just as the low production figures of 1976, 1977, and 1978reflected a decrease in analytical resources and consumer interest, so the muchhigher figures of 1979 were indicative of greater analytical resources and arenewed interest in the region. Although some of us who were involved in thislater effort on Indochina believed that the US was still a long way from devel-oping a clear-cut policy for Southeast Asia, we at least were comforted by theknowledge that we had an interested audience which read our assessmentscarefully?a far cry from those analysts who kept watch over Indochina duringthe unrewarding period of the mid- and late-1970s.This article is classifiecl_SrfretEr72"Solving the Vietnam Order Of Battle Puzzle," Studies In Intelligence, Fall 1984Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620600(b)(3)(c)