NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FOR 27 OCTOBER 1989

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: GERMAN REUNIFICATION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000416288
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-00522
• Publication Date: October 27, 1989

c ait *r=AVq (b)(1)
Analysis. Comments may be directed to Chief,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 October 1989
German Reunification: What Would Have to Happen?
summary
German reunification is, to use Chancellor Kohl's
phrase, "back on the interr?tional agenda." This is not
to say that he thinks reunification is around the corner,
but clearly West German leaders--sensing both
opportunities and dangers as events unfold in Eastern
Europe and the-Soviet Union--are giving more serious
thought to what had been seen as only an academic
possibility a few months ago. This memorandum represents
an effort to leave aside for the moment the world of
probabilities and to think through changes that would
have to occur before reunification could take place. It
also assesses implications for the United States of the
continuing debate.
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*4
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of European
DECL OADR
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APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
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 Discussion
in recent months, chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister
Genscher as well at leading Social Democrats have proclaimed
that reunification is "back on the agenda." Although they
clearly made those statements in part to undercut the
far-right Republican Party, we believe that the tide of events
is moving West German leaders to reconsider whether
reunification must remain a back-burner issue. The main
stimuli to rethinking the inner-German relationship have been
the exodus of refugees from East Germany, which demonstrated
anew the failure of that regime to win popular support, and
the possibility of change implied by East German leader
Honecker's ill health and possible departure from the scene.
The impact of these developments has been heightened because
they are occurring against a backdrop of growing Soviet
tolerance of diversity in Eastern Europe, growing influence of
non-Communist political forces in the region, arms control
progress, and the ebbing of the East-West conflict. West
Germans have long thought re- ification might be possible in
the long run--in that context, the fact that 88 percent of
West Germans favored it[ I comes as no
surprise--but the phrase has lost the character of an empty
incantation and--as one West German official noted
recently=become something that people really expect to
happen.
We believe Bonn will try to exploit these trends to forge
closer inner-German relations, and because some officials will
want Washington's help, this will place the United States in a
delicate situation. An active US push for reunification would
disconcert the West Germans because they would worry about
adverse reactions from their other Western Allies. Perhaps
more important, they would be concerned about provoking
hostility in Moscow and East Berlin--which they still see as
posing the largest obstacles to reunification. On the other
hand, West German perceptions that Washington was only paying
lipservice to the issue-
Bonn's Western partners.
H-would stir resentment against
In our view, German reunification depends on formidable
conditions--East German liberalization, Moscow's acquiescence,
Western acceptance, and West German willingness to accept the
at least initially reduced living standards and the left-of-
center, Protestant flavor that the former GDR would impart to
'This paper refers to "reunification"--even though some
believe that the eventual solution to the German problem would
be a loose federation or other arrangement--because those
debating the issue in West Germany often use the term and it
is the stated goal of West German leaders and parties.
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 a newly reunited country. The following is an analysis of
Bonn's perceptions on each of these issues.
East German Liberalization
The Federal Republic's constitution calls for the unity
and freedom of all Germans in free self-determination and, in
our view, reunification would be impossible without
substantial democratization in the GDR. West German leaders
believe East Berlin will have an increasingly difficult time
holding back pressure for change. The recent mass exodus from
the GDR demonstrates that--28 years after construction of the
Berlin Wall--the East German regime still has not bridged the
gulf separating it from its citizens. Liberalization in the
Soviet Union and Hungary and formation of a non-Communist-led
government in Poland are highlighting the intransigence of the
governing elite in East Germany and are compounding popular
frustration there. Open discontent is spilling out of its
protected sanctuary in the Evangelical Church into
unprecedented, if still small street demonstrations. These
developments are unfolding, moreover, at a time when
Honecker's longevity is in serious doubt and as his
colleagues' grappling with the succession issue raises
questions about the regime's future direction.
Although West German leaders do not expect dramatic moves
toward reform in East Germany in the near term, their
perception that something has to give eventually in East
Berlin is a key factor in Bonn's renewing hopes for
reunification. Leaders in Bonn would not be surprised to see
a crackdown as East Berlin's aging leadership struggles to
reassert its authority, but they believe that over the longer
term East Germany will have to liberalize in order to
revitalize its slowing economy and to combat the alienation of
the public. As many West German politicians and journalists
have noted recently, even the GDR leadership seems to
recognize that each step East Germany takes down the road to
reform will diminish down the rationale for its existence--its
"socialist" identity--and will make it harder to argue against
reunification. Indeed, there is a possibility that the
leadership itself may begin to experience the loss of faith in
communism already experienced by ruling elites elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, and this could greatly stimulate the desire
for closer links in both Germany.
Soviet Acquiescence
Although the Soviets have publicly and privately opposed
the idea of reunification recently (see box), we believe
events in Eastern Europe are leading West German officials to
wonder what effect Gorbachev's encouragement of reform will
have on East Germany--and with what implications for the
inner-German relationship.
the USSR was
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 no longer wedded to the concept of the GDR as a defense
bulwark, and that relations with West Germany are more
important to the Soviets because of that country's potential
as an economic partner.
Although there is no evidence to indicate a radical shift
in Soviet views, Foreign Minister Genscher, in particular,
appears to believe that his own efforts are influencing
Moscow's policy by reassuring Gorbachev that an evolution in
Eastern Europe is possible without threatening Soviet
security. He doubtless hopes that his urgings to "help
Gorbachev," his vision of Europe (which is sometimes
reminiscent of Gorbachev's "Common European Home"), and his
resistance to NATO programs that might "raise
tensions"--such as nuclear modernization--are playing a
constructive role. Certainly West German leaders are aware
that Gorbachev wants to ease the East-West conflict so as to
reduce the burden of defense expenditures, to facilitate
access to Western capital and technology, and ultimately, to
enhance Soviet security by per--uading NATO to reduce its
military strength. We doubt that anyone in Bonn is redrawing
the map of Germany based on these trends, but there is a
perception now that this is an era where even the implausible
can happen and it is best to think ahead. Statements by
politicians, editorials in the press, and academic writing all
indicate that such thinking is occurring. And if the
centrifugal forces in the once monolithic Soviet bloc continue
to gain momentum, we believe West Germans will think even more
actively about ways to bring the two Germanys closer together.
 Soviet views
Despite scattered hints--dropped by Moscow to influence
West Germany--that Soviet thinking on infra-German relations
is evolving, we believe Moscow remains fundamentally opposed
to German reunification. Official Soviet spokesmen have
consistently denied that changes are being contemplated to the
Berlin Quadrapartite Agreement or to the status of German
borders, and a Soviet official in Berlin last month told US
diplomats that Moscow "would not welcome" any discussion on
The Soviets still see a united Germany as a threat to
European stability and expect to keep a substantial military
contingent in East Germany even under a CFE agreement. The
memories of Nazi devastation in World War II remain potent
within the USSR, and the Soviets share the concerns of their
Pact allies that a unified Germany might renew territorial
disputes resolved in post World War II agreements and could
become a political and economic threat to the USSR and Eastern
Europe. We believe that Moscow continues to place a high
value on its relationship with East Germany, which is its
largest trading partner and a key military ally, and is
worried that raising the reunification question would
exacerbate anti-regime sentiments in the GDR.
Nevertheless--particularly when the crisis over East German
refugees subsides--Moscow will continue to hint that some
change in the status of the two Germanys is possible in order
to cultivate West German support on trade and arms control
We believe that even the Soviets' most visionary
spokesmen do not consider German reunification a near-term
possibility. Over the'long term, however, Moscow might
consider reunification acceptable if preceded by major changes
in Europe, such as the replacement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
with a new security order and the achievement of a neutral,
largely disarmed West Germany.
 Western Acceptance
West German leaders probably see several Western
impediments to reunification. Bonn realizes that other West
European capitals worry about the political and economic
strength of a united Germany, and it considers Washington, at
best, only a lukewarm supporter of reunification. Bonn also
recognizes that the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom retain a say on the issue as a result of post-World
War II agreements and the Allies' control of West Berlin.
Even more important, West Germans are aware that their
security and prosperity in the postwar era have depended on
their Western ties. Political leaders share the commitment of
the voters to maintaining the country's well-being, and they
realize that the Federal Republic's participation in the
West's economic abundance has been a key factor in its ability
to continue to exert a magnetic attraction on East Germany.
These considerations suggest that West Germany would not
readily exchange its Western economic ties for reunification.
We doubt, however, that such a choice would be necessary.
Bonn entered the Alliance in exchange for assurances that NATO
would support the goal of eventual peaceful reunification, and
it would be very difficult for any West European government to
cling to the post-war arrangements and actively oppose
reunification without appearing to violate its own commitment
to the principle of self-determination. In our view, Western
capitals would probably see Bonn as too important to risk
offending over the issue, and Western leaders would support
reunification as the best way of maximizing a reunited
Germany's ties with the West.
West German Support for Reunification
We believe that few West Germans have thought deeply yet
about the internal character of a united Germany or about its
relationship to either the West or the East. West Germany is
currently nearly evenly divided between Protestants and
Catholics and between the left and the right. A united
Germany incorporating the GDR, however, would havl a decidedly
Protestant and probably social democratic flavor. The GDR
would also bring with it a relatively backward economy and 17
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 million new citizens accustomed to elaborate social welfare
programs. Absorption of the GDR would be a wrenching
experience, even though the West Germans view the East Germans
far more fraternally than they do the several hundred thousand
other ethnic Germans who have poured into the Federal Republic
in recent years. Social tensions and pocketbook issues could
lead some West Germans--especially in the Catholic,
conservative, and westward-looking Rhineland--to oppose
reunification. The ideal of a united Germany, however, is so
strong and pervasive--extending from the great bulk of the
Social Democrats to the radical right--that we doubt these
obstacles would dissuade political leaders from pursuing
reunification if other obstacles appeared to be fading away.
Security concerns and ties to the West would give greater
cause for hesitation. If East-West tension eased, however,
and the lights were green in Moscow and East Berlin, we doubt
that concern over West Germany's security position would deter
Bonn from pursuing reunific-pion. West German leaders would
be most concerned with maintaining Bonn's EC relations as a
guarantee of a united Germany's prosperity and a repository of
shared Western values. If the threat from the East continued
to fade and progress toward reunification had proceeded apace,
even conservatives would probably be willing to attenuate
Germany's security ties with the West.
Implications for the United States
We believe that as long as the East-West warming
trend--and particularly the trend toward more Western-style
government in Eastern Europe--continues, it will fuel West
German aspirations toward reunification and induce Bonn to
look actively for ways to promote and shape this outcome.
Indeed, a major reformist breakthrough in the GDR probably
would convince West German leaders that rapid progress in
bringing the two Germanys closer together was possible. In
the absence of such a breakthrough, however, Bonn will have
difficulty identifying feasible policies that could promote
reunification. West Germans are likely to conclude, for
example, that trying to compel reform in East Germany by
threatening to cut off economic assistance would only cause
the regime in East Berlin to dig in its heels and would
threaten the travel and immigration accords that are highly
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 valued in West Germany. Moreover, Bonn is aware of continuing
Soviet opposition to the reunification debate, and fears
Moscow's ability to slam the rapprochement into reverse. On
the other hand, West German leaders probably are already
offering increased aid to East Germany in return for steps
toward liberalization, hoping that the GDR leadership will
loosen_up sufficiently to see the attractiveness of such an
Partly because of its interest in ever-closer relations
with East Germany, Bonn will remain disinclined to perceive
risks in East-West detente, and will push especially hard for
conciliatory Western arms control and trade policies. West
German leaders are not likely to seek significant reductions
in US forces and influence in Europe any time soon--they would
see that as squandering potential bargaining chips with
Moscow. But West Germany will have more of an interest than
any other Western country in seeing that those chips are
increasingly expended in return for corresponding reductions
in Soviet military strength a'-d political influence in Eastern
Europe.
West Germany's rapidly expanding political dialogue with
the East is likely to spill over increasingly into security
issues--a process already advanced to some extent by her
onn will also seek to preserve its privileged
economic relationship with the GDR as the EC strives tc
realize its goal of a fully integrated market by 1992. Its
likely success in that effort will help it contain criticism
by far-right critics that EC membership is incompatible with
During this short to medium term, the West Germans will
encourage the United States and other Western countries to
become more involved in Eastern Europe, partly because many of
them believe that Eastern Europe as a whole will have to
change before reunification can occur. West Germany's
position as the leading Western country in that region is
already so pronounced that Bonn has little fear of would-be
competitors for commercial advantage or political influence.
Indeed, it looks to other Western countries to camouflage its
at times embarrassingly high profile there so it can make
additional inroads. More fundamentally, West Germans
recognize that they cannot achieve detente on their own and
that they need to work with other Western countries to bridge
the East-West divide and prepare the way for reunification.
Under the terms of a protocol to the Treaty of Rome that
established the EC, a wide variety of East German products are
allowed duty free access to West Germany.
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 During this period the West Germans will almost certainly
continue to play their diplomatic cards close to their chest.
Although they will seek continued US and other western support
for the principle of reunification, they will be aware that a
perception of aggressiveness on the issue could spook the East
Germans and the Soviets as well as unsettle their western
partners. West Germans are likely to be increasingly
sensitive to possible signs that their allies have doubts
about reunification and Bonn's commitment to the West. At the
same time, because of their concern about sensitivities in the
East, they would not welcome efforts by Washington to take the
lead in promoting reunification, and some might even suspect
an attempt to derail reunification and reinforce Bonn's
Western ties by provoking a hardline response from East Berlin
If prospects for reunification move ahead over the next
several years, relations among Washington's West European
allies could begin'to shift. As West Germany became more
concerned with maximizing the opportunites for achieving
reunification, its attention would be diverted from West
European unity and some of the considerable impetus that the
Federal Republic has contributed to that movement would be at
least temporarily
lost.
Over the longer term, the reunification issue could bring
US and West German interests into sharper conflict. The
division of Germany lies at the heart of the bipolar postwar
order, and that order has been a key ingredient in maintaining
US influence in Western Europe. If the East-West divide
continues to ease and West Germany moves closer to
reunification, the US security role on the continent will
become steadily less significant. Indeed, at some point in
the process, the West Germans may begin to see the Alliance in
its present form as an anachronism and as an impediment to
their pan-European aspirations.
At the same time, a
Germany sufficiently unified to act as a unit in international
affairs might seriously alter postwar power balances.
Although a growing "European vocation" might act as a check on
German pursuit of national interests, it is possible to
envision other scenarios with such a strong power located in
Central Europe. For example, East European countries might
come to resent growing German influence, and competition for
influence in that area might grow between Germany and the
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