ANGOLA: UNITA'S SITUATION AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: SOVIETS AND CUBANS IN ANGOLA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000498047
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-01213
• Publication Date: April 20, 1978

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
21-Jun-2010
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Angola:' UNITA's Situation and Prospects
20 April 1978
Because of Jonas Savimbi's effective leadership. UNITA
now can field ,a force of about 18,000 trained quarrillas and
5,000 irrequlars (see table); the guerrillas move freely
within and are supported by tribal kinsmen in an area of
southern' Angola conpprisinq roughly one half of the country's
territory., (See'map, Disposition of UNITA Forces in~'Angola.)
Although Cuban and.Angolan troops'still move about in much
ofithe region in, armed convoys, for the most part they have
kept; to the major towns which have.remained under government
control.
.Since last summer, UNITA reportedly' has expanded its
.:operations into parts of northern and eastern Angola and
; along portions of the southwestern coast. UNITA claims to
'have small units operating along the Zairian border,j.in
north central ' Angola; around Nova Gaia; and to control .a
section of the coast north of Lobito. UNITA maintains that
it enjoys the'support of most of the people in thesel'areas
and that','! it has ,won' over many of,the traditional tribal
leaders.. We are unable to verify, such' claims, but they
suggest that Savimbi is making a serious attempt to broaden
the ;base l~ of tribal 4nd popular , support, for his movement.
Although previous large-scale operations have failed
todislodge Savimbi~in the south,'Angolan and Cuban forces
early last month began yet another major offensive against
UNITA forces in 'southeastern Cuando'Cubango Provinces" `The
.offensive probably had four objectives:
 received military supplies and equipment
-SEGRLLT
is
--to encircle and neutralizea
.that was preparing to attack
in the.'region.
--to isolate UNITA headquarters
large UNITA force-'
several major towns
and capture
Savimbi.
--to deprive UNITAof airfields where it has recently
flown infrom Zaire.
--to free''some:southern border areas for use by
guerrillas=operating into northern Namibia.*
SWAPO
Iavvimbi claims this was the most difficult offensive
UNITA had experienced and that Cuban and Angolan forces,
supported by'Cuban-piloted fighter aircraft and helicopters,
almost accomplished ;the first two' objectives. UNITA} apparently
avoided' serious reverses, and it now appears that Cuban and
Angolan forces have, withdrawn to. the larger, towns in.1the
region.
The recent'~offensive probably was the major factor
behind Savimbi'sdeparture for Kinshasa last week. He
apparently hopes to expedite the delivery of already! promised
military assistance,! and possibly to secure new aid commitments.
Since. the Angolan civil war, UNITA'has'depended primarily on
weapons and supplies that were'cached during the fighting
andlequipment';that was subsequently captured from Cuban and
Angolan forces. The expansion this year of UNITA's-area of
operations and the marked increa^e in the number,of trained,
guerrillas operating in the field,. together with critical
food shortages in,manv rural areas, have forced UNITA to
look' increasingly, to, foreign suppliers."
*UNITA s activities in southern Angola have vrevented
SWAPO querrillas,from'operating across !, much of Angola's
southern border with Namibia. In addition, UNITA uji'ts in'
northeastern''Angola have impaired the activities of anti-Mobutu
 SECRET
Savimbi is particularly anxious to acquire anti-aircraft
weapons to counter the growing use of Cuban-piloted heli-
copters and fighter aircraft against his guerrilla forces.
.'Although some guerrilla units in southern Angola recently
'acquired SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, they
are inoperable due to mishandling.
if Savimbi''acquires the anti-aircraft weaponry he is
seeking,, it will still take some t me before his forces can
be trained to use iteffectively.
support.to a guerrilla movement that claims to represent
t e
Angolan people, they would have considerable difficulty
justifying theirlsupport for a secessionist regi-:^ before
government. While they may he willing to provide
because they seeit''as a step toward establishing a secessionist
undermining their morale and possibly creating pressures in
Cuba...to reassess its military commitment.
Savimbi'has often toyed with the idea of capturing and
holding several key towns in southern Angola. His African
supporters have strongly argued against'such action, however,
.reason, UNITA's prime objective is to,inflict as manyi:.
casualties onthe Cuban forces as possible-in the hope of
fighter aircraft,'Cuban pilots will become reluctant:to
engage his forces.
Savimbi knows he cannot defeat the Neto regime militarily
so long as Cuba maintains its strong presence. For this
Savimbi hopes'the anti-aircraft weapons will not only
provide protection for his guerrillas but give them an
important psychological advantage,over'the Cubans. Savimbi
doubts his forces could withstand ,a concerted air andtground.
attack, but hopes that by downing;several helicoptersF'and
 SECRST
the OAU's_longstanding position that all African borders are,
inviolable. '
conventional level would cause similar problems for Savimbi's
a decision to escalate the guerrilla struggle to the
backers. Such a decision would
We foresee a prolonged guerrilla struggle in Angla.
which they probably would be reluctant to make..
require a greater and more visible commitment from them..
in so doing, he would not only-greatly increase his dependence
on foreign supporters, but expose his forces'to the possibility
would also pose major risks, to Savimbi.I In effect, Savimbi
would be attempting'to beat the Cubans at their own game.
An escalation of the fighting to the conventiona'level
of a major battleriela aereat.
so long as his base or operations continues to expand and
the'Luanda government.is beset by growing internal problems.,
Neto has long maintained that reconcilation with UNITA is
possible,,but,that neither Savimbi nor his top military
leaders are acceptable to the Luanda . regime.
troops from Angola,,;,and he is unlikely to favor an accommodation
at some point'be willing to discuss a political reconciliation,
;
neither leader appears ready to accepting the other's
conditions.- Savimbi,wants the withdrawal of all Cuban
As.long as Cuban maintains its substantial military presence
in Angola,..the'conflict will remain basically stalemated.
.Although it is,conceivable that Neto and Savimbimight
titularly if coupled with an enhanced air strike capability,
'could force Savimbi'into an extremely defensive posture.
Even if the Cubans doubled their forces, however, it is
highly unlikely UNITA's guerrilla forces could be effectively
A substantial.increase in Cubantroop.levels, pair
neutralized.
 Military Forces in Angola
Estimated
Force
Major Combatants Acronym
Strength
Leader
Comments
Argolan Armed Forces.
Agostinho Neto
Formed from MPLA (Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola)
cadre.
Cuban forces. @
19,000-20,000
Brig. Gen. Menendez
Mostly reservists.
plus 5,000 civil-
ian advisers
Nationo1 Union for the Total 18,000 plus 5,000
Jonas Savimbi
Operate in southern and eastern
Independence of Angola. recruits
Angola.
National Front for the Liberation
Holden Ro:.erto
Operate in northern Angola.
of Angola.
Front for the Liberation of the FLEC @500
N'Zita
Now strongly fragmented.
Exclave of Cabinda.
Other Liberation Forces in Angola:
South-West Africa People's
SWAPO
2,000-3,000 plus
Sam Nujoma
Fighting for liberation of Namibia;
Organization.
other forces in Zambia and
Namibia.
Notional Front for the Liberation
FNLC
@5,000
Nathaniel Mbumba
Fighting for the overthrow of Zairian
of the Congo.
President Mobutu.
Zimbabwe African. People's Union.
ZAPU
@2,000
Joshua Nkomo
Fighting for the liberation of Rhode-
sia; other forces in Zambia.