ETHICS AND CLANDESTINE COLLECTION

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000619183
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183TITLE:Ethics and ClandestineCollectionAUTHOR:(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:27 ISSUE: SpringYEAR:1983Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183pproved for Release.14/07/29 000619183STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence. ?0All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183(b)(3)(n)Amejpractical considerationsETHICS AND CLANDESTINE COLLECTION(b)(3)(c)In the press, in the universities and in public life it has become fashionablein recent years to express concern over the allegedly corrupting effect ofservice as an intelligence officer responsible for espionage operations: forrecruiting, handling, and terminating spies. Sustained personal exposure?soruns the argument?to the heady atmosphere of deceit, secrecy, and violence,actual and threatened, inherent in such operations sooner or later blunts theparticipant's scruples, undermines his integrity, and calls into question hisreliability as a public servant.Paradoxically, those who express this concern seldom apply the samereasoning to their analysis of other professions. There is little, if any, publiccomment about service in the military predisposing a person to commitmurder. It is difficult to sustain the argument that there is something speciallycorrupting about espionage when a regular reading of the daily press makes itclear that followers of many other callings?psychiatrists and prosecutingattorneys, bankers, Congressmen, jewel merchants and jockeys (to name only arepresentative sample)?are all susceptible to corruption in this imperfectworld. If we are to take Boccaccio seriously, we must accept that even inmatesof convents fall victim from time to time to temptations that undermine thedefenses of the flesh and the spirit.Concern over the probity of career intelligence officers demands attentioneven where it is a concern induced largely by a misconception of the realnature of clandestine collection activities. The legitimacy of Americangovernment depends to a far greater extent than is the case for other Westerndemocracies (especially those whose history reaches back to an era beforegovernment derived its legitimacy from the formal consent of the governed)on a consensus among Americans that the actions of their government areconsistent with the principles upon which it was founded. The subjection ofintelligence activities to Congressional oversight is a striking example of astrongly felt need for such consistency, for the admission of official responsi-bility implicit in oversight violates one of the oldest traditions of clandestineintelligence activity.Many factors contribute to the suspect image of the intelligence officer.Some are inherent, arising out of the very nature of espionage, with itsconnotations of institutionalized deception and the betrayal of trust. Theabhorrence inspired by the application of such techniques to the conduct offoreign policy is probably more widespread, deep-seated and genuine amongAmericans than other peoples, those less materially successful than we havebeen, less able than we in our relative isolation to cherish comforting illusionsabout the way the world works.(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006191831Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183--G044FtDticffrAt. (b)(3)(n)EthicsPersons sharing this abhorrence and therefore opposed on principle to theinvolvement of the U.S. Government in clandestine activities have seized onthe reports of and leaks from the Pike and Church Committees as confirma-tion of a thesis that illegal excess and intelligence activity go hand in hand. Awealth of sensational and inaccurate reporting by the media, together withoccasional errors of judgment by those in charge of U.S. intelligence, has lentsubstance to their concerns. Within the intelligence community it liassometimes been difficult to strike a balance between the -can do- attitude thatcontributes so much to the effectiveness and therefore the morale of .aclandestine intelligence service and the obligation placed on all citizens, if weare to avoid damage to the society we are trying to sustain, not to violate gratu-itously the principles to which it claims allegiance.Those skeptical of the value of undertaking clandestine activities opbehalf of an open society?and even many of those who are well disposed?have wondered how those responsible can be held accountable for their actionsand for the expenditure of government resources placed at their ;djsposal.Indeed, they have asked, how can the public be certain that the circumstancesin which the profession is exercised do not somehow place intelligence officersin a privileged position beyond the reach of U.S. law?Long before Congressional oversight and a host of new legal restrictions,executive orders, and internal regulations came into effect to meet theseconcerns, experience and reflection had led thoughtful intelligence officers toconclude independently that attention to ethical considerations is a factor ofcritical importance in the collection of intelligence and the effective handlingof agents, in the sound management of personnel in a secret intelligenceservice, and in the maintenance of a healthy relationship between such aservice on the one hand and on the other the remainder of government andthe general public. We shall consider these issues separately below.Foundation of TrustDeception is inherent in agent operations, but rare is the agent who willrisk his well-being unless there is a positive ethical content in the relationshipbetween him and the service for which he works. If the relationship is toendure, he must have confidence in the organization on whose instructions heis risking so much. Winning that confidence is the necessary precursor to therecruitment of an agent; for at the moment of recruitment, when the agentagrees to cooperate with his intelligence contact in the performance of actsillegal under his country's laws, he is placing his own security and the securityof his family in the hands of the recruiter. Maintaining and reinforcing theagent's trust in his new clandestine associate and the service he represents is amajor responsibility for the intelligence officer and later for the succession ofsuch officers who over months and even years may direct and support theagent's clandestine activities.These references to trust may strike a jarring note for readers accustomedto think of recruitment to commit espionage in terms of entrapment first andthen coercion. However widespread the use of such techniques may be in spyfiction and among the intelligence and security services of Eastern Europe and2___Calsw-44)E-tatricrApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183Ethics __c.QN-F+DerrrrAT(b)(3)(n)tlo* Stviet Union?at least in circumstances where they control the ground?their use, in raising ethical difficulties, also would pose serious practicalproblems for an American intelligence service. Treatment of the impact oftheir use on personnel management and on the service's relations with the restof the government and the American public properly belongs later in thisarticle. A discussion of the impact on the relationship between an agent andhis case officer belongs here.Steady nerves, courage, and high motivation are among the qualities onwhich agents must draw as they carry out their tasks; for the conditions ofwork oblige them often and for prolonged periods of time to labor in isolationfrom anyone with whom they can share the secrets of their clandestineemployment. They submit to these conditions for various reasons. In mostcases it would be simplistic to ascribe their motivations solely to an overmas-tering need for hard cash. Ideological commitment; the desire for revengeagainst a system, or against individuals in it whom the agent feels havewronged him; a wish to prepare a future for himself and his family far ft/funhis native country; patriotism, even?a conviction that his country's interestscan best be served by insuring that the U.S. Government is' well enoughinformed to make intelligent foreign-policy decisions where his country isconcerned?any one or more of the foregoing may also apply. Necessarily,however, they are secondary to the agent's trust in the competence andreliability of the person and organization for which he works.In my experience, an agent, far from collaborating under compulsion,looks to the relationship with his case officer for a release from psychologicaltension and a sense of comradeship and common purpose in the routineundertakings of a dangerous venture, sentiments that would be vitiated if therelationship depended ultimately on compulsion. In the world of clandestineintelligence operations as elsewhere, positive motivation, not fear, provides asound basis for a lasting and productive relationship.An intelligence service's reputation for honoring its commitments iscritical to developing and sustaining an agent's confidence and therefore hismotivation. The Soviets are well aware of this. Witness the lengths to whichthey have gone to obtain the release of agents of theirs who have been caughtand imprisoned. In the case of George Blake they apparently even arrangedhis escape from a British prison. Indeed, a serious adverse effect of theCongressional investigations of the mid-1970's, of the stream of books aboutCIA by disaffected or simply indiscreet former employees, and of the leaksthat continue to afflict official Washington today is the fear they arouse inagents and potential agents that the U.S. Government cannot guarantee theconfidentiality of their identity.Secondary in importance for an agent only to the commitment to protecthis (or her) identity are commitments on compensation, material or otherwise.The agent needs to believe that on essentials the intelligence officer fromwhom he takes direction is honest with him and looks after his interests.Honesty in assessing risks is as important as honesty in passing on to the agentany form of material compensation. Dishonesty or evident carelessness on thepart of the case officer in handling his agent's financial affairs, by disillusion-____CaaF-443Eterrxr(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006191833Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183_____Ge4.+FietrITTAT(b)(3)(n)Ethicsng the agent, can dangerously diminish the case officer's ability to influencehis actions. Overall, there are many parallels between the relationship of a caseofficer with his agent and that of a combat officer with his men. In both cases,principal and subordinates are involved in a hazardous undertaking. In bothcases, the principal reinforces his control over his subordinates by earning theirrespect and looking after their welfare. In both cases, situations arise where thesubordinate's welfare cannot be the overriding consideration for the principalas he devises and implements a course of action.The risk implicit in espionage activity and the conditions, often dramatic,under which clandestine contact is maintained tend to foster close personal tiesbetween agent and case officer, ties which can make the agent unusuallyreceptive to the officer's influence on the major decisions of his life. At firstglance such a situation would appear to enhance the officer's ability tomanipulate his agent. An experienced case officer, however, will immediatelyrecognize the restraints on his freedom of action in this area. The assumptionby a case officer of responsibility for decisions affecting the directjon of anagent's life is a time-tested recipe for serious problems in the relation-stap at alater date. For if matters have not gone well for the agent; he will be temptedto blame his case officer, or the service for which the case officer works, orboth, for all the ills that have befallen him. Depending on how embittered hehas become, the agent may then seek retaliation, or see himself in a position toinsist on extravagantly generous compensation for the misfortunes he ascribesto his clandestine relationship.Inevitably, at some point every agent relationship must be suspended orbroken off permanently--terminated- is the service jargon. The likelihoodthat the agent faces compromise, his loss of access, his failing health, or simplyhis desire to retire and enjoy a peaceful old age are prominent among the rea-sons for terminating a case. Here it needs to be said that whatever the agent'sperception may be, constitutional restraints and the dominant value system inAmerican society rule out -termination with extreme prejudice,- an obscureand pompous euphemism that I have never come across except in the press.Killing an agent, even a treacherous one, in conditions short of war is not anoption.Given the inhibitions, legal and other, against adopting such an extremesolution, experience teaches that one of the more positive inducements tocontinued discretion on the agent's part after the relationship ends is hisrecognition that the service has consistently treated him well, if firmly,responding favorably to his justified requests and faithfully honoring itscommitments to him. Unless his judgment is failing he will also realize thatlapses in discretion on his part risk embarrassing him even more than they dothe service's representatives, for it is he who is vulnerable, as they seldom are,to prosecution or conceivably to some less formal but more efficaciouscorrective action by the local authorities.This is not to say that given human nature, agents will not try to exploitfor their own benefit, material or otherwise, the service with which they havebeen in contact. It is to say that on balance, in view of the inherent limitationson an American intelligence service's freedom of action, the service willnormally best serve its own ends by dealing with an agent at every stage of hiscareer in a manner that he will perceive to be honest and equitable.4ELD.6.14T1*,r7(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183Ethics(b)(3)(n)Bi-den of ResponsibilityClandestine intelligence collection constantly raises ethical issues for thecase officer, if for no other reason than that it is his job to direct and supportpersons engaged in an activity that normally is illektal in the country in whichit is undertaken. The responsibility that any principal feels for a subordinateundertaking risky tasks is heightened where failure could result in ruin and the, 'loss of freedom for the subordinate or even in the loss of his life.Other aspects of the job increase the burden of responsibility. Security ,concerns usually require a case officer to meet alone with each of his agents?to pass them their instructions and debrief them on their activities or on the in-formation they are reporting; to pay them the salary they have earned; to passthem operational funds; to issue or retrieve equipment. The same concernsoften require a case officer to act without direct supervision, with the agentthe only other person aware at first hand of what the case officer has done orwhat he, the agent, has said. It is work that offers a wealth of opportunities forintellectual and fiscal dishonesty.'In the absence of a system of informants within the service, which is thetotalitarian way of dealing with this situation, an American intelligence servicehas to be able to count on the case officer's integrity: for accurate reporting ofthe information he obtains from his agent; for passage to the agent of all thefunds and equipment destined for him; and for an accurate accounting oftheir use, to the best of the case officer's knowledge. At first sight a mastery ofthe techniques of clandestine activity, a talent for planning and completingrisky undertakings, plausibility, decisiveness, energy, and courage appear to bethe principal qualities required of an intelligence officer. Yet individually andtogether they are worthless if he lacks integrity. Furthermore, as a practicalmatter the long hours worked, especially abroad, mean that supervisors couldnot perform the missions assigned them if they had to be preoccupied withquestions about the honesty of their subordinates. In short, dishonest reportingis the most serious professional shortcoming in an intelligence officer. AnAmerican intelligence service that could not rely implicitly on the integrity ofits personnel would be no more than a gang operating under officialcognizance.The degree of dependence of American intelligence on the personalintegrity of its employees, shaped and reinforced by the quality of theleadership to which they are subject, has broader and deeper implications forthe selection and management of personnel than may at first be apparent. Theessential requirement is that the employee accepts without reservation theobligation under which his chosen profession places him, to compartment thedeception needed in the conduct of operations from the rest of his professionaland personal life. This obligation is not so difficult to meet as it may at firstseem to be. To draw a military analogy once again, we are simply asking of thecareer intelligence officer what we ask of a regular in one of the combat arms:that he restrain himself from using against his comrades and the civilianpopulation it is his mission to defend, the lethal techniques that enable him towin and hold an advantage over the enemy in battle. Experience leads meto believe that a well-defined, unfashionably mid-Victorian set of personalApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006191835Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183__CONfterEgiric?(b)(3)(n)Ethicsstandards helps maintain such compartmentation. Cynicism is ultimatelydisabling. What we look for is a person with a strong sense of right and wrong,combined with a recognition of the inevitability of compromise in a less thanperfect world.Probity and a readiness to accept responsibility for one's actions areessential; and the need for probity applies as much to personal conduct as to'the reporting of information and the handling of official funds. No matter howrelaxed and sophisticated personal morality may have become in these closingdecades of the 20th century, sexual involvement with an agent remainsunacceptable from a professional standpoint. In the real world, in contrast tothe pulsating world of fictional espionage, an involvement of this sort sodiminishes a case officer's ability to assess objectively the agent's circum-stances, motivation and security, and can lead to such a loss of influence andtherefore of control over the agent's behavior, as to threaten if not destroy thevalidity of the operational relationship. Similarly, its adverse impact onsecurity, judgment, and professional relationships means , that profligairbe--havior by intelligence service personnel?even where agents, prospective, Icurrent, or former are not involved?is fraught with the risk of damage toservice interests.In any organization, including those whose mission is the clandestineacquisition of intelligence, the tone is set by those at the top. Given the legaland social framework within which U.S. intelligence must operate, given thesecrecy of much of its work and the necessary freedom from direct supervisionof many of its personnel, given the large sums of money that case officers maybe called upon to handle and the need for sound judgment, often renderedunder stress, on a wide variety of issues, it is more than usually important forsenior management to pay attention to the power of example as a factor in itsability to direct and control the activities of its subordinates. Clearly it wouldbe disastrous for the leadership not to hold itself to the same high standardsthat it rightly must demand of the troops. The partial isolation imposed onintelligence personnel by the secrecy of their profession reinforces theimportance of example.A Reputation for IntegritySecrecy breeds suspicion. To be effective in conducting its relations withthe rest of the government and with the American public, quite as much aswith its own personnel and agents, a U.S. intelligence service is heavilydependent on a reputation for integrity and responsible behavior. Withoutsuch a reputation the chances increase of damaging incidents like the recentacceptance by a New York jury of a defense argument, without foundation infact, that CIA had sponsored the accused in smuggling arms on behalf of Irishterrorists. In a totalitarian system the actions of the intelligence and securityorgans of the state are normally not subject to challenge, and the organsthemselves have the power to compel the cooperation of other governmentcomponents and of the general public. In an open system, by definition allofficial actions are subject to challenge. And specifically in the United States,at least in conditions short of war, the intelligence service needs to be able to6 _cg4.+F1ttiqTrA-rApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183Ethics(b)(3)(n)-*Count on the active goodwill of other components of the government to obtainfrom them the support it requires to carry out its mission.Similarly, the credibility of the information that the intelligence servicedisseminates to its customers and of the judgments it makes on foreign policyissues depends in part on the customers' confidence that the service is self-dis-ciplined and its members honorable: in short, that they tell the truth, withoutfear or favor. Widespread acceptance in our society of a judgment that theservice slanted information or that it endorsed and its personnel habituallyimplemented courses of action repugnant to generally accepted standards ofethical behavior would quickly call into question the integrity of the service'sreporting function. Indeed, the damage could go further. Customers whobelieve that a service is slanting its reporting or analyses?whether to pleasethe customer, to exaggerate the apparent success of the service, or to promote adesired policy?will not trust any aspect of the work of that service. Linkagemay not be universally popular, but it is a fact of life that we disregard .at ourperil.Equally serious, such a judgment would threaten the quality and even thedegree of support that the service could count on from other governmentcomponents. The clandestine aspects of an intelligence service's mission makeit heavily dependent on such support. The need in an emergency for a rapidresponse, slicing through bureaucratic obstacles, and the dependence of mostintelligence personnel under cover on the cooperation of the genuine em-ployees of the cover organization to sustain that cover are two instances of howthe special requirements of a clandestine service call for a service relationshipwith the rest of government that goes far beyond the implementation offormal administrative agreements. The service needs to be able to elicit thewilling assistance of other components and their personnel. It can do so only ifits representatives inspire confidence. They inspire it in part by theirprofessional competence as intelligence officers, but above all by an evidentawareness of the service's obligation to protect the other components' equitiesand by their honesty in reaching, and communicating to those concerned, anassessment of the risks incurred in furnishing the requested support. Onceagain, the service's reputation for honesty, the perceived integrity of itsrepresentatives, is essential to the attainment of its operational goals.My comments on the relationship between a U.S. intelligence service andthe rest of the government apply also in substance to the service's relationshipwith the American public. A general perception that the service is a -rogueelephant,- flourishingAitself and its representatives?by adherence to stand-ards antipathetic to the aims and values generally accepted by Americansociety, could only limit the support that the public would be willing tofurnish. Such a perception, for example, could make it difficult to attractofficer prospects with the personal standards and the academic and profession-al background needed for a successful career in operations. It could also makeit difficult to attract political analysts, scientists, or technical experts of thefirst rank, for too many would be concerned that their professional reputationscould suffer through association. Citizens would be less ready to assist, whetherby volunteering the identities of persons of potential value as employees or_____C.GN-Fterocil)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006191837Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183--Q9++FtErSKITTAT (b)(3)(n)Ethics?vineormants, or by furnishing substantive information of intelligence value.Currently CIA can count on many Americans with contacts abroad to providejust such information, some of it of very great worth.Such a perception could also limit the number of American nongovern-mental organizations willing to furnish cover for intelligence officers. There isno shortage today of commercial enterprises prepared for patriotic reasons to,provide U.S. intelligence with such assistance, but there could be if they everhad reason to question the credibility and professional competence of theintelligence representatives with whom they deal. Finally, unless the votingpublic views it with favor, U.S. intelligence cannot hope for the legislativesupport essential to maintain its capabilities at an adequate level or to providelegal protection against the wrecking activities of American citizens like Ageeand Wolf, who seek to exploit the liberties granted them under the Constitu-tion so as to prevent U.S. intelligence from accomplishing its mission.?The conclusions set down in this article are the fruits of personal reflectiori-on over thirty-two years of experience as an operations officer working onclandestine collection, in line and staff positions, under nonofficial and officialcover, on assignments in the United States and in seven countries overseas, inEurope, Africa, and South Asia. The reader should not interpret what I havewritten as an assertion that American intelligence officers are all, like theChevalier Bayard, sans peur et sans reproche. Rather, he should see it as anattempt to describe an approach to the intelligence profession that works?theonly one, I happen to believe, that can work over the long term in our society:a standard of conduct to be endorsed even though it cannot always beattained.That a concern with ethical issues has a practical impact on every aspectof the conduct of clandestine operations by the government of a country suchas ours says something about the United States, and that something iscreditable. This article will have accomplished its purpose if it leads readersunfamiliar with clandestine operations to look on them with new understand-ing and helps persuade intelligence officers at all levels of the need to giveexplicit recognition to the principles on which our services must base theirconduct if they are to be the effective instruments of a free society.This article is classifiedirTrir(b)(3)(n)8 ____C_CILLF-443etTIATApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000619183(b)(3)(n)